Reforming democracy : institutional engineering in Western Europe, 1990-2010 by BEDOCK, Camille
  
Reforming Democracy: 
Institutional Engineering in Western Europe, 1990-
2010 
Camille Bedock  
 
Thesis submitted for assessment with a view to 
obtaining the degree of Doctor of Political and Social Sciences 
of the European University Institute 
Florence, April, 2014 (defence) 
 
 European University Institute 
Department of Political and Social Sciences 
Reforming Democracy: 
Institutional Engineering in Western Europe, 1990-2010 
Camille Bedock 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thesis submitted for assessment with a view to 
obtaining the degree of Doctor of Political and Social Sciences 
of the European University Institute 
Examining Board 
Prof. Sven Steinmo, European University Institute (Supervisor), for Prof. Peter 
Mair (†), EUI 
Prof. Nicolas Sauger, Sciences Po Paris (External Co-supervisor) 
Prof. Stefano Bartolini, European University Institute 
Prof. Jean-Benoit Pilet, Université Libre de Bruxelles 
  
© Bedock, 2014 
No part of this thesis may be copied, reproduced or transmitted without prior 
permission of the author 

 
 
 
« On ne se lasse pas de changer les institutions, ne pouvant changer les hommes. » 
Réflexions et maximes – 1911 
Lucien Arréat 
 
“Everybody knows that the dice are loaded  
Everybody rolls with their fingers crossed”  
Everybody Knows, in I’m Your Man, 1988 
Leonard Cohen 
  

 
 
Thesis Abstract  
 
The modification of the formal rules regulating the functioning of democracy has 
become, over the years, an increasingly important field of research in political science. This topic 
has become ever more significant in recent years as Western European democracies face strong 
challenges to their legitimacy, in a context of decline of political support. This thesis focuses on 
reforms of the core democratic rules in Western European democracies during the two last 
decades, adopting an expansive focus in order to adopt a multidimensional and longitudinal 
approach to institutional engineering in consolidated democracies. It investigates the occurrence 
of reform, successively examining the description and the characterisation of reforms, their 
contextual determinants and the mechanisms of change, articulating mixed-methods including 
large-N statistical analyses and case studies. The starting point of this thesis is that, as institutions 
come together to form a coherent multidimensional system, they should also be studied as such. I 
introduce the concept of bundles of reforms, defined as institutional reforms which are linked to 
each other and relate to several dimensions of the institutional architecture. They can be 
understood empirically as either package deals linking together reforms during a single 
negotiation or as sequences of reforms resulting from each other in a snowball effect.  
  The first part of the thesis focuses on the description and the determinants of reforms, 
taking advantage of a database which enables the quantitative analysis of six dimensions of reform 
in 18 Western European democracies (SIEPOL database “Institutional Change in Advanced 
European Democracies”). It demonstrates that institutional reforms in the last few decades have 
been frequent (8.2 on average between 1990 and 2010), have happened in bundles 75% of the time, 
and have been moving towards more inclusive institutions in two-thirds of the cases. The empirical 
evidence also confirms the predominance of reforms of representative democracy compared with 
other alternative forms of democracy, and demonstrates that changing the formal institutional rules 
is the prerogative neither of democratising countries, nor of peculiar outliers.  
When studying the long- and short-term determinants of the number of reforms, certain 
long-term factors foster a favourable structural environment for the occurrence of institutional 
reforms, in particular a lack of political support from citizens for their institutions, but also the 
disproportional electoral systems in majoritarian democracies. In the short-term, institutional 
reforms in a given legislature tend to be more numerous after political alternation, and in contexts 
of rising electoral uncertainty. The thesis also evidences the fact that neither constitutional rigidity 
nor the number of partisan veto players can be considered to be the main explanation, or even 
relevant at all in some cases, in relation to the number of reforms adopted, going against traditional 
explanations of institutional stability and change.  
  The second part of the thesis focuses on understanding why, in favourable contexts, some 
reforms succeed and others fail, investigating case studies of three reform processes involving 
bundles of reforms, in France, Ireland and Italy. These bundles of reforms have emerged as the 
result of endogenous and exogenous factors, including economic and political crisis translated to 
the electoral arena (Ireland), political and institutional instability and alternation (Italy) and a 
favourable institutional context of cohabitation after political alternation (France). The main finding 
of the second part is the evidence that the final outcomes of reforms are dependent on the 
combination of the nature of the reforms at stake (divisive or consensual) and the process used to 
adopt them (majoritarian, supermajoritarian or externalised). Divisive reforms tend to obey a self-
interested logic, and their success is mainly dependent on the ability of the parliamentary majority to 
build an agreement in relation to a package deal of reforms, or to pass the reform alone. During the 
processes of consensual reform, the behaviour of political actors is moulded by their perceived 
ability to claim credit for popular reforms. When the majority chooses to exclude opposition parties 
and interest groups from the elaboration of reforms in order to claim sole credit, the fate of such 
reforms depends on the attitude of the opposition, who may choose to oppose the reform in order 
to symbolically defeat the government.   
 
 
  
 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
This thesis has brought me to the banks of the Seine, of the Tevere, of the Arno and of the 
Liffey for over four years and a half of academic and personal wanderings in two different 
universities and many more countries. During this time, I have certainly considerably broadened 
my horizons thanks to the many great people I have come across during these past years. 
Finally getting to the acknowledgements (the best part of writing a thesis; really), my first 
thoughts go to Peter Mair, without whom I would not have had the opportunity to do my PhD 
in the European University Institute, and without whom I would probably not have decided to 
work about Ireland. I can only hope the final manuscript would have him say ‘Maith an cailín!’  
I am deeply grateful to my supervisor, Sven Steinmo, who has been a great support over the past 
two years and a half. He had to take over the supervision of this thesis, and has made the 
transition as swift as it could have been in these difficult circumstances. He has allowed me the 
opportunity to develop my own arguments and ideas while always keeping an eye on the big 
picture, and pushing me tirelessly to define what I wanted to demonstrate. His benevolence and 
his kindness have been hugely helpful in the occasional moments of despondency in the last few 
months in particular.  
I am not sure how to express my thanks to my co-supervisor, Nicolas Sauger, to allow him to 
understand how essential his help has been since I came to know him in 2008 during my research 
Masters in Sciences Po. He has guided me though every single step of my academic journey, 
teaching me what a research question is, correcting my dubious statistical analyses, reading 
dozens of unfinished versions of my PhD projects, articles and chapters, advising me on where 
to apply, where to publish, where to attend a conference. He has always taken the time to talk 
with me about my thesis, academia, and, all too often, listened to my doubts or rants with infinite 
patience, availability, and hindsight. For having been such a relentless mentor, I am evermore 
grateful.   
Florence Haegel, who has supervised this thesis when I first started it in 2009 in Sciences Po, as 
well as Nonna Mayer and Vincent Tiberj who have hired me as a research assistant at a time I did 
not benefit from a scholarship should also be very warmly thanked. They have given me the 
helping hand I needed to get the process started. I also sincerely thank Emiliano Grossman for 
having given me the opportunity to teach my first course.  
Achieving this thesis would not have been possible without the financial support of the EUI and 
the MESR. Academically, my work has greatly benefited from the comments and suggestions I 
have received in the various seminars and workshops I have been involved in over the years at 
the EUI, and as a visiting student at the UCD in Dublin and in the Centre d’Etudes Européennes 
of Sciences Po. I am grateful to the organisers of these seminars, as well as all the participants of 
the conferences I have had the opportunity to attend. Damien Bol, David Farrell, Mark Franklin, 
Kristof Jacobs, Jean-Benoit Pilet, and all of Peter Mair’s supervisees should be thanked in 
particular. So should be the great administrative staff of the EUI, in particular Gabriella Unger 
 
 
and Martina Selmi, as well as the energetic secretaries of the CEE, for their practical support over 
the years.  
I should express my gratitude to the people who have agreed to meet me for interviews in 
France, in Ireland and in Italy, despite their busy schedules. Conducting these interviews has 
been, by far, the most rewarding and enjoyable part of the empirical work of this thesis.  
I have many friends to whom I want to express thanks for their extra-academic contribution to 
this thesis. I thank Nuria for having introduced me to the mysteries of Luxembourg and linguistic 
politics. Quentin, Pauline, Simon, Hélène, Francesca, Sara, Florent, Charlotte D., Antoine J., 
Marine, Manon, Tom, Léa, Thomas, and the other friends of the CEE have been great working 
and partying companions. I also thank my EUI friends for having become an irreplaceable part 
of my life: Marion the rugby amateur, Elisa the master of bittersweet humour, Stephanie, the 
silent Glaswegian French-speaker, Tomek, Sarah, Jan, Maria, Maja, Bogna, Trajche, Kristian, and 
many others. I am grateful to my flatmates, who became great friends over the years and have 
managed the difficult task of handling a Phd student on a daily basis: Laure B., Charlotte H., 
Yann and Clémence. Lastly, I thank the Peuple debout. Armel, Franck, Laure, Mathieu, Nelly, 
Olivia, Sandy have been around for ten years of trips, parties, (very) improbable discussions and 
musical misconducts. They have never known exactly what I work on, and that is certainly for the 
best.  
Finally, all my thoughts go to my family, with a special acknowledgement to those who have gone 
before this thesis was achieved. They were there, always, in the happy times of this PhD as in the 
dark ones. I dedicate this thesis to my parents, as the derisory expression of my gratefulness for 
having unconditionally supported and encouraged me over the years.  
 
ix 
 
Table of contents 
 
Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 1 
PART I – REFORMS OF THE CORE DEMOCRATIC RULES AND THEIR CONTEXTUAL 
DETERMINANTS ..................................................................................................................... 7 
Chapter 1: Introducing the bundle of reforms: a theoretical and empirical tool to analyse 
multidimensional institutional change ................................................................................. 9 
1. Identifying the core democratic institutions ............................................................ 10 
1.1. The distinction between majoritarian and consensus democracy ..................................................... 10 
1.2. Defining the reforms of the core democratic rules ........................................................................... 14 
2. The bundle of reforms: a conceptual and empirical instrument to analyse 
multidimensional institutional change ........................................................................... 22 
2.1. Two ways to conceptualise bundles of reforms: as sequences and as package deals .......................... 23 
2.2. Operationalising bundles of reforms through a mixed-method strategy ........................................... 27 
Chapter 2 To reform or not to reform? The determinants and processes of institutional 
change in established democracies .................................................................................... 31 
1. Explaining the determinants and processes of institutional change ...................... 32 
1.1. Triggers of reform: exogenous factors, endogenous factors, and their interaction .............................. 33 
1.2. The processes of institutional change: paths and barriers of reform ................................................ 40 
2. The three illusions of the literature on institutional reforms ................................... 45 
2.1. The illusion of rarity: are institutional reforms so unusual? .......................................................... 45 
2.2. The illusion of parsimony: are institutional reforms zero-sum games? ............................................ 48 
3. Challenges to legitimacy in Western Europe and institutional change .................. 53 
3.1 1990s-2000s: an uncertain context for Western European political elites spurring institutional 
change  .................................................................................................................................................. 54 
3.2. Three sets of general propositions about institutional reforms in Western European democracies .... 60 
Chapter 3 The changes to core democratic rules in Western Europe, 1990-2010: an 
overview ............................................................................................................................... 65 
1. Analysing multiple dimensions of institutional change: the theoretical and 
empirical challenges of the SIEPOL database ............................................................... 66 
1.1. Frequent, bundled, and inclusive: three hypotheses about reforms of the core democratic rules in 
Western Europe ...................................................................................................................................... 66 
1.2. The SIEPOL project: a multidimensional database about reforms of the core democratic rules in 
Western Europe ...................................................................................................................................... 70 
1.3. A qualitative description of the database’s main trends: representative and participative reforms .... 75 
x 
 
2. Contrasts and common trends in the reforms of the core democratic rules in 
Western Europe ............................................................................................................... 80 
2.1. Extent and scope of reforms ........................................................................................................ 80 
2.2. Direction and format of reforms .................................................................................................. 83 
2.3. From common trends to country-specific differences in the propensity to reform ............................... 89 
Chapter 4 Disentangling the long- and short-term determinants of the reforms of core 
democratic rules: a model for Western Europe, 1990-2010 ................................................. 95 
1. Challenges to legitimacy, institutional characteristics, electoral change, and 
reforms of core democratic rules ..................................................................................... 96 
1.1. Change in the long run: the link between institutional characteristics, levels of political support, and 
reforms  .................................................................................................................................................. 97 
1.2. Moments of change: favourable short-term conditions for reforms of core democratic rules ............. 102 
2. Hypotheses, models, empirical results: disentangling long-term and short-term 
factors of reform ............................................................................................................ 105 
2.1. Hypotheses, variables, and model specifications .......................................................................... 106 
2.2. Patterns of reforms of the core democratic rules in the long term: the centrality of political support?     
  ................................................................................................................................................ 115 
2.3. Short-term determinants of reforms: the centrality of shifts in the electoral arena .......................... 122 
PART II – THE MECHANISMS OF REFORMS OF THE CORE DEMOCRATIC RULES .................. 129 
Chapter 5 The mechanisms of institutional reforms in action: understanding the politics 
of bundles of reforms ......................................................................................................... 131 
1. Theory and justification of the cases ......................................................................... 132 
1.1. Some mechanisms behind reform and non-reform ....................................................................... 133 
1.2. The justification of the cases ...................................................................................................... 137 
2. Predicting the outcome of reforms ........................................................................ 144 
2.1. Two types of reforms, three types of processes .............................................................................. 144 
2.2. Why do some reforms succeed and others fail? ............................................................................ 150 
Chapter 6 You win some, you lose some: the various fortunes of institutional reforms in 
Ireland since 2011 ............................................................................................................... 161 
1. Child of the crisis: the origins of the debate on “political reform” in Ireland .......... 162 
1.1. The progressive emergence of a narrative on the failure of the Irish political system ....................... 162 
1.2. “The system is broken”: civil society mobilisation and its consequences in the 2011 election ......... 172 
2. The different paths of Irish institutional reforms .................................................. 176 
2.1. From the compromises of the Programme for Government to a scattered bundle ........................... 177 
2.2. The different outcomes of a scattered bundle of reforms: adoption, non-adoption, and kicking to touch 
  ................................................................................................................................................ 181 
xi 
 
Chapter 7 An unexpected journey: the quinquennat and the reordering of the electoral 
calendar in France, 2000-2001 ........................................................................................... 199 
1. The contrasting emergence and formulation of a consensual vs. a divisive reform    
  ................................................................................................................................ 200 
1.1. The quinquennat: from a recurring debate to a fight over the initiative of the reform .................... 201 
1.2. The reordering of the electoral calendar in the shadow of 2002 ................................................... 210 
1.3. Analysis of the press coverage of the two reforms ........................................................................ 218 
2. Two reforms of different natures leading to highly distinct processes of adoption    
  ................................................................................................................................ 223 
2.1. Institutional competition over a consensual reform: the supermajoritarian logic in action .............. 224 
2.2. Self-interest guiding a divisive reform: the adoption of the reordering of the electoral calendar ........ 232 
Chapter 8 Bundling the bundles: coalition dynamics and institutional reforms in Italy, 
2003-2006 ........................................................................................................................... 239 
1. From separate discussions to the convergence of the institutional debate in 2003     
  ................................................................................................................................ 241 
1.1. The institutional debates of the “Second Republic” before 2001 ................................................. 241 
1.2. The convergence of the debates on federalism and form of government in 2003 ............................. 249 
1.3. The initial deal of Lorenzago di Cadore: overcoming the tensions in the coalition ........................ 254 
2. The expansion of the bundle and the different destinies of the constitutional and 
electoral reform .............................................................................................................. 260 
2.1. The discussion of the constitutional reform in the parliament: between coalition and self-survival logics 
  ................................................................................................................................................ 260 
2.2. The upsurge of the electoral reform: closing the final deal ............................................................ 267 
2.3. The reasons behind the failed referendum: the consequences of the majoritarian logic of adoption... 274 
Conclusion of the second part ....................................................................................... 283 
General conclusion ........................................................................................................... 293 
Bibliography ...................................................................................................................... 301 
Appendix ........................................................................................................................... 317 
 
 
  
xii 
 
  
xiii 
 
Figures and tables  
  
Figure 1. Evolution of the theoretical debate about institutions and institutional change ................................... 34 
Figure 2. Relationship between erosion of political support and incentives for institutional reforms .................... 57 
Figure 3. Number of institutional reforms adopted between 1990 and 2010 for each of the six categories ......... 81 
Figure 4. Number of reforms of the core democratic rules adopted between 1990 and 2010 for each country ..... 82 
Figure 5. Number of reforms adopted for each legislature and country in Western Europe, 1990-2010 ........... 91 
Figure 6. Total number of reforms of the core democratic rules on least squares index in 18 European 
democracies, 1990-2010 ............................................................................................................................... 116 
Figure 7. Total number of reforms of the core democratic rules on partisan veto players in 18 European 
democracies, 1990-2010 ............................................................................................................................... 116 
Figure 8. Total number of reforms of the core democratic rules on political support in 18 European democracies, 
1990-2010 .................................................................................................................................................. 117 
Figure 9. Predicted number of reforms according to the evolution of total volatility (model 7) ........................... 124 
Figure 10. The three actors of institutional reforms ....................................................................................... 148 
Figure 11. Share of the votes of the three main Irish parties, 1944-2011, in % ............................................ 164 
Figure 12. Identity of the party or coalition in power in Ireland, 1950-2012 ................................................ 164 
Figure 13. Coverage of the reforms of the quinquennat and of the electoral calendar by newspaper, July 1999-June 
2001 ............................................................................................................................................................ 219 
Figure 14. Coverage of the reforms by theme, July 1999-June 2001 .............................................................. 220 
Figure 15. Arguments presented among the articles containing argument for or against the reforms of the five-year 
term and electoral calendar, July 1999-June 2001, in % ................................................................................ 222 
Figure 16. Poll predictions for “yes” vote and turnout for the referendum on the quinquennat, June-September 
2000 ............................................................................................................................................................ 229 
Figure 17. Initial positions in summer 2003 of the four parties of the majority on the four main institutional 
themes ........................................................................................................................................................... 255 
Figure 18. “No” vote in the referendum of 2006 by region, Italy .................................................................. 278 
Table 1. Direction of the reforms of the core democratic rules by dimension in Western Europe, 1990-2010 (in 
%) .................................................................................................................................................................. 84 
Table 2. Number of institutional reforms adopted by legislature in 18 Western European democracies, 1990-
2010 .............................................................................................................................................................. 85 
Table 3. Proportion of bundled reforms adopted by dimension in Western Europe, 1990-2010 (in %) ............ 85 
Table 4. Combinations of reforms encountered on the six dimensions in Western Europe, 1990-2010 ............. 86 
Table 5. Direction of the reforms of the core democratic rules by country in Western Europe, 1990-2010 (in %)
 ....................................................................................................................................................................... 87 
Table 6. Proportion of bundled reforms adopted by country in Western Europe, 1990-2010 (in %) ................ 88 
Table 7. Values of the dependent and independent variables for the macro-analysis of the determinants of the 
reforms of core democratic rules, 1990-2010 .................................................................................................. 111 
Table 8. Determinants of the number of reforms of the core democratic rules in Western Europe, 1990-2010 119 
Table 9. Determinants of the number of institutional reforms adopted by legislature in Western Europe, 1990-
2010 ............................................................................................................................................................ 123 
Table 10. Evolution of volatility and political alternation by number of reforms adopted by legislature ............ 126 
Table 11. Comparison of the main contextual characteristics of the three legislatures investigated .................... 138 
Table 12. Comparison of the three bundles of reform investigated ................................................................... 142 
xiv 
 
Table 13. Main macroeconomic indicators for Ireland, 2007-2010 ............................................................... 170 
Table 14. Trust in political institutions in Ireland in %, 2007-2011 ........................................................... 174 
Table 15. Construction of the bundle of reforms in Ireland since 2011 .......................................................... 180 
Table 16. Articles containing tactical considerations about the quinquennat and/or the electoral calendar ...... 221 
Table 17. Summary of the processes of emergence and adoption of the reforms of the quinquennat and the 
reordering of the electoral calendar .................................................................................................................. 237 
Table 18. Main modifications enacted from the first to the final version of the constitutional reform ................ 261 
Table 19. Main steps in the emergence of the electoral reform in the Chamber of deputies ............................... 269 
Table 20. Prioritisation of the objectives on the electoral law by the parties present in the Italian Parliament, 
2005 ............................................................................................................................................................ 272 
Table 21. Comparison of the results of the 2001 and 2006 confirmative referendums .................................... 280 
Table 22. Expected outcomes for different combinations of types of reform and types of process ........................ 284 
  
1 
Introduction 
Introduction 
 
 Based on where a painter places her easel, the same landscape will be represented 
differently. Some objects will appear distant and blurred, others more closeby and colourful. The 
sun will light up the sky in a particular and unique way at any given time, so that the very same 
object may seem different on another day or from another perspective. For an impressionist 
painter, reality would be represented as a series of broken brush strokes, whereas a Renaissance 
Florentine painter would emphasise lines and devote time to the geometric construction of the 
painting. This can be applied as a metaphor for change and stability: according to a researcher’s 
chosen perspective, she may place greater emphasis on elements that vary, or on those that 
remain the same, she may pay greater attention to particular details, or focus more on general 
impressions, so that what she sees as reality is, in fact, only a particular perspective. To 
understand how conceptions of reality become crystallised within particular research 
perspectives, it is useful to draw a parallel between party system change and institutional change 
before presenting the topic of this thesis: institutional engineering in Western Europe during the 
last two decades.  
Mair is keen to deconstruct the common assumptions about change and stability in the 
field of party systems, and has shown that parties and party systems in Western Europe are very 
stable, despite the fact that they have faced great challenges. Whereas most authors have 
emphasised the changes within Western European party systems, Mair has shown that the cores 
of most of these party systems have remained untouched. This stability has been made possible 
by the fact that parties and party systems generate their own momentum through their capacities 
to limit choice and change, through constant adaptation and control strategies (Mair 1987, 1997). 
In a changing environment, a great deal has to change in order for things to remain the same. 
Therefore, shifting the usual focus away from the changes in party systems has enabled us to 
illuminate the high degree of stability of their cores. In the same vein, authors who have looked 
into institutional reform in established democracies have overwhelmingly emphasised the stable 
elements, using a perspective from which change, in order to be detected in the picture, must be 
massive and disruptive. Other authors adopt a more impressionistic approach, observing changes 
in electoral systems, for example, but are less inclined to focus on the ways in which these 
changes interact within a wider institutional system. Authors who are interested in institutional 
reforms in established democracies mainly show evidence that, apart from in exceptional cases 
and circumstances, the institutional systems of Western Europe are very stable. This focus on 
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stability has resulted in the absence of documentation on cross-national, longitudinal and 
multidimensional institutional reforms in Western European democracies. So far, we have made 
assumptions regarding the degree of stability, rather than actually measuring it. One of the central 
claims of this thesis is that, just like the stability of the core of the party systems, the stability of 
the core democratic institutions in Western European democracies could hinder the ability to 
make necessary institutional adaptations in an ever-changing environment. This is all the more 
relevant in relation to the context in which political parties have competed over the last two 
decades: policy constraints have never been so high, the capacity to respond to citizens’ demands 
has never been so low and, as a result, Western European political elites face an unprecedented 
“erosion of political support” (Dalton 2004). If, in a changing environment, a lot must change in 
order for things to remain the same, then one might expect that in a context of democratic 
challenges, institutions will change. To refer once more to the theoretical debate on party system 
change, party systems may have been stable because political elites have been able to alter their 
environment, and in particular their institutional environment.   
 This thesis aims to provide a different perspective on institutional engineering in Western 
European democracies over the last two decades. By developing a new analytical tool to account 
for the multidimensional and systemic nature of institutional change (bundles of reforms), I aim 
to put into perspective, and to revise, the common understanding of institutional change up until 
now. I focus on reforms of the formal rules regulating the functioning of democracy, which I call 
the core democratic rules. These rules are essential in shaping the environment in which parties 
compete and cooperate, but also in defining and redefining what is meant by representation in a 
modern democracy. They are not written in stone. They are the product of conscious social 
choices made by political elites and other actors. They constitute strategic responses to challenges 
and incentives. I start from the assumption that elites do what is necessary to reinforce their 
position in favourable environments, and to survive in hostile environments, and that they 
understand institutions as “mechanisms that must ‘work’” (Sartori 1994, ix). Consequently, my 
initial hunch is that the conjunction of political uncertainty and political delegitimation should be 
a strong incentive for institutional change, and that institutional engineering could be one of the 
solutions chosen by the elites to address these challenges. It might prove to be wrong. The elites 
might use institutional engineering for completely different reasons, unrelated to any kind of 
external incentives. They might also be faced with strong incentives and choose not to address 
them, or not to address them through institutional engineering. They may also attempt to adopt 
institutional reforms, and prove incapable of managing to provide positive outcomes. The 
question guiding the whole thesis is the following: what explains the occurrence of reform of 
3 
Introduction 
the core democratic rules in Western European democracies in the last two decades? This 
research deals with the context, the motives, and the mechanisms explaining the incidence of 
institutional engineering. Therefore, two different questions about institutional change are crucial 
here: firstly, how much change to the core democratic rules in Western European democracies 
can be observed over the course of the two last decades, where did this change take place, and at 
what point in time? Secondly, why are some attempts to reform successful, while others are not? 
This thesis aims to test the general hypothesis that institutional reforms constitute a response from 
political elites to challenges to their legitimacy and to growing uncertainty in established democracies, and also, 
that the final outcome of reforms is expected to depend on the type of reform taking place, and on the process of 
reform that is used. These two hypotheses are not the first that come to mind when considering the 
occurrence of change. The more obvious explanation is that change occurs less frequently and 
with greater difficulty when rules are rigid and veto points are numerous. One of the main results 
of this thesis is to challenge this general explanation, because it does not hold empirically. I will 
first abandon the narrow view of institutional change, based only on major reforms or on single 
dimensions of reform. The multidimensional nature of the institutional systems, which has long 
been theoretically and empirically established (Lijphart 1984; 1999), implies that one should also 
account for the clustering of institutions when studying change. This also means that I will take 
into account both successful and unsuccessful institutional reforms. The empirical problem 
consists of a descriptive question:  
 What has the scope of institutional engineering in Western Europe been in the last two 
decades? What types of reforms have been adopted, in what circumstances, and at what 
time?  
The analytical problem is composed of two separate questions:  
 A question about reform triggers: what particular circumstances bring about 
institutional reforms?  
 A question about the processes of reforms: what mechanisms can explain why a 
reform which is on the agenda is eventually adopted, or rejected? What can be learned 
about the processes of institutional change when reforms are analysed in bundles rather 
than separately?  
Answering these questions necessitates the development of a research strategy based on 
mixed methods. The notion of mixed methods is not considered here as a buzzword or slogan, 
but as a consequence of the different methological challenges posed by the questions underlined 
above. As Newman and Benz have argued, qualitative and quantitative methods are best 
understood as part of a single “continuum” (1998). The use of mixed methods is here the result 
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of a pragmatic approach, based on the belief that no single method can adequately answer all of 
the research questions this thesis seeks to tackle. As a consequence, the thesis will proceed in two 
steps: firstly, a preliminary large-N longitudinal and cross-sectional analysis aiming to test the 
theories developed in the literature concerning electoral and regime change, and secondly, a series 
of case studies of bundles of reforms with the aim of building theories to investigate the 
mechanisms behind the processes of institutional reform. Therefore, the first part of the thesis 
focuses on describing the changes which have been made to the core democratic rules, and on 
identifying their determinants. The second part, on the other hand, attempts to link these 
determinants to actual mechanisms. It also centres the analysis on the importance of the 
processes (the politics of reform) in gaining a full understanding of their final outcome. The two 
methods are informed by one another on the topic of the determinants of change, and 
complement each other because they provide insight into different issues: the issue of the 
description of change for the quantitative analysis, and of the mechanisms which lead to positive 
or negative outcomes for the qualitative analysis. The use of a nested analysis using mixed 
methods therefore appears to be particularly appropriate (Lieberman 2005).  
This mixed method strategy leads us on to the development of the concept of bundles of 
institutional reforms, i.e., reforms affecting several dimensions of the institutional system at once 
(Chapter 1), which can be mobilised both in large-N and in more focused, qualitative analyses. 
The first chapter also focuses on the crucial matter of identifying and defining which reforms are 
to be investigated: reforms of core democratic rules. A distinction is made between those which 
affect the representative and the participative functions of democracies, leading to the delineation 
of six dimensions of reform. Although political science has made considerable progress in 
addressing the matter of institutional change in the last twenty years, the current explanations 
about the determinants and processes of change fall short when the aim is to expand the 
dependent variable to include several dimensions of change and minor reforms. The existing 
literature overlooks the frequency of change, overestimates the self-interested nature of 
institutional reforms, and finally, insufficiently acknowledges the fact that reforms do not take 
place as isolated events, but often as parts of a bigger picture. Finally, Western European 
democracies are currently facing particular challenges in relation to the progressive erosion of 
political support during the last few decades (Chapter 2). The third chapter will present the 
unique database on which the empirical analysis in this thesis is based: the SIEPOL (Seclusion 
and Inclusion in the European Polity: Institutional Change and Democratic Practices) project 
“Institutional Change in advanced European democracies” accounts for six dimensions of 
change in 18 Western European democracies, and is directed by Peter Mair and Adrienne 
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Héritier. It will provide an overview of the scope, the direction and the nature of institutional 
engineering in the last 20 years in Western Europe. I will show that institutional reforms have 
been relatively frequent, mostly inclusive, and have been “packaged” in bundles in the majority of 
cases. Then, the central claim that reforms of core democratic rules are triggered by political 
instability and democratic delegitimation will be tested and refined through the use of this 
database. In order to do this, I distinguish the long-term factors that provide fertile ground for 
reforms of core democratic rules, and the short-term factors that explain why more reforms 
happen at particular moments. The importance of the level of political support in the long-term, 
and of political alternation in power and rising volatility will be demonstrated (Chapter 4).  
The second part of the thesis moves the reflection on institutional change forward by 
focusing on the mechanisms of reform. The first part of the thesis describes and analyses only 
those reforms that have actually happened. The reality is that many of the reforms of core 
democratic rules which make their way on to national agendas never actually manage to reach the 
stage of final adoption. The three case studies undertaken aim to provide greater understanding 
of why and in what circumstances some reforms are passed. This involves distinguishing between 
the different types of reform at stake, and between the processes used to conduct these reforms. 
The fifth chapter argues that the crucial element in distinguishing between reforms of core 
democratic rules is whether they are of a divisive or a consensual nature, according to the level of 
public support they enjoy. These two types of reform lead elites to focus on claiming credit or on 
self-interest, respectively. This in turn explains why the factors accounting for the final fate of 
divisive and consensual reforms are different, and imply distinctive mechanisms. The impact of 
veto players, the number of dimensions of reform at stake, and the type of process of reform 
(majoritarian, supermajoritarian, or externalised) will be discussed. The three remaining chapters 
provide empirical evidence about the mechanisms of bundles of reforms. The bundle of reforms  
undertaken in Ireland in 2011, firstly, serves to illustrate the conditions necessary for alternation, 
volatility, and a lack of political support to be translated into concrete pressure on elites to reform 
institutions. Secondly, it enables us to understand why the consensual reforms which went to a 
referendum failed, while other consensual reforms which were adopted in the parliament 
succeeded. Finally, it shows the way in which the Irish government got rid of the most divisive 
reforms through an externalised body, the constitutional convention (Chapter 6). For France, two 
reforms are studied: the reduction of the presidential term from 7 to 5 years, and the reordering 
of the electoral calendar in order to hold the presidential elections before the legislative ones. 
Despite the fact that these reforms were intrinsically linked, the reformers used distinctive 
processes leading up to their successful adoptions, because the reforms were of different natures. 
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The first (the quinquennat) illustrates the dynamics of collaboration as well as the credit-claiming 
characteristic of consensual reforms adopted through a supermajoritarian process. The second 
(reform of the electoral calendar), on the other hand, exemplifies the prevalence of self-interest in 
a majoritarian process with a divisive reform (Chapter 7). The final chapter is dedicated to the 
study of two reforms debated in Italy between 2003 and 2005: reform of the second part of the 
constitution, and electoral reform. These two contentious and divisive reforms illustrate the 
importance of close examination of coalition dynamics in understanding the politics of reform. 
Led by a centre-right coalition composed of parties with hugely diverse interests, these processes 
illustrate how, by bundling reforms into a package deal with mutual tradeoffs and concessions, 
the reformers managed to reach an agreement in parliament. The constitutional reform was 
eventually defeated at referendum, providing insights into the importance of the timing of 
reforms (Chapter 8).  
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Chapter 1: Introducing the bundle of  reforms: a theoretical 
and empirical tool to analyse multidimensional 
institutional change 
 
 
There is a good reason why we commonly refer to “institutional systems”. A system is a 
set of interacting, interrelated and interdependent elements that come together to form a whole. 
Our starting point, based on the existing literature and specifically on Lijphart’s work, is that 
political institutions evaluated together constitute a system. Hence, the different dimensions of 
institutional systems are linked together by the underlying logic of distribution of powers and 
conceptions of democratic legitimacy. As a consequence, I will develop a theoretical and 
empirical systemic tool in order to analyse the changes in the core democratic institutions in 
Western Europe: bundles of reforms. This chapter answers the following questions: which 
political institutions can be said to constitute the core of these democratic rules? Why should 
institutional reforms be studied in bundles rather than separately?  
This thesis focuses on institutional reform as a modification of the formal core 
democratic rules which is enacted by parliament. I focus on institutional changes that are 
“explicit products of social choices” (Bawn 1993, 965). These changes are therefore intentional, 
clearly definable (given the possibility of determining the moments at which choices and 
decisions were made), and shaped and adopted in accordance with the usual rules of the 
democratic game.  
However, important issues immediately arise. First of all, it is far from an easy task to 
determine what set of formal institutions can be said to constitute the core democratic rules. One 
could accept so broad a definition as to include the rules of selection for candidates in political 
parties, or all aspects of the regulation of elections, or be so narrow as to limit them to the 
electoral systems. The first part of this chapter considers this issue, drawing on Lijphart’s 
framework (1984, 1999). Secondly, I will show why different models of democracy are associated 
with different interpretations of what democratic legitimacy is. Finally, I will justify the thesis’ 
focus on the core democratic rules regulating the relationship between citizens and political elites. 
In the second part of the chapter, I will introduce the main theoretical and empirical 
innovation of this thesis, i.e., the concept of a bundle of reforms. The idea behind these bundles 
is that, since institutions are clustered, it makes no sense to study changes in various institutional 
dimensions in isolation. On the contrary, I make the assumption that in many instances, the 
10 
Introducing Bundles of Reforms 
processes of institutional change affect several dimensions at once, and should be studied as 
such.  
 
1. Identifying the core democratic institutions 
 
The description of democratic regimes has always been a major preoccupation for political 
scientists. For a long time, comparative politics and the description of the systematic differences 
between political systems were as one. Two historical fields of research have developed over 
time. One has focused mainly on formal institutions, and on the distinction between 
parliamentary, semi-presidential and presidential democracy (Duverger 1986; Elgie 1999; Lijphart 
1992; Shugart and Carey 1992). The second has analysed the functioning of political systems, 
focusing on the characteristics and mechanisms of party systems (Cox 1997; Duverger 1951; 
Lijphart 1994; Sartori 1976; and Taagepera and Shugart 1989, to name a few of the most 
influential accounts). These works have shown evidence of systematic differences in the 
repartition of power between actors across different institutional settings, as well as the influence 
of institutional systems on the format and patterns of competition of party systems. 
 Several authors have synthesised the conclusions of these two corpuses by defining the main 
distinctions between democratic regimes (Gerring and Thacker 2008; Lijphart 1984 & 1999; 
Powell 2000). All of them have pointed out the fundamental distinction between two broad types 
of democratic regime. This division originates from two different conceptions of democratic 
legitimacy, the central difference being the degree of dispersion or concentration of political 
power. These authors have helped to identify core democratic rules, providing major insights in 
defining the set of institutions studied in this thesis. Most importantly, they have shown and 
demonstrated empirically that the different dimensions of these institutions are linked together 
and form a coherent system.  
 
1.1. The distinction between majoritarian and consensus democracy 
Lijphart is undoubtably an apt starting point in tackling the classification of democratic 
regimes. He considers that institutional arrangements serve as different ways of answering the 
following question: who should govern, and who should the government be responsive to? Two 
answers are possible: “the majority of the people”, leading to a majoritarian model of democracy; 
and “as many people as possible”, leading to a consensus model of democracy. In other words, 
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the crucial point in distinguishing between democratic regimes is the degree of dispersion or 
concentration of power. Other authors have built upon this core distinction, showing that these 
two patterns have their origins in distinctive and conflicting visions of the basis for enduring 
legitimacy in a democracy.  
 
1.1.1. Lijphart as a theoretical starting point  
Lijphart defines two archetypes which are derived from the distinction he draws between 
majoritarian and consensual democracy: the Westminster model of democracy, and the consensus 
model of democracy.1 To do this, he relies on ten institutional indicators (Lijphart 1999, 3–4) 
which can be separated into two clusters, as evidenced by his factor analysis of 36 democracies 
between 1945 and 1996. To use his words, “clear patterns and regularities appear when these 
institutions are examined from the perspective of how majoritarian or how consensual their rules 
and practices are” (Lijphart 1984, 1, emphasis added). In order to conduct a multidimensional 
analysis of institutional change, the first step is therefore to identify the core democratic 
institutions that enable us to understand these systematic regularities within and differences 
between democratic regimes.  
The first cluster is made up of what he calls the “executive-parties dimension”, and deals with 
the arrangement of executive power, through the five following elements: 
1- Concentration of executive power in single-party majority cabinets vs. executive power-
sharing in broad multiparty coalitions 
2- Executive-legislative relationships in which the executive is dominant vs. executive-
legislative balance of power 
3- Two-party vs. multiparty-systems 
4- Majoritarian and disproportional electoral systems vs. proportional representation 
5- Pluralist interest group systems with free-for-all competition between groups vs. 
coordinated and corporatist interest group systems aiming to achieve compromise and dialogue. 
 
                                                 
1 Lijphart shows that there are very few pure examples of Westminster democracies, the closest being 
New Zealand before the electoral reform of 1993, whereas there are more examples of systems which are 
relatively close to his ideal-typical model of consensus democracy, Switzerland and Belgium being the 
most prominent of these.  
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The second cluster, which he calls the “federal-unitary dimension”, deals with the contrast 
between federal and unitary government, and includes the following five indicators: 
 
6- Unitary and centralised government vs. federalised and decentralised government 
7- Concentration of legislative power in a unicameral legislature vs. division of legislative 
power between two equally strong but differently constituted houses 
8- Flexible constitutions that can be amended by simple majorities vs. rigid constitutions 
that can be changed only by extraordinary majorities 
9- Systems in which legislatures have the final word on the constitutionality of their own 
legislation vs. systems in which laws are subject to judicial review by supreme or constitutional 
courts vis-à-vis their constitutionality  
10- Central banks dependent on the executive vs. independent central banks.  
This attempt to define the core distinction between democratic regimes2 has proved 
extremely influential and sometimes controversial. It has enabled Lijphart to build a “conceptual 
map” of democracy, and to compare the governing performance of majoritarian and consensus 
democracies. Nonetheless it has been criticised, at times heavily, on methodological grounds.3 
However, overall, the divide between consensus and majoritarian democracies has quickly 
become theoretically unavoidable. Indeed, although Lijphart was not the first to suggest this 
distinction, he was one of the first authors to provide compelling empirical evidence of the 
systemic nature of institutional systems and the way these tend to be clustered.  
 
 
                                                 
2 The ten characteristics listed above are the ones he used in the 1999 edition of his work. Three more 
characteristics have been added to - and one subtracted from - the institutional definitions of consensus 
and majoritarian systems in this text, as compared with the 1984 version. The presence or absence of 
independent central banks, corporatism, and judicial review are included, while the number of cleavages 
represented in the party system being dropped. The empirical scope is widened by the inclusion of fifteen 
more countries in the 1999 version. 
3 It is noteworthy though that Lijphart’s fiercest critics have tended to focus on matters of measurement 
rather than on any substantial criticism of the concepts of majoritarian and consensus democracy. 
Lijphart’s measure of executive dominance, that of cabinet duration, has drawn the most comments and 
challenges. Lijphart has been reproached as having a bias towards parliamentary systems, since presidential 
systems cannot be adequately captured by an index of executive dominance (Roller 2005), or more 
radically, because the measure is an inappropriate means of evaluating the concept it is intended to assess 
(Tsebelis 2002).   
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1.1.2. A distinction built on distinctive interpretations of  democratic 
legitimacy 
The fundamental distinction between models of democracy corresponds to different, 
mutually incompatible answers to the question, “what ensures enduring democratic legitimacy?” 
The models presented above are, to be sure, ideal-types. All democracies develop coexisting, and 
sometimes conflicting, forms of democratic legitimacy. The shift from one to another is the 
crucial issue to identify and understand.  
Powell (2000) has reformulated Lijphart’s framework into a core distinction between 
majoritarian and proportional democracies, focusing on the different visions of democracy they 
entail. Majoritarian democracies value the clarity of responsibility, accountability, responsiveness, 
and the identifiability of alternatives. Elections are used as instruments of control, as moments 
when decisions are made on new teams of policymakers, and evaluations of incumbents are 
carried out (Powell 2000, 5). An archetypical example of this form of democracy would be the 
United Kingdom during the 1950s. Scharpf develops a classification that in many ways echoes  
Powell’s. He distinguishes “output-oriented legitimacy” and “input-oriented legitimacy” (1997a; 
1999). Majoritarian democracies favour output-oriented legitimacy which “derives legitimacy 
from its capacity to solve problems requiring collective solutions because they would not be 
solved through individual action” (1999, 11). In order for the core objectives of majoritarian 
democracy to be achieved, power needs to be concentrated in the hands of a single party-
government and a strong executive, so that concrete policies are produced. On the other hand, 
what Powell calls the proportional vision of democracy (corresponding to Lijphart’s consensual 
democracy) is based on a democratic legitimacy which relies on inclusion and participation. The 
purpose of elections from this perspective is to bring “representative agents of all the factions in 
the society into the policy-making arena” (Powell 2000, 6). The preferences of all citizens, not 
only the majority, must be represented, leading to a dispersed form of political power. Legitimacy 
relies on what Scharpf calls “input-oriented legitimacy”, in that political choices are legitimated if 
and because they reflect the preferences of all citizens.  
The important issue here is that different visions of democratic legitimacy entail different 
clusters of institutions. Therefore, shifting visions of democratic legitimacy should imply 
institutional change in several dimensions of institutions, rather than just one, which justifies the 
use of the concept of a bundle of reforms.4 Before introducing that concept, however, the set of 
reforms that will be examined should be carefully defined.  
                                                 
4 Cf. chapter 2, section 2.3.1.  
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1.2. Defining the reforms of  the core democratic rules 
Institutional change is important in that it says something about the shifting relationship 
between political parties, citizens and elites, in the same way as elections or the evolution of 
citizens’ preferences. However, we are not interested in all institutions. Depending on the scope 
of the definition one chooses, administrative and informal practices can be considered as 
institutions, just like written constitutions. It is therefore essential to clarify which institutions will 
be studied, and which ones will not. It is worth noting that the particular dimensions which will 
eventually be studied have not only been defined theoretically, but also empirically, using a new 
database that contains a complete list of reforms of six institutional dimensions in 18 Western 
European democracies between 1990 and 2010.5   
 
1.2.1. Are we really all institutionalists now? Why focus on formal rules? 
Pierson and Skocpol have provocatively claimed that “we are all institutionalists now” (2002, 
706). Indeed, the study of institutions has come to refer to pretty much anything, as they have 
been defined in increasingly broad terms over time. The wide variety of definitions of institutions 
in general and political institutions in particular makes it difficult to circumscribe the actual 
subject, and this modest study will certainly not have the final word in this dispute. The main 
empirical debates relevant for this research are the following: should institutions be defined as 
formal rules, or should one adopt a broader definition, to include norms and practices? What are 
the main dimensions of political institutions?  
The debate about institutions has gained momentum with the advent of new institutionalism, 
and the development of its three competing versions: rational-choice institutionalism, historical 
institutionalism and sociological institutionalism.6 Hall, in an influential and widely used 
definition (1986, 19), described institutions as “formal rules, compliant procedures and standard 
operating practices that structure the relationship between individuals in various units of the policy 
and economy” (emphasis added). Another influential author provided the following definition: 
“institutions are the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, are the human devised 
                                                 
5 Cf. chapter 3.   
6 It is now generally accepted that neo-institutionalism is the consequence of the renewed interest in the 
capacity of institutions to shape political behaviour and outcomes which emerged at the beginning of the 
1990s. Three “branches” developed: sociological neo-institutionalism, rational neo-institutionalism, and 
historical neo-institutionalism (Hall and Taylor 1996). Sociological NI (March and Olsen 1996) focuses 
specifically on how institutions produce norms and shared understandings for actors. Historical NI placed 
particular emphasis on the mechanisms of path dependence and institutional stability (Steinmo, Thelen, 
and Longstreth 1992,  Pierson 2000a), while rational NI (Shepsle 1989 & 2008) argues that actors are both 
bounded by institutions, and maximise their benefits, within particular institutional frameworks.  
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constraints that shape human interaction” (North 1990, 3). While Hall and North’s definitions 
insist that institutions are composed of both formal written rules and informal constraints 
deriving from these formal rules, North places greater emphasis on the notion that institutions 
are constructed. Thus, he also puts forward the possibility of intentional institutional design. The 
main issue is that both of these definitions encompass an extremely wide variety of objects to be 
considered as institutions: formal rules, but also customs, codes of behaviour, traditions, and so 
on. At the risk of being reductive, any interactions – and even the hidden motives behind them –
that are seen to have some form of regularity are considered as institutions by neo-institutionalist 
scholars. This is what Sartori would call an extreme case of “conceptual stretching” (1970). 
This thesis, on the other hand, focuses only on the change of formal rules, and leaves out any 
examination of changing practices or norms. The reason behind this choice is quite 
straightforward: ultimately, this research deals with the political elites’ decision to reform the rules 
of the game (or not). We emphasise the notion of choice because it constitutes a central aspect of 
our reflection: only when formal rules are modified is it possible to clearly identify the moments 
at which these choices happen. Unlike other texts (Mahoney and Thelen 2010;  Streeck and 
Thelen 2005; Thelen 2004), this thesis does not focus on informal institutional change, but on 
institutional change which is the product of an explicit social choice made by political elites in the 
parliamentary arena. The second reason is empirical: as the first part of the research is based on a 
large-N comparison of institutional change in 18 democracies, it was crucial to be able to clearly 
define a comparable set of institutions included in the analysis, and characterised by a high degree 
of formalisation. The third reason is theoretical: the changing of formal rules and the changing of 
norms and beliefs are two different things, involving very different time scopes, explanatory 
factors, and processes of change.  
 
1.2.2. Delineating the two main functions of  democratic institutions 
Explaining this focus on formal rules is an important step, but it is far from sufficient to 
define the institutions which are to be studied, i.e., the core democratic rules that enable us to 
discriminate between democratic regimes. One way to address this issue is to attempt to 
distinguish between institutions through the “functions” they are supposed to perform.  
While many authors basically agree that political institutions serve as the rules of the political 
game, not all of them delineate the same functions. Harty has proposed the following definition 
of political institutions: “(1) decision-making and bargaining structures that distribute resources, 
(2) rules and processes that govern access to power, (3) rules and measures to monitor and 
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enforce compliance” (2005, 55). Others define political institutions as “durable structures that are 
involved in the process of making and implementing public policy” (Wiarda 2005, 403). The 
notion of distribution of resources and power appears central, as is, implicitly, the notion of 
competition for power. Empirically, through his two “clusters” of institutions,7 Lijphart (1984, 
1999) has distinguished between the repartition of political power at the “horizontal” level 
(executive-power dimension) and at the “vertical” level (federal-unitary dimension). Regulating 
access to representation, offices and policy-making is therefore one of the main functions of 
institutions in a democratic setting. However, this definition implicitly limits democratic political 
institutions to their traditional representative function as defined by Cain, Dalton and Scarrow 
(2003).    
These three authors have produced a study of the recent democratic developments in 
advanced industrial democracies, in which they propose a very valuable tool for the classification 
of institutional functions in a democratic setting. They distinguish between (1) representative 
democracy (democracy “as we know it”, including the functions of decision-making and the 
selection of political representatives), (2) direct democracy, which bypasses and complements 
representative democracy by giving citizens the final say on certain policy choices, and (3) 
advocacy democracy “in which citizens directly participate in the process of policy formation or 
administration (...) although the final decisions are still made by elites” (Cain, Dalton, and 
Scarrow 2003b, 10–11).8 The Ariadne’s thread of their book is the idea that “over the past quarter 
century, citizens and political elites in advanced industrial democracies have displayed a growing 
willingness to question whether a fundamental commitment to the principles and institutions of 
representative democracy is sufficient to sustain the legitimacy and effectiveness of current 
mechanisms of self-government” (Cain, Dalton, and Scarrow 2003b, 1). What this simply means 
is that democratic institutions cannot be reduced to representation, but must also include a 
significant and increasingly important participatory element. In conclusion, democratic political 
institutions perform the following two main functions:  
a) The representative function. This includes what Cain, Dalton and Scarrow mean by 
representative democracy. It encompasses the rules regulating the repartition of  power, 
the process of  selection of  political elites and the modes of  decision-making and policy 
implementation:   
                                                 
7 Cf. supra.  
8 Advocacy democracy includes the participation of citizens, citizen groups or NGOs in advisory hearings, 
as well as “government in the sunshine”, ombudsmen, agencies to encourage freedom of information, and 
the possibility of judicially challenging the government (Dalton, Scarrow, and Cain 2004, 128) 
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 At the national level,  
 between the national and the subnational levels.  
b) The participative function. This second function includes some forms of  democratic 
institutions that seek to go “beyond” traditional representative democracy at the national 
level by providing alternative modes of  democratic involvement in decision-making 
and/or alternative tools for democratic participation in the traditional political process.  
 
1.2.3. The investigation of  six dimensions of  reform of  the core democratic 
rules 
This thesis will examine reforms of the core democratic rules, i.e. of the formal political 
rules enacted by the national parliaments regulating the direct relationship between elites 
within the political system, parties and citizens. This thesis is centred on electoral democracy 
and on the first links in what Strøm calls “the chain of delegation”: between voters and elected 
representatives, and between legislators and the executive (2000).9  
The choice of the six dimensions of reforms for examination in the following empirical 
chapters is the result of the availability of an external database as much as it is a theoretical 
reflection on the core democratic institutions. The following analyses are based on the expansion 
and the exploitation of a database collected for the project “Institutional Change in Advanced 
European Democracies” to cover a variety of institutional changes in 18 Western consolidated 
European democracies from 1990 until 2010 (for an exhaustive presentation, see Bedock, Mair, 
and Wilson 2011).10 The dimensions studied account for the functions of political institutions as 
defined above:11  
a) regulation of  the representative function at the national level (electoral (1) and 
parliamentary reforms (2) ),  
                                                 
9 Strøm considers that “representative democracy features a chain of delegation from voters to those who 
govern, in which we can identify at least four discrete steps: 
1. From voters to elected representatives, 
2. From legislators to the executive branch, specifically to the head of government (the prime minister), 
3. From the head of government (prime minister) to the heads of different executive departments, and 
4. From the heads of different executive departments to civil servants” (Strøm: 2000, 267).  
10 I did not participate in the initial stages of the database’s compilation (selection of the dimensions and 
collection of the data). I did engage in the subsequent transformation of the database into a resource 
suitable to statistical analysis, the collection of data for the period 2008-2010, and the inclusion of external 
indicators for the subsequent empirical analyses conducted.   
11 Cf. appendix 1.  
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b) regulation of  the representative function between the national and the subnational levels 
(federal/decentralisation reforms (3) ), 
c) regulation of  the participative function (reforms of  the direct election of  the head 
executive (4), direct democracy (5), and access to suffrage (6) ). 
The decision to focus on these six specific dimensions is necessarily debatable. For 
example, we might have used the ten indicators proposed by Lijphart to distinguish political 
regimes. Apart from the obvious empirical reasons not to do so (taking advantage of a new 
unreleased database), we consider there to be three theoretical reasons why some of these 
indicators are problematic when the focus shifts to institutional change. First, this framework 
does not tackle the confusion between the rules and their outcomes, especially in relation to the 
executive-parties dimension. For example, the electoral system is placed at the same level as the 
format of the party system. The electoral system is the formal rule, while the party system is the 
consequence (Duverger 1951, Cox 1997, Taagapera and 1989) or the cause (Boix 1999, Colomer 
2005) of the former, and the result of informal practices and interactions as much as institutional 
constraints.  
Secondly, Lijphart focuses purely on what I have defined as the representative democratic 
function. Grofman and Vatter, who use Lijphart’s works extensively, have shown that a third, 
distinctive “orthogonal” dimension can be added to the political institutions other than the 
executive-parties and federal-unitary: direct democracy (Grofman 2000, Vatter 2008, Vatter 
2009).12 Therefore, this means that empirical evidence exists which shows that the participative 
dimension of the core democratic institutions is distinctive and should be accounted for.  
Finally, Lijphart includes indicators which do not exclusively belong to the core 
democratic institutions as I have defined them (central banks13 and interest group systems14). The 
matter of reforms dealing with constitutional review, which is a dimension that is absent from 
our database, is more problematic as it is arguable that courts are performing increasingly central 
                                                 
12 Previously, Grofman (2000) found that direct democracy could not be linked systematically with the two 
dimensions of patterns of democracy. Because he provides a more complex indicator of direct democracy, 
Vatter finds that this dimension is not fully independent of the previous two and is linked with broadly 
supported multiparty governments.  
13 It should be noted that the creation of the Eurozone, to which many of the countries analysed belong, 
rendered the independence of central banks irrelevant in distinguishing between European political 
regimes.  
14 The indicator of the structure of interest group systems is a consequence of the particular social 
structures of societies and its change does not depend on the pure social choice of political elites, but is 
rather a consequence of the social structures. 
19 
Introducing Bundles of Reforms 
roles in mediation between citizens and elected representatives. Still, they do not regulate 
electoral democracy.15 Let us now present each of the six dimensions in greater detail.  
a) Regulation of  the representative function at the national level 
The two following categories of reform deal with reforms of the rules for the selection of 
political elites, modifying the processes of decision-making and the allocation of power between 
the executive and the legislative.  
1- Electoral reforms regulating the translation of  votes into seats and the expression of  votes adopted at the 
national level.  
This concerns elections at the national level, the European level and, when applicable, the 
subnational level (in cases where the electoral system for local elections is decided by the national 
parliament). Electoral reforms are here understood as modifying the electoral formula, the system 
translating votes into seats, and the expression of votes. These reforms range from any 
modifications or substitutions of the electoral formula, to main modifications of the boundaries 
of constituencies,16 the introduction of corrective tiers or of a legal threshold, etc. Purely 
procedural reforms regarding the concrete organisation of elections (for example, regulations 
regarding voting days or times) have been left out. It should also be noted that reforms 
modifying the access rules for citizens wishing to vote, or changes to the size of the assembly, 
have been included in different categories (access to ballot and parliamentary reforms, 
respectively). 
The dataset includes, for example, the introduction of an additional electoral tier in Austria in 
1992 in the 43 districts, and the modification of the boundaries of electoral constituencies for the 
parliamentary elections which was adopted in 2009 in France.  
2- Parliamentary reforms.  
This category includes reforms altering the composition of the parliament, the main legislative 
procedures, the number of lower and upper chambers, the relationships between the executive 
and the parliament, and the duration of the term at the national level.17 Again, purely procedural 
reforms of the organisation of the parliamentary sessions have not been included. Compared to 
                                                 
15 The idea to expand the existing SIEPOL database to include other dimensions of institutional change is 
currently being studied, and so constitutional review might be a part of it in the near future. It would also 
be important to include reforms covering the “advocacy function” of democracy, which is absent from 
the database for the moment.  
16 Including in countries using PR.  
17 According to Lijphart, the distinction between unicameral and bicameral legislatures belongs to the 
federal-unitary dimension rather than to the executive-parties dimension.  
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Sieberer, Müller and Heller (2011), who focus on reforms of the standing orders, the reforms 
included in this category tend to be constitutionalised in most of the countries, meaning that the 
database focuses on parliamentary rules which are laid down in constitutions.  
Reforms classified in this second category comprise, for example, the introduction of a single 
legislature to replace the tri-cameral legislature in Iceland in 1991, the reduction of the number of 
MPs in Portugal in 1997, which was enacted in the lower chamber, or the reform to increase the 
power of the parliament vis-à-vis the president which was adopted in Finland in 2000.  
b) Regulation of  the representative function between the national and the 
subnational levels 
3- Federal reform or decentralisation reforms.  
This third category encompasses reforms modifying the balance of powers between the national 
level and the regions or federal entities in terms of competences, fiscal autonomy and instruments 
of control, as well as provisions regulating the number and the organisation of subnational 
entities.  
This broad dimension comprises reforms such as the amendment of the Basic Law to give 
German Länder direct involvement in EU decision-making in 1992, or the change in regional 
financing allowing regional governments to raise a substantial part of their own taxation enacted 
in Spain in 1996.  
c) Regulation of  the participative function 
The three subsequent categories include reforms of the institutions dealing with the development 
of forms of direct head executive election at different levels, the regulation of access to direct 
democracy, and the provisions modifying the access to and the means to exert electoral suffrage. 
4- Reforms of  the direct election of  the head executive/president.  
This category encompasses reforms introducing the direct election of the president at the 
national level, and the mayors or presidents of regions or provinces adopted in the national 
parliament for part or all of the territory.18 
                                                 
18 The only exception to this rule is the case of Belgium, where the direct election of mayors was adopted 
in 2006 in Wallonia. The decision has been made to keep this case in the database, as this affects a very 
important part of the territory of a federal country, despite the fact that the national parliament did not 
vote on the matter. 
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This covers, for instance, the initiation of direct elections for the Finnish presidency via a two-
round system in 1994, or the series of reforms organising the direct election of the mayors, and 
the presidents of regions and provinces implemented in Italy between 1993 and 1999.  
5- Reforms of  direct democracy at the national level.  
This group of reforms involves all cases in which provisions for citizens’ initiatives or referenda 
(not necessarily binding, but also agenda initiatives) were introduced or modified at the national 
level.  
This fifth category includes the authorisation of citizen-petitioned local and national consultative 
referenda in the Netherlands in 2004, and Portugal’s introduction of a constitutional amendment 
in 1997 allowing citizens to propose a referendum, which must have parliamentary approval 
before being held.  
6- Reforms expanding suffrage or the means of  access to suffrage.  
This category of reforms concerns all cases in which suffrage has been expanded to include new 
sections of the population (people under 21, foreigners), or in which alternative methods of 
voting have been introduced or facilitated, ranging from the introduction of postal voting and 
electronic voting, to constituencies for citizens living abroad, the right to vote for overseas 
citizens, and proxy voting.  
This final dimension covers, for example, the extension of voting rights for local elections to 
non-EU citizens living in Luxembourg in 2003, as well as the reform of postal and proxy voting 
to facilitate citizens voting away from their places of residence which was enacted in 1999 in the 
UK.  
The reforms that have been labelled as regulating the participative function probably merit 
further explanation than those regulating the representative function, as the delineation of 
reforms included in the latter is relatively straightforward. While the inclusion of reforms dealing 
with direct democracy is quite clear-cut, the question remains as to why the reforms dealing with 
the expansion of suffrage and access to suffrage were not grouped together with the other 
electoral reforms. Why have reforms introducing direct elections for the head executive position 
not been included in the category about federal reforms or parliamentary reforms?  
The reforms which regulate access to suffrage are a particular type of electoral reform. Rather 
than focusing on the translation of votes into seats, they define who should be entitled to vote 
and the means that they should be allowed to use in order to do so. Hence, these reforms 
regulate access to participation in the political process ex ante, which is clearly distinct from the 
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regulation of representation and access to office. The issue of the direct election of head 
executives at the national or subnational level is trickier. Scarrow highlights the following point: 
“while partisan elections are certainly the current norm in the political realm, we nevertheless can 
distinguish different degrees of party involvement in these elections” (2003, 44). Traditional 
representative democracy relies on the mediation of political parties to act as a catalyst in 
motivating citizens to vote. On the other hand, Scarrow argues that the direct election of public 
officials can be considered a more “direct” form of representation than traditional elections, since 
voters choose a candidate rather than for a party, although the same author also shows that in 
most such elections, the party mediation factor still exists (through party branding, party 
candidate selection, etc).19 By instituting a separation between the election of legislatures and 
executives at the local or national level, voters are given a direct say as to which individual should 
occupy the most important position in their government, and are allowed to split their ballots 
between legislature and executive. This could also be seen to go hand in hand with a process of 
presidentialisation of politics, undermining the relative power of parties. 20  
 
2. The bundle of  reforms: a conceptual and empirical instrument to 
analyse multidimensional institutional change 
 
The main argument advanced in this chapter is that, since the existing literature has 
convincingly proved that institutions can be seen to form a coherent multidimensional structure, 
one should consequently also account for the systemic nature of institutions when studying 
change. This has led us to an initial outline of the SIEPOL dataset, which will be further 
expanded upon and detailed in the following chapters. This dataset provides a unique 
opportunity to systemically study multidimensional institutional change. It also enables us to 
overcome one of the main difficulties faced by researchers interested in institutional change, i.e., 
the lack of data taking into account not only single, but multiple dimensions of the institutional 
system over time and across different countries.21 
                                                 
19 There are a few exceptions to this, with true “non-party” elections for officials in many cities in the US 
and Canada, as well as in micro-states such as Micronesia, Palau and the Marshall Islands.  
20 The degree of presidentialisation is “determined by the shift of political power resources and autonomy to the 
benefit of individual leaders and a concomitant loss of power and autonomy of collective actors like 
cabinets and political parties” (Poguntke and Webb 2005, 7).  
21 Cf. chapter 2, section 2.  
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As a consequence, a conceptual and empirical instrument to deal with multidimensional 
institutional change has been developed, through the notion of a bundle of reforms. This section 
presents two means of considering such a bundle of reforms: as a sequence, and as a package deal 
of reforms. In the second part, the empirical operationalisation will be briefly introduced. The 
significance of this concept is that it is suitable for both quantitative and quantitative analysis, and 
is firmly grounded in the premise that political institutions are clustered, and should be studied as 
such.  
 
2.1. Two ways to conceptualise bundles of  reforms: as sequences and as package deals 
Bundles of reforms can be conceptualised in two different ways, which are not mutually 
incompatible, but it is important to distinguish between them, both theoretically and empirically. 
They can be defined as such: institutional reforms which are linked to each other and relate to at least two 
dimensions of the institutional architecture. This very general definition can lead to two interpretations 
about the manner in which the reforms are related. Firstly, the notion of the bundle of reforms 
could refer to the existence of a package deal in which a particular reform is part of a bigger game. 
Secondly, one could think of a bundle of reforms operating as a sequence: the adoption of one 
institutional reform leads actors to reflect on other dimensions of the institutional system, and 
potentially to reform other aspects, through a spillover effect.  
 
2.1.1. Bundle of  reforms as a package deal: some reflections on nested 
games and multifaceted reforms 
Tsebelis provides many original insights on what he called “nested games” (1990). His 
intention was to show how apparently suboptimal choices can in fact be adequately analysed in 
terms of rational choice theory, with the following premise: “only the study of the whole network of 
games in which an actor is involved will reveal the actor’s motivations and explain his behavior” 
(Tsebelis 1990, 5, emphasis added). He considers the existence of two types of nested games: 
games in multiple arenas (those with multiple payoffs),22 and institutional design, whereby actors 
try to increase the number of possible options at their disposal through the manipulation of the 
rules of the game. As Tsebelis puts it: “I do claim that rational choice is a better approach to 
                                                 
22 He describes them as such: “technically, games in multiple arenas are games with variable payoffs, the 
game is played in the principal arena, and the variation of the payoffs in this arena are determined by 
events in one or more other arenas. The nature of the final game changes, depending on the order of 
magnitude of these payoffs, whether or not the actors can communicate with one another, and whether or 
not the game is repeated over time” (Tsebelis 1990, 10). 
24 
Introducing Bundles of Reforms 
situations in which the actors’ identity and goals are established and the rules of interaction are 
precise and known to the interacting agents” (1990, 32). My aim is not to engage in this debate, 
even though this thesis is also based on the premise that the interactions of political actors in 
parliament and in the political arena are indeed characterised by features which encourage 
strategic behaviour and calculations.23 What is much more important for the argument about 
bundles of reforms is the idea behind these nested games: the outcomes of the game, the payoffs 
for each player, and the strategic moves used by each of them cannot be adequately explained if 
one only considers one part of the game, and not the entire game. Tsebelis uses the example of a 
number of UK Labour party constituencies which, having decided to replace their MPs for being 
too moderate, consequently lost the seats. Tsebelis argues that this apparently irrational behaviour 
should actually be understood as part of a repeated game between constituency activists, standing 
MPs, and Labour leaders, nested within the competition between the Labour Party and the 
Conservatives at constituency and national level. From this perspective, the activists’ behaviour 
can be explained by their will to build a reputation for toughness in order to discourage their 
representatives from walking the line of moderation.  
 Rahat is another author who has produced a particularly valuable conceptual framework, 
this time one which is explicitly designed to analyse institutional change, to clarify what is meant 
by a bundle of reforms (2004, 2008, Rahat and Hazan 2011). Analysing the (failed) reforms of 
Israel’s electoral system and the (successful) reform implementing the direct election of its prime 
minister, Rahat shows that, in contexts where the power is greatly dispersed between political 
actors, successful reforms are often multifaceted, combining a lot of different and potentially 
contradictory mechanisms, enabling coalitions to be built involving actors with potentially 
conflicting interests. He argues that, “constructive, multifaceted proposals must be detailed, 
allowing room for interpreting the political consequences of its mixed elements” (Rahat 2008, 
71). Rahat does not analyse a bundle of reforms per se; rather, he shows how a reform focusing on 
one single dimension can itself be broken down into a multiplicity of small games, each of them 
dealing with a different element. In other words, ambiguity and uncertainty concerning the 
outcomes of a particular reform constitute strong catalysts for institutional change in contexts 
where power is dispersed. Rahat’s approach, which analyses reforms separately, can easily be 
expanded to examine bundles of reforms by following the same logic as he develops with the 
notion of the multifaceted reform.  
                                                 
23 The most notable characteristics of the “political game” include the salience of information, processes 
of learning, and the reinforcement of successful behaviour over time. 
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 From this perspective, a bundle of reforms can be defined as a package deal of reforms.24 
The strategies and the interests of the actors must then be defined, taking into account the entire 
package of reform, and the sequencing of action (which reform is discussed first?). Unlike 
Tsebelis though, I shall insist, as Rahat does, on the importance of ambiguity, miscalculations, 
and the dispersion of power in explaining the adoption of bundles of reforms. Again, this 
approach is justified by the assumption that elements of institutional architectures are linked to 
each other in clusters. Therefore, from this second perspective, the initial definition of a bundle 
of reforms can be completed as follows: institutional reforms relating to at least two dimensions of the 
institutional architecture, belonging to a single package deal and defining the strategies, interests and moves of the 
political actors accordingly. 
 
2.1.2. The bundle of  reforms as a sequence: some reflections on embedded 
institutions 
It was Grofman who proposed the notion of embedded institutions, which has since 
been argued against in several books (Grofman et al. 1999a, Bowler and Grofman 2000, 
Grofman and Lijphart 2002). He defined an embedded institution as follows: “I use [the term] to 
refer primarily to the notion that (1) a given institution is embedded in a wider institutional 
framework and social setting, and thus seemingly identical institutions may not always yield similar 
behaviour once we recognize contextual factors and constraints; and (2) the choice of institutions 
is not independent of context, thus longitudinal historical analysis is important if we are not to 
mistake the nature of causality” (Grofman 1999, ix, emphasis added). Although Grofman uses 
this idea primarily to show why the same rules can have different effects in different contexts, the 
idea of embedded institutions is of particular relevance to our understanding of why institutional 
change can be thought of as part of a broader sequence. In the first part of his definition, 
Grofman suggests that no particular institution “float[s] in the air”, but that all are part of a 
general institutional architecture in which democratic institutions are linked to each other, which 
clearly relates to Lijphart’s argument. When applied to institutional change, this means that the 
reform of one dimension of the institutional architecture should lead to strategic adaptations in 
terms of the political actors, and ultimately to other institutional changes, being that the different 
aspects of the institutional architecture are related. It also means that any given institutional 
                                                 
24 Tsebelis uses the same basic argument to describe games in multiple arenas, and also introduces the 
importance of sequence: “when a political actor is confronted with a series of decisions presented 
sequentially, she can consider each either as an isolated event (an object of choice per se) or as part of a 
sequence of choices (an intermediate choice toward a final outcome)” (1990: 161). 
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change may be the result of something which had been deemed a necessary adaptation to a 
previous change. Methodologically, this vision of institutional change advocates for a process-
tracing, backward-looking analysis of its development, with the outcome as a starting point, 
working backwards towards strategies and motivations.  
Some authors have adopted this type of longitudinal and diachronic approach to the 
analysis of institutional reforms, with solid and promising findings. Flinders (2009), for example, 
has studied the evolution of British institutions since 1997 using a Lijphartian framework. He 
pays particular attention to the links between different institutions, arguing that the UK has tried 
(and failed) to accommodate incongruent models of democracy at national and regional levels 
(what he calls “bi-constitutionalism”), most notably through the adoption of mixed-member 
electoral systems for devolved assemblies in Wales and Scotland. This growing institutional 
incongruence has led to the multiplication of institutional reforms, with no general underlying 
logic to hold the whole structure together. The important issue for our argument is that his case 
study focuses not on a single dimension of institutional reform but on the evolution of the whole 
institutional system over time, hence Flinders shows the relevance of studying individual reforms 
as part of a temporal sequence, and the importance of accounting for the existence of embedded 
institutions.  
From this perspective, our initial definition of bundles of reforms could thus be 
completed as follows: institutional reforms relating to at least two dimensions of the institutional architecture, 
belonging to a broader sequence beginning or finishing beyond the moment of adoption and discussion of a given 
reform. Unlike the definition of bundles of reforms as package deals which can be examined 
through a large-N analysis and by qualitative analysis, this second conception of a bundle of 
reforms as a sequence is limited to circumstances in which the researcher has a broad knowledge 
of the country under analysis and is capable of identifying the beginning and the end of the 
institutional sequence precisely. As a conclusion, the bundle of reforms as an analytical tool 
derives directly from the Lijphartian notion that democratic institutions sit together in clusters. I 
have formulated the following general definition of bundles of reforms: institutional reforms linked to 
each other relating to at least two dimensions of the institutional architecture. This concept can be interpreted 
synchronically, as reforms belonging to a single package deal and defining the strategies, interests and moves of 
the political actors accordingly (1), or diachronically, as reforms belonging to a broader sequence beginning or 
finishing beyond the moment of adoption and discussion of a given reform (2).  
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2.2. Operationalising bundles of  reforms through a mixed-method strategy  
 This study investigates the reforms of core democratic rules in Western European 
democracies between 1990 and 2010. Bundles of reforms are examined using both quantitative 
and qualitative methods in order to understand their occurrence. The mixed-method strategy is 
best systematised by Lieberman (2005), who proposes a research strategy involving intensive case 
studies and statistical analysis. This is the track that this thesis will follow, by focusing both on 
the determinants and timing of reforms in the large-N analysis, and on the processes of reform in 
the case studies. Consequently, the notion of bundles of institutional reforms will be 
operationalised differently in the two parts of the analysis.  
 
2.2.1. Bundles of  reform in a large-N analysis 
Operationalising a complex concept in a large-N analysis necessarily leads to conceptual 
shortcuts that should really be made explicit. In the subsequent large-N empirical investigations, 
bundles of reforms are defined as all the moments at which a given legislature adopted more than one 
institutional reform in one or more of the six dimensions included in the analysis.  
This choice of operationalisation is based on the notion that one can reasonably believe 
that several reforms happening within the same legislature with the same parliamentary majority 
are linked to each other and can be considered as part of a bigger game, even though they might 
not appear to be completely related in the dataset. This assumption is to some extent 
unsatisfactory and rough, as the dataset at our disposal only includes reforms that were 
successfully adopted and gives no indication of when exactly they emerged on the parliamentary 
agenda. In addition, even when some institutional reforms are clearly linked, one might imagine 
that, for strategic reasons, the elites might not necessarily want to discuss them together, in order 
to simplify the game, to avoid particular interests being raised in debates on a given reform, and 
so on. In other words, the only thing the large-N analysis will be able to establish is the 
concomitance in time of the adoption of a package of institutional reforms. I insist on adoption, 
because this term suggests only that these reforms might have been linked in the discussions, and 
nothing about the moment at which they were put on the agenda. What it does show is the 
existence of more or less intense moments of reform that should be examined closely. Moreover, 
the following analysis will, if anything, overlook rather than overestimate the frequency with 
which bundles of reforms are put forward, as only successful reforms are included in the dataset.  
   Consequently, in the large-N analysis, this operationalisation of bundles of reforms will 
serve two purposes. First, the term ‘bundles of reforms’ will be used to simply describe 
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multidimensional institutional reforms. Particular attention will be paid to the apparently 
pedestrian task of describing the dataset and the bundles of reforms that were instigated during 
the 1990–2010 period. Therefore, I will look at the timing (are there periods which proved more 
fertile for bundles of reforms?), the frequency of bundling (how often do reforms come as part 
of a bundle? Is this frequency uniform across countries?), and at the institutional dimensions that 
are reformed together (the “composition” of the bundles).25 Secondly, the notion of bundles of 
reforms will enable us, using the large-N analysis, to identify the more intense moments of 
institutional reform, before studying the contextual determinants of reform, where we will focus 
on the number of reforms adopted by a given legislature.26  
 
2.2.2. Bundles of  reforms in a process-tracing analysis 
 Using the notion of bundles of institutional reforms as defined in the first section is 
clearly more conceptually and empirically powerful in a process-tracing analysis than in a large-N 
analysis, as one can look at the processes of institutional reform in all of their complexity. 
Therefore, in the chapters dealing with the case studies, the concept of bundles of reforms will be 
used to evidence the causal mechanisms behind reforms, by focusing on the following questions: 
how do bundles encourage tradeoffs? Can we reconstruct the sequence of events leading to the 
change and identify which reforms belong to this sequence? What reforms were linked (or not) 
by those who initiated the reforms, and why? What form did the discussions take and in what 
arenas were the reforms discussed? Ultimately, why did some reforms succeed and others fail? In 
other words, intensive process-tracing enables us to focus on bundles both as package deals and 
as wider sequences of reforms. 
 The adoption of what Scharpf calls the “backward” strategy (1997b) of causal analysis to 
investigate how an interesting outcome such as an institutional reform has been reached is in 
itself an extremely common and widely used strategy. Sherlock Holmes’ observation, in the 
words of Conan Doyle,27 is probably more accurate, and more telling about the difficulty of the 
process-tracing enterprise: “In solving a problem of this sort, the grand thing is to be able to 
reason backwards” (A Study in Scarlet). To put it more academically, George and Bennett define 
process-tracing as a “method [that] attempts to identify the intervening causal process - the causal 
chain and causal mechanism - between an independent variable (or variables) and the outcome of 
                                                 
25 Cf. chapter 3.  
26 Cf. chapter 4.  
27 I stole the idea of making a parallel between process-tracing and Sherlock Holmes’ method from the 
stimulating Comparative Method seminar I followed with Peter Mair in autumn 2011.  
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the dependent variable” (2005, 206). The same authors argue that this method consists of 
examining “histories, archival documents, interview transcripts, and other sources to see whether 
the causal process a theory hypothesizes (...) is in fact evident in the sequence and values of the 
intervening variables in that case” (2005, 6). Process-tracing differs from simple narratives in 
three ways: it deals only with selected and focused aspects of a phenomenon, is based heavily on 
a theoretical framework, and its goal is to reach a narrative explanation of a causal path that 
results in a specific outcome (Vennesson 2008, 235).  
This methodology enables us to investigate complex causal relationships characterised by 
multiple causality, complex interaction effects, feedback loops, or endogeneity. Put differently, 
while statistical methods enable the investigation of causal effects, process-tracing enables the 
unravelling of causal mechanisms. Hall (2002, 2007) insists on the fact that process-tracing, 
during backwards reasoning, should be structured by theories and hypotheses about the causal 
mechanisms investigated. In the course of the chapters dealing with case studies of processes of 
reform,
28
 bundles of reforms will enable us to identify the outcomes to investigate. The following 
characteristics will serve to determine what exactly a bundle of institutional reforms is:  
1- One reform, or attempt to reform, modifying several dimensions of the institutional 
architecture at once; 
2- Two or more reforms, or attempts to reform, dealing with several dimensions of the 
institutional architecture, which were initiated, discussed and/or adopted, concomitantly 
or otherwise, and were explicitly linked by the reform initiators during the process. 
A crucial point is that bundles of reforms do not necessarily include only successful reforms, and 
that a conscious and identifiable will must exist on the part of the initiators of the reform to link 
it to several institutional dimensions, either through one multidimensional reform, or through 
several reforms which are part of the same broader game and sequence. The constitutional 
package adopted in 2008 in France corresponds to the first type. This included provisions to 
modify the balance of powers between the executive and the parliament and introduced the 
possibility that a group of parliamentarians and citizens could promote a popular referendum. All 
of these provisions were discussed as part of the same reform. The parallel (successful) electoral 
and (failed) constitutional reforms of 2005 in Italy, on the other hand, correspond to the second 
type of bundle.
29
  
                                                 
28 Cf. chapters 6, 7 and 8.  
29 Cf. appendix 1.  
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In short, defining processes of reform through institutional bundles is helpful because it 
forces us to identify the starting and end points of the process being investigated. It abandons a 
single-dimensional vision of institutional reform in insisting on the multidimensionality of the 
tradeoffs taking place when discussing institutional matters, and focuses strongly on sequence 
and complex causal mechanisms.  
 
 Conclusion 
 
 Using the framework developed by Lijphart, this chapter has first and foremost shown 
why, since indubitable empirical evidence has shown that institutions are clustered, institutional 
change should also be studied as a multidimensional and systemic process. This chapter has also 
defined the two main functions of democratic institutions (representative and participative 
functions), and justified the six dimensions of institutional reforms that will be studied in 
subsequent chapters. I have introduced the SIEPOL database, which constitutes a major 
empirical contribution to the study of multidimensional institutional change in consolidated 
democracies. Finally, I have presented the notion of the bundle of reforms, a conceptual and 
empirical tool that will enable us to study multidimensional institutional change. The bundle of 
reforms is a concept built to illuminate the motives and the strategies of political actors, enabling 
us to better describe the processes of reform and non-reform, and helping to identify and 
understand the circumstances of intense institutional reforms.   
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Chapter 2 To reform or not to reform? The determinants 
and processes of  institutional change in established 
democracies 
 
 
 The first chapter has seen an interesting paradox taking shape: whereas this is now seen as 
common sense to treat political institutions as a coherent system, there are few tools in the 
literature with which to analyse systemic institutional change affecting several dimensions at once. 
The concept of the bundle of reforms is meant to address this contradiction. So far, the issue of 
the determinants and processes of reform, which is the core interrogation of this thesis, has not 
been developed. The aim of this chapter is to answer the following questions: what are the 
determinants behind institutional reforms in established democracies that have been identified by 
the existing literature? How do the dynamics inherent to the processes of reform facilitate or 
impede change? Finally, how does the current context faced by Western European elites enable 
us to formulate hypotheses concerning the determinants and processes of reform?  
The chapter will proceed in three sections. In the first section, I will show that three fields 
of literature prove useful in tackling the issue of the determinants and mechanisms of change: the 
first deals with electoral system change, the second with regime change, and the third with policy 
change. These accounts suggest several sets of incentives and obstacles to change: political crisis, 
political instability, and the state of the pre-existing institutional system. Some incentives and 
barriers to change are exogenous to the political actors that make institutional changes, while 
others result from the endogenous interactions of actors within the political system. On the other 
hand, the research in this field has confirmed the existence of several barriers to change, the 
importance of taking the roles of complexity and uncertainty into account, and how the type of 
reform and the type of process leading to reform (or non-reform) are intrinsically linked.  
The second section shows that authors often fall into traps, of which there are several, 
and these mainly devive from the absence of cross-national and multidimensional data on 
institutional change: that reforms are rare, mainly self-interested, and tend to happen as isolated 
events. Moreover, when authors studying institutional change adopt a strategy that is not based 
on case studies, insufficient attention is paid to the particular context in which political elites 
govern and compete as an integral part of the explanation. 
 There is good reason to believe that the existing literature does not adequately respond to 
the challenges posed by the analysis of multidimensional reforms of the core democratic rules, 
32 
To Reform or Not to Reform? 
and this is the object of the final section. Political science tends to assume that a static world 
exists outside of the political system, whereas specific contexts entail specific sets of explanations 
for change. Therefore, I argue that the context is central, not only to the understanding of the 
differences between countries, but also to the understanding of the differences between periods. 
Indeed, numerous conceptual and empirical arguments have been put forward suggesting that 
political elites in Western European democracies have been trapped in areas of turbulence for the 
last two decades, with this taking the form of a general “erosion of political support” (Dalton 
2004) I conclude by presenting three sets of general propositions about the description of 
change, the determinants of change and the mechanisms of change which I will present in further 
details in the empirical chapters.  
 
1. Explaining the determinants and processes of  institutional change 
 
In 1992, Steinmo and Thelen wrote that “although arguably one of the most important issues 
in comparative politics, [the question of institutional formation and change] has received little 
attention in most of the literature to date” (1992, 15). So what has happened since the authors 
specified this agenda of research? Quite a lot, actually. Institutions used to be treated as 
independent variables, explaining a number of political outcomes. Having identified sources of 
institutional stability, political science has made considerable progress in providing insights into 
the determinants and the mechanisms of institutional change. This was made possible by the 
combined efforts of three fields of study: works on electoral system change (on which this thesis 
relies more particularly), regime change, and some accounts on policy change. Authors working 
on institutional reforms have tried to answer two broad questions: the “why” (the triggers that 
might explain the use of reforms and their motives), and the “how” (the processes that can 
explain the final outcome of reforms).30 Drawing from the conclusions of these three strands of 
literature, I will present first the main triggers of change in established democracies, and secondly, 
the mechanisms and processes of institutional reform.   
 
 
 
                                                 
30 Although this specific literature is not used in this chapter, the questions of “why” and “how” things 
change have undoubtedly been investigated by authors focusing on party system change (Mair 1997, Smith 
1989) and on changes within party organizations (Aucante, Dézé, and Sauger 2008, Katz and Mair 1995, 
Katz and Mair 2009). 
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1.1. Triggers of  reform: exogenous factors, endogenous factors, and their interaction 
Reflections on the triggers of institutional reforms have usually followed the progress of 
the debate begun by the new institutionalists concerning the crucial importance of institutions. 
Starting from the assumption that institutions are intrinsically stable, authors have progressively 
accounted for the possibility of institutional change. Earlier accounts focused on exceptional 
circumstances that prompt institutional reform, namely democratic transitions and deep political 
crises. More recently, authors have taken into consideration reform triggers taking place in 
“everyday” politics, such as shifts in political competition. These factors can be characterised as 
exogenous to the political systems. Finally, recent reflections have insisted on the interaction 
between “exogenous” and “endogenous” triggers of change. These accounts develop the 
argument that certain political systems are more prone to reform than others if certain 
circumstances are present.  
 
1.1.1. From institutions as independent variables to institutions as dependent 
variables: accounting for the possibility of  change 
The beginning of the 1990s saw a renewed interest in the role of institutions that has 
been broadly labelled as new institutionalisms. Very early on, analysts confessed the lack of works 
dealing with institutional change. Indeed, the underlying assumption of most authors was that 
institutions are by definition relatively stable features, since they are meant to shape human 
interactions. By drawing on the general concepts of self-enforcing institutions31 and path 
dependence (Pierson 2000a), new institutionalist scholars have identified three main factors of 
stability. Firstly, there are transaction costs inherent to institutional reform (reforming is never 
cost-free, North 1990). Secondly, actors with the power to change the rules are characterised by 
risk-aversion (actors might prefer the status quo to risk even if they anticipate they could 
theoretically gain something from change). Thirdly, and more crucially, as actors benefit from 
increasing returns through the use of existing institutions over time, there is an absence of 
rationale for institutional reform (Pierson 2000a, 2000b): the more they use them, the more 
benefits they get from their use. The conjunction of these three factors leads to a situation of 
stability that Shepsle has called “structure-induced equilibrium”. He defines this situation as the 
moment where “no alternative allowed by the rules of procedures is preferred by all the 
individuals, structural units, and coalitions that possess distinctive veto or voting power” (1989, 
                                                 
31 Self-enforcing institutions are defined by the fact that “it is in the interest of the actors to abide by the 
limits imposed by the institutions” (Weingast 1998, 175).  
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137). As long as institutions are seen to exist as equilibria, change is difficult to consider except in 
moments of great disruptions. Indeed, the initial explanations of institutional change were hardly 
more than expressions of an implicit reluctance to admit that intentional institutional change is 
even possible. Consequently, change was seen as the consequence of a punctuated equilibrium, 
i.e., the fundamental and exogenous disruptions of the political system leading to substantial 
change (Baumgartner and Jones 1993), that other authors refer to as a “critical juncture” (Collier 
and Collier 1991,  Capoccia and Kelemen 2007), following long periods of stability.  
Figure 1. Evolution of the theoretical debate about institutions and institutional change 
 
The last two decades have witnessed a major change of focus. Institutions have been 
studied progressively not only as independent variables, influencing social, economic and political 
outcomes, but also as dependent variables (Figure 1), subject to change and even to constitutional 
engineering (Sartori 1994).  
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One can distinguish between the literature which focuses on policy change, investigating 
gradual institutional change, and the literature that deal with regime change and electoral system 
change. The former is particularly useful for the analysis of certain types of “slow-moving” 
processes, relating to what Pierson called “politics in time” (2004). Some historical neo-
institutionalist authors apply concepts of evolutionary theory to the study of institutional change, 
showing that “from an evolutionary perspective, change is the normal state – not something that 
is punctuated occasionally” (Steinmo 2010, 16). They demonstrate how different variables matter 
to varying extents depending on their contrexts, and how cognitive schemas and ideas constantly 
generate variations which enable us to explain the diversity of human institutions (Lewis and 
Steinmo 2012). Others have focused on incremental change. Thelen was among the first to 
explicitly acknowledge that discontinuous, abrupt change may not be the most common manner 
in which institutions change over time, also noting that institutions were sometimes surprisingly 
resilient in times of massive upheaval (2004). This interest in the incrementl processes of 
institutional change continued in 2005 with the elaboration of a typology about four different 
types of change: displacement (replacement of rules by new ones), layering (introduction of new 
rules in addition to existing ones), drift (changed impact of existing rules due to environmental 
shifts), and conversion (changed enactment of existing rules due to strategic redeployment, 
Streeck and Thelen 2005). Based on this perspective, the core focus is not the moments when 
changes occur, but rather the mechanisms that lead to change and stability over time. The 
literature on regime and electoral change, on the other hand, has tackled both the triggers and the 
mechanisms of institutional change.  
Now that the evolution of the debate on institutions over the last faw decades has been 
briefly presented, we can focus on the determinants of institutional change as they have been 
developed through the literature on regime change and electoral system change. For the sake of 
simplicity, these institutional reform factors can be divided into two main categories: exogenous 
factors of change, and endogenous factors of change.  
 
1.1.2. Exogenous factors of  change: crises, transitions, and shifts of  political 
competition  
The development of explanations about the determinants of institutional change has resulted 
from certain tangible, albeit puzzling, developments that have taken place during the last few 
decades: one one hand, the third wave of democratisation that began in the 1970s (Huntington 
1993); and on the other hand, the concomitance of three major electoral reforms in three 
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established democracies in 1993. Earlier explanations for this pointed to the presence of political 
crises or democratic transitions. Others – more relevant to our own study of established 
European democracies- have illustrated how party system change and electoral instability have 
constituted decisive incentives for electoral system change. 
In the year 1993 alone, three “old” democracies have adopted new electoral systems: New-
Zealand, Japan, and Italy. The three countries were experiencing particularly high levels of 
political dissatisfaction, taking different forms in each country: corruption scandals in Japan and 
Italy, economic turmoil in New Zealand, popular referendums in both New Zealand and Italy, 
rapid electoral change in all three countries.32 The combination of political crisis and widespread 
citizen dissatisfaction has been interpreted as a crucial trigger of electoral system change. Other 
authors, who have focused on democratic transition in post-communist countries (Birch et al. 
2002) have emphasised the link between electoral system change and the process of stabilisation 
of party systems. For instance, Benoit and Hayden show how the successive electoral outcomes 
in Poland led to progressive readjustments being made to the electoral law initially adopted after 
the transition (2004).  
This focus on crisis is even more overwhelming as regards the literature on regime change. 
Moore’s seminal account, in which he examined the social genesis of democratic, fascist and 
communist regimes, demonstrated the central role of violent social revolution in bringing about 
democratisation (1966); a theory expanded by Skocpol who examined the social conditions prior 
to social revolutions (1979). Unlike accounts of electoral system change where authors usually 
rely on case studies, this agenda of research has also used large-N studies extensively. Haggard 
and Kaufman (1995) show that democratisation, and to an even greater extent coups and returns 
to dictatorships, are strongly associated with economic crises. In a later piece of work, two 
authors cite empirical evidence that moves towards democracy occur “in the face of significant 
social conflict and possible threat of revolution”, in combination with the fact that policy 
concessions are not credible and repression is too costly (Acemoğlu and Robinson 2006, 29). 
Overall, what Congleton calls the “revolutionary hypothesis” (2010) constitutes the dominant 
understanding of how regime change occurs. 
The main issue with these “crisis” explanations of electoral system and regime change is that 
they deal with exceptional rather than everyday politics. By definition, during regime transitions, 
the former constitutional order is suspended, so that the applicability of these explanations to 
                                                 
32 For the reasons behind the crisis and its consequences in Italy, Cf. Bartolini and D’Alimonte (1995), 
D’alimonte (2005), Donovan (1995), Fabbrini (2000), Massetti (2006), Renwick (2010). For Japan, cf. Reed 
and Thies (2001), Renwick (2010). For New Zealand, cf. Vowles (1995), Renwick (2010).  
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study institutional reforms in established democracies is probably limited. That being said, the 
context in which the 1993 electoral reforms took place was also relatively unusual in many ways, 
as the Japanese, Italian and New-Zealander systems had shown signs of malfunctioning 
(corruption and low governability for Japan and Italy, reversed majorities for New Zealand) for 
quite a few years.  
Recently enough, the literature on electoral system change has endeavoured to go beyond 
crisis-based explanations. The focus had centred on shifts in political competition, and the 
previous state of the party system, as determinants of electoral reforms. Several authors have 
analysed the link between electoral reform and change in terms of political competition by 
“reversing” Duverger’s laws33 (Benoit 2007, Colomer 2005). They have turned around the 
common assumption that electoral laws shape electoral outcomes, and ultimately, party systems. 
In doing so, these authors show that, in countries such as Belgium or Holland for example, which 
adopted proportional representation at the beginning of the 20th century, the proliferation of 
multiple parties in parliament preceded the adoption of PR. Thus, the conventional wisdom 
considering that PR actually caused multipartism was reversed. A number of authors have 
developed empirical models based on the switch from single-member plurality to proportional 
representation in Europe at the beginning of the 20th century. These pieces of research have 
demonstrated how the emergence of socialist parties threatening incumbent elites (Rokkan 1970, 
Boix 1999). Authors have also outlined the correction of “partisan biases” caused by majoritarian 
electoral systems after the extension of electoral franchise (Calvo 2009), along with showing how  
contexts of extreme political uncertainty for the main national parties vis-à-vis future electoral 
success have led to proportional electoral reforms in Western Europe (Andrews and Jackman 
2005). Focusing on more recent times, Remmer shows how, over the last few decades, the degree 
of electoral volatility in Latin-America, as well as the variation in the effective number of political 
parties contributes helps to explain the frequency of electoral system change (2008).  
As a conclusion, these studies show that certain exceptional circumstances (political crisis, 
democratic transition), as well as shifts in political competition (emergence of new parties, 
growing volatility, etc.) constitute factors that facilitate institutional reforms. However, are all 
political systems equally sensitive to these particular circumstances?  
 
 
 
                                                 
33 Duverger’s “laws” analyse the link between electoral systems and the format of party systems (1951). 
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1.1.3. Endogenous factors of  change: why are some political systems more 
vulnerable to change? 
The literature which has been reviewed concerning the determinants of change has enabled 
to identify certain circumstances in which change is more likely. However, change does not 
depend solely on the existence of favourable circumstances. Certain political systems are more 
prone to institutional reform than others. Thus endogenous factors of change (the current state 
of a given system, the number of veto players) interact constantly with exogenous factors of 
change.  
The literature on regime change has only marginally, and very recently, addressed the issue of 
the interaction between existing institutional systems and change. Congleton (2010), who 
examined the emergence of the modern parliament in Western Europe during the 19th century, 
shows that in many instances, institutional reforms have occurred, and yet circumstances which 
are favourable to change (crisis, political shifts and so on) have not always been present. The 
divided nature of political power (between the king and the council) in some European countries, 
as well as the progressive emergence of new economic interests and new ideas, have led to a 
series of peaceful and cumulative institutional reforms, and eventually, to parliament and 
government as we now know them. This theory differs quite substantially from that developed by 
Acemoğlu and Robinson, for instance, as Congleton insists on the interaction between 
endogenous factors of change (divided power) and exogenous factors of change (changing ideas 
and economic interests).  
In the field of electoral system change, Colomer (2004) bases his research on a large dataset 
of electoral reforms in 94 countries, dating back to the beginning of their democratic histories, 
and notes a general trend towards proportional representation. He attributes this to the fact that 
majoritarian systems are more easily replaced when new challengers emerge within the electoral 
arena. His main hypothesis, which is confirmed by the data, is stated as such: “it can be 
postulated that the more restrictive and exclusionary the existing electoral system – such as those 
based on majority rule – and the higher the number of parties with popular support or reasonable 
expectations of getting it, the stronger the pressures for electoral system change in favour of 
more permissive and inclusive formulas will be” (Colomer 2004, 4). Again, his underlying 
argument is that the existing party systems and incentives for change (such as the emergence of 
new electoral challengers) interact to produce stronger or weaker incentives for change.  
Other authors have focused on the link between the “extreme” character of electoral systems, 
and change-related tensions (Shugart 2003). Shugart develops the idea that reforms are the result 
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of the conjunction between what he calls “contingent” events, and “inherent” characteristics (an 
electoral system considered to be extreme based on the degree of personalisation of the votes and 
the concentration of power in the government). He shows that, before the reforms of the 1990s, 
both Italy and Japan displayed extreme characteristics in relation to the personalisation of voting 
(because of electoral systems based heavily on preference voting), which, in combination with 
corruption scandals and political crises, served to fuel reform.   
In an updated version Shugart defines the inherent condition as such: “poor performance, 
relative to normal standards for the electoral system in use that results from the mechanical 
application of the seat allocation principle of the existing system.” He adds: “when this poor 
performance leads to obviously anomalous outcomes, it can be said that the inherent tendencies 
of the system have generated a systemic failure”(Shugart 2008, 9–10). Anomalous outcomes would 
include, for example, the fact that a party that receives the second largest amount of votes can 
still win more seats than its main opponent in a First-Past-The-Post system (“plurality reversal”), 
which happened twice in New Zealand during the 1980s. He concludes by saying that, in order to 
find a place on the agenda, a governing party must acknowledge that it has an interest in 
modifying the system. In other words, systemic failure is a necessary but insufficient condition 
for reform.  
Finally, some authors, focusing on policy change as opposed to institutional change, have 
developed theories concerning veto points, or veto players. This approach was introduced by 
Immergut (1990, 1992)34 and has been systematised by Tsebelis (2002). Tsebelis’s core argument 
posits that “to change the legislative status quo, a certain number of individual or collective actors 
have to agree to the proposed change” (2002, 2). Consequently, opportunities to change the 
status quo are dependent on both the number of veto players and on the ideological distance 
between them. Tsebelis concludes bluntly predicting that “countries with many veto players will 
have policy stability, while the ones with one veto player may have instability” (2002, 5). Of 
course, one question immediately springs to mind in contemplating the applicability of the vet 
player theory to institutional change: are policy change and institutional change comparable? 
Many authors, Colomer included, have argued that they are incomparabl, and that bringing about 
change in institutions is a more difficult task than changing policies (2001, 235). Acemoğlu and 
Robinson argue that “conflict about policies is static - it is about what happens today. Rational 
actors also care about the future. This is where political institutions - which are durable, and, 
                                                 
34 Immergut was actually not talking of veto players, but of veto points, later defined by other authors as 
“areas of institutional vulnerability, that is, points in the policy process where the mobilization of 
opposition can thwart policy innovation” (Steinmo and Thelen 1992, 7). 
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consequently, have the capacity to influence political actions and political equilibria in the future - 
come in” (2006, 173). Are policies “static” and easier to change than institutions? Actually, the 
number of longitudinal and cross-national studies on institutional reforms that have been 
conducted is too small to be able to accept or reject the postulate that policy change works in the 
same way as institutional change.  
As a conclusion, my hypotheses on the determinants of change will rely heavily on the 
interaction between “exogenous” triggers, such as electoral instability and “endogenous” triggers 
(pre-existing institutional and party system, veto players) and their impact on the adoption of 
institutional reforms. Still, several implicit premises will be challenged, in particular the notions 
that reforms are exceptional events, that they can be explained through parsimonious models of 
self-maximising utility in zero-sum games, and finally, that they occur independently from each 
other.35 
 
1.2. The processes of  institutional change: paths and barriers of  reform 
Even when circumstances favourable to institutional reforms are present, a lost must 
happen in the time between when an institutional change first appears on the agenda, and the 
moment of adoption and implementation of a reform or series of reforms. Therefore, it is 
important to understand the processes behind institutional change.36 Existing works note the 
existence of various paths and barriers that encourage and impede institutional reform. They also 
draw attention to the undertain impact of ambiguity and complexity on the final outcome of 
reforms. Finally, authors focusing on incremental institutional change have provided evidence 
that not all types of rules offer the same incentives for reform. This means that different actors 
and processes lead to different forms of change according to the nature of the rule at stake.  
 
1.2.1. Who initiates reform? The existence of  distinctive paths for institutional 
reform 
Contrary to the literature dealing with triggers for institutional change, where attempts have 
been made to utilise large-N analysis, the literature dealing with the processes of adoption of 
institutional reforms is mostly based on case studies, and most of the authors in thid bracket 
share a qualitative, comparative and historical perspective.  
                                                 
35 Cf. section 2.  
36 Cf. also chapter 5, in which the mechanisms behind processes of reform are studied in much more 
detail.  
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In the field of regime change, one of the most influential accounts on the “problems of 
democratic transition and consolidation” is the aforementioned book by Linz and Stepan (1996). 
The two authors, in examining the processes leading to (or failing to result in) complete 
democratic consolidation in three regions (Southern Europe, South American and post-
communist Europe) distinguish between different paths of transition. They argue that these paths 
result from crucial differences in the basic characteristics of regime-ideology, in conceptions of 
pluralism, in forms of mobilisation and finally, in the leaderships of the previous regimes. For 
example, they refer to “pacted” transitions which occur through the negotiation of tacit 
agreements concerning the character and sequence of political change. This pathway away from 
authoritarianism would not be feasible in regimes where no organised opposition or “moderate” 
elites are present within the authoritarian regime. Therefore, the path of democratic transition 
depends on actor-centred variables (the type of elite and leadership strategies) as well as other 
factors (cultural, economic, and political).  
In the field of electoral system change, many countries have been studied, including Italy 
(Chiaramonte and Di Virgilio 2006; Katz 1995; Renwick, Hanretty, and Hine 2009), France 
(Browne and Hamm 1996), Germany (Bawn 1993), Israel  (Diskin and Diskin 1995; Rahat 2004) 
and Mexico (Diaz-Cayeros and Magaloni 2001).37 Renwick provides the most comprehensive 
summary of all of the knowledge accumulated through these case studies over the last two 
decades. He developeds a crucial distinction between the two main pathways of electoral reform 
in established democracies, distinguishing between reforms characterised by “elite-majority 
imposition” and those characterised by “elite-mass interaction”. The former is defined by the fact 
that “politicians dominate the reform process and (…) primarily seek to advance their own 
power” (Renwick 2010, 138). The electoral reform of 1986 in France replacing majority runoff 
with PR in order to avoid the electoral defeat of the Socialist Party, is presented as the 
archetypical example. The latter is characterised by the fact that a minority of politicians brought 
the issue of reform to the people in order to achieve sufficient popular mobilisation to bring the 
issue to the parliament.  
The significance of this approach is its ability to illustrate that different reform routes imply 
different building blocks, and distinct processes in the achievement of reform, depending on who 
initiates the reform. Jacobs (2011a, 2011b), who examines a wide range of electoral reforms in 
consensual democracies, has developed the notion of the “onion model”: when governing 
politicians initiate the reform process, they are more likely to try to modify more substantive 
                                                 
37 To name only some of the studies dealing with established democracies. 
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aspects of the institutional system (“inner layers”) that have a greater influence on the distribution 
of power. In instances, when they are subjected to the introduction of reforms on the agenda, 
they are more likely to give up symbolic measures affecting the “outer layers”. Reformulating his 
conclusions, it could be argued that politicians tend to focus on divisive issues when they are the 
initiators of reform, while focusing on consensual institutional reforms when they are forced to 
act.  
 
1.2.2. Barriers for change and the role of  uncertainty in the outcomes of  reform 
The distinctive processes which lead to successful or failed attempts of reforms can also be 
accounted by the presence of different barriers for change interacting in a unique way in each 
political setting. It is important to acknowledge that we are not looking at a deterministic process: 
the outcome of a given reform is always contingent and probabilistic.  
Two authors (Rahat and Hazan 2011) have tried to synthesise and articulated the seven 
possible barriers for electoral reform, which can be expanded to include institutional reforms in 
general: legal barriers (1); the cultural and political traditions of the countries (2); the social 
structure within the society (3); the fact the system produces certain expected outcomes (4); the 
vested interests of parties within the existing electoral system (5); coalition politics (6); and 
disagreement over content (7). They show that political traditions, social structures and systemic 
barriers are the easiest obstacles to overcome, especially if some of the more powerful actors 
have strong interest in reforming. Legal barriers and disagreements over content can delay 
reform, while the strongest barriers are those posed by vested interests and coalition politics. The 
authors also rightly note that the relative strength of each of these barriers varies across specific 
reform constellations, based on the previous scenario, constitutional arrangements, the political 
context of the reform’s introduction, and so on. For example, coalition politics constitute more 
of a barrier in countries where a large number of parties are in government, such as Israel or 
Belgium, while vested interests in the electoral system play a more prominent role in countries 
characterised by single member plurality such as the United-Kingdom.   
There are many barriers for reform that  could potentially influence final outcomes, but the 
process is also dynamic and sequential, so that “the analysis of the process [of institutional 
reform] demonstrates that the politics of reform are to a great extent about building and 
rebuilding coalitions” (Rahat 2008, 3). Therefore, at each step of the process of reform, new 
actors and dynamics come into play. One of the major findings of the analysis of processes of 
institutional reforms, and particularly electoral reforms, was to show the central role of 
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“recognized uncertainty” (Renwick, 2010). The very fact the final outcome of reform is 
constructed through a series of sequence goes some way to explaining why misperceptions and 
uncertainty as to the effect of a given reform might not impede, but rather facilitate the process 
of reform.38 Several authors, including Katz (2005) and Rahat (2004), have shown that main 
parties commonly underestimate the future effects of reforms. These misperceptions have, in 
several cases, led to the adoption of a reform apparently contrary to the interests of the main 
actors. Such misperceptions are all the more common when the reforms in question are complex, 
such as during the discussion on mixed-member electoral reforms (Shugart and Wattenberg 
2001).  
In conclusion, actors face a series of barriers when promoting institutional reform, and these 
barriers should be assessed and differentiated depending on the context. Moreover, it is 
important to take into account the sequencing of reform, as well as uthe inherent ncertainty and 
complexity thereof, as they are likely to contriute  meaningfully to our understanding of play the 
final outcomes of processes of reform. 
 
1.2.3. Incremental institutional change: the link between the nature of  reform, 
the actors of  reform, and change 
Mahoney and Thelen attempted to understand whether a precise combination of factors 
could explain the success or failure of policy change by developing an original model of gradual 
institutional change, focusing on the notion that particular institutional properties drive certain 
actors towards behaviour that fosters change (Mahoney and Thelen 2010b). The authors argue 
that shifts in balances of power serve as important sources of change. So too do issues of 
compliance, i.e., the varying degree of openness in the interpretation and implementation of 
rules. Two central questions are seen as determining both the agents of change and the type of 
institutional change that is likely to occur: (1) how strong is the veto capacity afforded to 
defenders of the status quo in the given political context? (2) Does the targeted institution allow 
actors to exercise discretion in the interpretation and enforcement of rules? Mahoney and Thelen 
argue, for example, that displacement is more likely where veto possibilities are low, and where 
the margin of discretion is low too. They also argue that, in combination, the margin of discretion 
and veto possibilities can offer a greater or smaller field of action to certain actors. For instance, 
the actors they refer to as the “insurrectionaries” (those who do not want to preserve the status 
                                                 
38 In particular, the framework developed by Rahat (2004, 2008) was presented in more details in the first 
chapter, section 2.1.1.  
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quo nor to abide by the rules) are expected to play a central role in bringing about displacement. 
To summarise, “political context and institutional form have these effects because they shape the 
type of dominant change agent that is likely to emerge and flourish in any specific institutional 
context, and the kinds of strategies this agent is likely to pursue to effect change” (Mahoney and 
Thelen 2010b, 15).  
Mahoney and Thelen do not dwell on the modification of formal rules at specific moments, 
but instead focus on changes that have been made to formal and informal institutional rules over 
an extended period. Therefore, their theory is not directly applicable in this study. That being 
said, their analysis is particularly interesting for our investigation of the processes contributing to 
bundles of reforms, for several reasons. First, the authors establish a link between the type of 
institution that is being modified, the ability of veto players to stop that change, and the type of 
institutional change process that is likely to occur. Hence, the nature of the institution in question 
is central to understanding why institutional change is rolled out in one direction or another. 
Here, these authors focus on the level of discretion afforded by the institutions. When it comes 
to changing formal core democratic rules, other defining characteristics of the relevant 
institutions may be central to explaining the outcomes of the processes of reform, such as the 
(perceived) level of support for the proposed modification.39 Secondly, and as Tsebelis, Mahoney 
and Thelen assert the “veto possibilities” are a central variable. Thirdly, these authors maintain 
that there is no single path to reform, but several: they also maintain that certain paths to reform 
have affinities with particular types of reform, and particular actors leading reform. 
These reflections lead us to ask three questions regarding the processes of bundles of reform: 
(1) can reforms of core democratic rules be divided into different types, with defining 
characteristics? (2) Can several distinct processes of institutional change of formal core 
democratic rules be identified, and are these processes linked with particular actors? And finally, 
(3) ss there a link between these types of reforms, and the types of processes leading to reform or 
non-reform?40 
 
 
 
                                                 
39 Cf. infra.  
40 Cf. infra, chapter 5.  
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2. The three illusions of  the literature on institutional reforms 
 
The research conducted on electoral system change and regime change has undoubtedly 
represented a major milestone in overcoming the focus on institutional stability and in finally 
explaining (or at least attemting to) institutional change in established democracies. However, this 
research has relied on three illusions that must be reflected upon in order to provide an 
understanding of institutional reforms in a multidimensional perspective. The first illusion is the 
contention that reforms are rare. The second is that parsimonious models based purely on the 
redistribution of power can account for the outcome of reform. The third illusion is that reforms 
only occur as isolated events. Issues with the current literature derive mainly from the restrictive 
definition of the dependent variable. They can be summed up as three separate questions: are 
institutional reforms so unusual? Are they zero-sum games? Can they be described as “one-shot” 
games? If the answer to these three questions is a triple “no”, then, distinctive models and tools 
for reflecting and measuring change must be developed in order to enable us to analyse reforms 
of core democratic rules.  
 
2.1. The illusion of  rarity: are institutional reforms so unusual?  
For a great part, the enthusiasm shown in the study of electoral system change and regime 
change has been, and still is, a consequence of the academic will to bear witness to exceptionally 
uncommon developments. In fact, this has mainly been due to the implicit adoption of stringent 
definitions in relation to what “classifies” as an institutional reform, leading to limitations of 
focus in the study of major reforms. Recent attempts to expand the definition of the dependent 
variable in both fields of study have tended to suggest that the difficulties in achieving 
institutional reform might have been exaggerated, while the frequency of institutional reforms in 
established democracies may have been greatly underestimated. 
 
2.1.1. The overwhelming focus on major institutional reforms 
In 1994, Lijphart found evidence of  only 14 cases of  substantial electoral reform in the 27 
democracies he studied.41 Renwick (2010) highlights the rarity of  major electoral reforms, stating 
that only ten far-reaching electoral reforms were adopted in established democracies between 
                                                 
41 Among these, six reforms happened in France and five in Greece (Lijphart 1994, 57). 
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1945 and 2010. Like most authors, he attributes this stability to the fact that the actors that 
benefit from the existing rules are the same ones that have the power to change them. More 
concretely, this means that in the vast majority of  cases, the reforms that have been investigated 
in depth are reforms that have substantially influenced the translation of  votes into parliamentary 
seats at the national level (or in other words, the balance of  powers between political actors). 
Katz phrases this as a paradox: “why are there so many (or so few) electoral reforms?” His 
objective is to show that two different issues arise according to the way electoral reforms are 
defined: 
“If  electoral reform is understood to apply only to such major changes in the electoral 
system as the replacement of  SMP with PR, or of  PR with MMP, then the question is why 
such reforms occur at all (…) Why, it is often asked, would politicians change the rules of  a 
game they have been winning? (…) On the other hand, if  electoral reform is understood to 
include such apparently more minor changes in the electoral system as the alteration of  
ballot access requirements (e.g. the British increase in electoral deposit from £150 to £500 in 
1985) or a change from one PR formula to another, then the question is why reforms remain 
relatively infrequent.” (Katz 2005, 59–60) 
The argument is important, because Katz states, in simple terms, that which has remained 
implicit in the previous accounts on electoral reform, and institutional reform in general: 
according to the manner in which the dependent variable is defined, different aspects may seem 
puzzling. Even more significantly, the criteria which explain the final outcome of  reform can be 
seen to differ as well. The same remarks apply to the literature on regime change: I have already 
mentioned the fact that the existing explanations focus on exceptional factors because they 
implicitly adopt a maximalist definition of  regime change, focusing only on wholesale 
replacement of  institutions. 
What happens if  one adopts a more modest vision of  institutional reforms, one that is not 
limited to major changes, but also includes (apparently) less far-reaching reforms? The 
assessment might well be extremely different, and might help to put other assumptions of  
authors studying institutional change into perspective. As the previous section has shown, while 
major advances have been made in identifying the determinants of  change, most authors see 
reform as a consequence of  the rare conjunction of  structural and contingent elements. This 
“exceptionalist” conception of  reform may have consequences when an expanded range of  
reforms is taken into account. Empirically, the actual extent of  change might be overlooked. 
Theoretically, existing hypotheses may overestimate the effect of  certain barriers to change, and 
exaggerate the rational and self-interested character of  institutional reforms. 
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2.1.2. Some fragmented attempts to move beyond major reforms 
Authors have only very recently begun to tackle the issue by expanding their definition of  
reform. In the field of  electoral reform, two authors have developed tentative classifications of  
major and minor reforms (Jacobs and Leyenaar 2011). However their work shows the difficulty in 
distinguishing between the concepts of  “major” and “minor” reforms without taking into 
account their ex post consequences. This issue is all the more significant in that in practice, it has 
consistently been demonstrated that apparently innocuous reforms can have lasting and 
important consequences, whereas seemingly more ambitious reforms can be bypassed.42 As a 
consequence, Jacobs and Leyenaar develop a convincing classification that distinguishes ex ante 
between three categories of  reforms: major, minor and technical reforms.43 These are based on 
the expansion of  what Lijphart calls the “20% criteria” for several types of  electoral system 
change.44 This criteria, in turn, is based on the idea that for every aspect of  the electoral system 
that can be “quantified”, such as the number of  constituencies, the size of  the electorate and so 
on, any reform that represents a change of  more than 20% when compared to the previous 
“level” (for example, a 21% increase in the number of  constituencies) constitutes a major reform. 
Inspired by this method of  classification, the next chapter will include a categorisation of  
reforms (breaking reforms up into their functions, their scope, and into various categories for 
each dimension), as such important empirical distinctions are crucial to our understanding of  
change.45 
The same authors have also shown that the existing theories used to account for the 
behaviour of  political elites during processes of  reform, relating mainly (although not exclusively) 
to the maximisation of  seats (or at least to the minimisation of  losses), do not convincingly 
account for cases of  minor electoral reform. Taking the example of  the 1997 electoral reform in 
Holland, which falls into the category of  minor reforms, Jacobs and Leyenaar show that self-
interest is only marginally able to explain party strategies, since the parties had believed that this 
reform would only marginally affect the repartition of  seats in the Parliament. 
                                                 
42 This has been eloquently illustrated by the case of Italy from 1993 onwards, where small political parties 
managed to bypass the majoritarian part of the new electoral system by negotiating constituencies leading 
to a de facto “proportionalization” of the majoritarian system (Bartolini and D’Alimonte 1995). In 2008, 
small parties were virtually erased from the Italian parliament after the adoption of apparently ridiculously 
low thresholds. 
43 Technical reforms actually refer to very minor reforms. 
44 Jacobs and Leyenaar (2011) distinguish five categories of  reforms: reforms of  the proportionality of  the 
electoral system; reforms of  the ballot structure; reforms of  the inclusiveness of  the electoral legislation;, 
reforms of  the election level; and finally, reforms of  the practical organisation of  elections, with each one 
of  these categories being further divided into major, minor and technical reforms. 
45 Cf. appendix 2. 
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Within the sphere of  research on regime change, Congleton (2010) develops a theory of  
constitutional reform for the purpose of  analysing the peaceful and lawful shift from feudalism 
to modern parliamentarism. Unlike most other authors, Congleton does not limit his study to 
moments of  wholesale institutional replacement. He focuses on how the accumulation of  minor 
institutional reforms conducted through constitutional bargaining eventually led to the 
emergence of  a new parliamentary constitutional order in Western Europe during the 19th 
century. Again, what this example shows is that when we expand the definition of  what 
“classifies” as an institutional reform, the explanations for change and the “narrative” behind 
them differ quite substantially. 
To conclude, at this point we are not in position to answer the question, “are institutional 
reforms so uncommon?” So far, all we know is that major reforms are rare. There is a striking 
need to adopt a more all-encompassing definition of  institutional reform (one which is not 
limited to major changes), and to evaluate the frequency of  reforms empirically. This re-
evaluation may also put parts of  the theoretical premises used to study processes of  institutional 
reforms into perspective, most notably in the national case studies. 
 
2.2. The illusion of  parsimony: are institutional reforms zero-sum games? 
Almost invariably, the premise of  research dealing with both electoral reform and regime 
change, to a greater or lesser degree, lies in the belief  that all actors act as self-utility maximisers. 
The underlying assumption is that the politics of  institutional reform can be thought of  as a 
zero-sum game, with clear winners and losers. In fact, significant empirical and theoretical 
evidence suggests that, as a shortcut in accounting for institutional reform, this is particularly 
problematic. 
 
2.2.1. Actors as self-maximisers: the consequence of  a redistributive vision of  
institutions 
Few fields of  study seem better suited to the development of  parsimonious, self-
maximising, explanations for change as institutional engineering, at least at face value. Indeed, in 
analysing both electoral system change and regime change, authors tend to present the politics of  
reform as a game that is played to distribute political power. For instance, some of  the most 
influential authors working on democratic transitions define political institutions as “the social 
and political arrangements that allocate de jure political power” (Acemoğlu and Robinson 2006, 
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21). Conflict over institutions is seen as a struggle for power between elites, who already have 
power, and citizens, who want more. 
Electoral reforms, on the other hand, seem to be one of  the few “real-life” examples of  
zero-sum games in political science: what is gained by one party is lost by another, so that there 
are clear winners and losers after a given reform which can be identified by looking at the 
repartition of  votes and seats. This enables us to develop parsimonious theoretical models to 
explain the results of  the processes of  electoral reforms almost entirely on the basis of  seat 
maximisation. In one of  the most cited articles on the topic, Benoit argues that “a change in 
electoral institutions will occur when a political party or coalition of  political parties supports an 
alternative which will bring it more seats than the status quo electoral system, and also has the 
power to effect through fiat that institutional alternative” (2004, 373–374). Undeniably, these 
parsimonious explanations can account for many of  the interactions between actors when it 
comes to major reforms of  national electoral systems, most particularly in the case of  what 
Renwick (2010) calls reforms through “elite-majority imposition”, in which “external” actors are 
not involved.46 
Yet, I explained in the first chapter that my investigation is not limited to a single dimension 
of  institutional reform, such as electoral reform, but has a broader scope, as six different 
dimensions are studied. Moreover, it was already specified that the function of  political 
institutions cannot be limited to the mere allocation of  political power, as they also serve to 
regulate and enhance political participation. Tsebelis provides a useful distinction between 
“redistributive institutions” and “efficient institutions”. They are defined as such: 
“I call institutions efficient if  they improve (with respect with the status quo) the condition 
of  all (or almost all) individuals or groups in a society. Such institutions would have the 
unanimous (or nearly unanimous) support of  a society. (…) I call institutions redistributive if  
they improve the conditions of  one group in society at the expense of  another. Such 
institutions would be supported by only part of  a society’s population. The most prominent 
example of  such legislation is electoral laws” (Tsebelis 1990, 104). 
Parsimonious and self-maximising explanations for change should be limited to those 
reforms where the stakes are apparent and the future outcomes are relatively predictable, so that 
actors may reasonably be able to identify “winners” and “losers”. This is clearly not the case in 
relation to many processes of  institutional reform. 
 
 
                                                 
46 Cf. infra. 
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2.2.2. Moving beyond zero-sum games 
A growing branch of  the literature has already challenged these parsimonious, self-
maximising models, even when it comes to the apparently “archetypical” redistributive institution 
of  the electoral system. In the field of  electoral system change, some authors have underlined 
how ideas and values also have roles to play in reform processes (Bol 2011, Renwick and Pilet 
2009), in most cases through interaction with actors’ interests. Others accounts have shown that 
elites cannot ignore the roles of  citizens and external actors, such as judges and experts (Farrell 
and Bowler 2009, Norris 2011). Still others emphasise the great uncertainty surrounding the 
adoption of  electoral reforms, and the numerous information biases that put the “self-interest 
maximising” explanations into perspective, particularly the self-maximisation of  seats (Andrews 
and Jackman 2005). Pilet (2007, 2008), in examining several attempted electoral reforms in 
Belgium, reaches the same conclusion by showing that political actors, rather than being self-
interested maximisers, are actually risk-averse. They prefer to maintain an acceptable status quo 
rather than risk adopting a hypothetically more favourable, but potentially destabilising, electoral 
system. Time in government also decreases the likelihood of  supporting reform, meaning that 
governing parties are less willing to take risks than parties in opposition (Pilet and Bol 2011). 
Finally, as already mentioned, Jacobs and Leyenaar (2011) show that not only are the obstacles 
faced by minor electoral reforms much smaller than those faced by major reforms, but also that 
ideological, value-based, “act-contingent” (Reed and Thies 2001) and non-utilitarian 
considerations play much greater roles in the explanation of  actors’ strategies. 
Still, although many recent studies have relaxed the maximisation premises and greatly 
amended the existing models, the notion that institutional reforms in general, and electoral 
reforms in particular, are normally zero-sum games remains dominant. Exceptions to this rule 
(Bowler, Donovan, and Karp 2006; Fournier et al. 2011) are still seen as puzzling, and even 
anomalous. The reasoning behind this comes from the fact that reforms are thought of  as falling 
within the borders of  political competition. As soon as the range of  institutional reforms 
considered is expanded, this assumption does not hold; indeed, some institutional reforms have 
no direct impact on the actors in terms of  redistribution of  political power. In these cases, it is 
perfectly legitimate to think that cooperation, or even collusion between political actors, might 
offer a more logical explanation for the final outcomes of  some processes of  reform than 
competition. Bartolini also shows how the interaction between political actors can be described as 
a continuum between collusion and competition (1999, 2000). 
In brief, the parsimonious assumption of  self-maximisation, based on the notion that 
institutional reforms are redistributive, is a direct consequence of  a partial and limited conception 
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of  what “counts” as institutional change. This assumption will be challenged in greater depth in 
the case studies, where we will show that cooperation accounts for the outcome of  institutional 
reforms as much as political competition, especially when institutional bundles are on the table 
and contain consensual reforms.47 Thus, no single motivating factor can explain these processes, 
and neither can any single form of  interaction between actors. 
As a conclusion, in response to the question, “are institutional reforms zero-sum games?”, 
the answer has got to be “not all of  them”. Moreover, when it comes to a broader, more all-
encompassing vision of  institutional change, as in the case of  bundles of  institutional reforms, 
my provisional answer would still be “no”, as such bundles imply complex and multifaceted 
processes of  institutional reform. 
 
2.3. The illusion of  singularity: are institutional reforms best described as “one-shot” 
games? 
The two previous illusions (that institutional reforms are rare, and can be accounted for 
by parsimonious models) can be dispelled relatively easily through new empirical investigations 
on the one hand, and models accounting for the possibility of  institutional reforms that are not 
motivated purely by self-interest, on the other. The third commonly held illusion, or assumption, 
in the existing literature is in fact the most problematic for the purposes of  developing an 
argument centred on bundles of  reforms. 
 
2.3.1. The limits of  single-dimensional and single-country analyses in analysing 
institutional change 
So far, studies taking into account the multidimensional, clustered nature of  political 
systems in investigating institutional change have been scarce. In the field of  regime change, the 
differences in the dimensions of  the institutional systems examined have tended to be 
underreported, or have been understood very broadly, together with social and economic 
structures (cf. Skocpol 1979, for instance). Authors often adopt a minimal definition of  
democracy in order to define the transition from one regime to another, focusing mainly on the 
existence of  free elections in order to simplify matters, and to raise the number of  cases. For 
example, Acemoğlu and Robinson argue that their definition of  the move from non-democracy 
                                                 
47 For the theory, cf. chapter 5, and for the empirical applications, cf. in particular chapter 6 on Ireland, 
and chapter 7 on France. 
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to democracy is “Schumpeterian in the sense that we emphasize that a country is democratic if  a 
certain political process takes place – if  certain key institutions, such as free and fair elections and 
free entry into politics, are in place” (2006, 17–18). Such an “all-or-nothing” approach is limited 
to very specific institutional dimensions and institutional changes. In the field of  electoral reform, 
analysts also often ignore or underestimate the possibility that in many cases a given reform 
might be part of  a bigger game. 
Therefore, most authors have generally focused on a single country and/or a single 
dimension of  institutional reform. Consequently, reforms have generally been considered to 
result from contexts of  crisis, this being seen as the only possible explanation for the positive 
outcome of  a given reform process. Overcoming this “exceptionality” premise requires not only 
an examination of  a wider range of  institutional reforms and the abandonment of  parsimonious 
accounts of  actors’ behaviour, but also an understanding that a single institutional reform may 
very well be part of  a wider set of  reforms of  the political game in an established democracy. 
This is precisely why the concept of  bundles of  institutional reforms has been elaborated. 
 
2.3.2. Some fragmented examples of  cross-national and multidimensional 
studies of  institutional reforms 
What has become apparent in this discussion is that, in the end, the three “illusions” of  
rarity, parsimony and singularity are intrinsically linked, and that all derive from an empirical focus 
on major institutional changes, not least because of  an absence of  comparative cross-national 
data on the topic. This review of  literature would be incomplete if  I failed to mention the few 
exceptions. 
Armingeon has developed a study dealing with institutional change in OECD countries 
from 1970 to 2000 (2004), in which he has found evidence of  limited institutional change and an 
absence of  institutional convergence. However, he uses derived measures of  institutional change 
and proxies, such as fiscal decentralisation, to measure the degree of  federalism and 
decentralisation, and uses the number of  electoral parties to assess the extent to which a country 
is consensual or majoritarian. Moreover, Armingeon examines a wide range of  countries that are 
not fully comparable in terms of  democratic experience. He adopts broad definitions of  political 
institutions, including the welfare state and corporatism, compounding the existing confusion 
between political and economic institutions. A study of  post-communist countries from 1990 to 
2002 led by Armingeon and Careja (2008) tackles these issues partially. The authors measure the 
“constitutional core” (2008: 438) by examining several dimensions, such as the number of  
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chambers, special majorities for referendums, flexibility of  constitutions, degree of  
presidentialism, type of  electoral formula, etc.48 The authors then distinguish between this 
constitutional core and the “flexible institutions” which characterise the party systems. The 
findings are consistent with those of  the previous study, showing limited institutional change (but 
change nonetheless). 
In conclusion, in response to the question “can institutional reforms be adequately described 
as ‘single-shot’ games?”, my answer is an unequivocal “no”. This underlying assumption, as well 
as the two outlined previously, is a consequence of  the difficulty in developing a cross-national, 
multidimensional database on institutional change. Another major issue is that many authors who 
focus on institutional change tend to base their reasoning on the misconception that parties 
compete and survive in static political systems, immune to their changing environments. 
  
3. Challenges to legitimacy in Western Europe and institutional change  
 
Despite the limitations of  the existing explanations regarding the determinants and 
mechanisms of  institutional reforms, which have been outlined, the hypotheses that will be 
developed in the empirical chapters are heavily influenced by previous findings. Yet, my own 
hypotheses about the determinants of  change derive from the consideration that Western 
European political elites currently compete and govern in a context where their legitimacy is 
more at risk than it has been for decades, especially since their “output legitimacy” is increasingly 
difficult to maintain. In a democratic setting, elites need to sustain a certain amount of  assent, so 
as not to be swept away by new political forces. Institutional reforms may be thought of  as 
means for presiding political elites to achieve this objective in an uncertain environment. The 
final section of  this chapter will be devoted to a presentation of  the general hypotheses deriving 
from this particular context, as well as from the literature that has already been presented. 
 
                                                 
48 The datasets used for these two studies are available at the website addresses below. The first is an 
actualisation of  the one that was used for the 2004 article. Armingeon et al. (2010). Comparative Political 
Dataset I, 1960-2009. Bern. Available online at: 
http://www.ipw.unibe.ch/content/team/klaus_armingeon/comparative_political_data_sets/index_ger.ht
ml Armingeon, K. & Careja, R. (2005). Comparative data set for 28 post-communist countries, 1989–
2005. Bern. Available online at: 
http://www.ipw.unibe.ch/content/team/klaus_armingeon/comparative_political_data_sets/index_ger.ht
ml. 
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3.1 1990s-2000s: an uncertain context for Western European political elites spurring 
institutional change 
The theoretical discussion of  the first chapter has shown that political parties, which 
constitute the main incarnation of  modern democracy, derive their legitimacy from two sources: 
representing citizens and “getting things done”. Whereas different democracies place greater or 
lesser emphasis on one aspect or the other, both of  these sources of  legitimacy are necessary in 
order to ensure the resilience of  political systems. Yet various developments have made it 
increasingly difficult for political elites to achieve “output-oriented legitimacy” (Scharpf  1997a, 
1999). In considering that political delegitimisation spurs institutional reform, one might 
hypothesise that democracies deriving their legitimacy from policy outcomes, rather than from 
fair representation, face greater incentives to reform their institutions. 
 
3.1.1. “Ruling the void”? The erosion of  political support and its consequences for 
output-oriented legitimacy 
One of  the most important premises of  this research contends that political elites in 
Western European democracies have faced unprecedented challenges to their legitimacy during 
the last two decades, a phenomenon which Dalton calls “the erosion of  political support” (2004). 
These challenges are illustrated by diverse developments: the rise of  radical and populist 
alternatives (Mény and Surel 2002, Mudde 2007); the gradual disengagement of  citizens from 
political parties (Mair and Biezen 2001); lower voter turnout (Franklin 2004); rising electoral 
volatility (Mair 2011a); the erosion of  traditional voter loyalties (Dalton and Wattenberg 2000); 
the decline of  the traditional left/right cleavage and the proliferation of  parties representing new 
interests (Kriesi et al. 1995, Kriesi 2008); the fading of  ideologies (Dalton 2006); and growing 
scepticism towards political parties, political institutions and politicians (Dalton 2004). The 
sources of  this general disengagement are diverse and complex. Dalton, who conducted a large 
cross-national empirical review of  this issue, concludes that, “the gap between expectations and 
performance has widened because expectations have risen faster than performance” (2004, 199). 
The author focuses on factors that affect all advanced democracies. He shows that the main 
reason behind the propagation of  “dissatisfied democrats” (Norris 1999) arises from an increase 
in citizens’ expectations of  politics (due to higher standards of  education compared with 
previous decades) and a simultaneous proliferation of  interests, resulting in a denser policy space. 
To paraphrase, citizens are better educated and therefore more demanding, while policy-making 
has become increasingly complex and less intelligible, leading some authors to talk about 
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“technical democracy” (Callon, Lascoumes, and Barthe 2001). As Dalton puts it, “in a fluid, 
multidimensional policy space, it is very difficult for government to satisfy most of  the people 
most of  the time” (2004: 195). Obviously, the intensity and the specific impact of  these factors 
of  disengagement vary across countries, but overall, one is on safe ground in asserting that, 
virtually everywhere in Western Europe, political elites are more commonly challenged than they 
used to be. 
However, it is not just that citizens are becoming more critical, nor is it simply that policies 
are becoming more complex. There is also widespread evidence of  greater policy constraint and 
an overall reduction in the capacities of  national parties to shape policies, mainly as a result of  
European integration and globalisation. Some authors go even further, arguing that parties 
deliberately and actively choose to limit policy competition. In an article about the European 
Union’s impact on party systems, commenting on the paradox that European and policy issues 
are discussed in the arenas where parties have the least real capacity to enact change, Mair makes 
the following argument: 
“That is, by debating Europe within an arena (the European arena) where competence in the 
area is negligible, and by debating policy questions in another arena (the national arena) 
where choices are increasingly circumscribed, voters are being offered a voice that is likely to 
have little or no effect on the practice of  decision-making” (2000, 47). 
According to Mair, this is so because it enables parties to remain insulated from electoral 
constraints, in a context where they are all too aware of  the difficulties in achieving policy 
outcomes. This strategy of  insulation and blame avoidance (Weaver 1986) comes with a price, i.e. 
the disillusionment of  the citizenry towards politics, and the “hollowing of  Western democracy” 
(Mair 2006, 2013). Mair goes so far as to say that European citizens are now not only semi-
sovereign (Schattschneider 1975), but are, in fact, non-sovereign. Knowing whether it’s right to be 
this pessimistic is not really the issue here. What is important and relevant is that, both as a result 
of  constraints which did not exist until the last two decades (globalisation and the EU) and as a 
result of  intentional party strategies, there is less emphasis placed on policies in political 
competition, where it still exists, than there was in the past. To use Scharpf ’s distinction once 
again, achieving “output legitimacy” (1997a, 1999) is becoming an increasingly impracticable task 
for political elites, both as a result of  objective and exogenous factors, and as a result of  the 
deliberate will of  national parties. Therefore, one of  the two sources of  legitimacy for political 
parties is running dry. 
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3.1.2. The “Gattopardo argument”: the consequences of  dwindling legitimacy on 
the incentives for institutional reforms 
Today, traditional political parties paddle in troubled waters, as they find themselves in a 
context of  growing uncertainty and dwindling legitimacy. Existing in an expansive context of  
policy constraints and demanding citizenry, parties are less relevant than they used to be. This is 
all well and good, but one major question remains: do they respond, and if  so, how do they 
respond? 
Institutional reform is only one of  the tools at political parties’ disposal that enables them 
to react to and shape their environments. Moreover, the literature review appears to implicitly 
confirm that institutional change is considered to be a particularly costly choice. Mair, Müller and 
Plasser (2004) identify six possible responses to the new challenges parties face: non-response; 
organisational responses (making changes to party structures and means of  selecting candidates); 
redefinition of  “target groups” of  voters; redefinition of  strategies vis-à-vis other parties 
(changing coalition strategies, mergers, etc); programmatic and policy-oriented responses; and 
finally, institutional responses through reforms of  the rules of  the game. To be sure, most of  
these strategies are not incompatible. Moreover, institutional reform is certainly the most costly 
response in a context of  relative political stability, given that it leads to uncertainty and given that 
the political actors with the power to modify the political system are the ones in power.49 
Therefore, the question at issue is whether or not the context previously described is 
sufficiently threatening to the governing parties of  established democracies for them to respond 
through institutional reform. On this matter, Dalton remains optimistic, arguing that “an 
increasingly critical public has not posed a major challenge to the stability and vitality of  
democracy in the OECD nations. In part, this is because the potential systemic implications of  
decreasing support are moderated by the strong commitment to democratic values and the 
political community among contemporary publics” (2004, 199). While one might to some extent 
agree that the democratic regime has not been endangered (although recent economic and 
political developments have served to weaken this argument), I believe, on the contrary, that the 
erosion of  political support has posed a serious challenge to (some of) the political systems in 
(some) Western European democracies. In addition, the stability of  Western European 
                                                 
49 Cf. supra. Katz’s paradox (“Why are there so many electoral reforms?”, 2005) 
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democratic regimes like this may well eclipse the changes taking place conducted in order to 
preserve the status quo. This is the classical “Gattopardo argument”.50 
I argued in the previous section that governing parties exist in uncertain times, which 
suggests that institutional reforms are not now as costly to use as they would have been in 
previous decades, when their domination was evident. I begin with simple assumptions. Firstly, 
“parties begin with two goals: the first is survival, the second is success” (Mair, Müller, and 
Plasser 2004a, 261). Hence, governing parties aim to respond to their changing environments in 
such ways as to enable them to maintain their relevance within the political system, and to limit 
instability. Secondly, in a context of  delegitimisation and political uncertainty, governing parties 
have three main incentives to modify (or at least attempt to modify) the core democratic rules as 
defined in the previous chapter: (1) avoiding blame; (2) spreading blame; and (3) regaining 
legitimacy (see Figure 2). The concept of  “blame avoidance” has been developed by Weaver. 
Originally, he developed this idea to describe the behaviour of  politicians as policy-makers, 
arguing that, “politicians are motivated primarily by the desire to avoid blame for unpopular 
actions rather by seeking to claim credit for popular ones” (1986, 371). Blame avoidance is based 
on the fact that citizens judge their politicians to at least some extent retrospectively, but also on 
the fact that political parties anticipate punishment by ballot, and try to avoid it. 
Figure 2. Relationship between erosion of political support and incentives for institutional reforms  
 
 
If  one applies this theoretical framework to the issue of  institutional reform, it is easy to 
argue that changing some of  the core democratic rules is a means for political elites to avoid 
blame, particularly when they are challenged. The delegation of  certain policy decisions to non-
                                                 
50 In the movie “Il Gattopardo” by Luciano Visconti, Prince Salina has one of the most famous lines, 
saying, “Qualcosa doveva cambiare perché tutto restasse com'era prima”, referring to Sicily facing the 
wave of change brought by Garibaldi. 
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majoritarian institutions, or the development of  constitutional courts (Stone Sweet and Thatcher 
2002) may be thought of  as institutional strategies on the part of  political elites to avoid blame 
for unpopular actions or decisions. Blame avoidance strategies may also take more “cynical” 
forms, preventing voters from fully expressing their dissatisfaction. For instance, in the case of  
the French electoral reform of  1986, it was absolutely clear that the Socialist Party’s main motive 
in adopting PR was to mitigate the severity of  the electoral losses expected in the 1986 
parliamentary elections (Renwick 2010).51 Arguments about blame avoidance could also be linked 
with the literature on the strategies of  cartelisation and seclusion within the political system. Katz 
and Mair develop the idea that parties have penetrated deeper and deeper into the recesses of  the 
state in order to find new financial resources and ensure their own political survival. This has 
given them power to co-opt or exclude new actors from the political system, to the extent that 
many established parties can now be described as cartel-parties (1995). The cartel party thesis 
holds that political parties increasingly function like cartels, employing state resources to limit 
potential competition and ensure their own electoral success (Katz and Mair 2009, 753). Applied 
to institutional reforms, one could argue that political elites attempt to avoid blame by restricting 
access to the political system for new actors, effectively insulating themselves against electoral 
sanction. 
In his 1986 article, Weaver also listed several possible blame avoidance strategies. One of  
them, which he calls “passing the buck”, is of  particular relevance to our understanding of  the 
incentives for parties to use institutional reforms. Indeed, the notions of  blame and reward are 
intimately linked with the fact that it is now possible for the citizenry to clearly identify who is 
responsible for what. Therefore, spreading decision-making powers between more actors, or 
getting citizens more directly involved in political processes through institutional reforms could 
serve not even to shift blame, but to effectively neutralise it. In this regard, processes of  
decentralisation, or reforms increasing the proportionality of  electoral systems can be seen not 
only as ways to share power, but also to attenuate the responsibilities of  central governments or 
individual parties in the decisions undertaken. One motivation for institutional reform may be the 
attempt to dilute and obscure the personal responsibility of  actors for policy outcomes, making it 
more difficult for citizens to sanction parties. 
                                                 
51 In 1986, the socialist president, Mitterrand, pushed for the replacement of the run-off electoral system 
with a PR system with small constituencies at département level. This constituted an attempt to weaken the 
right, bringing the National Front to the Parliament, while keeping the extreme left and the ecologists out. 
After the victory of the centre-right, the system was immediately abandoned and the traditional run-off 
system was used in 1988. 
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The third, and final, strong incentive for parties to reform institutions in a situation of  
eroded political support is to regain legitimacy through institutional change. This argument is 
central to Cain, Dalton and Scarrow’s investigation (2003a), which focuses on the transformation 
of  democracy from much the same broad perspective as the one developed in this thesis, 
comparing a large set of  different institutions and consolidated democracies. These authors argue 
that the erosion of  political support for traditional forms of  representation and dominant parties 
“suggest[s] that the public’s preferred mode of  democratic decision-making is moving toward 
new forms of  more direct involvement in the political process”. They conclude that the current 
zeitgeist dictates that “the cure for democracy is more democracy” (Cain, Dalton, and Scarrow 
2003b, 2).52 The book is guided by the idea that political elites tackle existing democratic 
challenges by expanding the electoral marketplace (Dalton and Gray 2003) and by placing greater 
emphasis on what we call the participative function of  democracy.53 
In conclusion, while the first incentive (avoiding blame) can lead elites to adopt reforms that 
limit access to the political process, on the other hand, spreading blame and relegitimation 
strategies through institutional change could lead to the adoption of  reforms that would expand 
this access. The “Gattopardo argument” suggests that political elites want to survive, and will 
enact institutional reforms in changing and uncertain environments. 
 
3.1.3. A context providing incentives to increase input-oriented legitimacy 
So far, I have reasoned as though Western European democracies all face equally intense 
challenges to their political systems. The first chapter was devoted to demonstrating that 
institutions form a coherent system based on distinctive and even conflicting visions of  what 
ensures enduring democratic legitimacy. Hence, as different clusters of  institutions entail finding 
different “institutional balances” between the two sources of  democratic legitimacy, the 
knowledge that institutions rarely perform adequately should put the existing institutional balance 
into perspective, and suggest the need for institutional reforms in several dimensions (bundles of  
reforms). I have also just argued that recent developments have made it increasingly difficult to 
achieve output-oriented legitimacy. Therefore, if  one sees the institutional system as a balance 
                                                 
52 The term zeitgeist is not overworked here: in other places and times, institutions such as direct 
democracy were observed with suspicion, such as in Germany after the Second World War. At other 
times, institutional engineers have not had the same objectives. For example, the limitation of access to 
the decision-making process provided by numerous constitutional amendments in the French 5th Republic 
were seen as a necessary answer to the political stasis of the 4th Republic, which was characterised by the 
spread of power between many political forces and an almighty parliament. 
53 Cf. chapter 1, section 1.2.2. 
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between the two objectives of  representation (input-oriented legitimacy) and policy outcomes 
(output-oriented legitimacy), one might expect political elites to have greater incentives to 
“increase” the former aspect at the expense of  the latter. In other words, countries whose 
institutional arrangements emphasised input-oriented legitimacy should be a priori less vulnerable 
to recent political developments than those built on output-based legitimacy, as their legitimacy is 
not derived from policy capacity to the same extent, but rather from their ability to ensure fair 
representation. Consequently, countries like Holland and Switzerland should have less incentive 
to modify their institutions than countries like the United Kingdom. 
The different “institutional balances” between definitions of  democratic legitimacy must 
also, to some extent, limit and define the preferred choices of  institutions for political elites, and 
therefore limit and shape the options for institutional change. As Lijphart makes clear (1984, 
1999), different institutional arrangements constitute different answers to the question “who 
should govern and who should the government be responsive to?” Therefore, the core issue in 
evaluating the direction of  a given institutional reform is the assessment of  whether it disperses 
power or concentrates it. In other words, one can distinguish between inclusive reforms (dispersing 
power) and exclusive reforms (concentrating power).54 What starts to become clear from the 
previous considerations is that actors in different political systems have different incentives to 
adopt bundles of  institutional reforms, but also that these incentives encourage reforms going in 
a certain direction: towards greater inclusiveness. 
 
3.2. Three sets of  general propositions about institutional reforms in Western European 
democracies 
To conclude this chapter, I will present the general propositions that will guide the 
empirical analyses that will be developed into more precise hypotheses in the relevant empirical 
chapters. The descriptive propositions aim to address simple empirical problems: the scope, the 
format and the direction of  institutional engineering in Western Europe during the last two 
decades. The propositions concerning the determinants of  change aim to provide greater 
understanding of  the particular circumstances leading to institutional reforms and the 
endogenous variables that encourage or discourage change. Finally, the propositions about the 
mechanisms of  change focus on understanding why, in given bundles of  reforms, certain reforms 
fail, while others succeed. 
                                                 
54 Cf. chapter 3. 
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3.2.1. Propositions about the scope, format and direction of  reforms 
I have three general expectations about the frequency, the format, and the direction of  
institutional engineering in Western Europe: institutional reforms have been part of  everyday 
politics, they have tended to modify several dimensions of  the institutional system at once, and 
they have moved towards greater inclusiveness. I have already referred to the fact that there is 
widespread agreement among contemporary scholars that institutional change is rare. On the 
contrary, I believe that the amount of  change has been considerably underestimated because of  
the tendency to dismiss minor reforms and to focus on single dimensions of  reforms. Secondly, I 
have argued that given the “clustered” nature of  the institutional systems, it is reasonable to 
expect than when elites decide to put the topic of  institutional reforms on the table, they do not 
limit themselves to a single aspect, but discuss several aspects at once. Finally, as the main 
premise of  the thesis is that political elites use reforms to react to a less certain and more hostile 
political environment, one could have competing expectations: either elites try to depoliticise 
certain issues and to avoid blame (Weaver 1986) by closing off  the decision-making process to 
citizens, or they try to spread blame and relegitimise themselves through institutional change. I 
tend to favour the latter argument, as political elites are having greater difficulty than ever in 
achieving “output-oriented legitimacy” based on substantial policy outcomes (Scharpf  1999). 
Consequently, elites should have greater incentive to try to achieve “input-based legitimacy”, 
based on the inclusion of  more citizens in the decision-making process. This might be especially 
true for the case of  majoritarian polities, where legitimacy is mainly based on output-based 
legitimacy. 
 
3.2.2. Propositions about the determinants of  institutional reforms 
a) Exogenous triggers for change 
The main proposition that will structure the thesis concerning the determinants of  
institutional change can be formulated as such: the more delegitimised the political elites and the existing 
institutions, and the more uncertain the environment in which governing parties evolve, the greater the incentive to 
instigate institutional reform. The first part of  this idea derives from the conclusions about the 
general context in which political parties have competed during the last two decades in Western 
Europe. It starts with the simple assumption that presiding political elites will not change core 
democratic institutions unless they feel they are compelled to do so. I posit a negative relation 
between citizen satisfaction levels in relation to institutions and politicians and the propensity to 
adopt institutional reforms. The second part of  the proposition states that electoral instability is a 
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crucial trigger for institutional change, because of  the expectation that political elites will use 
institutional reforms to shift blame or relegitimise themselves when they face new threats or 
increasing dissatisfaction. Shifts in political competition signal to political elites that their 
environment is changing, so it is indeed logical that countries characterised by unprecedented 
instability, as Italy has been since the 1990s, are characterised by much more frequent institutional 
reform. 
b) Endogenous barriers and incentives for institutional change 
The literature review developed in the second part of  this chapter has shown that 
favourable circumstances for change are, at best, a necessary but insufficient condition for 
change. The exogenous factors interact with the pre-existing party and institutional systems. 
Therefore, I argue that, under the same circumstances, some countries should be more vulnerable 
to change than others: majoritarian democracies. It will also be necessary to investigate the effect 
of  the number of  veto players. This proposition simply states that not all party systems and 
institutional configurations offer the same incentives and the same “chances” for the adoption 
and implementation of  reforms. Majoritarian democracies base most of  their democratic 
legitimacy on accountability and efficiency. I have explained why output-oriented legitimacy 
particularly has been challenged in the last two decades. Therefore, one might expect that 
majoritarian countries such as the United Kingdom, and to a lesser extent France, face greater 
incentives to reform their core democratic institutions, and to reform more often, than 
democracies where legitimacy is based more on input-oriented legitimacy. Concerning the impact 
of  veto players, I will question Tsebelis’ assumption, i.e., that more veto players mean greater 
stability. Indeed, it should already be clear that there are a number of  counter-arguments that 
might challenge this assertion, both in the quantitative analysis of  the determinants of  change55 
and in the qualitative analysis of  the mechanisms of  change.56 Like Tsebelis, I will distinguish 
between institutional and partisan veto players. Some other authors would say that institutional 
veto players represent “constitutional rigidity”. Here, this can be roughly understood as the “rules 
to change the rules”. If  Tsebelis’ assumption holds true, it would mean, firstly, that rules would 
be harder to change in cases where the constitutional requirements for such reforms were stricter. 
Secondly, in countries characterised by bipolarism and single-party majorities (and therefore by a 
low number of  veto players) such as France, Greece and the United Kingdom, institutional 
reforms should be significantly easier to achieve and should occur more frequently than in 
                                                 
55 Cf. chapter 4, section 1.1.1. 
56 Cf. chapter 5, section 1.1.1. 
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countries characterised by multiparty coalition governments and a higher number of  parties 
represented in the parliament (and therefore by a higher number of  veto players), such as 
Holland or Switzerland. 
 
3.2.3. Propositions about the processes of  change 
Regarding the assumptions leading the analysis of  the processes of  change, I will be less 
precise here as the fifth chapter is devoted to the development of  a theory about the mechanisms 
behind bundles of  institutional reforms. The general assumption is that the dynamics of  these 
processes can help to explain why, in favourable circumstances for institutional reforms, some 
reforms succeed, while others fail. It is sufficient to say here that, firstly, the types of  reforms that 
emerge depend on the identity of  the actor that puts the reforms on the agenda. Secondly, the roads leading to 
successful reforms depend to a great extent on the interaction between the type of  reforms discussed in the bundle 
and the type of  processes used to conduct them. Thirdly, the barriers to reform vary according to the type of  reform 
on the agenda. Extrapolating from theories put forward by Renwick (2010) and Jacobs (2011b), I 
expect that when bundles of  reforms are initiated “endogenously” by governing parties, the 
reforms on the agenda are more divisive and subject to self-interested considerations. Conversely, 
when bundles of  reforms are put on the agenda through the combined efforts of  elite outsiders 
and the public, I anticipate that these are more consensual and obey a mixed logic of  cooperation 
and competition. The second proposal is inspired by the findings of  Mahoney and Thelen 
(2010b), who demonstrate that according to the nature of  the rule at stake, different actors and 
factors can be more or less prominent, explaining why institutions change or remain stable. What 
it means here, concretely, is that I do not expect bundles of  divisive reforms to succeed or fail for 
the same reasons as bundles of  reforms relating to largely consensual measures. To be more 
precise, I expect three factors to come into play differently in consensual and divisive reforms: 
the type of  reform process (which will depend on the degree of  inclusion of  political and non-
political actors in its elaboration); the number of  veto players; and the multifaceted nature of  the 
reform proposals. This argument resonates with that of  Rahat and Hazan (2011), who assert that 
the relative strength of  barriers to reform varies widely across reform constellations.   
Regarding this last aspect, I explained in the first chapter why the notion of  bundles of  
reforms is based on the idea of  institutional sequences, and of  institutional reforms as package 
deals. This implies a complex and uncertain process of  negotiation, re-negotiation, building and 
rebuilding of  coalitions in promoting bundles of  reforms. Thus, ambiguity, complexity and 
uncertainty may not necessarily prevent reform. Bundles of  reforms may enable the (diverging) 
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interests of  multiple actors to be reconciled, either through mutual concessions or because of  
misperceptions about the effects of  reforms. The multifaceted nature of  some reform proposals 
may also obscure or damage the interests of  certain actors, and thereby impede reform. In any 
case, this constitutes a worthy factor for analysis. 
 
 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has presented the main the triggers for and processes of  institutional reform 
that have been identified by the existing literature on regime change, policy change and electoral 
system change. Exogenous factors such as political crises and instability, as well as endogenous 
factors such as the existing institutional system have been seen to trigger, or indeed impede 
change. The literature is unsatisfactory if  the goal is to achieve an expanded focus on a 
multidimensional conception of  institutional reform. Indeed, mainly as a result of  the lack of  
cross-sectional and cross-dimensional datasets on institutional reforms, the existing literature has 
focused mainly on major changes, assuming that reforms are rare, essentially self-interested, 
“isolated” events. I reject these three illusions and develop three descriptive hypotheses, arguing 
that change is relatively frequent, usually “bundled”, and inclusive. In the final part of  the 
chapter, I have examined the challenging context that Western European political elites have 
faced during the last two decades, and shown why the “erosion of  political support” has spurred 
on the progress of  bundles of  institutional reforms, particularly in democracies where legitimacy 
is based on policy outcomes. Finally, regarding processes of  reform, I have presented some 
accounts suggesting that the outcomes of  reforms depend on the nature of  the reforms at stake, 
the process chosen to conduct them, the configuration of  veto players, and finally, the 
multifaceted nature of  the reform proposals. 
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Chapter 3 The changes to core democratic rules in Western 
Europe, 1990-2010: an overview 
 
  
 The second chapter has illustrated the state of the discourse concerning the triggers and 
processes of institutional reforms in consolidated democracies. Among other assumptions that 
must be tested, nuanced, or possibly discarded, “three illusions” about change have been 
presented, namely that reforms are rare, happen as single instances, and serve as pure zero-sum 
games. In the initial chapter of the thesis, it was also made clear that one of the main issues 
hampering more thorough understanding of institutional change is the lack of data encompassing 
multiple dimensions of institutional change, data which would enable these assumptions to be 
tested. In this chapter, two of these three illusions will be empirically investigated: that of the 
rarity of reform, and that of its singularity. In order to do this, one must take into account 
seemingly minor as well as substantial institutional reforms, and go beyond single country-based 
and single dimensional analyses of institutional reforms. Secondly, the chapter will investigate the 
idea that, as a result of the difficulty in achieving output-oriented legitimacy, reforms tend to be 
inclusive so as to get citizens more involved.  
 This chapter aims to describe the changes that were made to core democratic rules in 
Western Europe between 1990 and 2010, by using the SIEPOL113 (Seclusion and Inclusion in the 
European Polity: Institutional Change and Democratic Practices) project database of 
“Institutional Change in advanced European democracies”. With the inclusion of six dimensions 
of reform over 20 years in 18 Western European democracies, this database enables us to grasp 
the amount, the direction and the format of change in consolidated democracies. In the first part 
of the chapter, the theoretical and empirical challenges presented by a study of multiple 
dimensions of institutional reforms will be very briefly reviewed. This will consist of a short 
account of existing works on multiple dimensions of institutional reforms, a presentation of the 
three empirically tested hypotheses (namely that institutional reforms are frequent, bundled, and 
inclusive), and a thorough examination of the SIEPOL database, its construction, and the several 
qualitative trends that have been apparent over the last twenty years. In the second part, the 
                                                 
113
 This chapter makes extensive use of parts of a presentation on the results of the SIEPOL database that 
was outlined during the ECPR General Conference in Reykjavik, and which then became a standalone 
working paper from the Robert Shuman Centre – EUDO (European Union Democracy Observatory) 
project in 2012, with Alex Wilson and Peter Mair (Bedock, Mair, and Wilson 2011; Bedock, Mair, and 
Wilson 2012). Any quotes or figures from these two papers will be duly referenced in the chapter.  
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contrasts and the common trends that appear across dimensions of reform and across countries 
will be discussed, focusing on the number and extent of reforms (minor vs. substantial), their 
direction (inclusive vs. exclusive), and their format (bundled or isolated). The main conclusions to 
be drawn are that both the rarity and singularity of reform can be dismissed as the illusions they 
are, and that reforms adopted over the last decades have overwhelmingly moved towards greater 
inclusiveness. However, there are strong and puzzling differences across countries and 
dimensions. 
  
1. Analysing multiple dimensions of institutional change: the theoretical 
and empirical challenges of the SIEPOL database 
 
Existing works that have tried to overcome the lack of empirical and theoretical findings on 
institutional reforms have provided fragmented, but relatively clear evidence of a move towards 
greater citizen involvement, and of limited but regular institutional change. This leads us to 
formulate three hypotheses about change: reforms occur more frequently than is usually 
assumed, they tend to happen in bundles, and finally, the recent tendency is towards the adoption 
of inclusive institutional reforms.  
 
1.1. Frequent, bundled, and inclusive: three hypotheses about reforms of the core 
democratic rules in Western Europe 
 
1.1.1. The main conclusions of  the existing works on multiple dimensions of  
institutional change 
Describing institutional reforms is a difficult task, insofar as one must precisely define the 
institutions under consideration. Here, I refer specifically to reforms of formal core democratic 
rules in consolidated democracies in Western Europe during recent decades.114 There have been 
numerous normative reflections on the evolution of representative democracy, through what has 
been labelled as “participatory democracy” (Zittel and Fuchs 2006), or “deliberative democracy” 
(Elster 1998). The two concepts do not overlap completely (Mutz 2006), however both of these 
normative models concern the management of “the decision-making among free and equal 
citizens” (Elster 1998, 1), the directness of participation, and deliberation. Yet, actual empirical 
                                                 
114 Cf. supra, chapter 1.  
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evidence enabling the confirmation or refutation of these theories has been quite scarce, generally 
unsystematic and based on single countries, single reforms, or even more localised examples. 
Studies attempting to provide multidimensional, empirical and longitudinal evidence about 
institutional reforms in consolidated democracies are quite uncommon. Studies with such a focus 
include the works of Armingeon and Careja (Armingeon 2004, Armingeon and Careja 2008), 
Scarrow’s work on direct democracy (1999, 2001) and the seminal book edited by Dalton, Cain 
and Scarrow, Democracy transformed (Cain, Dalton, and Scarrow 2003a).  
Armingeon and Careja’s works have already been presented in this thesis in relation to the 
lack of precise data on institutional reforms over time.115 To summarise, the authors found no 
evidence of convergence between countries, and found limited, incremental, and path-dependent 
institutional change. Dealing specifically with direct democracy, Scarrow focuses on trends in 
institutional design in OECD countries and Israel from 1970 to 2000, looking at “a range of 
procedures that enhance possibilities for citizens to directly affect political decisions”: local 
referendums, direct election of mayors and heads of state, and national referendums (2001, 656). 
She finds widespread evidence of institutional reforms favouring direct democracy, although 
changing patterns in the use of referendums are confined to a few countries. Therefore, there is 
no clear evidence of the expansion of the narrow, traditional vision of direct democracy, but 
there is evidence of the development of devices that enhance citizens’ choices. In a study 
focusing on Germany, Scarrow found evidence that when German parties faced a citizenry 
disenchanted with partisan politics, they responded with the extension of direct democracy in 
order to “regain sympathy” (1999, 358). 
The most systematic attempt to study multiple dimensions of institutional reforms in 
established democracies is contained in the edited book Democracy Transformed (Cain, Dalton, and 
Scarrow 2003a).116 Among other findings, the authors find strong support for a hypothesis 
pertaining to the expansion of the electoral marketplace in four dimensions: citizens being called 
to vote more often, the creation of more levels of decision-making, allowing more voters to 
access the electoral process, and establishing various devices to provide greater choice for voters 
at election time (preference vote, directly elected mayors, referendums, etc.) (Dalton and Gray 
2003). Scarrow finds some evidence of an “opening up” of opportunities for citizens to select 
executive leaders or decide on issues directly, but notes that the use of these devices remains 
quite rare, concluding: “we are far from witnessing a radical move away from parties or party-
dominated political processes” (2003, 57). In the same volume, contributors focusing on 
                                                 
115 Cf. supra, chapter 2, section 2.3.2.  
116 Cf. supra, chapter 2, section 3.1.2.  
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decentralisation find that more decentralisation has occurred within unitary than in federal states, 
with complex and quite different agendas (Ansell and Gingrich 2003).  
It would be fair to say that there are also some strong contenders of the expansion of 
opportunities for citizen participation. These include Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, for example, 
who examine the preferences of the American public in relation to institutions and participation, 
and find that, rather than hoping to increase their involvement in the democratic decision-making 
process, citizens prefer to stay as far away from such matters as possible:  
“The last thing people want is to be more involved in political decision making: they do not 
want to make political decisions themselves; they do not want to provide much input to 
those who are assigned to make these decisions, and they would rather not know all the 
details of the decision-making process. (…) Rather than wanting a more active, participatory 
democracy, a remarkable number of people want what we call stealth democracy. (…) The 
people want to be able to make democracy visible and accountable on those rare occasions 
when they are motivated to be involved” (2002, 1–2). 
However this is a relatively marginal view, and most of the empirical findings (Ansell and 
Gingrinch, 2003; Cain, Dalton and Scarrow, 2003b, Dalton and Grey, 2003; Scarrow, 1999, 2001) 
point towards a will on the part of the elites, if not the citizens, to move towards more inclusive 
institutions.  
A couple of conclusions can be drawn from these studies. When institutional reforms occur 
in established democracies, recent trends suggest that they move towards what we could call 
greater citizen inclusion, although it should be made clear that this trend is not limited to direct 
democracy. Secondly, authors have found evidence of change, but not of massive change, and 
certainly not of regime change. This strongly implies the need to take minor reforms into account 
in order to have a complete picture of the amount of change taking place. Finally, the postulate 
of these authors, which is made explicit in Cain, Dalton and Scarrow’s book, is that in the end, all 
of these changes are part of a context of crisis, or at least of discontent with democracy, and that 
these various reforms are all part of similar stories, rather than being led by radically different 
logics.  
 
1.1.2. Three hypotheses about institutional reforms: frequent, bundled, and 
inclusive 
The second chapter has theoretically justified our expectations about institutional reforms in 
consolidated democracies, and particularly about what we have referred to as the illusions of 
rarity and singularity. Hence the three main hypotheses tested in this chapter are only briefly 
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recalled and justified: institutional reforms are not nearly as rare as was believed to be the case in 
the past; they tend to move towards greater inclusion in institutional reform; and they usually take 
place in bundles.117  
“H1. Elites in established democracies have frequent recourse to institutional reform.  
We believe that the amount of change has been considerably overlooked by the tendency of 
existing literature to dismiss minor reforms and to focus on single dimensions of reforms. Our 
first hypothesis is therefore that change is relatively commonplace in advanced European 
democracies as soon as the focus is widened to a bigger set of dimensions of reforms.  
H2. There is a general convergence of Western European democracies towards the adoption of more inclusive 
institutional reforms. 
As the main background hypothesis of this study is that political elites use reforms as a reaction 
to a more uncertain and more hostile political environment, one could have competing 
expectations: either elites try to depoliticise certain issues and to avoid blame (Weaver 1986) by 
closing the process of decision-making to citizens, or they try to spread blame and re-legitimise 
themselves through institutional change.” I argue that the latter is more likely, since it is 
becoming difficult to achieve popular policy outcomes.118 As a consequence, “and concurrently to 
the already well-documented trend towards delegation of competences to non-majoritarian 
institutions, elites should have more incentives to try to achieve “input-based legitimacy”, based 
on the inclusion of more citizens in the process of decision-making in the core democratic 
institutions.  
H3. Institutional reforms tend to happen in bundles. 
Since institutions tend to be “clustered” in several dimensions,119 it is reasonable to expect that 
when elites decide to put the topic of institutional reforms on the table, they do not limit 
themselves to a single aspect, but on the contrary discuss several aspects concomitantly. 
Therefore, we expect that change itself tends to be “clustered”, or “bundled”.” 
 
                                                 
117 The following section quotes Bedock, Mair, and Wilson 2012, 4–6. Unless otherwise stated in the 
footnotes, when parts of this text are quoted, these are parts that have been drafted and written by myself. 
118 Cf. supra, chapter 2, section 3.1.3.  
119 Cf. supra, chapter 1.   
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1.2. The SIEPOL project: a multidimensional database about reforms of the core 
democratic rules in Western Europe 
The SIEPOL (Seclusion and Inclusion in the European Polity) database “Institutional 
Change in advanced European Democracies” is the result of a research project funded by the 
EUI Research Council, directed by Peter Mair and collected by Alex Wilson. Six of the seven 
dimensions of the initial project will be analysed, thus including a broad range of institutional 
reforms which can be divided into two categories: representative reforms (focusing on 
“traditional” aspects of representative democracy), and participative reforms (providing 
alternative modes of democratic involvement in decision-making and participation to those of 
traditional democracies).120 In order to investigate the three hypotheses outlined above, three 
dimensions of classification have been utilised: one on the scope of reform (substantial vs. minor 
reform), one about the direction of reform (inclusive vs. exclusive), and finally, one on the format 
of reform (bundled vs. isolated).  
 
1.2.1. Construction of  the database and dimensions included 
The database “Institutional Change in Advanced European Democracies” aims to enable 
better understanding of institutional change in circumstances “where such changes are not part of 
the initial process of democratic consolidation and institution building” (Bedock, Mair, and 
Wilson 2012, 3). This is only one small element of the SIEPOL project, as its main interest is in 
the puzzling and contrasting developments occurring within the European polity. On the one 
hand, “key political decision-makers are increasingly “sealed off” from their wider constituencies, 
and, indeed from the rank-and-file of elected politicians” (Bedock, Mair, and Wilson 2012, 2), as 
a result of several developments: party organisational changes (Katz and Mair 1995; Katz and 
Mair 2009); challenges arising relating to European Union decision-making (Moury and Sousa 
2009); the development of the regulatory state (Majone 1994a, 1994b, 1996); and the proliferation 
of depoliticised agencies and non-majoritarian institutions (Stone Sweet and Thatcher 2002). This 
process of seclusion has been strengthened by other factors, such as the presidentialisation of 
politics (Poguntke and Webb 2005). On the other hand, “and seemingly paradoxically, we are also 
witnessing multiple and diffuse attempts at a radical opening-up of democratic decision-making 
that invokes direct-democratic procedures and enhanced contacts with civil society, and that 
                                                 
120 Cf. supra, chapter 1, section 1.2.2.  
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appears to establish direct links between the governors and the governed” (Bedock, Mair, and 
Wilson 2012, 2).121 
The motivating factor behind this collection of data was, therefore, the will to examine these 
two parallel developments (seclusion and inclusion) from the perspective of institutional reforms 
adopted in Western European democracies. The 18 democracies included were all democratised 
at least twelve years before 1989: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland 
and the UK. The initial time frame (1990-2008) was extended as far as 2010, thereby enabling us 
to focus on the two most recent decades. As was explained in the first chapter, “to facilitate 
cross-country and cross-time comparisons, the study uses indicators that were naturally and 
directly comparable. These were electoral system reform; parliamentary reform; federal reform or 
state decentralisation; (…) direct election of the executive head or president at the national or 
local level; referendums and citizens initiatives at national level; and regulations of access to 
suffrage (alternative methods of voting, age required to vote”.
122
 “The first [three] categories 
encompass reforms of what is generally understood as “representative democracy” (the rules 
regulating the repartition of power, the process of selection of political elites and the modes of 
decision-making and policy implementation)” (Bedock, Mair, and Wilson 2012, 3).  The last three 
categories correspond to forms of democratic institutions that aim to provide alternative means 
of involvement in decision-making and/or alternative tools for participation in the traditional 
representative political process.
123
 I refer to those in the first category as “representative 
reforms”, and those in the second as “participative reforms”. In other words, the data collection 
has followed a dimension-by-dimension logic, with the aim of being as exhaustive as possible on 
each dimension. This means that the dataset does not only include major changes, but also small 
ones.  
The initial phase of data collection, which lead to reports of reforms both by country and by 
dimension, provided the preliminary list of reforms up to 2008, which I then expanded to include 
those up to 2010.
124
 The collection of data was conducted through a “series of primary sources 
                                                 
121 These preliminary remarks on the SIEPOL project were written by Peter Mair.  
122 For a much more detailed description, cf. supra, chapter 1, section 1.2.3.  
123 In this chapter, the seventh dimension of the SIEPOL database, i.e. the reform of public subsidisation 
of political parties, was left aside for two reasons. First, it was hard to classify this as either a representative 
or participative reform, since it affects party resources rather than the rules within the political system 
(representative reforms), or wider links with the citizenry (participative reforms). Thus, I considered this 
as covering another, distinctive dimension (resources and access to competition), so I decided not to 
include it. 
124 Alex Wilson, who was in charge of the crucial initial phase of data collection, should be very warmly 
thanked for these reports. 
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and key secondary literature, as well as the use of existing datasets, whether publicly available or 
obtained directly from scholars.”
125
 “In all cases, existing datasets were supplemented and 
updated by our own data collection, carried out by a team of political scientists with diverse 
linguistic expertise. Each national data file was sent for verification to (at least one) national 
expert. The national expert was invited to highlight any mistakes and suggest corrections, a 
process that ensured a high level of accuracy for our findings” (Bedock, Mair, and Wilson 2012, 
3). In a later phase, these reforms were loaded onto a database suitable for statistical analysis, and 
complemented by a large number of independent variables for each country, in order to enable 
quantitative analysis concerning the determinants of particular reforms.
126
 It was considered that 
a “case” of reform refers to any modification of the formal rules in one of these six dimensions, 
meaning that if a single piece of legislation reforms n dimensions at once, then n reforms have 
taken place.
127
 This choice was made mainly for practical reasons: the sources on which the data 
was based were not always sufficiently precise to refer to the exact text of the law implementing 
the reforms, therefore we were not always aware of whether several dimensions that were 
modified in the same year had previously been discussed together, or separately. Still, this has 
allowed us to account for all of the modifications occurring in each dimension, and therefore to 
be more exhaustive than if we took a single case to mean a single law.   
 
1.2.2. Three aspects to be systematically analysed: scope, direction, and format 
of  reform 
In describing the reforms of the core democratic rules in Western Europe between 1990 and 
2010, three aspects appear to be particularly important for our understanding of how much, in 
what form, and how change took place: namely, the scope, the direction, and the format of the 
reforms. The choices presented below are necessarily unsatisfactory to some extent, as making 
                                                 
125 Key sources included the EJPR Political Data Yearbook; the dataset on Regional Authority by Gary 
Marks et al. (2008); the Committee of the Regions (2008) dataset on local and regional governments; the 
study by Magre and Bertana (2007) on the direct election of mayors; the comparative study of electoral 
systems by Gallagher and Mitchell (2005); the online IDEA dataset on the alternative forms of voting 
(ACE) project; the IDEA dataset; as well as Nassmacher (2009) and Bischoff (2006) on public funding of 
political parties.  
126 Cf. infra, chapter 4. These independent variables include formats and ideology of governments, main 
indicators concerning party systems and party system change, electoral change, the level of political 
support for various dimensions, constitutional rigidity and other important institutional features. 
127 This point is important, since it means that the number of reforms counted in the database is 
dependent to a very large extent on the definition used and the accepted boundaries of each dimension of 
reform. 
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change comparable across six dimensions of institutional reforms necessitates some complex 
arbitration.  
a) Scope of  reforms  
Evaluating the scope of reforms across six dimensions inevitably leads to the determination 
of some form of arbitrary threshold. I have chosen to speak about substantial vs. minor reforms. 
A substantial reform is a reform that substantially alters the balance of power and the relationship 
between parties, the executive and the legislative powers, or between citizens and the political 
system. The notion of a “substantial” institutional reform is necessarily partly subjective, as it is 
possible to evaluate the scope of a reform based on two factors: its objective content, and its 
impact. Defining a substantial reform by assessing its impact is quite problematic. Apparently 
small institutional reforms can have enduring consequences, major reforms can have delayed 
effects or be largely neutralised by actors’ behaviour, while identical reforms can have extremely 
different effects in different settings (Grofman et al. 1999). It would also require extensive 
knowledge of each of the cases included in the database. In order to be able to classify such a 
large range of reforms according to their scope, it was necessary to develop precise, ex ante 
(regardless of the importance of the consequences of a given reform) criteria for each of the 
dimensions that would be cross-comparable with a variety of countries.  
In order to avoid subjectivity in the classification, as much as this is possible,  a variety of 
criteria were developed for each of the dimensions included in the database using criteria 
developed by specialised secondary sources (such as Jacobs and Leyenaar 2011; Hooghe, Marks, 
and Schakel 2010) whenever possible. In cases when the content of a given institutional reform 
could be assessed through quantifiable set-off points (such as district magnitude, the number of 
seats in the parliament, the number of citizens entitled to vote, and so on), a threshold of 20% 
was used to determine the scope of the reform, as proposed by Lijphart in his dealings with 
electoral reforms (1994). Overall, reforms are classified as substantial when they affect the 
national level (the whole country), have a direct impact on the relationship between the citizenry 
and the political system, and between the actors within the political system, and when their 
quantifiable dimensions meet the 20% threshold.128  
b) Direction of  reforms 
One of the central aspects studied by the SIEPOL project is the shifting relationship between 
elites, citizens and institutions. I mentioned the fact that institutional arrangements, as Lijphart 
argues (1984, 1999), are essentially different answers to the question, “who should govern and 
                                                 
128 Cf. appendix 2.   
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who should the government be responsive to?”129 From this angle, evaluating the direction of a 
given institutional reform consists of determining whether it serves to disperse power or to 
concentrate it. Inclusive reforms are defined as reforms which open up the decision-making process to 
new political actors/citizens (dispersing power). Exclusive reforms, on the other hand, are reforms 
which close off the decision-making process to some political actors/citizens (concentrating power).130 
Indeed, “it is essential to understand the direction of an institutional reform and to know if elites 
try to build more inclusive institutions, enabling a larger range of actors and citizens to directly 
participate in the democratic process, or, on the contrary, try to limit access to processes of 
decision-making. As noted above, both hypotheses – the one suggesting inclusion, the other 
seclusion – have been defended in the literature and developed within a context where citizens 
become more critical of political parties and elites. 
“Since the database provides a description of each reform, all of them were classified to 
assess to what extent they opened-up or closed-off the process of decision-making to citizens or 
to new political actors. This general criterion was further delineated with several sub-criteria for 
each type of reform. Three categories were considered: inclusive reforms, opening-up decision-
making, reforms with multiple logics, containing elements both opening up and closing off 
decision-making, and exclusive reforms that close off decision-making”(Bedock, Mair, and 
Wilson 2012, 12).131 Inclusive reforms would include, for example, electoral reforms 
implementing a more proportional electoral formula or increasing the preference vote, 
parliamentary reforms increasing the powers of the lower chamber, reforms increasing the power 
of regional or federal entities to raise taxes, or introducing the direct election of mayors. Of 
course, one might argue that so-called “inclusive” and “exclusive” reforms are led by different 
logics: giving more say to the citizenry, increasing personalisation, increasing one actor’s power at 
the expense of another’s. Still, one can argue that there is an underlying logic in dispersing or 
concentrating power that can and must be identified. 
c) Format of  reforms 
The concept of the bundle of reforms has been developed with the argument that 
institutional reforms are in many cases not isolated occurrences, but that they come into play as 
part of a package-deal and/or sequence.132 “Most of the existing literature on institutional change 
assumes implicitly that reforms are one-off occurrences. Yet each reform can be also considered 
as a “nested game”, in which, as Tsebelis suggests (1990: 5), only an analysis of the wider panoply 
                                                 
129 Cf. supra, chapter 1, section 1.1.1.  
130 Ibid.  
131 Cf. appendix 3.  
132 Cf. supra, chapter 1, section 2.1.1. and 2.1.2.  
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of reform activities might get to the core of the actors’ motivations and behavioural choices. In 
some cases the wider panoply of reforms is dealt with more or less simultaneously, with 
individual reform being part of a package of changes. In other cases, the reforms occur in 
sequence, with the possibility that reforms further down the line are dependent on the successful 
passage of prior proposals. (…) We have considered reforms as being part of a bundle of reforms 
each time two institutional reforms or more relating to one or several dimensions of the institutional architecture 
were adopted in the same legislature (which could take the form either of a single multi-dimensional 
reform or of several reforms enacted alongside each other). The very concept of institutional 
bundling is clearly related to the idea that institutions form coherent systems, and that as a 
consequence change can and should be studied systemically as well” (Bedock, Mair, and Wilson 
2012, 14). This operationalisation of bundles of reform, and the limits to such operationalisation 
have been explained in the first chapter.133 Indeed, there is no certainty that reforms which 
occurred concomitantly were explicitly linked in the strategies and negotiations of political elites. 
However, being that only successful reforms are included in the dataset, at worst, one might 
underestimate rather than overestimate the phenomenon of bundling.  
 
1.3. A qualitative description of the database’s main trends: representative and 
participative reforms  
Before looking at the main figures and the patterns that have become apparent over time, 
placing emphasis on the scope, number, direction and format of reforms, a few words should be 
said about the main qualitative trends that have emerged for each of the six dimensions. A brief 
overview of the representative reforms shows very limited convergence in terms of countries and 
dimensions.  
 
1.3.1. Representative reforms: very limited convergence  
a) Electoral reforms 
First of all, nearly all of the countries included in the study pursued some, or even several 
electoral reforms during the period in question. No striking trends emerge, however, apart from a 
timid inclination towards reinforcement of the proportionality of electoral systems, very much 
like Colomer predicted (2004). Some countries replaced their electoral systems at the national 
level altogether in order to introduce either a mixed-majoritarian system (Italy 1993) or PR with 
bonus (Italy 2005; Greece 1993, 2007). Others, particularly the UK, introduced distinctive mixed-
                                                 
133 Cf. supra, chapter 1, section 2.2.1.  
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proportional electoral systems at the regional and European level. Most of the countries pursued 
smaller reforms: introducing thresholds to reduce fragmentation (Belgium, Iceland, Italy), 
increasing or introducing preference voting (Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg, Netherlands and 
Sweden), correcting imbalances between rural and urban areas (Finland, Iceland, Norway), or 
introducing gender quotas (Belgium, France). The relative enthusiasm shown for preference 
voting goes hand in hand with what Renwick and Pilet call the personalisation of electoral 
systems (Renwick and Pilet 2010, Renwick 2011), although it should be made clear that these 
provisions were limited, “reflecting the ambivalent attitude of party elites towards allowing voters 
a free hand at choosing their political representatives, particularly if this risks undermining 
internal party cohesion” (Bedock, Mair, and Wilson 2012, 6).134 Italy is the only clear exception to 
this trend, with the abolition of preference voting in 1991 at the national level coming as a result 
of an abrogative referendum following a deep political crisis. In conclusion, some countries, 
particularly Italy, Greece and the UK, have moved towards more complex, “mixed” electoral 
systems at the national and/or local level, a shift which has not been missed by the general 
literature (Shugart and Wattenberg 2001). 
b) Parliamentary reforms  
One overall tendency that can be observed from the parliamentary reforms adopted over 
the last two decades in Western Europe is a move towards the facilitation of governmental 
decision-making, “by reducing the veto power or delaying capacity of institutional actors that are 
not directly controlled by the government” (Bedock, Mair, and Wilson 2012, 7).135 This has taken 
several forms: the abolition of upper chambers in countries such as Iceland and Norway, or the 
introduction of procedures enabling most amendments and provisions to be taken by normal 
majority as well as the reduction of presidential power (Finland). There has also been a move 
towards four- or five-year terms for most offices, with the reduction of the presidential term 
from seven to five years and of the senatorial term from nine to six years in France, and the 
lengthening of MP terms to four years in Sweden (from three years), and to five years in Austria 
(from four years). Finally, moves have been made towards reducing the number of 
parliamentarians, even substantial moves in some cases (in Belgium, Germany, Portugal and the 
UK), although occasionally the numbers have increased slightly, as in France and Norway. If 
anything, Western European democracies now look more similar than they did twenty years ago 
in terms of organisation of parliamentary work, moving closer to what Poguntke and Webb call 
                                                 
134 This passage was written by Alex Wilson.  
135 Ibid.  
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the presidentialisation of politics (2005), insofar as mechanisms favouring executive dominance 
and rationalisation of parliaments have developed across the board.  
c) Decentralising and federal reforms  
The examination of the list of reforms clearly shows the reinforcement of decentralisation 
across Western Europe over the last 20 years. This also confirms the conclusions of Ansell and 
Gingrich (2003, 155), who argue that this trend differs to a great extent in both nature and degree 
across countries. Belgium became a fully-fledged federal state in 1993 and Spain has reinforced its 
regional powers quite considerably, making it a quasi-federal nation, whereas unitary countries 
like France and Italy have decentralised and given new competences and/or resources to local 
entities. The UK has also been characterised by an important process of devolution, although an 
asymmetrical devolution, in that it excluded England and granted important regional autonomy 
to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. “Asymmetrical arrangements can also be found in 
France (special regime for Corsica), Finland (special regime for Aland Island), Portugal (strong 
regional governments in Azores and Madeira) and Italy (5 Special Status regions). Other countries 
are experimenting with different forms of regional self-government, reflecting a move towards 
functional decentralisation whereby complex policy areas (e.g. healthcare or EU funds) are 
managed at a “meso” level more appropriate for planning than small municipalities or the central 
bureaucracy (Marks, Hooghe, and Schakel 2008). This tendency is most pronounced in the 
Nordic Countries, where several “pilot schemes” for regional government are being tested with a 
view to implementation across the country” (Bedock, Mair, and Wilson 2012, 7).136 There have 
also been notable attempts to rationalise municipalities and counties, either through greatly 
reducing their numbers (Denmark, Finland, Iceland), or through mechanisms to enable municipal 
cooperation (Luxembourg). Very centralised countries like Ireland have also introduced rather 
fragmented reforms, such as the creation of regional authorities, which monitor local authorities.  
To conclude, some signs of common trends in representative reform emerge when one 
looks at the big picture (there are more proportional and mixed electoral systems, decision-
making is becoming more “rationalised”, decentralisation has increased). However, this in no way 
alters the fact that the precise mechanisms and provisions chosen by each country differ quite 
significantly. If anything, the convergence has been quite limited.  
 
 
                                                 
136 This passage was written by Alex Wilson. 
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1.3.2. Participative reforms: reinforcing the means of  participation, without 
disrupting the representative model 
a) Direct election of  the head executive  
There has been a general trend towards the direct election of the head executive (and in 
particular of the local executive) in many European countries over the last twenty years. 
Provisions for direct election have, for example, been introduced in Austria, Wallonia, Greece 
and Italy, while provisions to allow direct election in certain cities have been introduced in 
Ireland and the UK. Direct election of the head executive has even been introduced at the 
national level in Finland, while Greece and Italy have extended direct election to all levels of 
government (provincial, regional). This points towards the personalisation of politics (Mcallister 
2007), or what other authors call “presidentialisation” (Poguntke and Webb 2005), or 
“presidential parliamentarism” (Hazan 1996), but at the local level. As noted by Alex Wilson, 
“this may be a response to citizen disengagement from municipal party politics, or may reflect an 
assumption among political elites that citizens want more personalised politics and accountability 
at local levels. In some countries, the introduction of directly elected mayors has proven popular 
(i.e. Germany, Italy), becoming an integral part of the political landscape. In other countries, a 
form of de facto direct election occurs without institutional change, as the main parties put forward 
their candidates for mayor (i.e. Spain, France), and the winner is rarely challenged by the 
legislature. In a few countries, direct election has proved somewhat unsuccessful and been 
partially reversed, notably in the Netherlands and the UK (with the exception of the London 
mayor). This reflects the uneasy interaction between distinctive municipal traditions and a single 
model of personalised electoral accountability” (Bedock, Mair, and Wilson 2012, 8). Interestingly, 
Scarrow classifies such reforms within the realm of “direct democracy”, in that they maximise 
“opportunities for citizens to directly affect political decisions” (2001, 655). Magre and Bertrana 
note that such provisions have not led to much convergence in terms of local institutional 
configurations, but have been the “most superficial element in the reform process undergone by 
the European local governments” (2007, 190). Hence, rather than representing radical change in 
the conception of the executive role, it seems that most of these reforms were seen as elements 
aiming to reinforce the legitimacy of such executives by involving citizens more directly.  
b) Mechanisms of  direct democracy at the national level 
Despite intense – mainly scholarly and theoretical – discussions about the development of 
– and the almost inevitability of – participatory mechanisms and direct democracy to open up 
decision-making processes to the public at the national level (through referendum provisions or 
citizens’ initiatives), this development has in reality been extremely limited within Western 
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Europe during the last 20 years. Where citizens’ initiatives exist, it is usually the result of a long 
institutional tradition that is well entrenched in the constitution (Ireland, Italy). Limited 
provisions have been introduced in Luxembourg and the Netherlands, and introduced but not 
fully implemented in France and Portugal. Moreover, when such provisions exist in the form of 
petitions or abrogative referendums, political elites often tend to ignore or challenge them (for 
Italy, see Uleri 2002, for example). Therefore, there certainly haven’t been any great 
developments in terms of mechanisms of direct democracy over the last decades at the national 
level, and the use of referendums is still limited to a few countries to a great extent (Ireland, Italy 
and Switzerland). This level of progress is actually in line with the conclusions drawn by Cain, 
Dalton, and Scarrow (2003), who note the multiplication of opportunities for participation within 
the framework of party politics, recalling that parties remain the main political actors. In other 
words, mediated representative democracy remains the norm.  
c) Access to suffrage 
When institutional provisions have been implemented regulating access to suffrage, they have 
aimed to facilitate the casting of votes, to boost the participation of emigrants, or to extend 
access to suffrage to include new elements of the population, such as young people or 
immigrants. Mechanisms such as postal and proxy voting have been introduced in some 
countries (Austria, Belgium, Switzerland and the UK). Italy and France have created 
constituencies for their citizens overseas, while voting for overseas citizens has been facilitated in 
Belgium, Portugal, Switzerland and the UK. The voting age has been reduced to 16 in Austria, by 
six months in Finland, and to 18 in Switzerland. Non-EU immigrants have been granted the right 
to vote in local elections in Luxembourg and in presidential elections in Portugal. “Increases in 
the use of alternative forms of voting can be seen as a response to the challenge of declining 
turnout in elections, and as a way to facilitate participation in the electoral process for 
increasingly mobile voters. Through such institutional changes, political elites can open up 
decision-making without the risk of highly disruptive consequences, since these changes rarely 
shift the balance of power in general elections. An interesting exception to this rule is the 2006 
Italian election, where the narrow centre-left majority in the Senate was only secured through the 
votes of Italians that resided overseas in newly created constituencies”137 (Bedock, Mair, and 
Wilson 2012, 8).  
 As a conclusion on participative reforms, the tendency across Western Europe is towards 
complementing the means of citizen participation in the representative process, rather than 
                                                 
137 This passage was written by Alex Wilson. 
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fundamentally disrupting the model through the development of direct democracy. This is 
evidenced by the prevalence of direct election reforms, and reforms expanding access to suffrage, 
as well as by the lack of reforms implementing new mechanisms of direct democracy. But what 
trends might appear if we move away from the qualitative description of individual indicators? 
This is the issue which will be developed in the second section.  
 
2. Contrasts and common trends in the reforms of the core democratic 
rules in Western Europe 
 
This section first examines the extent and the scope of the reforms of core democratic rules 
that have been adopted in Western Europe during the last two decades, showing that such 
reforms were far from rare occurrences, although substantial reforms have not exactly been 
common. Secondly, the analysis of the direction and format of reforms shows that these were 
overwhelmingly more inclusive, and that they came as parts of bundles. This should not 
overshadow the significant differences between countries. 
 
2.1. Extent and scope of reforms  
The data suggests that there has been a large number of reforms overall, with no less than 
147 reforms adopted between 1990 and 2010 in the 18 countries included in the analysis,138 with 
an average of 8.2 reforms by country and of 2.7 substantial reforms per country.  
 
2.1.1. Extent and scope of  reforms by dimension 
Clearly, the assumption that institutional reform is a rare event can be confidently 
rejected. A third of the reforms adopted (49 exactly) were classified as substantial institutional 
reforms, meaning that they significantly affected the balance of power and/or the nature of the 
relationship between parties, executive and legislative powers, citizens and elites. Figure 3 shows 
the considerable discrepancies between the number of reforms adopted in each of the 6 
categories, with a clear predilection for what we call representative reforms.  
                                                 
138 Compared to the reforms analysed in the working paper published in 2012 for the Robert Schuman 
centre, two decentralising reforms were added in the database for Ireland, and the 28 reforms of public 
subsidies of political parties were left aside for reasons mentioned above. 
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Indeed, these accounted for no less than 76% of the reforms analysed here (adding 
electoral, parliamentary and decentralising reforms), with participative reforms accounting for 
24%. Therefore, most of the institutional engineering activism in Western Europe during the last 
two decades has been devoted to reform of “traditional” representative democracy. By far the 
most common reforms, no fewer than 60, concerned decentralisation and federalisation, thus 
accounting for more than 40% of the total. 
 
Figure 3. Number of institutional reforms adopted between 1990 and 2010 for each of the six categories 
 
The data also confirms that electoral and parliamentary reforms are far from uncommon 
once minor reforms are taken into account, with 29 and 23 cases, respectively, across the 18 
Western European democracies. The last three categories (access to suffrage, direct election, and 
mechanisms of direct democracy) display  16, 13 and 6 reforms respectively, thus confirming that 
these, of all the institutional reforms adopted, were reforms which complemented, rather than 
endeavoured to supplant, the representative model. The proportion of substantial reforms varies 
from dimension to dimension, by an average of one third. The large number of decentralising 
reforms, along with the multiplication of reforms expanding the access to suffrage and direct 
election in particular, could imply the existence of diffusion mechanisms, with a move towards 
more decentralised democracies allowing increased citizen participation.  
 
2.1.2. Extent and scope of  reforms by country 
There were big differences in the use of institutional engineering across countries 
between 1990 and 2010 (Figure 4), in terms of the overall number of reforms and the number of 
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substantial reforms adopted during that time. France has been the “champion” of institutional 
reforms among our sample group of countries, and has reformed almost six times as much as 
Denmark (17 reforms vs. 3). Italy has adopted the greatest number of substantial reforms of its 
core democratic rules, with no fewer than 8 substantial reforms. Switzerland, on the other hand, 
has adopted no substantial institutional reform.  
Some countries seem to be characterised by limited use of institutional engineering (less than 
the average of 8.2 reforms):139 Denmark, Iceland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, 
Sweden and Switzerland. Reforms here have tended to focus on specific dimensions. These have, 
in some cases, involved major changes: important decentralising reforms in Denmark, Spain, 
Germany and Ireland, the introduction of the citizens’ initiative and national referendum in 
Luxembourg, and the abolition of the higher chamber in Norway. In countries such as 
Luxembourg and Norway, the reforms were relatively uncontentious and won widespread cross-
party agreement. The countries in which some minor and some substantial reforms were adopted 
have some characteristics in common (with the exception of Spain): “a high trust in their 
institutions and the way democracy works in general and/or proportional electoral systems as 
well as relatively consensual institutions as defined by Lijphart (1984, 1999)” (Bedock, Mair, and 
Wilson 2012, 11).  
Figure 4. Number of reforms of the core democratic rules adopted between 1990 and 2010 for each country 
 
Note: The lighter bar expresses the total number of reforms, and the darker bar the number of substantial reforms.  
                                                 
 139 Cf. appendix 4.  
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One can delineate a second category of countries, wherein reform has taken place either 
(much) more frequently than usual, and/or where an important number of substantial reforms 
have been adopted: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Greece, Italy, Portugal and the UK. 
“These countries can either be classified as majoritarian democracies (Greece, France, and UK), 
or they have experienced a major restructuring of their party systems (Austria, Belgium), intense 
popular dissatisfaction (Italy), or changes of governing majorities in a context of bipolar political 
competition. For instance, in Portugal, the Socialists came back into power after more than 12 
years of domination of the PSD, while the UK Labour Party returned to power in 1997 after 17 
years in opposition. France, Greece, and Italy (since 1994) are also characterised by bipolar 
competition, although the change in governing majorities has been even more frequent than in 
the UK. Finland suffered severe economic turmoil at the beginning of the 1990s which prompted 
an intense political debate, which suggests that the difficulties that political parties faced in 
dealing with policy issues also contaminated the debate about constitutional and institutional 
issues. (...) Belgium and Italy were both characterised by an intense restructuring of their party 
systems in recent decades” (Bedock, Mair, and Wilson 2012, 12). Similarly, in Austria, the 
historical domination of the ÖVP and the SPÖ has been eroding since the rise in power of 
conservative and radical right parties in the late 1990s. One might also note that several of these 
countries are semi-presidential regimes: Austria, Finland, France and Portugal. To summarise, 
countries characterised by (frequent) alternation in power, changing party systems, popular 
dissatisfaction, or opposition between two main parties or blocks have been more prone to adopt 
reforms of their core democratic rules than the first set of countries.  
 
2.2. Direction and format of reforms 
Whereas the number and scope of institutional reforms have varied a great deal across 
parties and dimensions, the picture is clearer when it comes to the direction and the format of 
reforms: an overwhelming majority of them have moved towards greater inclusiveness, and most 
have been part of bundles.  
 
2.2.1. Direction and format of reforms by dimension 
Three categories have been considered in the classification of the direction of the reforms 
adopted: inclusive reforms, which open up decision-making; reforms with multiple logics, capable 
of closing off and/or opening up decision-making processes; and exclusive reforms, which close 
off decision-making. In order to give a clearer picture, and to adopt a more stringent definition of 
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inclusive reforms (including only “pure” inclusive reforms), the last two categories have been 
collapsed (Table 1), keeping in mind that the number of reforms ranges from 6 to 60. The 
general picture suggests a strong predilection for inclusive as opposed to exclusive reforms or 
reforms with multiple logics, with more than two-thirds (100) of the 147 reforms adopted 
moving towards greater inclusiveness. It is important to recall that, as the analysis only takes into 
account reforms of core democratic rules, the data does not cover institutional power shifts 
towards non-majoritarian institutions, which may very well counterbalance such changes (Mair 
2005). Inclusive reforms account for 60% or more of the reforms adopted in Western Europe for 
5 out of the 6 categories included in this analysis. Only a little less than half of the electoral 
reforms adopted in the last decades went in the direction of opening up decision-making, 
whereas 15 out of the 16 reforms regulating access to suffrage led to decision-making being 
opened up to more citizens. Moreover, it is striking to see that for the reforms that have been 
labelled representative (electoral, parliamentary and decentralising reforms), there is less of a 
tendency towards inclusiveness than with participative reforms, which have moved almost 
exclusively towards greater inclusion. The fact that electoral reforms (which are long considered 
by the literature to be the “most manipulative instrument of politics”; Sartori 1968, 273), and to a 
certain extent parliamentary reforms, display less affinity with inclusiveness is interesting, “as it 
shows they probably obey a more competitive and self-interested logic than other types of 
reforms, in which questions of institutional legitimation may loom larger” (Bedock, Mair, and 
Wilson 2012, 14). 
Table 1. Direction of the reforms of the core democratic rules by dimension in Western Europe, 1990-2010 (in 
%) 
 
Inclusive 
reforms 
Mixed logic and 
exclusive reforms Total N 
Electoral reforms 48 52 
 
29 
Parliamentary reforms 61 39 
 
23 
Federal and decentralisation reforms 67 33 
 
60 
Direct democracy mechanisms 83 17 
 
6 
Direct election of head executive 92 8 
 
13 
Access to suffrage 93 7 
 
16 
All 67 33 100% 147 
Reading: out of the 29 electoral reforms adopted between 1990 and 2010, 48% were inclusive reforms.   
When turning to the most common format of reforms, dimension by dimension, the picture is 
even clearer: a full 75% (110 of 147 reforms) were part of a bundle of reforms, making it by far 
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the most common outcome, much more so than one-off reforms.140 When looking at the 
distribution of reforms across legislatures (Table 2), it appears that in around 30% of the 
legislatures, at least two institutional reforms have been adopted. In other words, 75% of the 
reforms have been adopted in less than a third of the legislatures observed, meaning that most of 
the reforms of the core democratic rules in Western Europe have been adopted during intense 
moments of institutional activism concentrated within particular legislatures. The differences 
across dimensions in terms of bundling are relatively trivial, with electoral reforms the most 
frequently “bundled” reforms (90% of the 29 cases), whereas  “only”  two-thirds of 
decentralising reforms and direct democracy reforms formed part of a bundle (Table 3). The 
second, more interesting insight that can be drawn from the analysis of the bundles of reforms by 
dimension is that certain dimensions have been reformed together much more frequently than 
others. 
 Table 2. Number of institutional reforms adopted by legislature in 18 Western European democracies, 1990-
2010 
Reforms by legislature N % 
0 43 37.1 
1 37 31.9 
2 19 16.4 
3 8 6.9 
4 3 2.6 
5 2 1.7 
6 3 2.6 
7 1 0.9 
Total 116 100% 
Source: my own elaboration of the SIEPOL database (Bedock, Mair, Wilson, 2012) 
Reading: In 37 out of the 116 legislatures, only one reform has been adopted.  
Table 3. Proportion of bundled reforms adopted by dimension in Western Europe, 1990-2010 (in %) 
  Bundled reforms Reforms (N) 
Electoral reforms 90 29 
Parliamentary reforms 70 23 
Decentralising reforms 67 60 
Direct election of the head executive 77 13 
Direct democracy 67 6 
Access to suffrage 88 16 
All 75% 147 
Reading: among the 29 electoral reforms adopted between 1990 and 2010, 90% were part of a bundle of reforms. 
                                                 
140 As the database covers the 1990-2010 period, this means that a certain number of legislatures in each 
country are incomplete. When recomputing the proportion of reforms that are part of a bundle after 
eliminating these incomplete legislatures, we find that 77% of the reforms have been adopted as part of a 
bundle. 
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Table 4 presents all of the incidences of the paired combinations encountered in the data across 
the six dimensions. “In his classic analysis of patterns of democracy, Lijphart (1999) drew a 
strong connection between electoral system rules and the rules regulating the relationships 
between executive and legislative powers, with both being clustered together in a distinct 
executive-parties dimension. This connection is also visible in our data, with electoral reforms 
often going hand in hand with parliamentary reforms (11 cases). The data also suggests that 
electoral reforms are often associated with other dimensions that impact on the electoral process 
and access to the electoral arena more generally, including direct election of executive heads (7 
cases), and access to suffrage (9 cases). It is also interesting to observe that electoral reforms are 
often linked to federal or decentralizing reforms, a combination which occurs in fourteen cases. 
There are also nine cases of parliamentary reforms being linked to decentralizing reforms. This 
may suggest that Lijphart’s particular clustering of institutions into two broad dimensions is less 
visible when it comes to institutional reform as such, with political actors tending to reform both 
institutions at the national level (electoral system, organization of the parliament) and institutions 
affecting the balance between national and subnational level at the same time” (Bedock, Mair, 
and Wilson 2012, 16).141 
Table 4. Combinations of reforms encountered on the six dimensions in Western Europe, 1990-2010 
2x2 encountered combinations Occurrences (N) 
Electoral reform + decentralising reform 14 
Electoral reform + parliamentary reform 11 
Electoral reform + access to suffrage 9 
Parliamentary reform + decentralising reform 9 
Decentralising reform + access to suffrage 8 
Electoral reform + direct election 7 
Decentralising reform + direct election 7 
Several decentralising reforms in one bundle 7 
Parliamentary reforms + access to suffrage 6 
Parliamentary reform + direct election 4 
Electoral reform + direct democracy 2 
Direct election + access to suffrage 2 
Direct democracy + access to suffrage 2 
Parliamentary reforms + direct democracy 1 
Decentralising reform + direct democracy 1 
                                                 
141 Compared to the version of 2012, the numbers are updated taking into account that only six out of the 
initial seven dimensions are included. 
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Finally, even though representative reforms are sometimes implemented together with 
participative reforms (for example, the frequent combination of electoral reforms with access to 
suffrage), we more frequently see combinations of representative reforms implemented together. 
Combinations of participative reforms have been relatively rare, suggesting again that these 
mainly served to complement the representative model rather than introducing something 
radically new.  
 
2.2.2. Direction and format of reforms by country 
I have chosen again to display the results in percentages to make them easier to read 
(Table 5), but because the number of reforms ranges from 3 to 19, one should be cautious not to 
over-interpret the differences between countries.  
Table 5. Direction of the reforms of the core democratic rules by country in Western Europe, 1990-2010 (in %) 
  Inclusive reforms 
Mixed logic and 
exclusive reforms Total N 
Iceland 29 71 
 
7 
Denmark 33 67 
 
3 
Ireland 50 50 
 
6 
Sweden 50 50 
 
6 
Portugal 54 46 
 
13 
France 59 41 
 
17 
Italy 67 33 
 
12 
Germany 67 33 
 
6 
Austria 70 30 
 
10 
Finland 73 27 
 
11 
Netherlands 75 25 
 
4 
Norway 75 25 
 
4 
UK 75 25 
 
12 
Greece 77 23 
 
9 
Belgium 87 13 
 
15 
Spain 100 0 
 
3 
Luxembourg 100 0 
 
5 
Switzerland 100 0 
 
4 
Mean 69 31 100% 147 
The aim was to evaluate whether, for example, countries in which relatively few reforms 
have been adopted had been also more (or less) likely to adopt inclusive reforms. Overall, there 
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seems to be no pattern of association between low numbers of reforms, and low numbers of 
inclusive reforms. While countries like Denmark, Iceland, Ireland and Sweden have adopted 
relatively few reforms, and small numbers of inclusive reforms, the opposite can be said about 
Spain, Luxembourg and Switzerland, where all of the reforms adopted between 1990 and 2010 
have been inclusive. Overall, this suggests that there has been a general shift towards more 
inclusive political institutions in almost all of the consolidated European democracies, regardless 
of the frequency of institutional reforms. Turning to the proportion of bundled reforms by 
country (Table 6), there is evidence that the proportion of reforms occuring in clusters (although 
again, this is the vast majority) varies quite substantially across countries, not least because of the 
small N in some of the polities included. There are, on average, 4.5 complete legislatures by 
country, and unsurprisingly, the proportion of bundled reforms by country rises when truncated 
legislatures are left out (Table 6). 
Table 6. Proportion of bundled reforms adopted by country in Western Europe, 1990-2010 (in %) 
 
All legislatures Without truncated legislatures 
 Bundled reforms Reforms (N) Bundled reforms Reforms (N) 
Spain 0 3 0 3 
Switzerland 50 4 67 3 
Ireland 50 6 60 5 
Netherlands 50 4 67 3 
Norway 50 4 50 4 
Iceland 57 7 67 6 
Germany 67 6 67 6 
Denmark 67 3 100 2 
Greece 67 9 67 9 
Portugal 69 13 60 10 
Finland 73 11 80 10 
Austria 80 10 89 9 
Italy 83 12 91 11 
Sweden 83 6 100 5 
Belgium 87 15 87 15 
UK 92 12 92 12 
France 96 17 89 9 
Luxembourg 100 5 100 5 
Mean 68% 147 74% 127 
When taking into account all legislatures, in Luxembourg, all of the five reforms adopted were 
bundled, and this was also the case for the overwhelming majority of reforms (more than 80%) in 
Austria, Belgium, France, Italy, Sweden and the UK. Below-average adoption of bundled reforms 
has been common in countries where only a small number of reforms have taken place: none in 
Spain, and only half of the total for Switzerland, the Netherlands, Ireland and Norway. There is a 
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mechanical positive relationship between the proportion of bundled reforms and the number of 
reforms adopted, with a positive correlation coefficient of 0.62. What we have yet to see is that 
the construction of bundles actively facilitates agreement on institutional reforms. This hypothesis 
will be carefully investigated in the second part of this thesis through case studies.142 
As a conclusion, more generally, “these figures underline the relevance of analysing a 
series of reforms together rather than separately, as in the overwhelming majority of the cases, at 
least in Western Europe between 1990 and 2010, the reform of a given institutional dimension 
appears to occur concurrently with other dimensions. Like Hamlet’s spies, they come not in 
single file but in battalions” (Bedock, Mair, and Wilson 2012, 15).  
 
2.3. From common trends to country-specific differences in the propensity to reform 
 
2.3.1. Common trends and contrasts: the nature of  the change of  core 
democratic rules in Western Europe 
Examining the reforms of the core democratic rules which have been adopted in the last two 
decades in Western Europe leads us to a number of conclusions. Firstly, the three hypotheses 
drawn from the various theories developed in the first two chapters are confirmed. Therefore, 
change is relatively frequent, represents a move towards more inclusive institutions, and in the 
great majority of cases, happens in clusters, or bundles, of institutional reforms. These three 
conclusions, in turn, show the importance of gathering empirical knowledge on a 
multidimensional, cross-sectional and longitudinal database on institutional reforms, in that this 
calls several existing assumptions about institutional reforms into question, particularly what we 
have called the illusions of rarity and singularity.  
However, aside from these conclusions, it is also quite clear that the database shows 
important differences across dimensions and across countries. Representative reforms, or in 
other words, institutional reforms regulating the traditional understanding of representative 
democracy, still constitute the lion’s share of the reforms adopted. Participative reforms, on the 
other hand, have mainly concerned direct election and the extension of access to suffrage, rather 
than direct democracy, suggesting a will on the part of the European political elites to expand the 
opportunities for participation, but also a reluctance to develop an alternative, more direct model 
of democracy at the national level through institutional reforms. Still, in all dimensions (with the 
                                                 
142 Cf. infra, and in particular the chapter on Italy.  
90 
An Overview of Changes to Core Democratic Rules 
notable exception of electoral reforms), elites have tended to move towards more inclusive 
institutions, opening up opportunities to participate in decision-making. Across all dimensions, 
reforms have tended to come in bundles, and the analysis of the 2x2 combinations shows that no 
dimensions of reforms appear to have been considered incompatible. Elites have often adopted 
different types of representative reforms together, or even both participative and representative 
reforms at once. This may suggest that, during the processes of institutional reforms, and 
depending on the countries and circumstances, changes can take very different forms and touch 
upon very different dimensions with no a priori incompatibilities, although again, this should be 
investigated by through observation of concrete instances of bundles of reforms.  
The differences across countries are more puzzling, particularly in terms of the number of 
reforms, where discrepancies are most apparent. I have shown that the move towards more 
inclusive institutional reforms has tended to be quite general, and that in any case, there are no 
obvious factors coming to mind which can account for the differences in the proportion of 
inclusive reforms across countries. The proportion of bundled reforms appears to be linked with 
the overall number of reforms adopted, suggesting that “clustering” of reforms may facilitate 
their adoption. The analysis of such a mechanism will be a major focus of the second part of the 
thesis.143 Returning to the main differences among countries, regarding the number of reforms 
adopted, both long- and short-term factors may help to explain these differences: the nature of 
the institutional system, electoral and opinion change, changes of actors in power, etc. So far, I 
have suggested that majoritarian democracies, democracies that have experienced party system 
change, popular dissatisfaction, and political alternation between two blocs, seem to be 
particularly vulnerable to reforms of the core democratic rules. But how should we go about 
disentangling the elements stemming from the varying vulnerability of each institutional system 
to change from those resulting from favourable circumstances? In other words, how can we 
assess the impact of long- and short-term factors on the propensity to reform? Before developing 
these aspects,144 a brief look at the moments when reforms were adopted by legislatures, and at 
the amount of reforms, might help us to understand some of the differences between countries. 
 
 
 
                                                 
143 Cf. infra, from chapter 5 onwards.  
144 Cf. infra, chapter 4.  
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2.3.2. The reforms of  the core democratic rules adopted by legislature: country-
specific factors at play 
Figure 5 displays the number of reforms adopted by legislatures, by country, between 
1990 and 2010. The patterns that emerge are relatively fragmented. It is clear that legislatures in 
which three or more reforms were adopted constitute a very small minority of cases, with a 
maximum of seven reforms in Belgium between 1999 and 2003. One might have thought that 
there may have been periods of intense institutional engineering across all countries in Europe, 
during which most of the reforms would have been adopted, but there is no evidence of this. In 
countries such as Austria, Finland or Portugal, the vast majority of the reforms adopted took 
place during in the 1990s. In other countries, such as France and the UK, and also Luxembourg, 
the pace of reforms accelerated at the end of the 1990s, and peaked during the 2000s. In others, 
like Italy and Belgium, reforms took place over a relatively long period of time, between 1993 and 
the mid-2000s. In the rest of the countries, a relatively low number of legislative reforms were 
adopted over time, with no apparent or striking logic behind this. What can explain the instances 
in which more reforms have taken place?   
Figure 5. Number of reforms adopted for each legislature and country in Western Europe, 1990-2010 
 
Reading: In Austria, in the legislature lasting between 1991 and 1994, 4 reforms were adopted.  
Note: the figures in bold show legislatures in which at least two substantial reforms were adopted. The figures in italic 
indicate truncated legislatures.  
In many of the cases cited above, and in others, political alternation, i.e. changes in terms 
of leadership and composition of the parties in power, has preceded the adoption of reforms of 
core democratic rules. Examples include Finland in 1991 and 1995, France in 1997 and 2002, 
Ireland in 1997, Italy in 1996 and 2001, Portugal in 1996, Sweden in 1994, and the UK in 1997. 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Austria 0 0
Belgium 0
Denmark 0
Finland 0
France
Germany 0 0
Greece 2 0
Iceland 0
Ireland
Italy
Luxembourg
Netherlands 0 1
Norway 0
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
UK 0
4 2 0 1 2 1
0
0 0 0 0 2 1
0 4 2 7 1 1
5 3 1 1 1
2 1 3 5 6
0
1 2 2 1 0 1
2 1 1 0 2
1 2 1 1 2
0 0
0 0 2 3 0
1 0 3 1 1
1 3 1 4 3
0 2 0 1 0
1 0 0 2 1
1 2 3 0 0 0
1
0 1 1 0 1
3 0 6 1 1 1
0 1 6 3 2
1 1 2 0 0 0
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In countries such as Finland and Sweden, the sequences of institutional reforms during the 1990s 
were preceded by deep public concern over the period of economic recession that the two 
countries experienced in the early 1990s. Evidence of restructuring of existing party systems 
could be found in countries such as Austria, Belgium, and even more strikingly in Italy. Countries 
like Belgium and Italy are, moreover, characterised by a high degree of party fragmentation, and a 
large number of veto players in government and in parliament.  
To summarise briefly, both long-term structural elements and short-term contextual 
factors seem to influence both the number of reforms and the timing of these reforms. Looking 
only at the overall number of reforms across time, it seems that majoritarian democracies, 
democracies in which the number of veto players is high, and with changing party systems 
have reformed more than others. When it comes to the timing of reforms, political alternation, 
periods of economic and political crisis and dissatisfaction seem to have presented 
favourable conditions for institutional change. These conclusions are partial, incomplete, and do 
not really provide a fair description of the consequences of structures, and of context. This will 
be the object of the next chapter.  
 
Conclusion 
 
 This chapter has provided an overview of the reforms of the core democratic rules which 
have been adopted in Western Europe during the last two decades. We have shown that 
representative reforms have dominated the institutional engineering agenda, rather than 
participative reforms. No clear convergence between the European polities is apparent, apart 
from a relatively strong tendency towards greater decentralisation, the development of direct 
election, and expansion of the access to suffrage. A surprising result of this study has been the 
rarity of reforms moving in the direction of more direct democracy, putting into perspective a 
relatively widespread understanding that the representative model of democracy is increasingly 
being challenged. When it comes to the actual formal core democratic rules, it seems, to the 
contrary, that direct democracy remains very marginal in the minds of reformers. In general, the 
domination of representative reforms shows that participative reforms have complemented 
rather than challenged the traditional model of representative democracy.  
 The three hypotheses developed, i.e. that reforms tend to be frequent, inclusive and 
bundled, have all been confirmed by the general picture, with interesting exceptions for certain 
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countries and dimensions. Electoral reforms have tended to be less inclusive than reforms in 
other dimensions. Certain countries have reformed their institutions significantly more than 
others, for reasons that are yet to be explored, which suggests that the particular structures of 
their institutional and political systems, or contextual events such as political alternation in 
particular, may have been key factors contributing to these differences. Moreover, one might add 
that there is no evidence of periods of general activism in terms of institutional engineering 
across Western Europe, insofar as reforms have occurred at different times, with no general 
cross-country pattern. This remark points to the need to analyse circumstances and characteristics 
specific to each country in order to understand the main country differences, rather than focusing 
on the general context common to all Western European democracies. Indeed, there are some 
commonalities in the use of reforms of core democratic rules which have been demonstrated in 
this chapter. Still, when talking about the propensity to reform core democratic rules, it would 
seem that this is country-specific, and linked to both the long-term, structural characteristics of 
each polity, and to the national shocks with which they are confronted. 
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Chapter 4 Disentangling the long- and short-term 
determinants of  the reforms of  core democratic rules: a 
model for Western Europe, 1990-2010 
 
 
Authors focusing on institutional reforms in established democracies have mostly shown 
that change is either the result of gradual trends in the long run or of changes following periods 
of punctuated equilibrium.89 Streeck and Thelen call the former “transformation without 
disruption” (2005, 4), and Steinmo refers to this as the “evolution of modern states” (2010), 
whereas Baumgartner and Jones described the latter as “disjoint[ed], episodic, and not always 
predictable” change (2012, 1). Based on these two perspectives, change is either imperceptible, or 
very sudden and hard to predict. These theories, moreover, have focused mainly on analysing how 
institutions change, rather than on predicting when they might change by identifying moments 
when change would be more frequent. And yet, the previous chapter has shown that, despite 
some common tendencies across Western Europe, the differences between countries in terms of 
the frequency with which they reform core democratic rules are huge, and these are not so easily 
explained at first glance. Preliminary considerations lead to the reflection that long-term factors 
spurring dissatisfaction with existing institutions and short-term factors, and indeed the vagaries 
of everyday politics, constitute determinants which can help to account for the amount of 
reforms, and the moments at which more reforms of core democratic rules take place. 
Democratic institutional systems are products of conscious decisions made by political elites and 
other actors, in response to the challenges and incentives that they face. Therefore, there are 
strong reasons to believe that parties do in fact adapt institutions. Consequently, it is logical to 
expect that both long-term conditions and short-term shifts and factors can have significant 
impact on the propensity to adopt more institutional reforms, and on the number of reforms. 
This is the case for the level of political support and institutional characteristics, but also for 
electoral shifts and the changing preferences of elites in power, etc.  
 The aim of this fourth chapter, which closes the first part of the thesis, is to understand 
the determinants of reforms of core democratic rules through a macro analysis taking into 
account both long-term and short-term factors of change. The objective is to disentangle the 
                                                 
89 For an early, seminal presentation of this debate, cf. for example, Structuring Politics (Steinmo, Thelen, 
and Longstreth 1992). 
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enduring features that pave the way for reform, and the short-term shocks that explain why 
particular numbers of reforms are adopted in particular legislatures. Two dependent variables will 
be examined: firstly, the total number of reforms adopted per country between 1990 and 2010; 
and secondly, the number of institutional reforms adopted by legislatures. The former will enable 
us to investigate the long-term trends and characteristics that impact on the total number of 
reforms. The latter will focus specifically on the short-term shocks which change from legislature 
to legislature, in order to explain the variation of this number within countries, and the moments 
at which reform is more likely.  
In the first part, the main theoretical expectations drawn from the existing literature are 
presented. I focus first on the factors that may be expected to lead to change in the long run: 
institutional characteristics deriving from a predilection for output-oriented legitimacy, and the 
lack of political support. Crucially, as this aspect is not usually examined, this section presents 
theories about the short-term determinants that lead to greater numbers of reforms at particular 
moments, using the works of authors who have investigated electoral system change. The factors 
that have been identified include the roles played by public opinion, electoral uncertainty and 
alternation. In the second part of the chapter, the hypotheses, the models and main variables, and 
the empirical results will be presented, again using the SIEPOL database. The main hypothesis 
posits the existence of a link between challenges to legitimacy and certain institutional systems in 
the long term, and electoral and opinion change in the short term, and more frequent reforms of 
core democratic rules. In the long term, polities with a lack of political support, majoritarian 
polities, and when accounting for other factors, democracies with a high number of veto players 
are reformed more often than others. Focusing on short-term determinants, the results show that 
rising electoral uncertainty, as measured by volatility, along with the changing preferences of 
actors in power as measured by the advent of new forces in government, lead to the adoption of 
greater numbers of institutional reforms in some legislatures.  
 
1. Challenges to legitimacy, institutional characteristics, electoral 
change, and reforms of core democratic rules  
 
 
In order to disentangle long- and short-term factors which influence reforms of core 
democratic rules, it is essential to identify two elements. First of all, certain polities display 
institutional characteristics and enduring trends that make them more vulnerable than others to 
pressures for institutional change. Secondly, certain circumstances – or short-term shocks – 
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produce conditions that lead to greater numbers of reforms at particular moments. I will examine 
both elements in each of the following sections. Note that although most of the following 
arguments have focused on the occurrence of change, they can be applied to the issue of the 
frequency of change as well, or in other words, to more intense moment of institutional activism. 
 
1.1. Change in the long run: the link between institutional characteristics, levels of 
political support, and reforms 
A number of theoretical reflections suggest that majoritarian polities may be particularly 
vulnerable to institutional change. When it comes to the relationship between veto players, policy 
inertia, and institutional reforms, the literature has not agreed on the exact relationship between 
the three elements, and the debate is still ongoing. Finally, the literature provides strong 
theoretical elements leading to believe that there is a link between low political support and the 
frequency of institutional reforms.  
 
1.1.1. Output-oriented legitimacy, policy inertia and vulnerability to reforms 
Shugart has shown that “extreme” electoral systems are more vulnerable than others to 
change. He refers to extreme institutional systems as those displaying “poor performance, relative 
to normal standards for the electoral system in use that results from the mechanical application of 
the seat allocation principle of the existing system” (Shugart 2008, 9–10). It is possible to expand 
his reasoning to make assumptions about which institutional systems are more vulnerable than 
others to institutional change. One could argue that two types of institutional systems may be 
particularly vulnerable to change in Western Europe, for radically different reasons: majoritarian 
democracies, because of their reduced capacity to rely on output-oriented legitimacy, and 
democracies with a high number of veto players, as a result of the difficulties in achieving 
substantial policy outcomes.  
Using Scharpf’s argument (1999), we highlight the existence of two main sources of 
democratic legitimacy, namely input-oriented legitimacy (based on representivity) and output-
oriented legitimacy (based on the quality of policy outcomes and decisiveness). The growing 
levels of citizen disengagement and scepticism about the traditional democratic process have also 
been examined, focusing on the high expectations of citizens, the increasing complexity of 
policy-making, and the increasingly stringent policy constraints faced by decision-makers in 
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Western European democracies.90 I argue that the conjunction of the rising scepticism of 
European citizens and the reduced capacity to implement policies provides an incentive for 
Western political elites to reinforce representation and input-oriented legitimacy at the expense of 
output-oriented legitimacy, on which they have much less capacity to act.  
I expect that majoritarian democracies as defined by Lijphart (1984, 1999) are more 
vulnerable than their consensus-based counterparts as regards the reform of core democratic 
institutions, as their legitimacy is primarily based on output. Indeed, the institutional design, 
which allows various institutional devices to concentrate power in the hands of a single actor, or 
a very small number of actors, can only be justified insofar as it spurs policy capacity and helps to 
“get things done”. One could go further: there are stronger incentives to enact reforms in polities 
where the results are “skewed” in favour of the stronger parties. Where power is 
disproportionately concentrated in the hands of a small number of parties, i.e., to use Shugart's 
term, in polities that are more “extreme”, elites have both greater motivation (because of the 
difficulty in achieving output-oriented legitimacy) and more opportunities to achieve reforms. 
Indeed, if the policy capacity of parties is reduced by a certain number of developments, the 
institutional framework can be thought of as inefficient, as it does not deliver what it is supposed 
to deliver. In other words, it is hard to legitimise the concentration of power when policy capacity 
is lower, meaning that countries where power has remained centralised, such as the UK or 
France, should be more vulnerable to change than countries where institutional power has been 
more widely distributed, such as Holland. 
Secondly, one might wonder whether the relationship between veto players and institutional 
reforms is of a different nature than that between veto players and policy reforms. Tsebelis 
argues that there is a clear relationship between the number of veto players and policy inertia 
(2002). His argument relies on the fact that policy outcomes are the result of two elements, 
namely the actors’ preferences and the prevailing institutions, which leads him to the following 
conclusion: “one analytical truth connecting veto players with policy stability is that as the 
number of vp increases, policy stability does not decrease (a change in the status quo does not 
become easier, though it may not become more difficult) (…) What is not possible under any set 
of conditions is to add a veto player and make changes in the status quo easier” (Tsebelis 2010, 
4). This is a more relaxed attitude than that of his previous argument, in 2002, when he 
considered that countries with a large number of veto players were doomed to be characterised 
by policy stability. Tsebelis’ assumptions, however, are based on the idea that a single status quo 
                                                 
90 Cf. chapter 2, section 3.1.1. 
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point exists, that this can be located and identified by the actors, and that these actors hold well-
established preferences that allow the win-set of the status quo to be defined. Following his 
hypothesis, and applying it to institutional change, this means that there should be significantly 
more reforms in countries characterised by two-party or single-party majorities (and therefore 
with a low number of veto players) such as France, Greece and the UK, and less in countries 
characterised by multi-party coalition governments, such as Holland, Switzerland and Belgium.  
Since the very early formulations of the veto players hypothesis, disagreements have arisen 
about the actual relationship between veto players and policy stability. Authors such as Immergut, 
who developed the notion of veto points before Tsebelis in her work on health policies (1992), 
shows that the main impact of veto players is to give greater influence to certain interest groups. 
Bonoli (2012), focusing on pension reform, finds that the number of veto players changes the 
nature of the policy concessions that must be made, meaning that certain constituencies are more 
commonly targeted. Crepaz (2002) distinguishes between the impact of institutional and 
collective veto players, which favour the adoption of reforms through logrolling, while increased 
numbers of partisan veto players can lead to policy inertia. These authors demonstrate that a 
higher number of veto players influences both the process and the nature of the deal, rather than 
leading to policy deadlock. Rahat91 (2008) assumes the existence of a negative, curvilinear 
relationship between veto players and reforms:92 adopting institutional reforms is easier in 
instances when power is highly concentrated, or when it is highly dispersed.  
Several questions arise when it comes to applying the veto player theory to institutional 
change. Firstly, it is even possible to apply conclusions drawn in relation to theories concerning 
veto players and policy stability to institutional stability? Secondly, if so, what is the nature of the 
relationship between reforms of core democratic rules and veto players? Institutions are typically 
defined as “stable, valued, recurring patterns of behaviour” (Huntington 1965), structuring actions 
and preferences, and as a consequence, they cannot be considered “just another variable” 
(Steinmo and Thelen 1992, 9). Many authors argue that changing institutions is (even) harder 
than changing policies: “Standard models in political science and public policy studies basically 
focus on three elements: citizens’ preferences, political party’s or candidate’s positions, and 
                                                 
91 Rahat makes the following argument: “If conventional wisdom tells us that reform requires the 
concentration of power in the hands of the reformers so that the proposition can overcome the rejection 
of other actors, here it is suggested that reformers can also take advantage of a situation in which power is 
highly dispersed. In short, a major claim of this study is that the relationship between power 
concentration/dispersion and reform should be interpreted as curvilinear rather than linear” (2008, 5). 
92 Steinmo and Tolbert developed a similar argument about the link between party domination and tax 
burdens, showing that taxes are lower when there is a single dominant party, or no dominant party (1998).  
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institutional rules. The typical assumption is that the set of institutional rules is the most stable of 
these elements” (Colomer 2001, 235). Ironically, the argument is circular and implicitly 
tautological: institutions are stable because they are institutions, and institutions are, by definition, 
stable. Actually, not enough longitudinal and cross-national studies have been conducted on 
institutional reforms to enable us to accept or reject the postulate that policy change works in the 
same way as institutional change.  
At this stage, and in a preliminary macro analysis, one can only make a couple of logical 
suppositions, working in several directions. To begin with, if one wishes to demonstrate that 
countries with a higher number of veto players have higher levels of institutional reform than 
other countries, one might outline two conclusions. Firstly, the actors in such systems have more 
preferences that motivate them to move towards institutional change than is the case in countries 
with lower numbers of veto players. Secondly, it would mean not only that the existing 
institutions do not prevent such change, but that in some cases, they might actually encourage it. 
Logically, this is not impossible. Considering that the implementation of preferred policies 
(Müller and Strøm 1999) is among the three main objectives of parties, the difficulties in doing so 
in environments with many veto players could push actors to try to implement different 
institutional rules, either to prevent future policy deadlock, or because they cannot agree on 
anything else. This would imply that institutional change and policy change “complement” each 
other: one does the former when one cannot do the latter. A less stringent hypothesis would 
consist of saying that, just as the linear relationship between the number of veto players and 
policy change has been challenged, the relationship between veto players and institutional change 
might also be relative, or even non-existent. Indeed, even in complex environments where 
change is difficult to implement, mechanisms to manage coalition deals, concessions, tradeoffs 
and complex processes could ultimately serve to enable change. Rahat’s contention (2008, 5) is 
that institutional reforms can be facilitated, or at least are unimpeded, by the dispersion of power, 
insofar dispersed power means that no single actor can block a reform. What Rahat implicitly 
means is that not every veto player actually has veto capacity: this capacity is absolute when the 
number of veto players is low, but beyond a certain threshold there can be too many actors for 
anyone to be truly able to block anything, meaning that veto capacity is relative. Hellman, who 
examines reforms in Eastern European countries, also finds that greater numbers of veto players 
can actually mean greater change in situations where, because of large, inclusive coalition 
governments, parties against reforms can more easily be swayed (1998). 
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1.1.2. Level of  political support and reforms of  core democratic rules  
Considering the fact that parties today face unprecedented challenges to their legitimacy,93 
and that political support has reached an all-time low in Western Europe, I have argued that there 
are three incentives for parties to respond to this context through institutional reforms: to avoid 
blame; to spread blame among a greater number of political actors in order to dilute political 
responsibility; and to regain lost political support through a proactive strategy. This reasoning has 
been labelled the “Gattopardo argument” and shows that political elites are motivated to remain 
in power, or at least to preserve their own positions within the institutional system, and thus they 
enact change in situations when they face increased environmental uncertainty and hostility.94  
There are many tangible examples of the challenges faced by European political elites, which 
take multiple forms: changing party organisations, rising electoral volatility, the decline of 
traditional cleavages, the rise of populist parties and other new political actors, and the growing 
dissatisfaction with political and democratic systems. At this point, I am specifically interested in 
the link between political support and institutional reforms. Dalton has distinguished no fewer 
than five spheres of political support: confidence in public authorities (parties, politicians); 
confidence in political institutions (government, parliament); evaluations of regime performance 
(satisfaction with the functioning of the democratic system); support for democratic principles; 
and support for the political community. While shifts in the first of these spheres express “no 
more than dissatisfaction with the incumbents in office, a normal and healthy aspect in 
democratic process” (1999, 57), and the last two aspects concern support for the polity itself, 
which tends to be relatively unproblematic in (most) consolidated Western democracies, the 
second and the third dimension of political support are interesting for the purposes of this 
analysis. 
The assumption developed in the remainder of the chapter is simple: in the long term, the 
polities that are the most severely affected by low levels of confidence in political institutions and 
by public dissatisfaction with the functioning of the democratic system are also the ones in which 
most reforms of the core democratic rules are enacted. This, again, is a consequence of the triple 
incentive of blame avoidance, blame shifting, and the attempt to regain democratic legitimacy. In 
this chapter, based on macro analyses, it is not possible to disentangle these motivations from 
one another. However, one might reasonably assume that polities in which the political 
institutions are not supported, and in which citizens are unhappy with the workings of 
                                                 
93 Cf. chapter 2, section 3.1.1.  
94 Cf. chapter 2, section 3.1.2.  
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democracy, are much more vulnerable. Indeed, this lack of political support expresses a general 
dissatisfaction that can translate into several different types of political crisis, taking the form of 
electoral shifts, protests, low voter turnout, etc. Political elites do not operate within a bubble; 
they do need a certain level of support in order to be able to enact their functions (governing, 
opposing, implementing policies, etc.). I deliberately ignore the question of the efficiency of 
institutional reforms in restoring political support. The argument here is that elites tend to react 
to environments with low levels of political support by enacting more institutional reforms.  
 
1.2. Moments of change: favourable short-term conditions for reforms of core democratic 
rules 
The overall level of political support and the characteristics of institutions can be 
considered as two elements which structure the environment in which political parties compete 
and cooperate. However, if one is interested in understanding the timing of reforms and their 
intensity, then short-term determinants become paramount, and these have been less frequently 
investigated. I do not expect short-term determinants to entirely explain the choice of recourse to 
institutional change, or for them to be the main determinants at all. However, they constitute an 
important part of the picture, in that they mediate the link between the short-term evolution of 
the political context, and the changing of formal institutions. Previous works on electoral system 
change offer helpful insights to provide a better understanding of this link. When studying 
electoral system change, the main explanations dealing with the exogenous determinants of 
change have fallen into two groups, with the role of electoral and opinion shifts on one hand, and 
the advent of new political forces in power on the other.  
 
1.2.1. The roles of  public opinion and electoral uncertainty on electoral system 
change 
The literature on electoral system change shows that significant attempts have been made to 
examine the impact of exogenous triggers on institutional change. I have already discussed the 
theoretical and empirical links that have been established by various authors between situations 
of acute political crisis, party system change, and alternation, in particular.95 Here, I focus on the 
theoretical link between periods of “relative” political crisis and institutional change, i.e. between 
                                                 
95 Cf. chapter 2, section 1.1.2 
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periods in which the political system is contested, but not truly endangered (when public 
satisfaction with the existing regime is low), and electoral uncertainty. Finally, I examine how 
authors have evaluated the impact of alternation on the reform of electoral and institutional rules.  
Norris (2011) provides one of the few attempts to find a statistical link between what is 
broadly understood as democratic legitimacy and electoral reform. Comparing the countries 
included in the World Value Survey between 1993 and 2004, she shows that there is a link 
between what she calls “democratic aspirations” (support for democratic ideals) and electoral 
reform. She finds no evidence of a link between confidence in institutions, evaluation of the 
democratic performance of a country, and electoral reform. However, these results may have 
been influenced by the research format, and by the wide variety of countries included, along with 
the fact that Norris studied the link between the overall level of democratic legitimacy and reform 
(i.e. the long-term impact of this factor), rather than the impact of short-term shifts on the 
propensity to reform. Indeed, whereas Norris studied the level of legitimacy as an “inherent” 
factor of reform (Shugart 2003), just as we did in the previous section, one could argue that shifts 
in the levels of public trust in political institutions and in the overall level of appreciation of 
democratic performance might be “contingent” factors for reform (i.e., short-term triggers).  
Secondly, among the authors who have studied the link between electoral system change and 
party system change, Andrews and Jackman (2005) have made a particularly interesting 
contribution, focusing on the impact of uncertainty on the behaviour of the political actors that 
are able to implement reform (who they call “strategic fools”). The notion of uncertainty is 
particularly interesting, as the authors show that such a context encourages political parties to act 
according to a short-term logic, and can result in miscalculations regarding the anticipated effects 
of new institutional rules. They argue: “for political actors to engage in reform of the procedures 
by which they won in the first place, they must come to believe either that existing arrangements 
will adversely affect their future prospects for winning, or that they face considerable uncertainty, 
or both” (Andrews and Jackman 2005, 66). The same study also establishes a clear link between 
uncertainty and electoral shifts, showing that parties base their support for the move to PR (or 
lack thereof) on their own performance in the most recent election, and tend to favour the 
retention of majority systems if they over-performed, and the introduction of PR if they under-
performed.  
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1.2.2. Political alternation and institutional and electoral reforms 
Another aspect of the literature on electoral system change is particularly relevant for the 
purposes of our investigation: the impact of electoral success and failure on individual and party 
support for change. There have been two main interpretations of the impact of winning or losing 
(alternation) in relation to the likelihood of supporting reform. On the one hand, certain authors 
have developed the idea that different parties hold different preferences regarding reforms, and 
that some parties are, for normative or strategic reasons, more inclined to support reform than 
others. On the other hand, other authors propose slightly more complex interpretations, arguing 
that incumbency has a systematic effect, leading parties that have been in power for a long time 
to be less inclined to reform. Regarding the first interpretation, a number of accounts have also 
introduced a simple, but central idea: that governing and opposition parties tend to have different 
preferences vis-à-vis what they consider to be the ideal electoral system. This is important, in the 
sense that the previous accounts of electoral system change focused mainly on the self-interested 
motivations of political actors (Pilet 2008, Rahat 2004, Renwick, Hanretty, and Hine 2009), 
arguing that electoral systems are essentially redistributive, in that there must be winners and 
losers (Tsebelis 1990). Recent works have shown that the positions of individuals and parties in 
relation to electoral reforms depend largely on their normative motivations regarding what they 
consider to be the “best” system, regardless of ideology (Bol 2011, Renwick and Pilet 2009). 
Dealing with minor electoral reforms, Jacobs and Leyenaar (2011) have demonstrated (taking the 
Netherlands as an example) that when the consequences of a given reform relating to the 
distribution of powers are unclear for political parties, their support or opposition for that reform 
is likely to stem from their normative conceptions concerning the desirability of reform.  
The second interpretation of alternation, which is based mainly on individual MPs’ opinions 
on electoral reforms, demonstrates a consistent link between being an incumbent, being in the 
majority, and low support for electoral reforms (Bowler, Donovan and Karp 2006). This result 
confirms these authors’ previous findings in relation to political elites’ support for the adoption 
of direct democracy mechanisms, which showed that incumbents and members of governing 
parties were significantly less supportive of such reforms (2002). In a similar vein, Bol and Pilet 
analyse the positions of parties in 13 electoral reform debates, finding that parties that were in 
government for more than 60% of the time over the last 25 years were significantly more risk-
averse and more supportive of existing electoral arrangements, regardless of the reform’s 
expected consequences in terms of seats (2011).  
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To summarise, during the empirical investigation into the short-term determinants of the 
number of institutional reforms by legislature, three factors will be of particular interest: shifting 
support for the democratic system, rising electoral uncertainty, and winner and loser status. All of 
these factors can be thought of as facilitating conditions for institutional reforms. Initially, they 
were thought to apply to electoral reforms. Should these factors also apply to a wider set of 
reforms? In fact, I argue that there are good reasons to believe that these factors should play an 
even stronger role for democratic reform in general. Electoral system change is a rather pure 
example of redistributive reform involving zero-sum games. Elites have vested interests in 
existing electoral systems, but the existing literature has already proven that vested interests and 
other barriers can be overcome and lead to reform. Authors increasingly insist on the fact that, 
outside of outcome-contingent motivations (based on expectations about the anticipated 
consequences of a reform), act-contingent motivations (based on expectations about the 
consequences of the very act of supporting a reform) are central to explaining the support for 
democratic reforms (Renwick 2010; 2011). In the case of reforms where the consequences, in 
terms of distribution of power, are more uncertain than would be the case with purely 
redistributive reforms, it is reasonable to think that elites base their judgments on act-contingent 
motivations and pay close attention to exogenous changes, such as crisis, electoral shifts and 
voter satisfaction, before making up their minds. 
 
2. Hypotheses, models, empirical results: disentangling long-term 
and short-term factors of reform 
 
  In light of the previous theoretical developments, six hypotheses are developed, in two 
separate empirical models. In the long term, majoritarian democracies, countries with many veto 
players and low political support would be expected to have reformed the most. In the short 
term, I expect more reforms to occur in a particular legislature when the level of public 
satisfaction with democracy drops, when electoral uncertainty rises, and when alternation occurs. 
Examining the empirical results in sections 2.2 and 2.3, the macro analysis does provide some 
evidence to support our three first hypotheses. Secondly, when the short-term determinants of 
reforms are analysed, shifts in satisfaction levels with democracy appear to have no impact on 
reforms. However, shifts in the level of volatility and political alternation both consistently 
appear to affect the number of reforms adopted by legislatures. 
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2.1. Hypotheses, variables, and model specifications 
This chapter’s main argument is that in order to understand institutional change, one must 
make a clear distinction between factors which foster favourable conditions for change in the 
long term, and the short-term shocks that allow us to explain why reforms happen, and happen 
in great numbers, at particular moments in time. The following sections will therefore 
systematically distinguish between the two models, investigating different questions:  
 Long-term determinants of  change: why have some countries adopted more reforms 
than others, overall?  
 Short-term determinants of  change: what conditions explain why more reforms are 
adopted in certain legislatures than in others?  
The main hypotheses and the two different models will be examined successively.  
 
2.1.1. Hypotheses to investigate the determinants of  the core democratic rules 
 
a) Factors creating favourable conditions for change in the long-run 
Two main elements are believed to contribute to reform in the long run: institutional 
characteristics (H1 and H2), and the level of political support (H3).  
H1. Majoritarian polities tend to adopt more institutional reforms than polities in which the power is less 
concentrated.  
This hypothesis is based on the assumption that in majoritarian countries, the fact that power is 
concentrated in the hands of only a few actors, through institutional mechanisms “skewing” the 
results in favour of few parties in the electoral arena, is only justifiable when elites are able to 
achieve a high degree of output-oriented legitimacy. As this is no longer the case in much of 
Western Europe, it is believed that majoritarian polities have more of an incentive to adapt their 
institutions than polities where legitimacy is primarily based on input-oriented legitimacy, and 
therefore, that they have reformed more over time. The more the system favours the electoral 
victors by disproportionately concentrating power in their hands, the stronger the incentive to 
reform should be.  
H2. The more veto players in a given polity, the more institutional reforms.  
There is a lack of agreement in the literature concerning the relationship between veto players 
and change and stability. Although a large part of the research on the topic has confirmed 
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Tsebelis’ initial theory regarding the existence of a positive link between policy stability and the 
number of veto players, many subsequent works have also examined this link, and have showed 
that the link between inertia and the number of veto players was not automatic. The null 
hypothesis regarding veto players consists of assuming that their impact on the number of 
institutional reforms adopted over time is indiscriminate. My own hypothesis goes further, stating 
that more veto players actually lead to more change. If this second sub-hypothesis holds true, 
there are two possible interpretations. Firstly, it could be because countries with many veto 
players have mechanisms to “unlock” reform, actually facilitating change. In such cases, these 
mechanisms would of course have to be carefully examined in the second part of the thesis, 
particularly in relation to how bundling or non-bundling could affect the adoption of reforms in 
complex environments. The second possible interpretation goes further: in environments where 
there are many veto players, there is a greater chance of policy deadlock; countries with many 
veto players adopt more institutional reforms in order to sort such deadlock out by changing the 
institutions.   
H3. The less political support the political institutions and the democratic system enjoy, the more institutional 
reforms are performed. 
Here, I posit that political elites in power tend to avoid changing the core democratic institutions 
unless they feel compelled to do so by the lack of political support, citizen dissatisfaction, 
uncertainty and a lack of legitimacy. This hypothesis presupposes that political elites deem a 
certain level of political support for their performance of democratic functions desirable.  
b) Factors spurring change in the short-run 
The main theoretical assumptions can be summarised quite simply. Poor levels of satisfaction 
with the democratic system, rising electoral uncertainty and the arrival of new political forces 
with distinctive preferences within the legislature encourage institutional reforms. I enquire about 
three main variables to explain the impact of the short-term context on institutional reforms: 
shifts in support for the functioning of the democratic system (measured by shifts in levels of 
satisfaction with democracy), the rise of electoral uncertainty (measured by increased volatility), 
and changes in preferences of governing actors (measured by alternation). The two first 
explanatory variables reflect changes in the political environment, while the third reflects shifts in 
the preferences of actors in power. The number of veto players, the level of constitutional 
rigidity, the ideological orientation of the parties in the legislature and economic growth, all serve 
as control variables. 
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H4. When the level of satisfaction with the way democracy is working drops, the number of institutional reforms 
adopted in a legislature increases. 
Expanding Norris’ assumptions, this fourth hypothesis assumes that when the level of political 
support for the democratic system drops, there is greater pressure to adopt institutional reforms, 
as parties must respond to public dissatisfaction with the democratic system through institutional 
change. This also posits, firstly, that a drop in the level of political support reflects citizens’ 
perceptions of a malfunctioning institutional system and dissatisfaction with the way it works, 
and secondly, that political parties are actually able to perceive these drops and to react to them 
quickly.  
H5. When the level of volatility in the electoral arena rises, the number of institutional reforms adopted in a 
legislature increases.  
The level of volatility can be thought of as the tangible expression of shifts of electoral 
preferences from one election to another, and of the level of electoral uncertainty that political 
actors must deal with. Each political system has an inherent level of volatility that is linked with 
the structure of its party system and the number of parties competing. Any rise in the level of 
volatility, compared to this “structural” level, is the translation of rising uncertainty about the 
balance of power between the different parties. This in turn may well be the result of 
dissatisfaction with the political system, as illustrated, for example, by the unprecedented levels of 
volatility observed in Italy in 1994, or in Ireland in 2011, in the aftermath of a very severe crisis of 
legitimacy for political elites. In such cases, volatility implies a level of uncertainty affecting all 
parties. As a consequence, I hypothesise that when the level of volatility rises between one 
election and the next, more institutional reforms should be seen in the following legislature.  
H6. When political actors previously in opposition come into power, the number of institutional reforms adopted in 
a legislature increases.  
Thirdly, I expect that as political alternation brings parties into power that were previously in 
opposition, it is a strong incentive for institutional reforms, as it gives new parties political 
opportunities to carry out reforms, which they may not have had the capacity to do previously. 
This assumes that governing and opposition parties have, over time, developed different 
preferences in relation to institutional reforms. It also means that when former opposition parties 
come into government, they have opportunities to change a system with which they were less 
satisfied than previous incumbents, supporting the conclusion that parties which were previously 
in opposition tend to be more reformist and less risk-averse. In any case, the expectation is 
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simple: alternation brings parties with different preferences in relation to the institutions into 
power, meaning that more reform takes place when incumbents lose elections.  
 
2.1.2. Determinants of  reforms at the macro-level: variables and models 
The first set of models, testing the first three hypotheses, focuses on the macro level for the 
period 1990-2010, taking each of the 18 countries of the SIEPOL database as a unit of analysis. 
The dependent variable used is the number of reforms adopted by country between 1990 and 
2010, ranging from 3 (Denmark) to 17.96 The empirical analyses will consist of simple linear 
regressions97 and of descriptive scatter plots with fitting lines showing the linear relationship 
between the number of reforms and our key explanatory variables. As the number of cases is low 
(18), one must bear in mind that the results are very much dependent on the model specification, 
and sensitive towards extreme values. It also means that the models include few independent 
variables each time. For each regression, the countries that influence the results in a particular 
manner will be singled out.  
In the macro analysis, five independent variables have been investigated. The first four deal 
with important institutional characteristics of the 18 polities included. Indeed, the most obvious 
explanation coming to mind when investigating the occurrence of reforms is that reforms are 
more difficult in instances when the rules of reform are more stringent, and veto points more 
numerous. Firstly, I have looked into the average number of partisan veto players (1), measured 
as the average number of parties present in the government between 1990 and 2010. The second 
variable, used here as a control, is the level of constitutional rigidity (2) of each of the 18 
countries, measured on a scale ranging from 1 to 4, from the least to the most rigid.98 The 
distinction between what Tsebelis calls partisan and institutional veto players is justified by results 
showing that indexes of veto players mixing primary structural characteristics and characteristics 
deriving from the competition within those systems tend to measure different things, and should 
be separated (Roller 2005). I have selected veto players measures as parsimonious as possible 
(number of parties in government for partisan veto players, constitutional rigidity for institutional 
                                                 
96 Cf. chapter 3, figure 4.  
97 I have systematically tested important assumptions for linear regressions, i.e. linearity, independence of 
the errors, homoscedasticity of the errors, and normality of the residuals. The existence of outliers and 
data points influencing crucially the regression coefficients, given the very low number of data points, was 
also of great concern and systematically examined.  
98 Cf. appendix 5. 
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veto players).99 Indeed, I am interested in the degree to which the constitution sets obstacles in 
the path of institutional reform. In this regard, it is better to look at constitutional rigidity rather 
than at a number of institutional characteristics that are less relevant to the analysis. Turning to 
partisan veto players, Roller (2003) has shown that the parsimonious measure of the number of 
parties in government performs as well, if not better, than more complex indexes.  
I then investigate majoritarian vs. non-majoritarian democracies (3), based on Lijphart’s 
classification using a set of five measures between 1976 and 1996 (Lijphart 1999).100 All parties 
loading negatively on the executive-parties dimension are considered as majoritarian, i.e. Greece, 
France, UK, and Spain. The final institutional characteristic I examine is the average level of 
disproportionality between seats and votes (4) as measured by the Gallagher index (Least square 
index, 1991) including all elections taking place between 1990 and 2010.101 The index ranges from 
0 (perfect proportionality) to 100 (complete disproportionality). Therefore, the higher the index, 
the higher the disproportionality between votes and seat distribution.102 This is a synthetic 
measure of the level of “skewedness” exhibited by a given institutional system in favour of the 
winners of the elections, giving them a disproportionate amount of seats.  
The fifth explanatory variable, and by far the most important theoretically, is a measure of the 
average level of political support (5) registered in each country between 1990 and 2010. This scale 
of political support, ranging theoretically from 0 to 100%, synthesises measures of the trust for 
the political parties, the parliament, the government, and the level of satisfaction with the way 
democracy works, averaged by country for the period 1990-2010. Each of the four measures 
included in the scale is the average of respondents who trust the institutions “a great deal” or 
“quite a lot”, and who are “very” or “fairly” satisfied with democracy,103 based on the 
                                                 
99 Tsebelis initially defined the institutional veto players as the chambers and presidents. He considers that 
“institutional veto players are usually determined in the constitution of a country” (Tsebelis 2000, 469). 
100 Cf. chapter 1 section 1.1.1.  
101 Gallagher’s disproportionality index, most commonly referred at as the Least squares index (LSq), 
measures disproportionality between the distributions of votes and of seats, based on the following 
formula:  
 
This involves taking half the sum of the squares of the difference between percent of vote and percent of 
seats for each of the political parties. 
102 Gallagher’s least squares index is more popular than other disproportionality measures, such as those of 
Rae (1969), Loosemore and Hanby (1971), and Lijphart (1994), as it is the most widely used and is better 
at accounting for the impact of a few large deviations compared to many small ones, thereby best 
conveying the disproportionality of a given electoral system.  
103 Cf. appendix 5. As these variables were transformed into a scale, Cronbach’s alpha test was performed 
in order to make sure that these variables measured the same concept, i.e. political support. The test 
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Eurobarometer for EU countries, and the World and European Value Survey and the 
Comparative Study of Electoral Systems for non-EU countries (Iceland, Norway and 
Switzerland). The number of data points unfortunately varies from country to country and from 
indicator to indicator, with an effort to use the measures which provide the most data points by 
country (Eurobarometer in most cases). Finally, the 18 countries present in the database have 
extremely varied population sizes. In order to avoid overstating the relationship between 
independent and dependent variable because of small countries “counting” as much as big ones, 
I have created a variable based on the number of registered voters in the most recent election 
held in each of the 18 countries, in order to be able to weight according to the number of voters 
in the scatter plots, and to control for the eventual presence of a “country size effect”. 
Table 7. Values of the dependent and independent variables for the macro-analysis of the determinants of the 
reforms of core democratic rules, 1990-2010 
 
Constitutional 
rigidity Majoritarian Lsq 
Partisan veto 
players 
Political 
support 
Number of 
reforms 
Austria 2 No 1.9 2 50.3 10 
Belgium 3 No 3.5 4.8 41.7 15 
Denmark 3 No 1.5 2.3 63.2 3 
Finland 2 No 3.4 4 52.9 11 
France 3 Yes 18.6 2.4 34.1 17 
Germany 3 No 3.2 2.6 37.6 6 
Greece 2 Yes 6.8 1 38.9 9 
Iceland 4 No 2.2 2.1 42.5 7 
Ireland 3 No 5.4 2.3 43.5 6 
Italy 2 No 6.5 4.9 28.6 12 
Luxembourg 2 No 4 2 60.7 5 
Netherlands 4 No 1 2.7 55.6 4 
Norway 3 No 3.4 2.2 59 4 
Portugal 2 No 5.3 1.1 38 13 
Spain 3 Yes 5.9 1 43.4 3 
Sweden  2 No 1.9 2 50 6 
Switzerland 2 No 3.2 3.9 53 4 
UK 1 Yes 16 1 38.1 12 
Source: see Appendix 5 for the construction of the variables 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
yielded very satisfactory results with alpha= 0.91. Other tests showed that the measure including all four 
items was necessarily preferable to a more synthetic one.  
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2.1.3. Determinants of  reforms by legislature: variables and models 
In order to test for hypotheses 4, 5 and 6, and the expected relationship between shift of 
political support, rising political uncertainty, alternation, and institutional reforms, the dependent 
variable examined is the number of institutional reforms adopted in 116 legislatures in 18 
Western European democracies from 1990 to 2010, first drawing a model for all reforms adopted 
in that period, and then evaluating the robustness of the model and its sensitivity to the 
dimensions included.  
a) The dependent variable: the number of  institutional reforms adopted by 
legislature  
The following analyses are drawn from the database “Institutional Change in Advanced 
European Democracies” presented in detail in the previous chapters, which includes 18 countries 
and six dimensions of reforms between 1990 and 2010. The unit of analysis is the legislature, and 
the dependent variable the number of reforms adopted in a given legislature. For the models that 
take all the reforms into account, this number ranges from zero to 7, with almost two-thirds 
(63%) of the legislatures adopting at least one institutional reform.104 The number of reforms 
adopted was preferred to a different dependent variable, such as a dummy variable reform/no 
reform. It offers a much more sensitive measure, without assuming arbitrary thresholds, 
considering for example that the crucial difference to investigate is that between zero reform and 
some reforms. Moreover, as at least one institutional reform has occurred in the majority of the 
legislatures, focusing on the frequency of reforms and not only on their occurrence enables to 
understand periods spurring more intense institutional activism. The first issue is to find the 
appropriate method to investigate this dependent variable, characterised by several aspects: its 
distribution is not normal, discrete, and it constitutes count data.  
b) Explanatory variables and control variables  
The first explanatory variable concerns shifts in the level of satisfaction with the way 
democracy functions. Ideally, testing for the impact of shifting support for political institutions, 
and satisfaction with the way democracy works in a given country might provide appropriate 
answers to the question of the link between shifts of support and institutional reforms. However, 
appropriately assessing the shifts between one legislature and another would require a large 
number of data points in time, preferably each year since the period covered is reduced. Such 
data only exists for the purposes of evaluation of the level of satisfaction with the way democracy 
is working in a given country, meaning that I will restrict the analysis to this aspect of political 
                                                 
104 Cf. supra, chapter 3, table 2.  
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support. The variable used is the shift in percentage of the aggregate level of respondents in a 
given country who say they are “very satisfied” or “fairly satisfied” in response to the 
Eurobarometer trend question: “are you satisfied with the way democracy is functioning in your 
country?” 
The second explanatory variable is the shift in percentage in the level of total volatility, which 
is defined by Bartolini and Mair as the “measure of the net electoral change between two 
consecutive elections” (1990, 17), and using the Pedersen index (1979).105 This second 
explanatory variable is a proxy for the level of uncertainty relating to each election, with the 
underlying idea that the more significant the shifts between one election and the next, the more 
unstable the party system and the electoral environment. The third and final explanatory variable 
is the level of political alternation at the beginning of a given legislature. This is a dummy 
variable, defined as the concomitance of a change in the political orientation of the cabinet and a 
change in the head executive. The ideological orientation of the cabinets in each legislature is 
assessed based on a specific literature review which correctly classifies parties in each country.106  
The first control variable is the aggregated number of  partisan veto players in the government 
for each legislature (measured as the number of  parties present in the government), thus 
controlling for the eventual effects of  governmental configuration on the occurrence of  
institutional reforms. The second control variable is the level of  constitutional rigidity of  each of  
the 18 countries, measured on a scale from 1 to 4, from the least rigid to the most rigid 
(Appendix 6). The third control is the ideological orientation of  the cabinets in the legislature: 
left/centre-left, right/centre-right, and grand coalition.107 Finally, given our reflection about the 
link between economic crisis, political legitimacy and institutional reforms, I also include the 
                                                 
105 The formula is the following: Total Volatility = |PiV| + |PjV| …. + |PnV| / 2 with |PiV| being the 
change in absolute terms of the vote for party i from one election to another, |PjV| the change in 
absolute terms of the votes for party j from one election to another. The total sum is divided by two to 
avoid counting twice losses and gains.   
106 The classification of cabinets as centre-left, centre-right or grand coalition cabinets was not always 
straightforward, especially in countries characterised by large coalitions (such as Belgium, Finland, Italy 
and the Netherlands), or by a political system not necessarily defined by left-right dimensions (Ireland). 
Grand coalitions were defined as government coalitions including all of the main parties in power at 
once. In Germany, a grand coalition would consist of the FDP, CSU-CDU and the SDP, for example. For 
instances when one or several of the main parties were excluded, and the cabinet still contained left-wing 
and right-wing parties, we looked at the prime minister in order to know whether the cabinet should be 
classified as a left-wing or right-wing cabinet. All of the cabinets in Ireland were classified as centre-right, 
given the fact that the two main parties, Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil, cannot be described as centre-left. 
107 In the few cases where the ideological orientation of the cabinet changed during the legislature, I 
classified the legislature as left/centre-left, right/centre-right, or grand coalition based on the cabinet that 
lasted longer. When caretaker cabinets took over, like in Belgium (Verhofstadt III in 2007), Italy (Dini in 
1995) and in the Netherlands (Balkenende V in 2010), I considered that they could be included within the 
category of “grand coalition”.  
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average level of  economic growth in each legislature as a control variable, although the fact that 
the timeframe of  this paper stops in 2010 does not really enable precise investigations to be 
conducted on this point.108  
 
c) Specification of  the model 
For the analysis, I have used negative binomial regression, which is a subcategory of event 
count models. Event count models are statistical models in which the dependent variable is a 
count of events, in this case, the number of institutional reforms adopted in a given legislature, 
therefore consisting of discrete, non-negative integer numbers. They constitute a generalisation of 
the linear model. The traditional OLS regression cannot account for the discreteness and 
functional form of the dependent variable, which would lead to biased estimators. These models 
are estimated using maximum likelihood. To model the dependent variable, the negative binomial 
regression was chosen over the Poisson regression, because of the issue of over-dispersion of 
data (Appendix 7). Indeed, Poisson regressions have stringent requirements, i.e., that the 
conditional mean is equal to the conditional variance. Over-dispersion can be interpreted as a 
violation of the requirement that counts are independent from one another (Hilbe 2011, 2). Its 
consequences on the estimators can be interpreted in a similar way, as a violation of the 
assumption of homoscedasticity in the linear regression model, meaning that the goodness of fit 
of the model is overestimated (Cameron and Trivedi 2001).  
Secondly, all of the statistical models presented below use clustered standard errors, to 
correct for the violation of the assumption that standard errors are independently and identically 
distributed. Here, the observations within groups (i.e. the 18 countries) are correlated in an 
unknown way, leading to biased standard errors and therefore biased inference in the absence of 
correction. Clustered standard errors have been preferred over robust standard errors, which are 
only adequate if the number of clusters exceeds 50. The overall fit of the models was estimated 
using the Wald test, a likelihood ratio test which compares the fit of the estimated model with a 
null model where all parameters are held at zero.  
 
                                                 
108 Thus far, there is no really well-established literature on the link between economic crisis and 
institutional reforms, but this constitutes one of the most promising research tracks for academics 
interested in the link between macroeconomic developments, popular legitimacy, and institutional 
reforms. Cf. for example a workshop organised by Kristof Jacobs and David Farrell in Leiden in 2013 
called “Crowd-pleasers or key janglers? The impact of drops in political legitimacy on democratic reform 
and their consequences”, or the panel “Economic recession, democratic recession?” in the 2014 Joint 
Sessions in Salamanca. 
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2.2. Patterns of reforms of the core democratic rules in the long term: the centrality of 
political support? 
 
2.2.1. The evidence for linear relationships between political support, 
disproportionality and reforms of  core democratic rules 
The aim of this macro analysis is descriptive rather than predictive, given the low number 
of cases and opportunities for statistical analyses it offers. Before examining the results of the 
regressions, one should have a look at the linear relationships between our main continuous and 
discrete independent variable and the dependent variable, i.e. the total number of reforms: least 
squares index, number of partisan veto players, and level of political support. When examining 
the coefficients of correlations of these three variables with the total number of reforms, there 
seems to be, as expected, a relatively statistically significant negative relationship between political 
support and total number of reforms: (correlation of -0.66, p<0.01) and a positive relationship 
between disproportionality and the number of reforms (correlation of 0.60, p<0.01). On the 
other hand, there is weak positive correlation between the number of partisan veto players and 
the number of reforms, but this is not statistically significant (0.23, p>0.10). The scatter plot 
(Figure 6) displaying the relationship between the level of disproportionality and the total number 
of reforms (weighted by number of registered voters) indeed confirms the existence of a linear 
relationship. Clearly, the two countries in which such disproportionality is most pronounced 
(France and the UK, the only ones that use a purely majoritarian electoral system), have strong 
influence on the relationship between the two variables. Significant outliers include Belgium, 
Portugal and Italy in particular, wherein a higher number of reforms were adopted than could be 
predicted by the linear relationship between disproportionality and reforms. A similar scatter plot 
for partisan veto players (average number of parties in government) displays a vaguely positive 
relationship, but there is no evidence whatsoever that this result is statistically robust, with the 
vast majority of the countries falling outside of the confidence interval (Figure 7).  
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Figure 6. Total number of reforms of the core democratic rules on least squares index in 18 European 
democracies, 1990-2010 
 
Figure 7. Total number of reforms of the core democratic rules on partisan veto players in 18 European 
democracies, 1990-2010 
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Finally, on investigating the scatter plot of the relationship between the number of reforms and 
the level of political support (Figure 8), weighted by the number of registered voters, there is 
relatively clear evidence of a linear and negative relationship between the two variables. The 
higher the level of political support (measuring the confidence towards institutions and the 
satisfaction with the functioning of democracy), the lower the number of reforms adopted 
between 1990 and 2010. For example, in Italy, where the level of political support only reaches 
28.1%, the predicted number of reforms would be around 13, whereas for Denmark, the country 
displaying the highest level of political support (63.2%), the fitting line indicates that around 2 
reforms should be adopted (3 were adopted in reality). Certainly, the relationship is not perfect: 
this scatter plot also displays significant outliers, such as France, where more reforms are actually 
adopted than would be expected, or Germany and Spain, where the actual number of reforms 
adopted is smaller than the linear relationship would suggest. 
Figure 8. Total number of reforms of the core democratic rules on political support in 18 European democracies, 
1990-2010 
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favour of the winners of elections (so France and the UK, in particular) seem to be more 
vulnerable to institutional reform than countries in which power is dispersed. There is, at this 
stage, no evidence that the number of partisan veto players affects the number of institutional 
reforms adopted in a polity, either positively or negatively. Finally, there appears to be evidence 
suggesting that polities in which the level of political support is particularly low are, in the long 
run, much more likely to adopt many institutional reforms than their counterparts in which there 
is stronger public support for the institutions and the way democracy is working.  
 
2.2.2. The evidence from the linear regressions: the impact of  disproportionality 
and political support 
The following steps are intended to determine whether the results suggested by the 
descriptive analysis are confirmed by linear regressions, as well as to investigate the explanatory 
power of the different variables.109 In order to identify the outliers, the observations with large 
residuals were pointed out, as were those with large leverage (points with extreme values on the 
predictor variables).110 These models (Table 8) focus on the impact of certain institutional 
characteristics (majoritarian democracies, disproportionality of votes/seats, and number of 
parties in government), and of the level of political support for the reforms of the core 
democratic rules. Yet other, simpler explanations may seem equally or even more plausible, such 
as the degree of constitutional rigidity, indicating the difficulty involved in modifying institutions. 
This was tested in model 1. The proportion of variance explained is virtually null, and the 
coefficient, although it is negative, is not statistically significant: there is no evidence that 
countries with higher levels of constitutional rigidity actually reform less than other countries. In 
this model, France appears as an outlier (studentised residual>2), but this does not impact on the 
predictive quality of the model.111 Model 2 tests for the impact of two institutional characteristics 
on the number of reforms: the fact of being a majoritarian democracy, and the number of 
                                                 
109 All of the five models have also been run controlling for the number of registered voters, to account for 
an eventual “country size effect”. The coefficients are never statistically significant, except in model 5 
where the size of the country has an extremely small negative effect, all other variables being held 
constant. Overall, I consider there is no conclusive statistical evidence and the models are therefore 
reported without this control variable. Cf. appendix 8. 
110 The methods used to perform these regression diagnostics are presented in the following extremely 
didactic web book: Chen, X., Ender, P., Mitchell, M. and Wells, C. (2003). Regression with Stata, from 
http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/stata/webbooks/reg/default.htm 
111 A studentised residual is the quotient that results from the division of a residual by an estimate of its 
standard deviation. When this quotient is more than 2, this indicates that the observation is an outlier. 
This is not problematic so long as the leverage of the same observation (its influence on the regression 
coefficients) is not too high. A test plotting the leverage of each observation on the residuals was 
systematically conducted. 
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partisan veto players (parties in government). Both coefficients are positive, and statistically 
significant, although the proportion of variance explained is quite low (14%). The results suggest 
that the four majoritarian democracies (France, Greece, Spain and the UK), all other factors 
being held constant, have adopted 5.1 more reforms than their consensus counterparts. Secondly, 
the model shows that when the average number of veto players in the government rises by one, 
1.7 additional reforms are adopted. This goes against the descriptive analysis, which did not show 
conclusive evidence of a relationship between the number of veto players and the number of 
institutional reforms adopted. Therefore, one should be quite cautious in interpreting these 
results, and consider that these may only hold when other variables are controlled for, particularly 
as several observations appear as problematic outliers: France, Belgium, Spain and Portugal.112  
Table 8. Determinants of the number of reforms of the core democratic rules in Western Europe, 1990-2010 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Degree of constitutional rigidity 
-1.691 (1.322) 
    Index of political support 
   
-0.289 ** 
(0.083) 
-0.171 * 
(0.092) 
Majoritarian democracy 
 
5.145 * 
(2.646) 
   Least squares index 
  
0.634 ** 
(0.172) 
 
0.420 * 
(0.197) 
Mean number of parties in government 
 
1.720 * 
(0.934) 
1.371 * 
(0.670) 
 
1.128 * 
(0.636) 
Constant 12.489 ** 
(3.516) 
2.773   
(2.818) 
1.471 
(2.195) 
21.544*** 
(3.931) 
11.067 * 
(5.580) 
 
Number of observations 18 18 18 18 18 
 
Adjusted R2 0.04 0.14 0.44 0.39 0.51 
Note: Coefficients are the result of ordinary least-squares regression; standard errors are in parentheses; the 
dependent variable is the number of reforms adopted between 1990 and 2010                                                   
*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 
Model 3, keeping the variable on partisan veto players, tests for a more specific variable: the 
impact of the disproportionality of the electoral results on the total number of reforms adopted. 
The classification as majoritarian democracies based on Lijphart’s typology corresponds to 
multifaceted aspects of institutional arrangements. Here, I test for a very specific aspect: what is 
the impact of having systems that disproportionately reward big parties in terms of seats for the 
                                                 
112 When the same regression is conducted without the four outliers, the proportion of explained variance 
doubles, and majoritarian democracies adopt on average 6.2 reforms more than others. However, it makes 
little theoretical sense to exclude four countries from an already limited database. The results without 
them are therefore only mentioned indicatively. 
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number of institutional reforms? The results show that there is a statistically significant, strong 
positive relationship between the least squares index (measuring disproportionality) and the 
number of reforms. For example, a country in which the least squares index is 10% will adopt, on 
average, roughly 5 more reforms than a country where the least squares index is 2%. In this 
model, the number of partisan veto players is again positively associated with the number of 
reforms, but the coefficient is lower than in model 2. The proportion of variance explained is 
much higher (44%). There is only one problematic outlier: Belgium. Crucially, it appears that 
when this country is excluded from the regression, the number of partisan veto players is no 
longer statistically significant. On the positive relationship between the least squares index and 
the number of reforms, there are several possible explanations for the underlying causality. 
Firstly, countries in which there is greater disproportionality between votes and seats typically 
reward the winners, allowing them more room to manoeuvre thanks to their “extra” seats. 
Secondly, small shifts in votes may lead to bigger shifts in terms of seats, making these systems 
more prone to big changes in terms of both the composition of parliament and in the balance of 
powers between parties. Finally, these disproportional countries are typically majoritarian 
democracies.  
Model 4 tests for the link between political support and institutional reforms. The strong, 
statistically significant, and negative relationship suggested by the descriptive statistics is 
confirmed. A country in which the level of political support stands at 65% adopts an  average of 
10 less reforms than a country in which the level of political support stands at 30%. This sole 
variable allows us to account for no less than 39% of the variance, a very fair share for a model 
with a single variable. France is the only significant outlier, but its exclusion from the model does 
not alter the results substantially.  
Finally, model 5 tests for the impact of disproportionality, the number of partisan veto 
players, and the level of political support when each of the three variables is controlled for at 
once. The three variables remain statistically significant. On average, when all other factors are 
held constant, a country in which the disproportionality of votes/seats stands at 10% adopts 3.4 
more reforms than a country where the disproportionality level stands at 2%. Countries with an 
average of five parties in government adopt an average of 3.4 more reforms than polities in 
which there are an average of two parties governing together. Finally, controlling for institutional 
characteristics, polities where the level of political support reaches 65% adopt six less reforms 
than those where the level of political support is as low as 30%. This final model explains 51% of 
the variance, which is not bad given the fact the model is parsimonious and only considers long-
121 
Disentengling Long and Short-term Determinants of the Reforms of the Core Democratic Rules 
term, structural variables. Belgium is, once again, the problematic outlier. Its exclusion alters the 
results quite significantly, as partisan veto players are no longer statistically significant. 
The impact of veto players, however small, and despite the strong influence of Belgium, 
remains quite puzzling. I had suggested in the hypotheses that a positive relationship between 
veto players and institutional reforms could be a consequence of policy deadlock, which makes 
institutional reforms more attractive. In order to test for this idea, I have conducted further 
investigations to understand whether the level of policy effectiveness (understood as the ability to 
enact efficient, long-term policy change as measured by the Worldwide Governance Indicators 
project)113 was linked with the number of partisan veto players. In fact, there is no such evidence 
at all: the two variables are clearly independent. Policy effectiveness, on the other hand, is very 
positively correlated with the level of political support (0.72, p<0.01). Therefore, the only thing 
we can conclude is that the existence of this slight positive relationship between partisan veto 
players and institutional reforms, when other things are constant, may have to do with the equal 
or superior capacity of certain countries with many veto players to secure deals on institutional 
reforms, independently of their policy capacity and results (such as Belgium).114  
To conclude, the empirical evidence drawn from descriptive and linear regressions supports 
the first three hypotheses. Majoritarian democracies, and particularly democracies where the 
disproportionality and the skewing of the electoral system in favour of the big winning parties is 
high, do tend to adopt more reforms than others. When controlling for the state of being a 
majoritarian democracy, disproportionality and/or the level of political support, there is a small 
amount of relatively consistent evidence to suggest that countries with more veto players adopt 
more reforms than others, although the reasons and mechanisms behind this cannot be 
satisfactorily investigated without case studies, and these results appear to be very strongly 
influenced by particular countries. Finally, and most importantly, there is consistent and 
convincing evidence suggesting that institutional reforms in Western Europe between 1990 and 
2010 were much more numerous in polities where the support for political institutions and the 
satisfaction with democracy was low than in others. Does this create a favourable environment 
                                                 
113 This indicator was developed by the World Bank within the realm of the Worldwide Governance 
indicators project. “Government Effectiveness” combines into a single grouping responses relating to the 
quality of public service provision, the quality of the bureaucracy, the competence of civil servants, the 
independence of the civil service from political pressures, and the credibility of the government’s 
commitment to policies. The main focus of this index is on “inputs” required for government to be able 
to produce and implement good policies and deliver public goods. Source: The Worldwide governance 
indicators project of the World Bank. http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp 
114 This idea will be investigated at length in the Italian chapter (Cf. chapter 8). 
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for reform in the long run, or do shifts in the level of political support also affect the timing of 
reform?  
 
2.3. Short-term determinants of reforms: the centrality of shifts in the electoral arena 
The following section presents six models, in which the dependent variable is the total 
number of reforms adopted by legislature. They show evidence of the central role of shifts in the 
level of total volatility and political alternation in explaining why more reforms are adopted in 
certain legislatures than in others. In other words, the predicted number of reforms depends, to a 
great extent, on shifts in the electoral arena. Also, in looking at extreme legislatures, in which a 
particularly high number of reforms were adopted, suggestions will be presented concerning the 
mechanisms linking political uncertainty (volatility), the advent of new forces in power 
(alternation) and the number of reforms in a legislature.  
 
2.3.1. The role of  alternation and shifts of  volatility evidenced 
The results are reported using incidence rate ratios for matters of readability and 
interpretation, with the 95% confidence intervals in parentheses to evaluate the uncertainty of the 
coefficients (Table 9). Model 6 comprises only the control variables. The results suggest that 
constitutional rigidity has a negative and statistically significant effect on the number of reforms 
adopted in a legislature, whereas the number of veto players within the government has, all other 
variables being constant, a positive and statistically significant effect on the number of reforms 
adopted. The level of growth does not reach statistical significance, and there is no evidence that 
the ideological orientation of the legislature plays any part in the number of reforms adopted. 
The positive effect of the number of partisan veto players tends, once again, to go against the 
assumptions of the literature stating that more veto players mean greater stability. Model 7 
investigates the effect of the evolution of the average level of satisfaction with democracy115 and 
the number of institutional reforms adopted in a legislature. The results do not support the 
fourth hypothesis, as there is no evidence of a statistically significant relationship between drops 
in satisfaction with democracy and the number of reforms adopted. The seventh model shows 
that, consistent with hypothesis 5, the evolution of volatility has a positive and statistically strong, 
significant effect on the number of reforms adopted by the legislature: the more volatility rises 
                                                 
115 In models not reported here, I tested for the effect of the lagged evolution of satisfaction with 
democracy, which did not lead to meaningful results either. 
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compared to the previous election, the more reforms adopted: if volatility rises by 1%, the rate of 
reform rises by a factor of 1.003. As the coefficients cannot be readily interpreted in negative 
binomial regressions, even using the incidence rate ratios, the predicted number of reforms for 
different levels of volatility was calculated, holding all other variables at their means (Table 9). 
Table 9. Determinants of the number of institutional reforms adopted by legislature in Western Europe, 1990-
2010 
 Model 6 Model 7  Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 
Evolution of the level of satisfaction 
with the way democracy works in % 
 1.006 
(0.99-1.02) 
    1.005 
(0.99-1.01) 
Evolution of the total volatility in %    1.003 ** 
(1.00-1.01) 
 1.002 * 
(1.00-1.01) 
1.003 ** 
(1.00-1.01) 
Alternation in government     1.876 *** 
(1.46-2.41) 
1.708 *** 
(1.34-2.18) 
1.567 *** 
(1.14-2.15) 
Degree of constitutional rigidity 0.753 ** 
(0.60-0.94) 
0.762 ** 
(0.60-0.98) 
 0.754** 
(0.58-0.97) 
0.776** 
(0.61-0.99) 
0.774 *  
(0.60-1.00) 
0.787 * 
(0.60-1.04) 
Number of parties in the government 1.138 ** 
(1.01-1.28) 
1.103 *  
(1.00-1.22) 
 1.126 **  
(1.01-1.25) 
1.079 
(0.64-1.22) 
1.081 
(0.96-1.21) 
1.056 
(0.96-1.17) 
Ideological orientation  
(ref. cat.: left/centre left) 
       
Right/centre-right government 
 
Grand Coalition government 
 
1.221  
(0.76-1.98) 
0.838  
(0.48-1.45) 
1.221 
(0.74-2.00) 
0.820 
(0.45-1.49) 
 1.232    
(0.76-1.99) 
0.862    
(0.51-1.46) 
1.310 
(0.82-2.09) 
0.962 
(0.58-1.59) 
1.308   
(0.82-2.09) 
0.966   
(0.58-1.60) 
1.281     
(0.79-2.07) 
0.930     
(0.52-1.65) 
Growth  
 
1.074  
(0.98-1.16) 
1.053 
(0.95-1.17) 
 1.083 * 
(0.99-1.18) 
1.083 
(0.98-1.19) 
1.088 * 
(0.99-1.19) 
1.073 
(0.97-1.19) 
Observations 116 110  116 116 116 110 
Number of clusters 18 18  18 18 18 18 
        
Alpha 0.468 
(0.25-0.86) 
0.440 
(0.24-0.80) 
 0.394    
(0.19-0.84) 
0.352 
(0.15-0.82) 
0.325 
(0.13-0.84) 
0.306 
(0.12-0.78) 
MacFadden's Pseudo R-squared 0.02 0.03  0.03 0.05 0.05 0.05 
Cox-Snell Pseudo R-squared 0.06 0.07  0.10 0.13 0.15 0.15 
Wald chi2 17.63 20.44  14.18 30.08 31.89 42.53 
Prob>chi2 0.004 0.002  0.027 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 Note: The results of the coefficients are reported in terms of incidence rate ratio. 95% confidence intervals are in 
parentheses. The dependent variable is the total number of reforms adopted by legislature between 1990 and 2010. 
*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. 
 
The graph of the predicted number of events shows that when volatility decreases by 
80%, the model predicts that 0.9 reforms will be adopted, while when volatility rises from one 
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election to the next by 200%, this number rises to 2.2. Beyond 200%, the interval of confidence 
becomes much wider, meaning that the relationship between volatility and number of reforms is 
less discriminate. 
Figure 9. Predicted number of reforms according to the evolution of total volatility (model 7) 
 
The ninth model investigates the effect of political alternation, and confirms the sixth 
hypothesis, as the effect of alternation is positive with strong statistical significance. Holding all 
variables at their means, the predicted number of reforms adopted in the absence of political 
alternation is 0.9, while when political alternation occurs this figure rises to 1.7, almost doubling 
the average number of reforms adopted.  
Model 10 includes both the evolution of total volatility and political alternation. Again, 
the effect of both variables is statistically significant while, as in model 9, the positive effect of 
partisan veto players has disappeared. Finally, in model 11, including all explanatory variables, the 
previous results are confirmed, with a very similar predicted number of reforms according to 
both the level of volatility and in the presence of alternation in power. Investigations into 
whether the effect of alternation was conditional upon a shift in the level of volatility were 
conducted. No evidence of interaction between these two key variables was found, suggesting 
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that rises in the levels of uncertainty in which parties compete and political alternation have 
independent effects on the number of reforms adopted by legislatures  
Substantively, these models enable us to draw several conclusions. First of all, there is 
consistent empirical evidence that short-term shocks, and shifts in preferences of elites in power, 
have a statistically, but also a substantially significant impact on the number of institutional 
reforms adopted in a legislature. Secondly, short-term variations in the “moods” of public 
opinion regarding satisfaction with democracy have no impact on this number, while political 
alternation and the evolution of the level of volatility, on the other hand, do. This in turn suggests 
that political elites are sensitive to shifts in the electoral arena when deciding to promote 
institutional reform, while changes in public opinion are not sufficient to influence political elites. 
Rising electoral volatility can be thought of as a tangible manifestation of changes within the 
electoral arena, implying increasing uncertainty for political parties. Alternation, as it brings 
parties with different preferences regarding institutional reforms into power, provides a window 
of opportunity to reform for parties that were previously in opposition. Moreover, the effect of 
these variables holds when they are both included, and therefore controlled for, in the various 
statistical models.   
One could, perhaps, argue that the robustness of these models might be affected by the 
dimensions of institutional reforms that are included in the analysis. In order to see whether the 
results are consistent across dimensions, the same regressions as in models 8, 9 and 11 have been 
run, with the omission of one of the six dimensions of reform each time (Appendix 9). All of the 
coefficients for volatility and political alternation are systematically statistically significant for the 
regressions reproducing models 8 and 9, meaning that the relationship found between volatility, 
political alternation, and the number of reforms holds even when a specific dimension of reform 
is omitted.116 The effects found are quite stable across models, in particular for volatility. The 
reproduction of model 11 with the omission of one dimension of reform each time also confirms 
the independent effects of volatility and alternation in each case. Therefore, these tests of the 
robustness of the models clearly confirm the results which were previously discussed. This in 
turn suggests that, without denying that not all of these dimension-by-dimension reforms are 
necessarily driven by exactly the same factors, one can draw a general model of the impact of 
short-term factors on institutional reforms and apply it to multiple dimensions at once.  
                                                 
116 The coefficients are extremely similar to those which were already presented for volatility, and they vary 
slightly according to the impact of alternation in government; the effect being strongest, systematically, 
when federal and decentralising reforms are left out. 
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2.3.2. Volatility shifts, alternation, and reforms: an illustration of  the 
mechanisms 
How do these two mechanisms (rise in volatility, and alternation) work concretely to 
bring about more institutional reforms? A precise answer requires an in-depth case study 
investigation. However, before doing that, it is useful to return to descriptive statistics, and to 
have a look at the “extreme legislatures”, i.e., at legislatures in which an unusually high number of 
institutional reforms were adopted. When observing the 8% of legislatures in which four or more 
reforms were adopted, the descriptive evidence is clear: six out these nine legislatures have 
experienced political alternation (vs. only 42% of the 116 legislatures in the total sample), while 
volatility rose an average of 87% in comparison to the previous election in these nine legislatures 
(an average rise of 19% was found in the 116 legislatures included in the database, see Table 10). 
These nine “extreme” legislatures include an Austrian legislature (1990-1994), two French 
legislatures (2002-2007, 2007-2010), a Finnish one (1991-1995), two Belgian ones (1991-1995, 
1999-2003), a Portuguese one (1995-1999), an Italian one (2001-2005), and finally, a British 
legislature (1997-2001).  
Table 10. Evolution of volatility and political alternation by number of reforms adopted by legislature 
Reforms by legislature Legislatures with 
alternation in % 
Average evolution 
of volatility in % 
N 
All legislatures 42% + 19% 116 
Number of reforms ≥2 (Top 25%) 60% +34% 36 
Number of reforms ≥4 (Top 8%) 67% +87% 9 
 The British and the Italian examples offer interesting illustrations of our findings and the 
mechanisms they imply: the UK for alternation, and Italy for volatility. In the UK in 1997, 
Labour came into power after 18 years of one-party, Conservative rule, with an unprecedented 
majority of 418 seats (almost two-thirds of the total number of seats). Undoubtedly, Labour held 
very different preferences regarding the desirable shape of the institutional system to those of the 
Conservative party, which had been in power since 1979. Electoral material in the 1997 Labour 
manifesto contained the following promise: “Labour is committed to the democratic renewal of 
[the] country through decentralization and the elimination of excessive government secrecy”. 
Concrete promises to “clean up politics” included the end of the hereditary principle in the 
House of Lords, reform of party funding, devolution for Scotland and Wales, elected mayors, 
and more independent and accountable local governments.117 By the end of the legislature, six 
                                                 
117 Cf. the Labour manifesto for the 1997 general elections, at the following link: http://www.labour-
party.org.uk/manifestos/1997/1997-labour-manifesto.shtml 
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institutional reforms had been adopted, touching upon multiple dimensions of the institutional 
system: reforms instituting devolution in Scotland and Wales with numerous competences and 
regional assemblies in England, electoral reforms introducing mixed-member electoral systems in 
Scotland and Wales, a parliamentary reform abolishing hereditary peerages, but also the 
introduction of the direct election of the mayor of London, and new provisions facilitating postal 
and proxy voting (Appendix 1). Alternation provided a clear push and political opportunity for 
Labour, a party that formed distinctive preferences concerning institutional reforms during their 
time in opposition, to implement a political programme including multiple institutional changes.  
 Italy experienced its third successive alternation in 2001, with the arrival into power of a 
centre-right coalition including Forza Italia, Alleanza Nazionale, Lega Nord, and the centrist 
UDC. The previous coalition in government, the centre-left, had led four unstable, multi-party 
and heterogeneous coalition governments since 1996. The volatility levels had risen from 8.8% in 
1996 to account for no less than 22% of the Italian voters in 2001, in the context of an extremely 
fragmented and unstable national electoral landscape. In this context of great electoral 
uncertainty, institutional reforms were high on the agenda for all government parties: the Lega 
was pushing towards fiscal federalism and to give greater power to the regions; the UDC was 
looking for ways to re-establish a proportional electoral system; Forza Italia and Berlusconi were 
advocating for a strengthening of the role of the executive power and the PM; while AN was 
trying to defend its new respectability within the Italian party system (Bedock 2011, Renwick, 
Hanretty, and Hine 2009).118 Electoral uncertainty reduces the temporal horizon of political 
actors, who may not be sure of their ability to maintain their positions in the system in the near 
future. As such, this context of uncertainty provided both incentives and opportunities to try to 
transform the Italian institutional system, and to be open to risk rather than risk-averse. As a 
result, several far-reaching reforms were adopted in order to accommodate everyone within the 
governing coalition: the complete replacement of the 1993 electoral system by a PR system with 
bonus, and the modification of 50 constitutional articles, which would have turned Italy into a 
federal state, removed bicameral symmetry, and reinforced the power of the PM considerably.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
118 These reforms are investigated in depth in the Italian chapter, cf. infra 
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Conclusion 
 
 The aim of this chapter was, firstly, to identify the determinants of the reforms of the 
core democratic rules in Western Europe between 1990 and 2010. Secondly, its aim was to 
disentangle the factors at play in the long term and in the short term, firstly in order to identify 
structural conditions which commonly result in institutional reforms, and secondly, to identify 
the moments at which more reforms are more frequent. This study has provided clear empirical 
evidence of the link between political support and majoritarian (especially very “disproportional”) 
polities and the number of reforms over the course of time. It has evidenced the relationship 
between shifts in the electoral arena (measured by rising uncertainty), shifts in preferences of the 
actors in power (measured by political alternation), and the subsequent number of institutional 
reforms adopted by a legislature in the short term. The fact that drops in the level of political 
support play no direct role in explaining the number of reforms shows that elites react to more 
substantial changes in the political environment, and particularly to electoral shifts, rather than to 
the short-term vacillations of public opinion.  
The fact that certain long-term factors are associated with a higher number of 
institutional reforms is hardly surprising. The results on short-term determinants are more 
important, as they challenge some of the existing assumptions about institutional reforms, which 
can be discarded thanks to this study of multidimensional institutional reforms: first and 
foremost, the assumption that institutional change is mostly a long-term evolutionary process, or 
the result of deus ex machina developments, and is not influenced by short-term shocks or 
everyday politics. We, on the contrary, have found that political elites react to their environment 
by using institutional reforms, have different preferences regarding institutional reforms, and use 
institutional reforms more frequently when actors in power hold distinctive preferences 
compared to the incumbents (alternation), and when the level of uncertainty in the electoral 
environment rises (rise of volatility). To summarise, although certain long-term factors may 
develop a more favourable environment for reform, short-term factors provide a decisive push, 
by fostering a favourable context and decisive opportunities to adopt reforms. Still: how does this 
actually work? For the moment, I have only investigated reforms that have actually happened. We 
are still in the dark when it comes to dissecting the mechanisms that lead from the moment a 
reform is put on the agenda to the moment when it is adopted or discarded. This is the focus of 
the second part of the thesis.  
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Chapter 5 The mechanisms of  institutional reforms in 
action: understanding the politics of  bundles of  reforms 
 
 
In his opus on The Politics of Electoral Reform, Renwick makes the following remark: 
“understanding the politics of electoral reform is crucial to full understanding of reform outcomes: 
we cannot just identify antecedent conditions and predict the end result” (2010, 83–84). 
Understanding the politics of institutional reforms is precisely what the second part of this thesis 
intends to achieve. Rahat defines the politics of reform as a concept that pertains to the struggles 
between the forces trying to preserve the existing system and those trying to change it (2011, 
523). I have selected three cases in which a bundle of reforms has occurred, that is, a series of 
institutional reforms that were linked together and were the consequence of the same antecedent 
factors. Yet still, some of these reforms have been adopted, and others have failed or been 
abandoned along the way. There is one puzzling question guiding the second part of the thesis: 
why do some of the reforms in each bundle succeed, while others fail? The first part of the thesis 
has helped us to better describe change and identify the antecedent conditions spurring reform in 
the short and in the long term. The second part focuses on understanding the link between the 
nature of the reform at stake, the process engaged to achieve reform, and the end result 
(adoption or non-adoption of reform). It is based on process-tracing and on case studies, 
triangulating diverse secondary sources with 53 elite interviews.119 After presenting the conditions 
present at the emergence of the reforms in all three countries, I will explain why the dynamics of 
the processes of reform are central to understanding why some reforms are successfully adopted, 
and others are not. Unlike the first part in which the empirical analyses are based on hypothetico-
deductive reasoning, the following chapter presents theoretical propositions based on inductive 
reasoning, and on the observation of the three case-studies. The three following chapters serve to 
illustrate in detail the theoretical propositions presented in this chapter, before the conclusion of 
the second part attempts to systematize these findings and expore their applicability.  
The empirical material of the second part involves the study of three bundles of reforms 
in three countries, Ireland, France and Italy, which will be presented in the subsequent chapters. 
These case studies do not present stories about countries; they present stories about bundles of reforms, 
                                                 
119 For a presentation of the method used, cf. chapter 1 section 2.2.2. For a full presentation of the 
methodology of the case studies conducted in Ireland, France and Italy, cf. appendix 10.  
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i.e., about attempts to achieve sequences of reforms, which are sometimes successful, sometimes 
partly successful, and sometimes aborted. The cases were selected on the basis of the dependent 
variable (the occurrence of successful and unsuccessful reforms within a single bundle of 
reforms), with close attention being paid to the selection of bundles presenting dissimilar 
characteristics. Moreover, France, Ireland and Italy display a number of important similarities in 
relation to their party systems and institutional configurations (pluralist and bipolar competition 
with additional intervening veto players). More importantly, they offer a wide variety of 
antecedent conditions in terms of volatility, alternation and political support.  
In the first part of the chapter, some mechanisms central to the processes of institutional 
reforms identified in the literature are presented, focusing on processes of electoral system 
change and regime structure change. The choice of the three bundles of reform under 
investigation in Ireland, France and Italy will be justified. In the second part of the chapter, I 
formulate propositions about the prediction of the outcomes of reform. The first part of the 
thesis has focused on a great variety of reforms, and it is indubitable that not all of these reforms 
are driven by the same motivations, or by the same processes. How to make sense of this 
plethora of reform? Based on the observation of the three cases, can we make some reasonably 
plausible theoretical propositions to predict their respective outcomes? I first discuss the link(s) 
between the antecedent conditions and the likelihood of a given type of reform and process 
emerging. Secondly, my theoretical propositions centre on the interaction between the nature of 
the reform (divisive or consensual, depending on the level of support for the reform), and the 
nature of the process of reform (majoritarian, supermajoritarian or externalised, depending on the 
level of inclusion). I explain why the effect of veto players and of multifaceted reforms vary 
according to the type of reform and type of processes chosen. I posit that the paths leading to 
successful reforms are different for consensual and divisive reforms. I expect divisive reforms to 
be primarily driven by self-interest and their outcome to depend mostly on veto player dynamics 
and on the ability to build a large coalition of reformers. Consensual reforms lead to credit-
claiming strategies, and their outcomes depend on the capacity of the majority of actors to claim 
some degree of recognition for a popular reform.  
 
1. Theory and justification of the cases 
 
Before turning to the justification of the three case studies, a few words on the state of 
the art of the mechanisms of institutional reforms are in order. Many of the theories presented 
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have already been mentioned in the two first chapters,120 but I want to focus here on what 
existing theories have to say about the politics of the processes of institutional reforms, and 
therefore, about the mechanisms serving to translate topics on the agenda into change (final 
adoption of a bundle of reforms), or non-change (a process interrupted before final adoption).  
 
1.1. Some mechanisms behind reform and non-reform 
I have already largely insisted on the breakthrough represented by the study of electoral 
system change in understanding processes of institutional reforms, and will present two aspects 
of these theories that have enabled me to develop the empirical and theoretical framework of 
analysis used in the case studies: the distinction between reforms by elite majority imposition and 
those by elite-mass interaction, and discussions about the role of coalition, and barriers to reform.  
 
1.1.1. Reforms by elite majority imposition vs. reforms by elite-mass interaction 
Alan Renwick has focused exclusively on major reforms of the electoral systems in 
established democracies. Many of his conclusions can be applied to a much wider set of 
institutional reforms. The central idea of his book is that, in established democracies, there are 
two main routes leading to electoral system change: one whereby the politicians in power decide 
they want reform (which he calls reform by elite majority imposition), and one whereby the 
politicians lose some control over the process to voters (reforms by elite-mass interaction).121 The 
central question defining the type of process of reform is the following: who has the power over 
the outcomes in each scenario? In the first case, the politicians (and implicitly, the politicians in 
the majority) retain the upper hand throughout the process, and focus mainly on power 
considerations. The examples analysed by Renwick include the 1986 French electoral reform that 
replaced the two-round system with PR, in order to limit the Socialist Party’s electoral losses. In 
the second category of processes of reform, the citizens become central actors, just like the 
political elites, and work in interaction and in competition. A minority of politicians espouse 
reform with insufficient strength to impose reform through the traditional legislative channels. As 
a result, these actors mobilise the public, and seek to achieve sufficient popular pressure to force 
politicians to accept a reform that may not want. The 1993 electoral system reforms in Japan, 
Italy and New-Zealand all belong to this category of reform processes. Moreover, the type of 
process has direct implications on the interests and/or values that are served. One could add that, 
                                                 
120 Cf. chapter 1, section 2.1.1., and chapter 2, section 1.2. 
121 Cf. chapter 2 section 1.2.1. 
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more generally, the different types of processes entail that different preferences will dominate, 
and different dominant strategies will tend to be successful.  
Renwick spends several chapters of his book examining how preferences are shaped, how 
they are translated into alternatives, and eventually into outcomes. The main motivations 
regarding electoral and political reform in general can be divided into two categories: interests 
and values (see also Bol 2010; Bol 2011). Renwick insists on the fact that power, and interests, 
should be understood in very broad terms, ranging from seats, to votes, and policy (Müller and 
Strøm 1999), but also including multiple other aspects such as influence within the governing 
coalition. The term “values” covers an even more diverse set of motivations: visions of what a 
working democracy actually is, stability, governance, the likelihood of achieving desired policy 
outcomes, and so on. It is actually extremely difficult to disentangle the motivations of actors, 
and even more difficult to understand how they are translated into alternatives and outcomes, 
without resorting to highly contingent explanations specific to each country and reform. 
Therefore, predicting the motivations and the ways in which they lead to alternatives and 
outcomes is a very difficult task, all the more so since Renwick is specifically interested in types 
of reforms that are essentially redistributive, and where power maximisation is likely to play a 
central role, which may not be the case for most of the reforms studied here.122 Moreover, several 
aspects tend to complicate the relationship between preferences, alternatives and outcomes. Pilet 
empirically shows, in relation to electoral reform attempts in Belgium, that uncertainty about the 
effects of reform can lead to conservative behaviour, even for parties that may have stood to 
benefit directly – in terms of seats – from an alternative electoral system (2007). In times of 
uncertainty regarding the balance of powers between political actors, Renwick shows that actors 
tend to privilege “maximin strategies” (i.e. choosing the “best” of the worst pay-offs, Renwick 
2010). To conclude, it would be very hazardous to make any strong assumptions about the 
preferences of actors regarding reforms of core democratic rules: these motivations are in all 
likelihood extremely diverse, contingent, and “blurred” by several important aspects inherent to 
the process of reform itself – time horizons, uncertainty, risk-aversion, etc.  
As well as attempting to classify the numerous motivations of political actors and citizens, 
Renwick insists on the fact that each of these motivations may be driven by two types of 
considerations: outcome-contingent considerations, and act-contingent considerations (Reed and Thies 2001). 
It would be wrong to assume that all that matters in a process of electoral (or political) reform is 
its outcome. Outcome-contingent considerations are “considerations that relate to the effects of 
different (…) systems”, whereas act-contingent considerations “pertain to the effects of an 
                                                 
122 Cf supra, chapter 2, section 2.2. 
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actor’s behaviour in respect of reform” (Renwick 2010, 29). Concerning electoral systems, the 
typical outcome-contingent consideration for a party would be “how many seats would I get with 
the alternative system?”, and the typical act-contingent consideration would be, “will I be 
punished by voters if I enact a reform based purely on my own interest?” The respective impact 
of each of these considerations inevitably differs for reform by elite majority imposition and 
reform by elite-mass interaction. For the former, politicians seek to advance their own powers 
and focus on outcome-contingent considerations, while act-contingent aspects may intervene in 
the form of legitimacy constraints – not enacting a reform that is quite obviously a cynical power 
grab, for example. For the latter, act-contingent motivations are central, since the public is a 
central actor in the promotion and in the enactment of the reform.  
 
1.1.2. Coalition dynamics, multifaceted proposals, and sequences of  reform 
Rahat (2008) develops an approach that explicitly tries to link the theories on electoral 
system change with a wider conception of institutional reforms, which he calls “reforms of 
regime structure” (these correspond roughly with what I call representative reforms).123 Secondly, 
this author chooses to focus explicitly on both successful and failed reforms, using the same 
instruments of analysis to understand them: background factors, and the list of barriers 
obstructing the promotion of reform in a given institutional structure. Several of his main 
findings are directly applicable to the cases studied in the following chapters, and in particular to 
Italy, which has been characterised by plethoric government coalitions.124 Rahat underlines the 
need to analyse failed and successful processes of reform as sequences that may involve different 
coalitions for each phase. His findings are particularly interesting insofar as he shows the 
conditions in which one might expect the veto players theory to be inapplicable: when skilled 
reformers are able to build and rebuild coalitions in a context where no actor, acting alone, has 
the capacity to veto the progress of reform. Hence, the dispersion of power does not necessarily 
impede reform, and in some cases may even facilitate it.125  
The analysis conducted in the first part of the thesis was fundamentally probabilistic: 
certain conditions have been identified as fostering reform, although there is obviously no 
automaticity between the presence of certain facilitating factors (alternation, rising volatility) and 
the rise in the number of institutional reforms adopted. Rahat insists on the fact that many of the 
analytical approaches to institutional change have tended to overemphasise background factors 
                                                 
123 Cf. supra, chapter 1, section 1.3. 
124 Cf. supra, chapter 2, section 1.2.2. 
125 Cf. supra, chapter 1, section 2.1.1. 
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(2008, 24). This explains why, for example, despite the fact that dissatisfaction with a polity is a 
factor which facilitates reform in the long run, it tells us little about why some reforms are 
successful at a particular time: “dissatisfaction with the polity is (much) too widespread a 
phenomenon to serve as an explanation for the adoption of reform. It appeared also at times 
when no reform was promoted, it was not necessarily higher at times of reform; and it was not 
unique to those countries that adopted reform, but appeared also in those that did not” (Rahat 
2008, 235).  
Rahat’s framework is based on an analysis of five elements: (1) the long-term 
developments affecting the likelihood of reform; (2) catalysing events that can be used as a 
window of opportunity for reform; (3) the political actors that serve to focus attention on certain 
issues rather than others, and create linkages between events and reform proposals; (4) the stages 
of the reform promotion process (from initiative to final adoption); and (5) the characteristics of 
the reform proposals. So far, the thesis has examined the two first elements: long-term 
developments that create favourable environments for political reform (the lack of political 
support, in particular), and short-term catalysts (alternation and rising volatility). It is now 
important to turn our attention to the three remaining ones: who are the actors supporting 
reform and defining the alternatives? What happens during each phase of the reform process? 
How do the defining characteristics of the reform proposal come into play in the final outcome? 
Regarding the characteristics of reform, Rahat is particularly interested in the consequences of 
what he calls “multifaceted proposals”, arguing that “the multifaceted nature of mixed systems – 
government or electoral- makes their promotion easier” (2008, 40). Indeed, multifaceted 
proposals are a way of bringing forward constructive ambiguity about the outcomes of reform, 
and of broadening the coalition of support. As will be made obvious in the Italian chapter, this 
can have a central impact in the case of divided coalition governments, and can often enable 
many veto players to be bypassed. 
I have already mentioned that, together with Hazan, Rahat (2011) identifies the seven 
possible hurdles to reform126 (the legal barriers, the cultural and political traditions of the 
countries, their social structure, the fact that the system produces certain expected outcomes, the 
vested interests of the parties, coalition politics, and disagreement over content). The weight of 
each of these barriers varies across institutional and political configurations. For example, in 
countries where a referendum may be required for the adoption of a given (set of) reform(s), the 
procedural barrier becomes central and affects the strategies of the political actors. Rahat 
                                                 
126 Cf. chapter 2, section 1.2.2. 
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considers this barrier as essentially a “delaying factor” (2008, 254), which may prove crucial, as 
very often, the battle for political reform is also a battle against time. The more relevant barriers, 
i.e. vested interests, coalition politics, and disagreements over content, all suggest the need to take 
a closer look into the different phases of reform.  
To conclude these theoretical considerations, if one seeks to move beyond an explanation 
of processes of reform grounded purely in the particular context of a given country, it is 
important to develop some theoretical propositions that will, at least to some extent, enable 
previsions to be made concerning the final outcome of a given reform, paying close attention to 
the different paths to reform and to the different phases of reform.  
 
1.2. The justification of the cases  
I have selected the cases on the basis of the dependent variable, i.e. three bundles of 
reforms presenting successful and unsuccessful reforms of the core democratic rules in France, 
Ireland and Italy. I will first present the most important characteristics of the three countries that 
serve as contextual settings for these processes of reform. Ireland, France and Italy offer useful 
commonalities in terms of institutional and party system characteristics, therefore enabling us to 
control, to some extent, for the effect of these variables. Conversely, they display differences that 
serve to illuminate the link between the long- and short-term factors of reform identified in the 
first part, and the emergence of reform on the agenda: level of political support, alternation, and 
rise in electoral volatility. The three bundles of reforms within these three countries have been 
selected because of their diverse characteristics: the level of support enjoyed by the reforms 
before the process took place, the ways in which the reforms were put on the agenda, the leading 
actors that elaborated the projects, the multifaceted or unidimensional character of the reforms 
discussed, and finally, the existence of both successful and failed reforms across bundles, and 
sometimes within each bundle.  
 
1.2.1. Veto players, political support, alternation, and rise of  electoral instability 
in France, Ireland and Italy 
The first part of the thesis, and in particular the fourth chapter, has shown that certain 
contexts tend to foster institutional reforms. In the long run, polities experiencing low levels of 
political support are more vulnerable to reform and, over time, adopt significantly more 
institutional reforms than countries where the overall level of political support is higher. In the 
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short-term, the number of reforms adopted by a legislature is higher in contexts characterised by 
political alternation and rising volatility. In order to understand the link between these long- and 
short-term contexts, and the actual mechanisms of reform, it was important to select countries 
that could enable us to disentangle these connections with successful and unsuccessful reforms. 
The bundles of reforms selected took place in three different legislatures: the legislature in 
Ireland since 2011, the 1997-2002 legislature in France, and the 2001-2006 legislature in Italy 
(Table 11).  
Table 11. Comparison of the main contextual characteristics of the three legislatures investigated 
 Ireland, 
2011-2016 
France 
1997-2002 
Italy 
2001-2006 
Institutional and 
party system 
characteristics 
Partisan veto players 2 4 Until may 2005: 
4; 2005-06: 6 
Institutional veto player Required 
referendum 
President of the 
Republic 
Abrogative 
referendum 
Type of government Minimum-
winning 
Surplus Surplus 
Ideological orientation Centre-right Centre-left Centre-right 
Type of competition Bipolar pluralism Bipolar pluralism Bipolar pluralism 
Long-term factors of 
reform: political 
support between 
1990 and 2010 
Average satisfaction with 
political parties 
23% 13% 17% 
Average satisfaction with 
the parliament 
39% 37% 36% 
Average satisfaction with 
the government 
36% 31% 32% 
Average satisfaction with 
the way democracy works 
72% 56% 32% 
Short-term-factors 
of reform: electoral 
environment 
Evolution of volatility 
since the last election 
+377% -29% +150% 
Alternation Yes Yes Yes 
Source: my own elaboration of the SIEPOL database 
 
The aim of the second part of the thesis is to provide predictions of the final outcome of a 
series of reforms within a bundle, given the type of reform at stake, and the processes of reform 
conducted. Therefore, the main variable of interest is not the impact of the institutional and party 
system characteristics of the different countries studied, even though it is perfectly obvious that 
“institutions matter”, and matter a great deal. The main institutional characteristics of the three 
legislatures share many similarities. This choice aims, first of all, to examine countries in which 
the institutional and party system constraints, most notably in relation to veto players, are 
relatively alike – even though there are undoubtable institutional differences between France, 
Ireland and Italy. Indeed, if I had chosen extremely dissimilar countries, a purely consensual 
democracy with large coalitions in power such as Switzerland, say, and a majoritarian country 
with one veto player, like the UK, it would have been much more difficult to isolate the effects of 
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the nature of the reforms and of the processes of reform from the effects of the institutional and 
party system disparities of the countries observed. The comparison to some extent follows the 
logic of Mill’s Most Similar Systems Design, comparing cases in which the crucial differences 
affect the dependent variable (1858). In the three countries, coalitions are in power, of between 
two and six parties. These coalitions are minimum-winning in Ireland, and surplus coalitions in 
France and Italy. In all three legislatures studied, a relevant institutional veto player intervenes in 
addition to the partisan veto players: the president of the Republic in France, who during this 
period belonged to a party other than the head of government’s, the requirement for a 
referendum for many of the institutional reforms discussed in Ireland, and the option to organise 
an abrogative referendum in Italy on constitutional matters. The heads of government belonged 
to the centre-right in Italy and Ireland (although in Ireland, the junior coalition partner is centre-
left), while the PM led a centre-left coalition in France between 1997 and 2002. Finally, all three 
countries are characterised by a competitive playing field that can be defined as bipolar pluralism, 
i.e. by multiparty systems in which two main coalitions tend to alternate in power. The bipolar 
and fragmented structure of competition and government is important here. Indeed, only in 
bipolar settings can the majority and the opposition be clearly identified, enabling us to draw 
conclusions based on the status of the political actors (government or opposition).127 Secondly, 
the fragmentation and the existence of coalitions offers the possibility to empirically test the 
impact of coalition dynamics on the outcomes of bundles of reforms. Finally, the choice to study 
reforms in fragmented and bipolar countries derives from the fact that this form of  
configuration is now, by far, the most common pattern in Western European polities (Bale 2003; 
Mair 2001), including in countries where the centre (Italy), grand coalitions (Austria) or a 
predominant party (Ireland, Sweden) used to rule the game.128  
 The three countries offer contrasting pictures when it comes to the level of political 
support. The average number of citizens who claim to trust their government and parliament “a 
lot” or “a great deal” is relatively similar, however Irish citizens are more likely to trust political 
parties than their Italian or French counterparts. The striking difference between the three 
countries comes from the gap in terms of satisfaction with the way democracy is working: no less 
than 40 percentage points separate Ireland and Italy. On average, between 1990 and 2010, slightly 
less than three-quarters of Irish respondents said they were “very” or “fairly” satisfied with the 
way democracy was working in Ireland. This figure falls to 56% for French citizens and to only 
                                                 
127 Cf. infra. 
128 Bale argues that “the much-touted fragmentation and polarisation under way is occurring alongside a 
trend towards two-bloc electoral competition.” (2003, 69) 
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32% for Italians (the lowest figure in Western Europe). When these four figures are aggregated to 
calculate the index of political support,129 it appears that Italy and France have the lowest levels of 
support among Western European democracies, whereas Ireland ranks around the average, close 
to countries such as Belgium, Iceland or Spain. France and Italy therefore offer very fertile 
environments for reforms of core democratic rules. Indeed, the vast majority of citizens in Italy, 
and a significant minority in France, do not consider the working of their democratic system 
acceptable, meaning that short-term contingencies favourable to reforms may find stronger 
popular support than in polities with higher levels of satisfaction with democracy. The interesting 
issue, in Ireland’s case, is the sharp drop in the level of support observed since the beginning of 
the crisis in 2009, in combination with political alternation and a spectacular rise in the level of 
volatility between the 2008 and 2011 elections.  
The three legislatures differ notably in terms of the evolution of the level of volatility 
experienced. Between 2008 and 2011, Ireland witnessed a political earthquake, with the level of 
volatility rising from 6.2% to 29.6%, one of the highest levels registered during the last 50 years 
in Western Europe. Therefore, the country offers the perfect environment to enable us to 
understand how a sharp rise in the level of uncertainty about the balance of forces between 
parties can provide incentive for institutional reform. Italy, although to a lesser degree, was in a 
relatively similar situation in 2001: the level of volatility had risen from 8.8% in 1996 to 22% in 
2001, to a great degree because of the sharp recompositions of the centre-left. In France, on the 
other hand, the level of volatility diminished significantly between 1993 and 1997, falling from 
18% to 12.8%.130 To summarise, the three cases offer different pictures that should enable us to 
more effectively disentangle the impact of rising uncertainty on institutional reforms: Ireland was 
characterised by a stable political offer but also by huge variations in the electoral performances 
of the usual contenders, the reformation of the Italian party system was still under way in 2001, 
whereas France was in a situation of relative electoral and party system stability.  
Finally, all three countries experienced a full political alternation at the beginning of the 
legislature, meaning that all of the political forces previously in power were sent back into 
opposition. In Ireland, a coalition composed of Labour and Fine Gael came to power in 2011, 
putting an end to the reign of Fianna Fáil and its junior partners, which had lasted since 1997. In 
France, the Socialist Party and its allies won the 1997 legislative election, after four years in 
opposition, and despite the fact that France had elected a centre-right president, Jacques Chirac, 
                                                 
129 Cf. chapter 4, table 7. 
130 The high level of volatility in 1993 in France was mostly the result of a particularly devastating election 
for the Socialist Party. 
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in 1995. Finally, in Italy, the centre-right coalition defeated the centre-left, paving the way for a 
second government led by Silvio Berlusconi, after five years in opposition since 1996. Therefore, 
in all three countries it will be possible to examine the different aspects of alternation to 
determine the incentives to conduct institutional reforms.  
 
1.2.2. Three bundles of  reforms, three referendums 
The second part of the thesis presents stories about bundles of reforms, understood here 
primarily as reforms that have been linked together as part as a broader sequence, beginning or 
ending beyond the moment of adoption and discussion of a given reform (cf. Chapter 1). The 
general logic has consisted of selecting the three cases on the basis of the dependent variable (i.e. 
the occurrence, or non-occurrence of reform within a bundle). This strategy has been criticised in 
the past by several authors, who argue that selecting on the basis of the dependent variable may 
lead to biased conclusions (Geddes 1990), or to the over-representation of positive cases in the 
sample (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994). Geddes went so far as to conclude that case-studies 
selected on the dependent variable “cannot test the theories they propose and hence, cannot 
contribute to the accumulation of theoretical knowledge” (1990, 149). Other authors, however, 
have adopted a much more nuanced stance, and have defended the theoretical and empirical 
soundness of case studies selected on the basis of the outcome of interest, on the condition that 
relevant negative cases are also selected (i.e. cases where the outcome of interest did not occur). I 
have adopted this perspective here, using Mahoney and Goertz’s “possibility principle”, which 
consists of selecting “only cases where the outcome of interest is possible” (2004, 653). Here, I 
have considered that all reforms included had some chance of adoption, insofar as they were on 
the agenda and were part of a wider bundle of reforms. Hence, the three sequences contain both 
successful and unsuccessful reforms, in order to enable us to consider the following question: 
why does a particular institutional reform fail, or succeed? Secondly, in all three cases, 
referendums have been organised to validate some, or part of the reforms debated, influencing 
the course of the processes of reform (cf. table 12).  
In Ireland, the sequence of reforms examined took place between 2011 and 2013, and our 
focus will be on the multiple successful and unsuccessful reforms launched after the arrival in 
power of a new coalition composed of parties that had promised far-ranging political reform in 
their election manifestos. These range from the attempt to abolish the second chamber, to the 
modification of the manner in which everyday business in the Dáil was conducted, to the 
institution of a constitutional convention to examine various aspects of the Irish constitution. 
The reforms examined in France took place between 2000 and 2001, dealing respectively with the 
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reduction of the length of the presidential term from 7 to 5 years, and with the reordering of the 
electoral calendar to place the presidential elections before the legislative elections. The Italian 
reforms include a major constitutional reform modifying multiple aspects of the balance of 
power, both between the executive and the legislative power, and between the central and local 
powers, and a major electoral reform replacing the Italian mixed-member electoral system with 
another mixed-system: PR with bonus.  
Table 12. Comparison of the three bundles of reform investigated 
 Reform Emergence Nature of 
reform 
Process of reform Outcome Multifaceted 
reform? 
Referendum 
Ir
e
la
n
d
 2
0
11
-1
6 
Discussion of an 
agenda of reforms 
by the constitutional 
convention 
Exogenous Both 
consensual 
and divisive 
Externalised Negative 
(so far) 
No No (so far) 
Abolition of the 
Seanad 
Endogenous
/ exogenous 
Consensual Majoritarian Negative No Yes 
Reform of the 
organisation of 
elections, of the Dáil 
and of the local 
government 
Exogenous Both 
consensual 
and divisive 
Majoritarian Positive 
 
Yes No 
F
ra
n
c
e
 1
9
9
7
-2
0
0
2 
Reduction of the 
presidential term 
from 7 to 5 years 
Endogenous Consensual Supermajoritarian Positive No Yes 
Reordering of the 
electoral calendar 
Endogenous Divisive Majoritarian Positive 
 
No No 
It
a
ly
 2
0
01
-0
6
 
Constitutional 
reform of the 
second part of the 
constitution 
Endogenous Divisive Majoritarian Negative Yes Yes 
Electoral reform 
replacing MMM 
with PR with bonus 
Endogenous Divisive Majoritarian Positive 
 
Yes No 
As may be immediately noted, in some cases (Italy and Ireland), my interest concerns all of 
the reforms and attempted institutional reforms that took place during a given legislature, 
whereas in the last case (France) I focus on two reforms, and deliberately omit other reforms 
which have taken place in the same legislature, such as the reform of the electoral system of the 
Senate, or the reform to give greater power to Corsica. The rationale behind this choice is that I 
focus on reforms that originate from the same initial pressures, and have been linked together in 
the minds of the legislators, either in the phase of elaboration, in the phase of adoption, or both. 
In Ireland’s case, all of the reforms studied were consequences of the same set of pressures: the 
economic crisis, and the narrative attributing this crisis to a failing political system. In the case of 
France, the reduction of the presidential term and the reordering of the electoral calendar, 
although not concomitant, have been explicitly framed as resulting from one another and are 
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thought of as parts of the same sequence. In Italy, the constitutional reform and the electoral 
reform were part of the same package deal.  
In the Irish case, the large sequence of reforms initiated in 2011 was largely the consequence 
of public pressure that was exogenous to the political system itself, through the mobilisation of a 
multiplicity of actors from civil society and academia, and pushing forward an ambitious, but ill-
defined agenda of reforms, ranging from making the Irish democracy more transparent, to 
involving  citizens directly in the process of reform. As the table shows, part of what was 
discussed since 2011 was also put on the agenda as a result of endogenous mobilisation within 
the political system: I refer here to the proposal to abolish the Seanad, which enjoyed a high level 
of political support. Secondly, the Irish case is the only one in which some of the reforms 
discussed have been externalised to actors outside of the political system, in this case, ordinary 
citizens within the realm of the Irish constitutional convention, containing both divisive and 
consensual reform proposals.131  
The French bundle of reforms examined comprises two reforms that were adopted between 
2000 and early 2001. The reduction of the presidential term was the result of a mobilisation 
endogenous to the political system, and was conducted through a supermajoritarian process,132 
meaning that both the parliamentary majority and the opposition were actively involved in the 
definition of the final proposal. This reform was adopted through a referendum, and can easily be 
classified as a consensual reform proposal. The reordering of the electoral calendar to place the 
presidential elections before the legislative elections was, on the other hand, conducted 
exclusively by the parliamentary majority, without the opposition, but again with a positive 
outcome. This was a highly divisive reform. Both reforms dealt with single issues, and not with 
multifaceted proposals.  
Finally, the Italian case presents two major institutional reforms, one successful (the electoral 
reform), and one which failed to overcome the final obstacle, the referendum (the constitutional 
reform). In both cases, the reforms did not result from external public pressure, but rather from 
the efforts of actors within the political system. Secondly, in both cases, the processes of reform 
were conducted by the parliamentary majority and without the opposition or external actors. 
Neither the constitutional nor the electoral reforms enjoyed widespread support, as they were 
divisive proposals. Both can be qualified as multifaceted proposals, as each of these reforms 
focused on multiple institutional aspects, rather than just one: the constitutional reform sought to 
                                                 
131 Cf. infra. 
132 Cf. infra. 
144 
The Mechanisms of Institutional Reforms in Action 
modify around 50 articles of the Italian constitution, whereas the electoral reform sought to 
replace the existing system with an entirely different one.  
 
2. Predicting the outcome of reforms  
 
In order to understand and to predict the outcomes of reforms, I focus on the connections 
between the nature of the reforms and the processes of reform that are chosen by reformers in 
order to see them adopted. I examine two types of reform (divisive and consensual) and three 
types of processes (majoritarian, supermajoritarian and externalised). The empirical evidence of 
the subsequent chapters shows that divisive reforms are based primarily on outcome-contingent 
motivations, and consensual reforms on act-contingent motivations. As a consequence, the 
number of veto players, the referendums, and the existence or lack of multifaceted proposals 
have different consequences according to the nature of the reform, and play out differently in 
each type of process.  
 
2.1. Two types of reforms, three types of processes 
I claim here that the reforms of the core democratic rules can essentially be divided into two 
categories, divisive and consensual reforms, according to the initial level of popular support they 
enjoy. Secondly, the processes of reform can be divided into three categories: majoritarian 
processes, in which the government takes the lead, supermajoritarian processes, where the 
opposition and majority collaborate, and finally, externalised processes whereby the elaboration 
of the reform is left to actors outside of the political system. 
 
2.1.1. Divisive vs. consensual reforms 
I have chosen to discriminate between the types of reform according to the level of 
public support they enjoy (or that actors perceive them to enjoy). I could have chosen different 
criteria, using, for example, Tsebelis’ distinction between redistributive and efficient institutional 
reforms, according to whether a reform benefits all individuals or improves conditions for some 
at the expense of others (1990, 104). I have also discussed the need to move beyond “zero-sum 
games” when studying institutional change. Indeed, even in the case of electoral system reforms, 
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which have often been presented as the archetypical redistributive reforms, ideas and cooperation 
matter, and limiting these reforms to self-interested maximisation logics is not fully adequate.133 
The distinction drawn by Tsebelis is extremely interesting and unproblematic on an 
abstract level. Indeed, it is easy to grasp that certain “institutions” or policies benefit everyone 
(for instance, the existence of roads and public lightning), whereas others redistribute resources 
or power (for instance, a tax that only affects rich households). However, when it comes to 
institutions that are complex, and intrinsically part of a greater system, such as the core 
democratic rules, it is much harder to discriminate between efficient and redistributive 
institutions. Some aspects of the same proposal may benefit “everyone”, whereas others might 
only benefit some of the actors involved. This distinction is therefore difficult to apply here: how 
does one discriminate between the two types of reform? What happens when a single proposal 
contains both redistributive and efficient aspects? Who is “everyone” – the actors within the 
political systems, or the citizenry? Do actors even have a clear sense of the distinction between 
redistributive and efficient aspects when they elaborate a reform? 
In the absence of satisfactory answers to these questions, I have chosen a different 
criterion to enable me to distinguish between reforms according the level of popular support they 
enjoy before the actual proposal is elaborated. Several assumptions are made here: (1) that actors, 
before they choose to make a proposal, attempt to evaluate the level of support such a proposal 
might garner among voters; and (2) that this evaluation may affect their subsequent behaviour. 
Of course, this does not imply that actors are necessarily right in their perceptions: they may 
over-evaluate the level of popular support enjoyed by a proposal or misperceive the effects that 
their actions may have on this level of support, as the process of reform may alter it substantially. 
Yet, through case studies, I believe it is possible to get a decent idea of the actors’ perceptions, of 
the level of support enjoyed by a project of institutional reform, and to trace the information that 
was at their disposal to back up their suppositions (in particular through press analysis, and access 
to reports). The fact that I am talking about the level of support prior to the process of reform 
taking place is also crucial here. Indeed, political actors may sometimes actively reframe reforms 
in order to turn them into divisive issues, if they believe this to be in their interest. Using our 
chosen perspective, the reforms fall in two categories: divisive reforms and consensual reforms.  
I define divisive reforms as reforms for which there is no perception of a broad agreement within the 
society or the political system on the part of the actors as to the desirability of the reform or the alternative envisaged. 
In other words, these are reforms where a substantial part of the citizenry or of the political 
                                                 
133 Cf. chapter 2, section 2.2.2. 
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actors support the status quo rather than the proposed alternative. Consensual reforms, on the 
other hand, are reforms for which there is a general perception of a broad agreement in the society and in the 
political system on the part of the political actors on the desirability of the alternative envisaged by the reform. This 
means that maintaining the status quo is much less of an option for reformers, insofar as the 
majority within the society and within the political system believe that the institution should be 
changed in a definite direction. The key postulate is that each type of reform leads to different 
ways of formulating the actors’ preferences:  
During reform processes involving divisive reforms, the behaviour of the political actors and their positions on 
alternatives to reform derive primarily from outcome contingent attitudes, i.e. from the expected outcomes of the 
reform.  
During reform processes involving divisive reforms, the actors define their strategies primarily according to their self-
interest.  
During processes of reform where there is no broad agreement in the society on the proposed 
alternative, politicians primarily base their support (or lack of support) for a proposal on whether 
they believe the reform to be in their own interests in terms of votes, policy, offices, or power in 
general; or else on values. In other words, in such processes, if a party or an individual decides to 
support a proposal despite a lack of popular support, it is because he believes there is something 
in it for himself, not necessarily just in terms of power, but also in terms of promoting his ideas 
on desirable institutions. Like Renwick (2010), I have adopted a very broad definition of “power” 
here: not only projections in terms of seats or offices, but also matters relating to coalitions or 
influence on policy. Values are also expected to have an influence, most notably on the definition 
and selection of the alternatives considered by the political actors. 
During processes of reform involving consensual reforms, the behaviour of the political actors and their positions on 
an alternative of reform derive primarily from act-contingent attitudes, i.e. from the expected benefits or costs of 
supporting the act of reform.  
During processes of reform involving consensual reforms, the actors define their strategies primarily in function of 
their ability to claim credit for the reform.  
I have already mentioned the fact that when a reform is broadly popular, i.e., when it enjoys 
support from both citizens and the political system, the status quo is much less of a viable option 
than would be the case for divisive reforms. Consequently, the positions on the reform in the 
case of consensual reforms are, first and foremost, defined after examining the consequences of 
being seen to instigate the reform, as there are strong reasons to support it. This depends on the 
position of each actor in the process, and on its capacity to claim credit for a reform that is seen 
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as desirable. In a seminal book, David Mayhew theorises on the three main activities of the 
members of Congress: advertising, position-taking, and credit-claiming (1974). Mayhew defines 
credit-claiming as “acting so as to generate a belief in a relevant political actor (or actors) that one 
is personally responsible for causing the government (...) to do something that the actor (or 
actors) considers desirable” (1974, 52–53). If this definition of credit-claiming is applied not to 
individuals in congress, but to the collective political actors themselves (and particularly to 
parties), this means that these actors seek to make citizens believe that they are personally 
responsible for government’s decision to enact a reform that is considered to be desirable by a 
majority of voters. Therefore, when engaging in a credit-claiming strategy, the central element is 
to appear to have taken a crucial part in the initiative and in the definition of the popular 
proposal. Consensual reforms are characterised by a form of competition focused on invoking 
the paternity of the reform. I also argue that in cases where actors recognise their inability to 
claim credit for a reform, they have more of an incentive to change the framing of the reform, in 
order to weaken the actual initiator of the process.134 This strategy can also be understood as the 
“contrary” of blame avoidance as defined by Weaver (1986, 1988), who argues that politicians are 
usually primarily motivated by the desire to avoid blame for unpopular actions. On the other 
hand, when a policy or an action is popular, credit-claiming becomes a rewarding strategy. A 
concrete example is given by Pierson, who shows that the periods of expansion of the benefits 
are leading to a process of “political credit-claiming” (1996, 143).  
To conclude, two types of reforms result in two types of strategies: what is broadly 
understood as self-interest for divisive reforms, and credit-claiming for consensual reforms.  
 
2.1.2. Majoritarian, supermajoritarian and externalised processes of  reform 
In established democracies, the decisions concerning the core democratic rules are usually 
elaborated and made in the parliament, and therefore by the actors who make up the political 
system of a given polity.135 However, there have been certain concrete cases in which the 
processes of reforms have been outsourced in order to involve actors outside of the political 
system, giving them power to define the alternatives that will later be discussed by the political 
actors. Therefore, three sets of actors can lead the processes of reform of core democratic rules: 
                                                 
134 Cf. infra. 
135 Renwick shows that in contexts of democratisation or regime change, other actors can be involved in 
the process of institutional reform, including judges, other countries or the international community. 
Although these reflections focused on electoral reforms, they can also apply to a wider set of reforms 
(2010).  
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the government (and its parliamentary majority), the opposition, and actors outside the political 
system, which may include actors ranging from political experts to ordinary citizens (Figure 10).  
Figure 10. The three actors of institutional reforms 
 
Following this logic, when the decision to reform a given topic has been made, there are 
essentially three roads to reform: majoritarian, supermajoritarian, and externalised processes, depending 
on their degree of inclusion. I argue that for each reform route chosen there are different 
incentives for actors, as a given actor will be included in some cases, and excluded in others.  
In majoritarian processes of institutional reforms, the actors that are involved in the 
definition of the alternatives and their concrete elaboration come only from parties that support 
the existing government. Therefore, the opposition is excluded from the processes of definition 
and elaboration, and intervenes only at a later stage, i.e., during the parliamentary discussion. In 
more abstract terms, such processes follow a logic that resembles the ideal-type of what Lijphart 
defines as the adversarial (1968), or majoritarian model of democracy (1984; 1999): the majority 
concentrates power in its own hands, the executive has a lead role on the process, the dominant 
logic opposes two blocks (the majority, and the opposition). Like Lijphart, one can associate such 
processes with a logic based primarily on competition, rather than cooperation.  
 In supermajoritarian processes of institutional reforms, the parties of both the parliamentary 
majority (and therefore the government) and the opposition are involved in the definition and the 
elaboration of the alternatives to reform. I refer here not to processes where only a tiny 
proportion of the opposition collaborates with the government, but to processes where, at the 
very least, the main party of the opposition takes a crucial part in the procedure. Bartolini 
considers that “the opposite of competition – that is of parallel and independent effort to achieve 
the same prize – is negotiation or cooperation – that is concomitant and coordinated effort to 
obtain or to share the prize” (1999, 436). Supermajoritarian processes are defined by a greater 
degree of cooperation and negotiation than majoritarian processes of reform. To use Lijphart’s 
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analogy again, such a process would resemble the ideal-type of a consociational, or consensus 
democracy, as it involves cooperation, bargaining, compromise and negotiation between the most 
relevant political forces within a given polity.  
 More attention should be devoted to understanding what I mean by externalised processes of 
institutional reforms. To be very clear, it is absolutely obvious that in most, if not all, of the 
reported cases of institutional reforms, the actors in the political system did not elaborate the 
proposals in a closed bubble which outsiders were excluded from. The establishment of ad hoc 
expert committees to produce reports on potential reforms, or consultation with independent 
experts or exponents of civil society during the elaboration phase of the institutional reforms are 
common practices. These, to my mind, do not qualify as falling within the category of 
externalised processes of reform, as the politicians maintain a firm grip on the definition of the 
alternatives, and are in no way compelled to listen to the advice of the experts or civil society 
advocates they have consulted. Externalised processes of reform are processes during which the 
political actors officially delegate certain phases of the definition and elaboration of the reforms to 
actors outside of the political system: experts, or ordinary citizens. The second criterion is the 
requirement to provide answers to the proposals made by the body in charge of the definition, 
which can take several forms: the government obligation to officially reply to the proposals or the 
obligation to proceed via a parliamentary vote or through a referendum on the alternatives 
elaborated. The rationale, particularly in cases where ordinary citizens are entitled to define the 
alternatives to reform, is that of maximum inclusion: indeed, such processes may often only 
result from a deliberate choice on the part of key actors within the political system to give up 
their prerogatives to define institutional reforms.  
To take concrete examples, and despite its significance in promoting the adoption of a 
mixed-member proportional system in New-Zealand, the institution of the Royal Commission on 
the Electoral System cannot be considered as an externalised process of reform: despite the 
Commission’s broad terms of reference, the government made no formal commitment to answer 
the its requirements prior to its institution (Vowles 1995). Dissimilarly, the citizens’ assemblies on 
electoral reform created in British Columbia in 2004 and in Ontario in 2006 are good examples of 
externalised processes of reform.136 These bodies, comprised of ordinary citizens, were charged 
with defining whether or not the FPTP system should be retained, and elaborating a concrete 
                                                 
136 The case of the Burgerforum (Civic Forum) in the Netherlands, where ordinary citizens reviewed the 
existing electoral system in 2006, would not meet the criteria I have set: indeed, before the citizens’ 
assembly was set up, the government made no commitment to implement or discuss its recommendations 
(Fournier et al. 2011). 
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alternative system, if deemed necessary. The politicians in power made the formal commitment 
to put the proposals of the citizens’ assemblies to a referendum, a promise that has been kept 
despite the fact that the two referendums in British Columbia and one in Ontario were 
unsuccessful.  
It is important to bear in mind that externalised processes of institutional reforms - although 
there are empirical recent examples, particularly taking the form of citizens’ assemblies, to reform 
the electoral system - are clearly the exception, as opposed to the rule. In relation to the choice to 
create citizens’ assemblies to review electoral systems, Fournier et al. argue:  
“It is one thing for political parties and governments to grant citizens a say in institutional 
design, but it is quite another for them to give up control over the rules of the game by 
which they compete for their own livelihood. It may make sense for public officials to try to 
pass the buck when facing difficult, divisive, or unpopular choices. Letting people pick the 
electoral system does not” (2011, 13). 
The authors argue that such a choice does not correspond to parties’ calculations of their long-
term strategic interests, but results from a decisive push from leaders of junior parties. They add: 
“however, it is clear that the initiating party in each instance hoped to garner the benefits of ‘act 
contingencies’ by portraying itself as a party of progressive change” (Fournier et al. 2011, 27).  
 To conclude, the categories of processes of reform depend on their degree of inclusion: 
the government working alone, the government working together with the opposition, or 
inclusive of the political system and actors outside of the political system. I will now turn to the 
consequences of each of these processes in relation to the likely outcome of reforms.  
 
2.2. Why do some reforms succeed and others fail? 
There are basically four possible outcomes for any given reform during the phase of the 
final vote. These outcomes are, in this instance, the “dependent variable” that I try to predict. 
First possible case: the reform is adopted thanks to actors outside of the parliamentary majority, 
and therefore by a large majority. Second case: the reform is only supported during its time of 
adoption by the parliamentary majority, or in the case of referendums, passes by a small margin. 
Third option: the opposition manages to make the reform’s adoption fail, or the reform is 
abandoned before being put to a vote. Finally, the worst case scenario for a reformer: the reform 
fails to be adopted not only because of successful activism on the part of the opposition, but also 
because of defections within the parliamentary majority. This final section is divided into two 
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parts. Firstly, I will present arguments about the link between the type of reform present on the 
agenda (divisive or consensual) and the way in which the reform emerges (thanks to exogenous 
popular pressure, or from within the political system). Secondly, I will present arguments about 
the impact of veto players, of multifaceted reforms, and of the type of processes on the likely 
outcome of a reform, examining consensual and divisive reforms successively.  
 
2.2.1. The link between conditions of  emergence and consensual and divisive 
reforms 
To schematise, reforms can be added to an agenda through two means: as a result of 
pressure external to the political system itself, when some successful reform entrepreneurs 
manage to put enough pressure on politicians to force them to examine a given reform (or to 
address institutional reform in general), and as a result of the endogenous interactions and 
calculations of the politicians. Of course, it is necessarily an intellectual shortcut to consider that a 
reform emerges “purely” as a result of endogenous or exogenous pressures. As Renwick 
demonstrates by distinguishing between reforms by elite-mass interaction and elite majority 
imposition, the key element of distinction is whether or not established politicians retain the 
upper hand in the process when the reform is put onto the agenda.   
Returning to the findings of the first part, I have found that reforms are more likely in the 
long run when the level of political support is low, and in the short run, in times of political 
alternation and rising volatility. I have argued that alternation tends to foster institutional reforms 
because it brings new actors into power, actors which may have different preferences about the 
institutions, and which then have the opportunity to implement them. The link between volatility 
and reform is trickier to interpret, and I have found no decisive evidence linking a drop in levels 
of satisfaction with democracy and reform. The findings were only probabilistic: there is no 
automaticity between, for example, an explosion of volatility during a given election and 
institutional reform. I argue that only in instances when a link is explicitly drawn between public 
anger, electoral uncertainty, and the need to reform the institutions can it generate a sufficient 
amount of popular pressure to influence politicians and the political agenda concerning 
institutional reforms. Renwick provides more details about the actual mechanisms. He argues that 
(1) the public must be angry about the performance of the political system and feel that this 
performance damages its interests; (2) there should be weaknesses in the existing system, making 
the link between its failures and political reform seem plausible; and (3) that link should be made 
by strategic leaders who have the capacity to impose this narrative against alternative interests, 
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interpretations, and schemes (Renwick 2010). Renwick, Lamb and Numan examine the 
consequences of the 2009 expenses scandal in the UK137 for the agenda of political reform. They 
reach the following conclusions:  
“The evidence it offers points towards three conditions that determine the degree of reform 
impetus that a scandal generates. The first has to do with the strength of politicians’ interests. 
(…) The second condition is the degree to which reform advocates can draw a plausible link 
in the public’s mind between the reform in question and the issues of public concern (…) 
The third condition is that the scandal should be linked in voters’ minds not just to the 
probity of the political class, but also to voters’ own personal well-being.” (2011, 40) 
They then show that reformers have succeeded in drawing this link with the necessity to 
institute reforms enabling them to recall MPs or to organise primaries, but have been unable to 
convince the public of the link between this scandal and the current electoral system for general 
elections, which explains the lack of interest and the failure of the referendum on the alternative 
vote of 2011. Moreover, I believe that in such circumstances, volatility is a facilitating factor 
because it implies that the relevant actors evolve in an environment where the balance of powers 
between parties is uncertain, and where, therefore, misperceptions are more likely, and new actors 
are offered opportunities of expression.  
Turning now to the link between antecedent conditions facilitating reform and the types of 
reforms that make it onto the agenda, the subsequent chapters develop two arguments:  
Consensual reforms are more likely to emerge as a result of pressures exogenous to the political system, combining 
popular dissatisfaction with the institutions, electoral uncertainty, and activism in favour of an institutional reform 
agenda.  
Consensual reforms are reforms that have – or are perceived to have – broad support among 
citizens and within the political system. As a consequence, in circumstances where established 
politicians are pressured to act on the political reform front, they would rather choose to 
implement reforms that enjoy widespread popular support as opposed to divisive reforms. It is 
important to keep in mind that the politicians are not wholly responsible for agenda-setting in 
this configuration: they are subject to popular pressure, and to a narrative linking the problems of 
the citizenry with the core democratic rules. Therefore, consensual reforms are less “costly” to 
implement in a constrained context.138 
                                                 
137 This scandal was triggered by the publication of expenses claims made by British MPs, which evidenced 
systemic misuse of the permitted allowances and expenses. This resulted in a major public scandal, in a 
loss of confidence in politics, and in a number of resignations, retirements and de-selection of MPs.  
138 Of course, counter-examples exist. For instance, popular pressure brought about a reform that divided 
the Italian political class in 1993. However, the citizens were overwhelmingly in favour of a majoritarian 
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Divisive reforms are more likely to emerge as a result of dynamics endogenous to the political system itself.  
I have argued that divisive reforms tend to result from conscious and relatively unconstrained 
choices made by actors within the political system itself. Indeed, I have already explained that 
since these reforms do not enjoy a high level of political support, they tend to primarily obey self-
interested motivations: actors push them forward in order to gain something for themselves. The 
notion that these reforms, in the majority of the cases, tend to result from a choice is implicit in 
this postulate, whereas in the former configuration, reform would result, at least partly, from a 
constraint.  
 
2.2.2. Veto players, multifaceted reforms, type of  processes, and outcomes of  
reforms 
The veto players, the existence of multifaceted or “unidimensional” reforms, and the type of 
reform processes are the three main factors that I examine in order to understand the different 
outcomes of the reforms studied.139 These three dimensions have a distinctive impact on the final 
outcome of consensual and divisive reforms.   
a) Veto players  
A veto player is an agent which is able to block reform, whether a party or an institution. 
George Tsebelis argues that: “the veto players theory expects policy stability (impossibility of 
significant change in the status quo) to be caused by many veto players, by big ideological distances 
among them, or by high qualified majority thresholds (or equivalents) in any collective veto player” 
(2000, 464, emphasis added). Regarding the specific issue of referendums, he considers that the 
possibility of a referendum is equivalent to the introduction of a new veto player, who is the 
median voter of the population (Tsebelis 2002; Hug and Tsebelis 2002). Hug and Tsebelis argue 
about the possibility of the elimination of veto players through referendums: “if the same actor 
(whether it is an actual veto player or not) controls both the formulation of the question and the 
triggering of the referendum, other veto players lose their ability to veto outcomes and hence the 
number of veto players actually decreases” (2002, 467). Tsebelis also underlines the power of the 
agenda-setter, who can “consider the winset of others as his constraint, and select from it the 
outcome he prefers” (Tsebelis 2002, 34). Tsebelis believes that the agenda-setting power usually 
                                                                                                                                                        
electoral system (Katz 2003): only the political actors or the First Republic were highly sceptical on the 
topic. 
139 It would be somewhat improper to talk about “independent variables” in the context of process-
tracing. 
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belongs to the government as a whole, for two reasons: a positional one (as governments in 
multiparty systems are supported by a majority or are centrally located in the policy space), and 
an institutional one (the government has institutional instruments to actually control the agenda) 
(2002, 109). Tsebelis implicitly believes that the preferences of actors are given and not 
influenced by the policy process itself, that any additional veto player tends to make reaching 
agreement more difficult, and that the identity of the agenda-setter is essential to the 
understanding of a process of reform, insofar as it defines the alternatives that are discussed.  
But what happens when there is broad agreement on a given reform, “cancelling” the 
ideological polarisation aspect? In theory, if all veto players agree on a given reform, the amount 
of them no longer matters. This has particular relevance regarding consensual and divisive 
reforms. By definition, consensual reforms are characterised by broad agreement among both 
citizens and relevant political actors. I have also argued that the government and the opposition 
cooperate on the conception of reforms in supermajoritarian processes of reform, and seek the 
inclusion of outsiders during externalised processes of reform. As a consequence:   
For divisive reforms, the usual expectations about veto players and referendums apply: reform becomes more difficult 
as the number of veto player rises as their preferences differ more widely.  
For consensual reforms elaborated through a supermajoritarian or an externalised process of reform, the number of 
veto players and the requirement to hold a referendum have no impact on a reform’s likelihood of adoption.  
For consensual reforms elaborated through a majoritarian process of reform, the positions of the actors throughout 
the process are likely to shift. The reforms can only be adopted when the parliamentary majority is cohesive and 
large enough to prevent the opposition from blocking the reform. 
There is no need to elaborate on the first argument. The second one is also relatively 
straightforward: if both the government and the opposition collaborate in bringing forward a 
concrete reform on a topic that is consensual, the number of veto players or the requirement to 
hold a referendum becomes irrelevant, as all of the relevant actors agree on a given reform, and 
consequently, all of them can claim credit for the adoption of a popular reform. The same goes 
for the case where political actors choose to go through an externalised process of reform for a 
consensual proposal: they have no incentive to block a proposal that enjoys widespread 
agreement, and as the process has been externalised, no political actor can claim for itself a 
decisive role in the reform. The last argument deserves additional explanation. I have argued that 
actors are, first and foremost, expected to seek to claim credit for reform when consensual 
institutional reforms are at stake. When a consensual reform is elaborated solely by the 
parliamentary majority, it means that the government and its supporters seek to exclude the 
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opposition from the conception of a reform that enjoys popular support. Therefore, even if there 
is widespread agreement among the actors within the political system on a given reform at the 
beginning of the process, the opposition is faced with two difficult choices: supporting a reform 
without being able to claim a decisive role in its elaboration, or shifting position in order to 
reframe the issue, oppose the government, and possibly lead the reform to fail. Empirical 
evidence suggests that this temptation is particularly strong for opposition parties in cases where 
the government must go through a referendum before a reform can be adopted. The hegemonic 
and plebiscitary aspects inherent to any referendum have long been evidenced and discussed in 
the literature on the topic (Qvortrup 2000; Qvortrup 2001; Suksi 1993). In any referendum, there 
is an implicit question of support for the government. Consequently, there are numerous 
examples of referendums results which have been heavily skewed by the fact that (some) voters 
wished to punish their government. For example, the French President’s support for the 2005 
referendum on the European Treaty was one of the best predictors of a “no” vote  (Sauger, 
Brouard, and Grossman 2007), and this proved decisive for the final outcome. As a consequence, 
in cases of majoritarian processes of reform involving consensual reforms, the final word 
depends on the attitude of the opposition, as they may choose to adopt strategies in order to 
make the reform fail. In such cases, the usual veto players’ logic applies in defining the final 
outcome: the outcome depends on the number of veto players, their ideological distance, and on 
the position of the status quo.  
b) Multifaceted reforms 
Multifaceted reforms can be defined as reforms in which the issue at stake is framed as multidimensional, 
as opposed to one-dimensional reforms that are centred on a single issue. To use concrete examples which 
will be discussed in the following chapters, the constitutional reform in Italy was multifaceted 
because it affected multiple aspects and was framed as a multidimensional reform: issues included 
devolution, the role of the second chamber, reform of the executive, and so on. Conversely, the 
issue of Seanad abolition in Ireland was framed as a one-dimensional issue: the options were 
abolition, or non-abolition. I insist on the aspect of framing, since no issue is a priori one-
dimensional, particularly issues related to the core democratic rules that always affect multiple 
dimensions, since institutions form a system.140 Yet, reformers may choose either to “simplify” a 
given institutional reform by presenting it as a one-dimensional issue, or to “complicate” it by 
framing it as a multifaceted reform. I argue that the effect of the multifaceted character of a 
                                                 
140 Cf. chapter 1. 
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reform is exactly the opposite in relation to the likelihood of adoption of a consensual reform to 
its effect on the likelihood of adoption of a divisive reform.  
Consensual reforms are more likely to be adopted if they are framed as one-dimensional issues.  
Divisive reforms are more likely to be adopted when the majority is divided, if they are framed as multifaceted 
reforms.  
The matter at stake here is the effect of complexity, ambiguity, but also of coalition-
building dynamics on the outcome of institutional reforms. Consensual reforms are adopted 
more easily when they are presented as one-dimensional. It should now be clear that the main 
reason facilitating the adoption of consensual reforms is the fact that they enjoy a high level of 
public support. In such a configuration, adding multiple dimensions of reform would only “blur” 
the message, and would risk adding a divisive dimension to an otherwise consensual matter. As a 
consequence, the reformer who aims to implement consensual reforms would be better off 
“slicing them” into single, popular, easily readable issues, limiting their level of complexity and 
ambiguity as much as possible, in order to get everyone on board on precise reforms.  
For divisive issues, the reformer who seeks to implement a reform does not enjoy a great deal 
of support, and faces exactly contrary incentives. Analysts coming from the field of public policy 
have reflected extensively on ambiguity’s capacity to bring forward reform. Palier coined the term 
“ambiguous agreement” to describe how certain welfare reforms have succeeded against the odds 
(2002, 2005). Others show that ambiguity is inherent to any policy process, and can be used as a 
resource by reformers (Zahariadis 2003). My argument here is similar to Rahat’s: complexity, 
ambiguity and uncertainty can in some cases serve reform (2008).141 In order to overcome the 
reservations of the other actors (in particular in cases where the parliamentary majority is highly 
divided) the most viable option consists of linking together multiple aspects of reforms into a 
package deal. Doing this carefully enables the reformer to accommodate the preferences of all of 
the actors in order to pass the reform, to facilitate tradeoffs, to blur the actors’ perceptions of the 
likely effects of the reform, or even to shift their preferences in a context where information and 
the cognitive ability to understand a reform is necessarily limited. Of course, there is no 
guaranteeing the success of such a strategy, particularly when the actors all prioritise their 
objectives in much the same way. Still, as in most cases there will be certain aspects of a package 
deal which are more relevant to one actor than to another, multifaceted reforms tend to make the 
adoption of reforms easier in a context where the actors are numerous and divided. This aspect 
will be specifically discussed in the Italian chapter.  
                                                 
141 Cf. supra. 
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c) Processes of  reform and nature of  reforms 
I will conclude with a series of arguments concerning the way in which the process of reform 
selected serves to facilitate or to complicate the adoption of consensual and divisive reforms. The 
basic idea here is that some processes of reform are better suited to particular types of reforms 
than others. This is because the reformers do not have the same objectives when they choose a 
majoritarian process as they would were they seeking an externalised, or a supermajoritarian one. 
Moreover, on some occasions, choosing one type of process over another may actually represent 
the desire to see the reform fail, or be delayed.  
When reformers choose a supermajoritarian or an externalised process of reform for a consensual reform, the reform 
is adopted by a comfortable margin. 
When reformers choose a supermajoritarian or an externalised process of reform for a divisive reform, the reform is 
very likely to fail before it is put to a vote. 
When reformers choose a majoritarian process of reform for a consensual or for a divisive reform, the final outcome 
is dependent upon the other dimensions discussed before (veto players, one-dimensional vs. multifaceted, etc.). 
Ultimately, these reforms pass if the parliamentary majority is cohesive and large enough. 
When the issue at stake is consensual, and the political actors collaborate together or with actors 
outside of the political system, there is no obstacle to the adoption of the reform. When it comes 
to supermajoritarian and externalised processes relating to divisive reforms, on the other hand,  
the rationale is that reformers choose these paths (generally at least) because they do not actually 
want the reform to be adopted. The justification here is very simple: if the government and the 
majority were truly committed to reforming a divisive dimension of the institutional system, they 
would seek to retain as much control over the process as possible. There has been a tendency to 
overlook the fact that many attempted institutional reforms actually fail, as authors first and 
foremost tend to study successful reforms. And yet, in so many cases, dealing with institutional 
reforms seems to consist mainly of burying them with sufficient craftiness to preserve illusions. 
In other cases, it also consists of trying, in desperation, to bring together a group of political 
actors that is far too diverse to give any reasonable expectation of agreement. Timing also 
becomes an essential aspect here: the following chapters will show that in most of the processes 
of reform, successful or unsuccessful, the management of time was crucial in explaining the 
outcome and the final form of the reforms.  
 The fate of citizens’ assemblies offers a cruel illustration of this dynamic. In British 
Columbia and Ontario, the governments had their hands tied, as they had made promises to hold 
referendums. They have since put very little energy into defending the electoral system crafted by 
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the citizen assemblies. In the Netherlands, the Burgerforum was created in order to get the D66 
party into the coalition in 2003, with the mission to review the electoral system and to propose 
alternatives or corrections. Long before the coalition failed in 2006, it was clear that the 
government had no intention of fighting for electoral reform and that the D66 had become 
isolated. Fournier et al. give the following conclusion: “[the politicians] will not hand over such 
power unless they expect delegation to fail or are convinced the outcome will correspond to their 
preferences” (2011, 146). Hence the paradox: although, in theory, very inclusive processes of 
reform may seem desirable in order to build agreement on divisive issues, such processes actually 
have very slim chances of leading to a vote, let alone to the adoption of a reform.  
 As for the last argument, I will simply state here that the fate of consensual and divisive 
reforms in majoritarian processes depends on other factors, discussed in the previous hypotheses: 
the attitude of the opposition – particularly in referendum contexts when a consensual reform is 
at stake, the cohesion of the parliamentary majority and the capacity of reformers to bring about 
acceptable trade-offs for divisive reforms, etc.   
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has introduced the case studies that will be presented in the three 
subsequent chapters, and a series of hypotheses in order to make sense of the different outcomes 
of the reforms comprising the three bundles of reforms under investigation. I have chosen 
bundles of reforms that are as varied as possible across several dimensions: they include 
successful and unsuccessful reforms, reforms that have emerged exogenously as a result of 
popular mobilisation and reforms that have emerged endogenously within the political system, as 
well as one-dimensional and multifaceted reforms. Ireland, France and Italy have been chosen as 
the settings for the case studies because they have important similarities that relate to their 
institutional and party system formats: competition is bipolar and pluralist, governments are 
formed by coalitions alternating in power, and relevant veto players – in addition to the parties 
forming the government – are present and active in all three countries. In all three cases, a 
referendum has been held on one of the reforms involved, giving us the opportunity to study the 
differing effects of the referendum barrier. Secondly, these three cases offer an interesting, 
dissimilar set of antecedent conditions regarding alternation, volatility and political alternation, 
enabling us to understand the link between the long- and short-term conditions facilitating 
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reform which were identified in the first part of the thesis, and the mechanisms leading to reform 
and non-reform.  
In this chapter, I have also argued that institutional reforms can be divided into two main 
categories according to the level of popular support they enjoy before the reform is discussed: 
consensual and divisive reforms. Consensual reforms are seen to be conducive to credit-claiming 
strategies, while divisive reforms are explained first and foremost as a product of self-interested 
motivations. The processes of reforms have been divided into three categories according to their 
level of inclusion: majoritarian, supermajoritarian, and externalised processes. The bundles of 
reforms studied in the following chapters also present a wide variety of variation, both in terms 
of the nature of reforms at stake, and the processes of reform used to carry them out. Finally, I 
focus on three dimensions that are seen as having different impacts on the likely outcome of 
divisive and consensual reforms: veto players, the (single or multi-dimensional) character of the 
reforms at stake, and the processes of reform.  
Ultimately, the argument that is developed and elaborated in the next three chapters is 
relatively straightforward: that the roads leading to successful reforms differ according to the type 
of reform at stake. The ability to adopt consensual reforms depends primarily on the reformers’ 
capacity to claim credit for the reform without excluding the opposition to too great an extent, as 
they could choose to retaliate if they are unable to share the government’s limelight. On the other 
hand, the ability to adopt divisive reforms depends mostly on the ability to build coalitions of 
reformers, where the actors necessary to pass the reform each find an interest in the reform, so as 
to overcome the barrier of veto players. In contexts where power is divided, this requires a great 
deal of craftiness, and the successful exploitation of complexity and ambiguity.   
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Chapter 6 You win some, you lose some: the various 
fortunes of  institutional reforms in Ireland since 2011  
 
 
“It's in the water, it's in the air, it's in the meat 
It's indirect, indiscrete, inconsistent, incomplete” 
Scapegoat in Overcast, 1997 
Atmosphere 
 
  
2011 marked the year in which the main actor in Irish political life since the civil war was 
effectively wiped out, as Fianna Fáil was punished harshly in the general elections that followed 
the beginning of the economic, social and political crisis. The Fine Gael-Labour coalition that 
came into power in 2011 put institutional reform at the top of its manifesto, making a plethora of 
promises about how politics would never be the same, and how institutions would be reformed 
to avoid the possibility of such a crisis ever happening again. Hence, in 2011, Ireland seemed to 
have all of the conditions to enable the redesigning of its institutions: complete political 
alternation, high volatility, very low levels of political support, as well as a keen focus on the topic 
of institutional change, and mobilisation on the issue. Still, the reforms which have made it to the 
agenda have experienced different fates: some have been adopted with ease, whereas others have 
failed utterly. Therefore, the question that this chapter seeks to address is the following: how can 
we explain such different outcomes for reforms that all resulted from the same initial pressures?  
 The chapter shows evidence which suggests that the way in which the process of reform 
unfolded and was acted upon by politicians can answer this question. The agenda of institutional 
reform was both imposed upon Irish elites and utilised by them during their campaigns in times 
of economic crisis and electoral recomposition, but the politicians chose to implement multiple 
processes of reform separately from each other. This agenda contains both divisive and 
consensual reforms, reforms that require a referendum and others that do not. Some reforms 
have been conducted primarily by the government, while others have been externalised to a 
device called the constitutional convention. The chapter provides evidence that the combination 
of the nature of the reforms and the processes chosen to implement them can to a great extent 
explain why the reforms followed different paths, and have resulted in various outcomes. The 
agenda of institutional reforms has resulted in three sets of outcomes: one which saw the 
successful adoption of many small, consensual reforms in the parliament with the support of the 
parliamentary majority; one where the referendum hurdle proved fatal for (what were initially) 
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consensual reforms driven exclusively by the majority; and one which saw the delegation of the 
most divisive reforms to an external body, in order to delay the need for a decision.  
The first part of the chapter focuses first on the conditions that led to the emergence of 
the debate on institutional reform in Ireland, showing that the economic crisis provided a clear 
push for the issue, after the progressive construction of a narrative that pinpoints the failures 
within the Irish institutional system. In the second part, I focus successively on the phase of 
formulation of the agenda, and on the adoption phase of the reforms. I show how the coalition 
in power built a scattered bundle of reforms, transforming the concomitant appearance of several 
dimensions of institutional reforms in the public debate into an agenda which was “broken 
down” into multiple issues. I then discuss how the combination of reforms of different natures 
and the choice of different processes led to different paths of reform.  
 
1. Child of the crisis: the origins of the debate on “political reform” in 
Ireland 
 
The debate on “political reform”, as it is known in Ireland, developed in a context of 
unprecedented political and economic crisis which shook the very roots of the Irish party system 
during the 2011 general election. The narrative that formed is a child of the crisis, attributing 
responsibility for the gravity of the hardship experienced by Ireland over the last few years to the 
political system, and leading to civil society mobilisation. This narrative did not just suddenly 
appear in 2011. The groundwork for its emergence had been laid by previous developments, 
characterised by a focus on corruption and transparency, and low-intensity debates on political 
reform since the mid-1990s. Yet this storyline remained relatively marginal until the economic 
crisis pushed the Irish political institutions into the spotlight, forcing politicians to act.  
 
1.1. The progressive emergence of a narrative on the failure of the Irish political system  
After decades of relative institutional stability since the 1990s, the emergence of a debate 
on political corruption raised questions concerning the inadequacies of Irish institutions and led 
to the adoption of certain reforms regarding transparency, while certain aspects of institutional 
reforms were discussed in the shadow of a wider debate on the constitution. The economic crisis 
that began in 2009 provided the decisive push to shift the blame away from individuals and onto 
the entire political system.  
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1.1.1. From institutional stability to the focus on corruption and transparency 
Three main elements can be advanced in explaining the stability of  Irish institutions since 
1937. The first one is the troubled context
142
 of  the adoption of  the Constitution: the 1937 
Constitution was a compromise between the different political forces and the most important 
social actor in Ireland, i.e., the Roman Catholic Church. It aimed to entrench democracy and 
fundamental rights by distributing power fairly and evenly (Fitzgerald 1998, Hogan 2012, Keogh 
and McCarthy 2007), and to provide safeguards in order to secure the democratic institutions (the 
existence of  a second chamber, a PR-STV electoral system, strong judicial review, etc.). Secondly, 
any constitutional change in Ireland must be approved through a referendum. Referendums are 
always a risky tool for parties to use, as they represent a strong challenge to the “partyness” of  
policy-making. In Ireland, the referendum requirement for constitutional issues removes 
discretionary powers over the institutions from the government (Gallagher 2011, 540-541).
143
 
There are emblematic examples of  unsuccessful institutional referendums, including failed 
attempts by Fianna Fáil (the main Irish party for many years) to replace the proportional electoral 
system with the British ‘First Past the Post’ electoral system in 1959 and 1968 (Gallagher 2005). 
The third and probably most important explanation for the stability of  the Irish institutions lies 
in two factors: on the one hand, Fianna Fáil’s continuous (if  now strongly challenged) 
domination over Irish political life, and on the other, the institutional practices that led to the 
executive prominence over the legislature. Remarkably, up until the 2011 elections, the same 
political parties occupied the first and second positions in every election: Fianna Fáil first, and 
Fine Gael second (Figure 11). Since the advent of  democracy in Ireland, Fianna Fáil was the only 
party that could ever claim to govern on its own, and only started to form coalitions with smaller 
partners from 1989 onwards (Figure 12). Between 1950 and 2011, Fianna Fáil held power 80% of  
the time (Kirby and Murphy 2011), for 21 of  the 24 years leading up to 2011, and consistently 
held more than 40% of  the votes, except in 1992 and 1997 (Murphy 2011). 
 
 
                                                 
142 The constitution of 1937 represented the completion of a painful process of emancipation from British 
dominion and the achievement of full independence. It replaced the constitution of the Irish Free State, 
which was adopted in 1922 in the aftermath of the 1921 Anglo-Irish Treaty. The political alignments in 
Ireland in 1937 corresponded to the positions of the main political actors involved in the Anglo-Irish 
Treaty, in the context of the partition of the country in the aftermath of the civil war (Weeks in Coakley 
and Gallagher 2010).  
143 Over time, only 23 out of the 31 constitutional amendments that have been put to the people of 
Ireland for approval have been adopted, with a very small minority of these (5) directly concerning minor 
modifications of the organisation of the political system (Gallagher 2010, 80).  
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Figure 11. Share of the votes of the three main Irish parties, 1944-2011, in % 
 
Source: Döring, Holger and Philip Manow. 2011. Parliament and government composition database (ParlGov): An 
infrastructure for empirical information on parties, elections and governments in modern democracies. Version 
11/07 – 26 July 2011. 
 
Figure 12. Identity of the party or coalition in power in Ireland, 1950-2012 
 
Source: Parlgov, op.cit., my own elaboration 
Over the years, the institutional practice in Ireland gave the cabinet an extremely dominant role, 
causing a growing disjuncture between the “letter” and the “practice” of the constitution (Hunt 
1998). Effectively, Ireland functioned largely like a Westminster democracy for many years: 
centrality of the cabinet, single party government, and asymmetric bicameralism (Chubb 1980, 
Farrell 1988, Ward 1994). In such circumstances, the parties in government benefit from 
important powers vis-à-vis the legislative, making the emergence of institutional changes 
touching upon the balance of powers more difficult.  
The Irish institutional system began to be challenged in the 1990s, with the initiation of 
multiple tribunals of enquiry:144 the “Beef Tribunal”, which ran between 1991 and 1994 (Tribunal 
of Enquiry into the Beef Processing Industry 1994), the McCracken Tribunal of March–August 
1997, which was followed by the Moriarty Tribunal, which operated between 1997 and 2011 
                                                 
144 Tribunals are a somewhat strange device in Irish judicial and political life, and are direct descendents of 
both the British tradition and of the Irish Free State (O’Neill 2000). They are established by ministers after 
the agreement of both Houses of the Oireachtas, invested with the powers, privileges and rights of the 
Irish High Court, and are comprised of independent member(s). They establish facts and, if needed, 
allegations over any matter of “urgent public importance”. 
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(Tribunal of Enquiry into payments to Politicians and Related Matters 2006; Tribunal of Enquiry 
into payments to Politicians and Related Matters 2011), and the Mahon Tribunal, which ran from 
1997 to 2012 (Tribunal of Enquiry into Certain Planning Matters and Payments 2012). While they 
were criticised at the time, and indeed still are, for both their slowness and their costliness (Byrne 
2012, O’Halpin 2000, O’Neill 2000), these tribunals served to expose a seemingly endless number 
of scandals, showing evidence of corruption and cronyism, as well as the secrecy and opacity of 
policy-making in Ireland in general. More crucially, these tribunals provided ample evidence of 
the pervasiveness of corrupt or unethical behaviour at every level of Irish political life, and of the 
deferent and conniving relationship between business and politics in Ireland (Byrne 2012, 144). 
The tribunals saw the involvement of ex-Taoisigh (prime ministers) and ministers from both 
Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael.145  
As the extension of this connivance between most political parties and businesses at all levels 
of power became apparent, this led to a series of legislations concerning ethics and transparency 
in Ireland. In 1995, the “rainbow coalition”, comprised of Fine Gael, Labour and the Democratic 
Left, adopted the Ethics in Public Office Act.146 In 1999, the FF-Progressive Democrats 
government established the Standards in Public Office (SIPO) Commission as an independent 
statutory body, leading to the adoption of the Standards in Public Office Act147 in 2001, to 
supervise and sanction the disclosure of eventual conflicts of interests for members of the 
Oireachtas. Two pieces of legislation designed to strengthen the fight against corruption in both 
the public and private sectors were adopted in 2001 and 2005.148 The Commission of 
Investigation Act of 2004 strengthened the procedures for future investigations by independent 
tribunals.149 This is only some of the list, since no less than 25 pieces of legislation focused 
directly or indirectly on corruption between 1995 and 2005 (Hugues et al. 2007, 383, Byrne 2012, 
194). Some efforts to develop legislations and regulation over transparency and accountability 
have also been made by the Irish governments since the end of the 1990s, the Freedom of 
Information Act of 1997 being the most important one,150 before its restriction in 2003. Other 
                                                 
145 These include Charles Haughey and Bertie Ahern (FF), and Michael Lowry (FG). 
146 Ethics in Public Office Act, 1995. Dublin: Stationery Office. 
147 Standards in Public Office Act, 2001. Dublin: Stationery Office. 
148 Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) Act, 2001. Dublin: Stationery Office.  
Proceeds of Crime (Amendment) Act, 2005. Dublin: Stationery Office.  
149 Commissions of Investigation Act, 2004. Dublin: Stationery Office. 
150 Freedom of Information Act, 1997. Dublin : Stationery Office. 
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indirect legislative measures of note include various provisions concerning the financing of 
political parties and political donations.151  
In conclusion, the tribunals served to gradually corrode the public image of politicians in 
Ireland, although criticism of the political system was only to come later on. Tribunals targeted 
individuals, some of whom were very prominent and influential, yet there was no widespread 
perception that the connivance, secrecy and lack of accountability were the result of bad policies, 
which were in turn the result of the wider political system.  
 
1.1.2. The debate on the political institutions: (not so) much noise about 
nothing?  
The 1990s and 2000s saw fierce debates over certain constitutional issues: on moral issues (in 
particular divorce and abortion) and Northern Ireland. The Constitution Review Group, which 
conducted one of  the most thorough reviews ever made of  the Irish constitution (Constitution 
Review Group 1996), was set up in the context of  the debate on the moral issues in the 
constitution, which eventually led to a series of  referendums on divorce and abortion,
152
 but also 
to the modification of  Articles 2 and 3 of  the Irish constitution and to the Good Friday 
Agreement in 1998.
153
  
The rest of  the constitution (i.e. the organisation of  the political system) has been discussed 
in this overall context of  review of  the Irish constitution, but the “hot” topics that actually 
resulted in legislation and referendums had nothing to do with the political institutions 
themselves. In 1996, an All-party Oireachtas Committee on the Constitution was established, 
with the mission to “identify those areas where constitutional reform may be required and to 
recommend change were necessary” (All-Party Oireachtas Committee on the Constitution 1997, 
iv). This commission was renewed up until 2012,
154
 and produced a large number of  
parliamentary reports over its tenure, many of  them dealing directly with the organisation of  the 
political system: two on the Seanad (All-Party Oireachtas Committee on the Constitution 1998, 
                                                 
151 For example, the Electoral Act of 1997 placed limits on spending by candidates and parties at election 
time, and required the disclosure of political donations above a certain threshold.  
152 Divorce was authorised after a referendum in 1995 removed the ban on divorce from the constitution. 
Two referendums to make the legislation on abortion even more stringent, stating that risk of suicide was 
not a valid reason for an abortion, were rejected in 1992 and 2002.  
153 The Good Friday Agreement put an end to 30 years of violent troubles in Northern Ireland, and was 
signed by all of the political forces within Northern Ireland, Tony Blair (UK Prime Minister), and Bertie 
Ahern (Taoiseach of Ireland). Ireland abolished Articles 2 and 3 of its constitution, which contained 
territorial claims over Northern Ireland.  
154 From 2007 until 2012, it was renamed the Joint Committee on the Constitution. 
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2002), one on the president (All-Party Oireachtas Committee on the Constitution 1998b), two on 
the role of  the parliament (All-Party Oireachtas Committee on the Constitution 2002; Joint 
Committee on the Constitution 2011), and two on electoral system reform (Joint Committee on 
the Constitution 2010a, 2010b), as well as many other reports on other aspects of  the Irish 
Constitution. The Seanad also produced its umpteenth report on its own reform in 2004 (Seanad 
Éireann Committee on procedures and privileges, sub-committee on Seanad Reform 2004). This 
abundence of  parliamentary reports is somewhat misleading in light of  two important facts. 
Firstly, the scope of  the reforms of  the political system proposed was very limited. Secondly, and 
more significantly, the impact of  these reports on actual legislation was virtually non-existent, as 
only very minor modifications of  the institutional architecture were adopted between 1997 and 
2011.  
The examples of  the discussions on the upper chamber and on the electoral system serve to 
illustrate this predilection for the status quo well. The utility, the mode of  election and the role of  
the Seanad have been periodically discussed, as have the main accusations levelled against the 
Irish electoral system: clientelism and localism. The Seanad is indirectly elected through five 
panels, and has no distinct role in the Irish parliament. As a consequence, the most recent reports 
focused on proposing different variants for the election of  senators, including some element of  
direct election by citizens, the end of  discrimination between university graduates, and proposals 
to enhance the powers of  the upper chamber regarding the implementation of  EU law. They 
tended to agree on the necessity of  reform to give the Seanad’s existence greater relevance and 
meaning, through a more legitimate mode of  election and non-overlapping role with the Dáil 
(lower chamber).  
Regarding the electoral system, the same conservatism towards the existing institutions is 
present. As an illustration, a survey conducted in 2009 showed that 57% of  the parliamentarians 
who replied were in favour of  keeping the existing system (Joint Committee on the Constitution 
2010b, 13). In its second report on electoral reform, the joint committee on the constitution 
clearly recommended the retention of  the PR-STV system, proposing minor adjustments such as 
the establishment of  an independent electoral commission to take charge of  the conduct of  
elections and referendums in the country, some provisions to increase the number of  women in 
the parliament, a change to the method of  redistributing surplus ballots, and other technicalities. 
The most important suggestion was to establish a citizens’ assembly, modelled on the one 
established in British Columbia, to discuss an eventual alternative electoral system (Joint 
Committee on the Constitution 2010b). Noel Dempsey, FF minister for the Environment and 
Local Government between 1997 and 2002, pushed for electoral reform and for the adoption of  
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a mixed-member electoral system similar to that of  Germany,
155
 and even managed to get the 
topic into the Programme for Government in 1997, but without concrete results.
156
 The topic of  
electoral reform, like other institutional topics, was very much a “hobby” for lone voices within 
the political parties who did not push their proposals very far in the parliament: Noel Dempsey 
for Fianna Fáil, Gareth Fitzgerald for Fine Gael, Brendan Halligan for Labour, etc. Jimmy 
Devins, a former Fianna Fáil politician who sat on the Constitution committee from 2002 to 
2007 and from 2009 to 2010, notes that the debates tended to cross party lines and be conducted 
in a very consensual manner:  
“Of  all the committees, that was the one committee where I certainly felt, in both Dáils, that 
there was a much greater relationship between the different parties, and ideas were dealt with 
in the basis of  the ideas rather than the party the person that put the idea forward 
represented.”
157
  
 
None of  the larger parties in the parliament had a clear position regarding political reform. Some 
of  the minor parties adopted strong stances on institutional reform at various points, such as the 
Progressive Democrats who supported the abolition of  the Seanad in 1988 (a position that was 
abandoned as soon as the party got a few senators elected, Collins 2005, 83). So, what happened 
with this plethora of  parliamentary reports, and why were they produced in the first place? On 
these two points, my interlocutors were extremely clear and unanimous. David Farrell talks about 
an “implementation disorder syndrome” in describing the production of  reports which were 
never implemented.
158
 Mary O’Rourke, who chaired the last report on Seanad Reform in 2004, 
tells me: “we put forward our report and we felt very good and very virtuous, and the then Prime 
Minister, the then Taoiseach of  my party [Bertie Ahern], said ‘thank you very much, now I’ll 
study that’, and then he never said another word. Not another word. It is on a shelf, somewhere, 
                                                 
155 For example, he officially defended this position when he spoke before the Joint committee on the 
constitution in November 2009. Cf. the minutes: 
http://193.178.1.238/DDebate.aspx?F=CNJ20091118.XML&Ex=All&Page=2 
156 Dempsey told me that he even conducted a secret poll in 2000 asking parliamentarians if they would 
support him, in which 58 out of the 69 parliamentarians he questioned supported the mixed-member 
system over the existing one. Despite all that, no politician ever publicly defended this option. Interview 
with Noel Dempsey, ex-Teachta Dála (TD) for Meath and Meath West between 1987 and 2011, ex-
minister (1997-2011), FF, 30 May 2012, at a café in Dublin. 
157 Interview with Jimmy Devins, ex Teachta Dála (TD) for Sligo-Leitrim between 2002 and 2011, ex local 
councillor in Sligo County Council between 1991 and 2002, ex-minister, FF, 18 May 2012, at his office in 
Sligo. The same impression of a constructive, non-partisan discussion has been confirmed to me by 
another member of the committee, Alex White. Interview with Alex White, Teachta Dála (TD) for Dublin 
South since 2011, senator from 2007 to 2011, Labour, 24 May 2012, Leinster House, Dublin.  
158 Interview with David Farrell, Professor of political science at University College Dublin, co-author of 
politicalreform.ie, member of the academic team of We the Citizens, the constitutional convention and 
reformcard.com, 8 May 2012, at his office in Dublin.  
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gathering dust”.
159
 Overall, reports served as a way of  putting the matter of  political reform on 
the long finger. Politicians who were interested in a particular matter were kept busy, and reform 
was hampered by the lengthy debates which led only to recommendations that the government 
was then free to ignore. To summarise, at the end of  the 2000s, not only was political reform a 
marginal topic of  discussion in the political debate, but the few people who were involved in this 
debate promoted no substantial institutional changes, and even those limited proposals that were 
put forward were not implemented in the form of  legislation.
160
  
 
1.1.3. From an economic to a political crisis: the emergence of  a narrative on the 
failure of  the Irish institutional system 
From 1990 to 2007, Ireland experienced a period of  vertiginous economic success, 
earning the cocky nickname “the Celtic Tiger”, and was presented everywhere in Europe as an 
exemplary success story. This economic development effectively obscured everything else, 
including, of  course, the worrying conclusions of  the tribunals of  enquiry, and the debates on 
political reform. Between 2008 and 2011, the situation changed dramatically, exposing the fragility 
at the heart of  this economic success story. The reasons behind the Irish economic crisis are 
well-documented and will only be presented here in brief.
161
 As Bernhagen and Chari argue, 
“while opinions diverge as to whether the problem was caused by too little or by ineffective 
regulation, it is uncontentious that the political context and regulatory framework in which 
financial markets operate constitute the conditions under which the crisis developed” (2011, 457). 
It is widely accepted that the Irish government actively fuelled the boom by encouraging financial 
exuberance through pro-cyclical fiscal policies (Bénétrix and Lane 2009, Lane 1998), and through 
light-touch financial regulation. This translated into a growth in credit, the concentration of  
lending on assets in property, high loan to value ratios, and high exposure to funding risks (Kirby 
and Murphy, 2010). Bernhagen and Chari identify three main steps that led Ireland into the crisis. 
Firstly, in September 2008, the Fianna Fáil Taoiseach Brian Cowen and his minister for Finance 
                                                 
159 Interview with Mary O’Rourke, ex-Teachta Dála (TD) for Longford-Westmeath and Westmeath (1981-
1997, 2007-2011), ex-senator (1997-2007), ex-president of the Seanad (2002-2007), ex-minister (1989-
1994, 1997-2002), FF, 23 May 2012, at her home in Athlone. 
160 Three reforms have been adopted on the topic of local government, which is particularly weak in 
Ireland in comparison with any other European country: the constitutionalisation of the election of local 
government and authorities in 1999, the simplification of the local government structure in 2001, and the 
ban of the “dual mandate” in 2003. However, the Joint Committee on the Constitution was not involved 
in these reforms.  
161 For two interesting journalistic and critical accounts of the development of the crisis, cf. O’Toole 2010, 
Cooper 2011. For and financial expert account, cf. the report of Honohan 2010. For an academic account 
summarising and enriching previous analyses of the crisis, cf. Chari and Bernhagen 2011.   
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Brian Lenihan took the crucial decision to provide life-support to Irish banks by guaranteeing 
bank bailouts by taxpayers through the National Assets Management Agency (NAMA) without 
the consultation of  the cabinet (Cooper 2011). This move amounted to more than €68 billion in 
2010. Despite the reluctance of  the government, they were eventually left with no choice but to 
ask for help from the IMF and the EU, who provided a package of  €85 billion (33% of  Irish 
GDP) alongside drastic conditions that virtually removed Irish economic sovereignty for the 
years that followed (Chari and Bernhagen 2011, 474–475). Hence, Ireland was (and is) facing a 
multidimensional economic crisis: a financial crisis, with the implosion of  the property bubble; a 
fiscal crisis, because of  the commitment of  public money to prevent the Irish banking system’s 
total collapse; and an unemployment crisis, with an explosion in the number of  people 
unemployed (Hardiman 2009). The main macroeconomic indicators (Table 13) are enlightening: 
deep recession, tripling of  the number of  people unemployed, and a 32% deficit in 2010.  
Table 13. Main macroeconomic indicators for Ireland, 2007-2010 
Year Growth Unemployment Deficit 
2007 +5,6 4,6 0,1 
2008 -3,5 6,3 -7,3 
2009 -7,6 11,8 -14,3 
2010 -1 13,6 -32,4 
Notes: Growth refers to the percentage of growth of GDP in constant prices. 
Unemployment refers to percentage of unemployed among the total labour force.  
Deficit refers to the government net lending/borrowing, as a percentage of GDP. 
Source: Figures for the deficit come from the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development and for 
growth and unemployment from the International Monetary Fund. 
 
Recently enough, a new narrative has developed that enables us to identify the culprits 
behind this crisis: the Fianna Fáil government in power when the crisis unfolded, but also the 
Irish political institutions that in every possible sense failed to prevent the crisis. The narrative 
was constructed by actors outside of the political system (journalists, political scientists, 
economists, lawyers, etc.) who, with few exceptions, made the following arguments: the crisis was 
largely the result of the irresponsible behaviour of the political decision-makers, fuelled by the 
proximity of the politicians to the financial world, and by a populist and localist political culture. 
This behaviour was made possible by the politicians’ lack of either accountability or responsibility 
(Mair 2010). In turn, this lack of accountability was considered to have been caused by the Irish 
political institutions themselves. In other words, the crisis was not caused solely by politicians, it 
was caused by the behaviour that the political system entailed, implying that the only way to prevent 
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such crises from happening again was to profoundly change the Irish political institutions (for a 
summary, see Coakley 2013, 9–11).  
To give just a few examples, academics such as Kirby and Murphy (2011) consider that the 
centralised nature of the Irish state, as well as the electoral system’s promotion of localism and 
clientelism over effective policy-making, were the two key problems, and push for the advent of a 
“Second Republic”. Hardinam summarises the most widespread view by arguing that “[d]uring a 
boom, it is easy to overlook poor levels of performance. In hard times this is no longer possible. 
Good decision-making capabilities are precisely what seem to be in short supply in Irish society” 
(2009: 3).  Journalists like O’Toole (2010) argue that Irish political culture was primarily to blame, 
and criticise the weak parliament and the weak public services.  
Renwick, who analyses the development of the debate on political reform in Ireland in the 
press between 2005 and 2011, shows that sustained attention was also paid to the issue of 
political reform, especially in 2009 and in 2011, and particularly in the liberal and progressive The 
Irish Times. This reached a peak in the first trimester of 2011, with 350 articles on political 
reform (2012, 21). The topics that were highest on the agenda were the abolition of the Seanad, 
the reform of the Dáil, and the representation of women (2012, 22). Finally, the author 
demonstrates that “a populist anti-politician response to the economic crisis has dominated over 
a constructive response” (Renwick 2012, 11) in the media, meaning that most of the debate has 
centred on ways to ensure that “politicians share the public’s pain” (2012, 4). 
In other words, the feeling that institutions were at fault and needed reform was a “child of 
the crisis”. As Clodagh Harris, an academic who is heavily involved in projects which evaluate the 
quality of democracy, puts it in an interview: “the crisis that we faced was such a sharp, such a 
severe crisis that it forced all citizens, all politicians, policymakers, etc., to examine what had gone 
wrong. And there had been obviously discussions taking place around the issue ‘how come the 
political system allowed this to happen?’”.162 Yet, despite the fact that most commentators agreed 
along roughly the same lines, there was no agreement on the precise institutions that were at 
fault, and even less so on the solutions that needed to be implemented in order to improve them.  
 
                                                 
162 Interview with Clodagh Harris, Professor of political science at University College Cork, a member of 
the academic team of We the Citizens and reformcard.com, 21 May 2012, through Skype. 
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1.2. “The system is broken”: civil society mobilisation and its consequences in the 2011 
election  
In three years, the country went from boom to bust. The narrative that reproached the 
political system for this demise resulted in a proliferation of  actors promoting the “political 
reform agenda”. In turn, this civil society mobilisation led all of  the main political parties to make 
a series of  promises in their 2011 manifestos to implement institutional reforms. 
 
1.2.1. The proliferation of  actors pushing for political reform, but an ill-defined 
agenda 
At first glance, the proliferation of  actors from both civil society and the academic world 
who set out to put political reform on the agenda in one way or another in the aftermath of  the 
crisis is quite impressive. Some of  these actors are well-established think tanks and NGOs 
pushing for an expansive agenda of  political and social reforms, such as TASC (Think tank for 
Action on Social Change), the ICCL (Irish Council for Civil Liberties), Amnesty International 
Ireland and the Women’s Council of  Ireland. Some try to promote a more grass roots approach, 
based on debate, and bring together a mix of  environmentalists, trade unionists, ordinary citizens, 
and students, at events comprising around 250 people, such as Claiming Our Future or Second 
Republic (An Dara Poblach), which were both founded in 2010. Some initiatives have been 
promoted by academics, such as the creation of  the platform blog politicalreform.ie, which 
involves junior and senior political scientists in the debate on political reform, or the creation of  
the Reform Score Card to evaluate the main parties’ commitments on political reform in the 2011 
election. Some joint efforts including both academics and civil society also took place, through 
the original initiative “We the Citizens” financed by Atlantic Philanthropies. Its chairman, Fiach 
MacConghail, presented it to me in an interview
163
 as a “non-partisan, civil society project” that 
was set up to see how the process of  deliberative democracy could work in Ireland. By setting up 
a citizens’ assembly, modelled on that which existed in British Columbia for electoral reform, it 
aimed to influence the political decision-makers regarding the way political reform should be 
brought about in Ireland (Farrell, O’Malley, and Suiter 2013).
164
  
                                                 
163 Interview with Fiach MacConghail, director of the Abbey Theatre, Senator and Chairman of “We the 
Citizens”, independent, 29 May 2012, at his office in Dublin. 
164 “Behind the scenes, we were also trying to raise funds to run a citizens’ assembly, because we had been 
trying to push forward the idea that this was a useful device, but we were constantly critiqued by the 
journalists particularly, who said that the citizens’ assemblies could not have been working in Ireland, 
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Since the beginning of  this chapter, I have deliberately been talking about “political 
reform” without defining it. The truth is that, despite the multiplicity of  actors pushing in 
roughly the same direction for “political reform”, no clear definition of  what was meant by this 
term really existed. As Elaine Byrne admitted in a column for The Irish Times in 2010, “there is a 
growing consensus for fundamental political reform but this is complemented by an uncertainty 
of  how to go about it or what specifically those reforms should be.”
165
 Certain actors, mainly the 
longer-established ones such as TASC, include within their agenda of  “political reform” aspects 
ranging from dealing with social and fiscal inequality to the right to vote for prisoners, and from 
regulation of  social partnerships in Ireland to laws on state transparency, or children’s rights. 
Others go further still, pushing for the replacement of  the 1937 Constitution with a new, more 
inclusive one (Second Republic, Claiming Our Future). The academic world focused more on the 
political institutions themselves, but their lobbying tended to be limited to bringing these issues 
forward on the agenda, with no precise proposals. Some individuals have promoted precise 
proposals, although not in a sustained and coordinated manner.
166
  
These actors agreed on certain aspects: a vast majority of  them pushed for the creation 
of  some form of  citizens’ assembly, and for a deliberative and participative process of  
institutional change in general. Furthermore, almost all of  the various proposals went in the 
direction of  a more inclusive democracy, be it through a stronger parliament, a stronger civil 
society and/or a stronger local government. From the point of  view of  the politicians, Alex 
White, Labour senator, talks about a “very fuzzy agenda”, and argues: “People have got great 
ideas about the process, but not so much about the substance”.
167
 Whereas politicians were well 
aware of  this “buzz”, the ill-defined agenda of  the numerous promoters of  political reform 
basically let them open up the field to decide what they wanted, or didn’t want, to include in their 
proposals for the 2011 election.   
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
because Ireland is different”, says David Farrell, the academic conveyer of the We the Citizens initiative. 
Interview with David Farrell, op.cit.  
165 Byrne, Elaine. “To move on we must never forget”. The Irish Times, 4 April 2010.   
166 For example, in the aftermath of 2011, a group of academics pushed for measures to reinforce the Dáil, 
such as the allocation of committee chairs proportionately to the share of vote, giving the Dáil greater 
powers to control its own agenda, etc. Byrne, Elaine, Farrell, David, O’Malley, Eoin, Suiter, Jane, Wall, 
Matt. “New coalition must make political reform a priority”. The Irish Times, 3 March 2011 
167 Interview with Alex White, op. cit.  
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1.2.2. The 2011 campaign: clear momentum for institutional reform?  
In the run-up to the general election of  2011, all of  the major Irish parties adopted a 
number of  promises regarding the reform of  the Irish political institutions (Appendix 11), along 
with certain deadlines. While certain parties, particularly Fine Gael and Labour, were early 
converts to the move for political reform, during the time of  the 2011 campaign, it seemed that 
there had never before been such momentum to reform the political institutions. Moreover, 
between 2007 and 2011, the Irish citizenry’s level of  trust in the main political institutions 
(parties, parliament and government) dropped by around ten percentage points (Table 14), 
making Ireland a country with one of  the lowest levels of  political trust in all of  the EU in 2009 
(Hardiman 2010, 54).   
Table 14. Trust in political institutions in Ireland in %, 2007-2011 
  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Trust in political parties 22% 23 13 17 13 
Trust in the parliament 33 36 19 22 21 
Trust in the government 32 33 15 21 22 
% of people who declare they “tend to trust” the following institution.  
Source: Eurobarometers 68, 70, 72, 73, 76. http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb_arch_en.htm 
This drop in political support created a sense of urgency to act and propose measures. 
Whereas it was very difficult to make economic promises in a context where Ireland had been 
deprived of most of its autonomy, promises to reform the political institutions were much 
“cheaper” to make. Fine Gael and Labour started to work on the issue of institutional reforms as 
early as 2010, through consultations with academics and experts.168 In March 2010, Fine Gael 
released  an ambitious plan they called “New Politics”, in which they stated: “political failure lies 
at the heart of Ireland’s economic collapse.”169 These policy proposals were seen as a way of 
differentiating Fine Gael from such failure.170 The main measures that made up the plan included 
the abolition of the Seanad, an enhanced role for the parliament, rules to make the government 
more transparent and easier to scrutinise, and the creation of a citizens’ assembly on electoral 
reform. They also announced that they would organise a “Constitution Day”, which would be a 
super-referendum on the points requiring constitutional approval, within 12 months of assuming 
                                                 
168 Byrne, Elaine, journalist and research fellow at the University of New South Wales Sydney, co-author 
of politicalreform.ie, on the academic team of We the Citizens, 10 May 2012, at a café in Dublin. 
169 Fine Gael, “New Politics”, March 2010, republished in 2011: 
http://www.finegael2011.com/pdf/NewPolitics.pdf 
170 “It really was the political crisis that brought political reform back on the agenda and it provided a key 
component of our political campaign. (…) People were very interested in shaking up the system; it gave us 
something very different to talk about from the other political parties”. Anon., political adviser with the 
department of the Taoiseach, FG, 30 May 2011, at his office in Dublin. 
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office. This paved the way for the Labour Party to release its own plan in January 2011: “New 
Government, Better Government: changing a broken system. Labour’s 140 proposals to 
transform government, politics and the public services”. The argument was, again, to change the 
way politics is conducted in Ireland in order to prevent further economic crises from happening. 
The most emblematic measure called for the creation of a constitutional convention, one third of 
which would be made up of experts, one third of politicians and one third of citizens, to entirely 
redraft the Irish constitution by 2016, as well as a number of measures to enhance the powers of 
the Dáil, among other things. In both parties, it was possible to identify a few individuals who 
had particular inputs into the debate: Enda Kenny, the leader of Fine Gael,171 and Brendan 
Howlin of Labour.172 
Despite the fact that all parties eventually expressed strong stances in favour of 
institutional reforms, not all of them did so either early or enthusiastically. Fianna Fáil climbed on 
the bandwagon when it became obvious that political reform would occupy central stage in the 
2011 campaign. The decision to hold the election in May 2011 was delayed until the last minute, 
so that FF had only a couple of months to assemble its manifesto, whereas the opposition had 
been drafting its project for much longer. Averil Power, FF spokesperson on political reform in 
2011, confirmed to me in an interview that the process of drafting the section on political reform 
only started around January, after the replacement of the Taoiseach, Brian Cowen, with a new 
leader, Micheál Martin. Many of the ideas incorporated in the manifesto, including the separation 
of the legislature and the executive, were his. The manifesto was created behind closed doors, 
between the leader and his advisors.173 
When the time came and actual manifestos for the 2011 election were released, all of the 
main parties made a number of commitments on political reform. Some, such as Fianna Fáil and 
Sinn Féin, called for the replacement of the electoral system with a mixed-member electoral 
system. All of them agreed on the abolition of the Seanad, and the establishment of an 
independent electoral commission (Appendix 11). All of the manifestos contained several pages 
on political reform, and all, including that of Fianna Fáil, the party that had been in power for the 
previous 12 years, directly attributed the economic crisis to the failure of the institutions: “Of the 
many major failings in Ireland’s political culture the failure of our parliamentary system to 
                                                 
171 Interview with a political adviser, op. cit. 
172 Interview with Alex White, op. cit. 
173 Interview with Averil Power, senator since 2011, ex-political advisor of Mary Hanafin in the 
Department of Tourism, Family affairs and Education, ex-spokesperson on political reform in the 2011 
election, FF, 29 May 2012, Leinster House, Dublin. 
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consider structural problems until it was too late is the most significant. The dominance of short-
term considerations in public debate is obvious.”174  
Much more could be said on the 2011 election, which was one of the most volatile in the 
history of Western Europe (29.6% of total volatility, Mair 2011b). Yet, what happened was 
mostly a redistribution of the cards between the three main players, disguising some degree of the 
party system’s stability (Hutcheson 2011). For the first time in history, FG became the leading 
party with 36% of the votes and 45.8% of the seats; Labour received the second most, with 
almost 20% of the votes and 22% of the seats. Fianna Fáil lost almost 25 percentage points in 
votes, and lost three-quarters of its previous number of seats. Sinn Féin, finally, tripled its 
number of seats. The abovementioned continuity lay in the identity of the government coalition 
formed after the election, a Fine Gael-Labour coalition that the country had experienced in the 
past (Little 2011). To relate the Irish situation to the findings of the first part, one could say that 
there was an unprecedented conjunction of events which were favourable to the adoption of 
institutional reforms:175 the first full political alternation in 14 years, and a level of political 
volatility never previous achieved in the Republic of Ireland. No party had ever had such 
momentum to apply its political programme, and promoters of institutional reforms had great 
confidence in the new coalition's ability to bring forward change, thanks to its comfortable 
majority and the near-unanimity of the main parties on the political reform agenda.   
 
2. The different paths of Irish institutional reforms 
 
As the first part showed, the momentum to reform the institutions in 2011 resulted from the 
political system’s designation as the culprit in the economic crisis; the mobilisation of a wide 
variety of actors with an imprecise agenda in favour of “political reform”; and from the promises 
made by all of the main actors present in the parliament to adopt far-ranging institutional 
reforms. Yet, not all of the reforms which were placed on the agenda in 2011 have experienced 
the same fate: some have been successfully adopted, whereas others have either failed or have 
been lost in the twists and turns of the decision process. I will focus firstly on the definition of 
the bundle of reforms, and secondly on its adoption. The compromises reached by the two 
coalition partners, Fine Gael and Labour, resulted in the formulation of a scattered bundle of 
reforms, dividing the topic of political reforms into multiple reform issues, departments and 
                                                 
174 Fianna Fáil manifesto for the general election of 2011, “Real Plan, Better Future”, p.32. 
http://election.fiannafail.ie/pages/read-the-plan 
175 Cf. supra.  
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processes. Ultimately, the final outcome of the reforms has depended on the conjunction 
between the nature of the reform and the process chosen to conduct it. The final section of the 
chapter will show how the Irish case provides evidence about three configurations of reform.  
2.1. From the compromises of the Programme for Government to a scattered bundle  
The Programme for Government adopted by the Fine Gael-Labour coalition after the 
election of 2011 made a number of commitments regarding institutional reforms, the most 
substantial of these being the establishment of a constitutional convention and the organisation 
of a referendum on the abolition of the Seanad, as well as a number of consensual provisions on 
various elements of the political system. The process of reform was organised by splitting the 
reform agenda into no less than three departments and a very large number of laws and 
proposals. 
 
2.1.1. The content of  the Programme for government 
As is the tradition in Ireland, the Programme for government (Pfg), underlining the policy 
priorities of  the coalition entering power after the general election, was written quickly after the 
general election, with negotiating teams composed of  frontbench members from both parties. 
One of  the advisers of  the Fine Gael team explains that the most contentious point did not 
relate to political reform, and that as a consequence, this section was written hastily, leaving the 
more contentious aspect for later stages: the agenda of  the constitutional convention.
176
 While 
the Labour manifesto pushed for a complete rewriting of  the constitution, Fine Gael was in 
favour of  a less ambitious and more focused plan of  reforms, with the abolition of  the Seanad at 
the forefront. The section on political reform also included discussions on constitutional 
amendments and transparency measures that had no direct link with the organisation of  the 
political institutions.  
In the end, regarding the reform of  political institutions, both parties agreed on two 
priorities: to hold a referendum on the powers of  investigation of  the parliamentary committees, 
and another on the abolition of  the Seanad, proposals that were perceived as benefitting from 
widespread assent. The Pfg also promised the creation of  a constitutional convention that would 
“consider comprehensive constitutional reform”,
177
 and include a variety of  topics, some 
regarding the political institutions, some not: review of  the Dáil electoral system, reduction of  
                                                 
176 Interview with a political adviser, op. cit. 
177 Programme for government, p. 17., accessible from the website of the Department of the Taoiseach: 
http://www.taoiseach.gov.ie/eng/Publications/Publications_Archive/Publications_2011/Programme_fo
r_Government_2011.pdf 
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the presidential term, reduction of  the voting age, but also same-sex marriage or removal of  
blasphemy from the constitution. The convention was supposed to report within 12 months, 
while the document was mute on its composition.  
The Pfg also promised a parliamentary reform to give constitutional standing to major 
committees and to reduce the number of  committees, to give greater power to the speaker, 
extend the parliamentary question system to agencies founded by the state, increase time for oral 
questions, and in general, to reinforce the powers of  the parliament to hold the government and 
agencies accountable. This focus on accountability went alongside a number of  promises to 
improve transparency, such as the creation of  a register of  lobbyists, the reinforcement of  the 
Freedom of  Information Act, stricter legislation on donations to parties and candidates, and 
election spending, but also regulations to promote gender equality, by linking public funding to 
the number of  female candidates standing for elections. The Pfg also focuses on “showing 
leadership” through symbolic measures such as reducing the number of  TDs (with no indication 
regarding the number), and a “code of  good practice of  the use of  the government jet” (sic).  
Other issues include the reinforcement of  the power of  the Dáil vis-à-vis the executive. A 
long list of  proposals were made, including ones to: tackle the over-use of  guillotine motions,
178
 
increase the number of  Dáil sitting days, devote one day a week to private members’ bills, and 
establish a petition system in the Dáil to be managed by a new committee. Finally, on the topic of  
local government reform, the Programme for government was pretty much a simple copy-and-
pasting of  measures contained in both parties’ manifestos,
179
 including making  property-related 
revenues part of  the income stream of  local governments (FG), giving powers to councillors to 
seek reports from public services providers in their areas (Labour), and a number of  promises on 
possible services and competences that could be performed by local authorities: fire services, 
traffic management, economic development, etc.  
A number of  aspects on how and by whom the reforms should be carried out remain ill-
defined in the document. Overall, the Programme for government makes a clear commitment on 
only one major measure: the abolition of  the Seanad, without any further justifications. . The 
“comprehensive constitutional reform” is outsourced to a constitutional convention, which could 
in no way tackle parliamentary reform or the debate on the existence of  the Seanad. Regarding 
the Dáil, the Pfg commits to a mix of  symbolic and small measures to modify the organisation of  
parliamentary work. On local government, the document remains quite vague, and makes no 
                                                 
178 A guillotine motion (formally called “allocation of time motion”) is a procedural device used to speed 
up the passage of contentious legislation, strictly limiting the time devoted to the debate of a given clause, 
after which point a vote is taken. 
179 Cf. appendix 11.  
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major commitment. Overall, the programme for government constitutes a substantial re-
dimensioning of  the agenda on political reform in comparison with the promises contained in 
the 2011 manifestos.  
 
2.1.2. A scattered bundle of  reforms 
Many issues regarding institutional reforms have been placed on the agenda concomitantly in 
the manifestos of political parties, and afterwards in the Pfg. What choice did the governing 
coalition make to implement this agenda? Did they choose a big “package” of reforms, or did 
they seek to separate each dimension from the others? In the first chapter, bundles of reforms in 
the context of a process-tracing analysis were defined as following, either as a package deal or as a 
sequence:  
1- One reform, or attempt to reform, modifying several dimensions of the institutional 
architecture at the same time; 
2- Two or more reforms, or attempts to reform, dealing with several dimensions of the 
institutional architecture, that were initiated, discussed and/or adopted, concomitantly or 
otherwise, and explicitly linked by the reform initiators during the process. 
In the case of Ireland, we are clearly dealing with the second form of bundles: a series of 
institutional reforms touching upon several aspects of the institutional architecture that were 
explicitly linked by the initiators of reform (Fine Gael and Labour), both in their manifestos and 
in the Programme for government, but were discussed and adopted (when applicable) at different 
times. This is a process that I call the “scattered bundle”. The important aspect to keep in mind is 
that the choice to proceed by separating the different reforms, both in time and between 
ministers, was a deliberate strategy.  
The most emblematic aspects of the agenda of institutional reform, namely Seanad abolition 
and the organisation of the constitutional convention, are dealt with by the Department of the 
Taoiseach (Table 15), and are thus under the close supervision of Enda Kenny. Paul Kehoe, 
Minister of State at the Department of the Taoiseach, is in charge of aspects regarding the 
functioning of the parliament and the reform of the standing orders, so that all of the elements 
relating to the powers of the Oireachtas are controlled by the same Department. The Minister for 
Environment, Community and Local Government (Phil Hogan) is, as is traditionally the case in 
Ireland, in charge of all technical and financial aspects of the electoral system, as well as of local 
government reform. Finally, the Labour Party only has a handle on aspects of the agenda of 
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political reform that do not directly relate to the political institutions. Instead, Brendan Howlin, 
Minister for Public Expenditure and Reform, is charged with implementing all of the 
commitments in relation to transparency, greater openness of the public sector, and public access 
to information coming from the ministers and public agencies (through Freedom of 
Information).  
Table 15. Construction of the bundle of reforms in Ireland since 2011 
Dimensions 
of reform 
Minister/department 
in charge Laws, referendums 
Aspects still on the 
agenda 
Transparency, 
Public sector 
reform 
Brendan Howlin, 
Minister for Public 
Expenditure and 
Reform (Lab) 
Referendum on the powers of enquiry of the 
Oireachtas (rejected Oct. 2011) 
Referendum on judges pay (adopted Oct. 
2011) 
Legislation on lobbying, 
corruption, whistleblowing,  
Expansion of Freedom of 
Information  Act (2012-
2013) 
Electoral 
regulation 
and local 
government 
reform 
Phil Hogan, Minister 
for the Environment, 
Community and Local 
Government (FG) 
Electoral (Amendment) Act 2011 on political 
expenses,  
Electoral (Political Funding) (Amendment) 
Act 2012 on political donations, party 
expenditure and gender balance 
Electoral (Amendment) (Dáil constituencies) 
Act 2013, reducing by 8 the number of TDs 
Local Government Reform 
(government bill published 
in Oct. 2013) 
Reform of 
the Dáil 
Paul Kehoe, Chief 
Whip and Minister of 
State for the Taoiseach 
(FG) 
Reform of the Dáil standing orders, 2011 Subsequent reforms of the 
Dáil standing orders 
Seanad 
abolition, 
Constitutional 
Convention 
Department of the 
Taoiseach 
Motion on the concrete organisation of the 
constitutional convention (July 2012) 
Referendum on Seanad abolition (rejected 
Oct. 2013) 
Launch of the constitutional convention 
(established Dec. 2012) 
Concrete tackling of the 
proposals made by the 
constitutional convention: 
constitution day and 
referendum on voting age 
(2015) 
Three remarks come to mind when analysing the composition of the bundle of reforms. 
First, the government chose not to give responsibility for the reform agenda to a single individual 
or ministerial department, but rather to dispatch different elements of the agenda to various 
ministers and departments. This, is turn, implies multiple sequences of discussion about reform, 
multiple pieces of legislation, and the splitting of the reform agenda into multiple debates, rather 
than a single, unique debate. Secondly, the Department of the Taoiseach is in charge of the two 
most important issues, while the aspects of reform that appeared as more peripheral in the 
Programme for Government are handled by different ministers. Thirdly, there is evidence that 
not all of the reforms that have been completed to this date have been adopted, and that many 
are still under way. For example, two referendums have been rejected, on the Seanad and on the 
181 
The Various Fortunes of Institutional Reforms in Ireland Since 2011 
powers of enquiry of the parliament, whereas three pieces of legislation have been adopted 
concerning electoral regulation in Ireland. Finally, thus far, no concrete step has followed the 
launch of the constitutional convention and its proposals.  
 
2.2. The different outcomes of a scattered bundle of reforms: adoption, non-adoption, 
and kicking to touch 
It is actually possible to separate the outcomes of  the political reform agenda into three 
reform configurations. In the remainder of  the chapter, I will not focus on all of  the reforms, but 
only on those that most clearly illustrate the links between the nature of  the reforms, the process 
of  reform, and their final outcomes. Firstly, a number of  consensual reforms led by the 
parliamentary majority, but without the referendum requirement, have been successfully adopted 
in the parliament. Secondly, two major reforms have failed at referendum - the expansion of  the 
powers of  enquiry of  the parliament and the abolition of  the Seanad- despite the fact that these 
reforms were highly consensual in 2011. These reforms were conducted by the parliamentary 
majority, and their non-adoption illustrates the mechanisms of  framing and re-framing that take 
place during processes of  institutional reforms, especially those that involve direct public 
consultation. Finally, the most divisive institutional reforms that made it onto the agenda in 2011 
were delegated to the Irish constitutional convention. This was the consequence of  a will on the 
part of  the government to kick to touch on these issues, with no real will to implement major 
achievements on political reforms, which is the most contentious issue for public opinion and/or 
the political actors.  
 
2.2.1. The successful adoption of  consensual and non-constitutionalised 
institutional reforms 
Many of  the reforms on the agenda in 2011 concerned matters that did not require a 
referendum. Indeed, all of  the provisions within the Irish political system that are not specifically 
regulated by the constitution can be modified through a traditional legislative process, i.e. by 
simple majority. These aspects do not relate to the core of  the Irish institutional organisation, but 
rather, to more peripheral and concrete aspects of  the institutional system. The government has 
conducted a number of  reforms through a majoritarian process, thereby controlling the process 
of  reform from the elaboration phase through to final adoption.  
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As soon as the new coalition came into office in 2011, a few symbolic measures were adopted, 
such as a 6.6% reduction in the salaries of  the Taoiseach, the Tánaiste, and the ministers.
180
 A 
reform of  the Dáil standing orders was also adopted in July 2011.
181
 Among other provisions, 
this reform reduced the number of  committees from 25 to 16, gave extra powers to the Ceann 
Comhairle (Speaker) to command ministers to answer parliamentary questions, significantly 
increased the number of  Dáil sitting days, allocated one day a week for private members’ business 
and the option to raise “topical issues”.
182
 Note that some of  Fine Gael’s important symbolic 
commitments, such as the election by secret ballot of  the Speaker, or of  the Programme for 
government, or the rules to limit the use of  guillotine motions, have not been adopted. In 
September 2013, the government published additional proposals for Dáil reform, including the 
extension of  the use of  pre-legislative scrutiny, and longer sitting hours in the parliament.
183
 
These reforms, as reforms yet to come still could, give some limited extra powers to the Dáil vis-
à-vis the government. Yet it certainly had no significant effect on the balance of  powers between 
the two institutions. Therefore, it is clear that when the government controls the process of  
institutional reform, it has the capacity to define the alternatives to reform. Weakening the 
government vis-à-vis the Oireachtas was not one of  the chosen alternatives, despite the fierce 
criticism over the government’s lack of  accountability and its management of  the economic crisis 
(Hardiman 2010, 2011).  
The Electoral (Amendment) Act of  2011 revised the terms of  the Constituency 
Commission to prepare for the reduction in the number of  TDs and reduced the spending limits 
and the level of  recoupable election expenses for presidential elections.
184
 The reduction of  the 
number of  TDs, in particular, was surveyed as being by far the most popular political reform 
among the Irish public, with 78% of  respondents agreeing that “the number of  TDs should be 
significantly reduced” in 2011.
185
 In 2012, new legislation introduced much tougher regulation on 
corporate donations to political parties through the creation of  a registry of  donors, obliging 
parties to disclose their accounts to the Standards in Public Office Commission, a reduction of  
                                                 
180 Cf. http://www.merrionstreet.ie/index.php/2011/03/government-cuts-ministers-pay 
181 These modifications were adopted on 25 July 2011. Cf. “modifications and amendments in effect to the 
standing orders relative to public business (2011 edition)” Dublin: Stationery Office, 2011.  
182 Programme for Government – Progress Report March 2012, accessible from the Department of the 
Taoiseach: 
http://www.taoiseach.gov.ie/eng/Publications/Publications_Archive/Publications_2011/Programme_fo
r_Government_2011.pdf 
183 http://www.merrionstreet.ie/index.php/2013/09/government-publishes-programme-of-dail-reform-
2/?cat=3 
184 Electoral (Amendment) Act 2011. Dublin: Stationery Office. 
185 This survey was conducted by the Irish National Election Study in 2011. For the detailed results, cf. 
Coakley 2013, 13. 
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the maximum acceptable donations to political parties from both companies and individuals, as 
well as a reduction of  the threshold below which donations must be reported. Another important 
provision states that, if  women do not account for at least 30% of  candidates fielded by parties 
in the next general election, and 40% in the general election after that, the amount of  public 
funding received by the parties will be reduced by 50%.
186
 The success of  this provision in 
promoting better representation of  women is not foreign with the long-term efforts within Irish 
civil society which were present long before the economic crisis, with organisations such as the 
5050 Group promoting gender equality in the Dáil by 2020, or the National Women’s Council of  
Ireland. The idea benefited from relative consensus among the Irish public, with 46% agreeing in 
2011 that “parties should be forced to nominate more women as candidates” (22% disagreeing, 
and 30% indifferent).
187
 The success of  this measure illustrates how the crisis constituted a 
decisive “tipping point” (Buckley, Galligan, and McGing 2013, 1) for a reform that already 
benefitted from extensive political debate and assent: Fianna Fáil, Fine Gael and the Labour Party 
had all promised the introduction of  gender quotas in their 2011 manifestos.
188
  
Other laws are under way, particularly on the peripheral aspects of  political reform (not 
linked with the political institutions), regarding transparency and protection of  whistle-blowers 
(Protected Disclosures in the Public Interest Bill, published in July 2013),
189
 while the first draft 
of  the regulation on lobbying was published in April 2013.
190
 The Government published the 
Freedom of  Information Bill in September 2013.
191
 Legislation was adopted in April 2013 to 
reduce the number of  TDs from 166 to 158, which is significantly less than Fine Gael’s initial 
promise to reduce the number of  TDs by 20.
192
  
In 2011, 61% of  Irish people agreed with the idea that “local government should be given 
power to raise and to manage their own finances”.
193
 Plans for local government reform were 
announced in the autumn of  2012 (Department of  the Environment, Community and Local 
Government 2012). They include in particular the refocusing of  local government efforts 
                                                 
186 Electoral (Amendment) (Political Funding) Act, 2012. Dublin: Stationery Office.   
187 This figure, again, come from the Irish National Election Study of 2011 
188 Cf. appendix 11. 
189 http://per.gov.ie/2013/07/03/publication-of-the-protected-disclosures-bill-2013/ 
190 http://per.gov.ie/regulation-of-lobbyists/ 
191 http://www.oireachtas.ie/viewdoc.asp?fn=/documents/bills28/bills/2013/8913/b8913d-memo.pdf 
The government plans have already attracted fierce criticism, with some specialists considering that its use 
will be restricted to only the most affluent individuals. Cf. for example the blog entry by Jennifer 
Kavanagh, “Free for those that can afford it, very expensive for those that can’t”, on 12 November 2013: 
http://politicalreform.ie/2013/11/12/free-to-those-that-can-afford-it-very-expensive-to-those-that-cant-
creating-the-luxury-of-freedom-of-information/ 
192 Electoral (Amendment) (Dáil Constituencies) Act 2013. Dublin, Stationery Office. 
193 Survey of the Irish National Election Study of 2011. 
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towards economic, social and community development, the delivery of  certain public services 
through locally based bodies rather than central agencies, a significant reduction (by 500) in the 
number of  councillors, the replacement of  114 local authorities with 31 integrated authorities 
organised on the basis of  municipal districts, the replacement of  the eight regional authorities 
with three regional assemblies, and the introduction of  new income streams for local authorities 
through the institution of  a new property tax.  
The adoption of  these consensual reforms has not posed major problems for the 
government, as the coalition in power benefits from a very comfortable parliamentary majority. 
However, there is evidence to suggest that the opposition parties have opposed certain measures, 
despite being in favour of  the same measures in their manifestos. For example, during the debate 
on gender quotas and political funding in 2012, Fianna Fáil voted against the law, despite its 
support for gender quotas, on the grounds that the government’s corporate donation provisions 
did not go far enough.
194
 The position of  the opposition parties on consensual institutional 
reforms is largely driven by credit-claiming logic. When the main opposition leaders believe that 
they cannot benefit from a reform because the public would not see them as leading instigators 
of  the measure, they tend to switch positions and oppose the reform in order to turn it into a 
criticism of  the government, and into a divisive measure. In this case, the main opposition party, 
Fianna Fáil, has defended a maximalist vision of  change to justify its opposition to certain 
important provisions. This, of  course, contrasts sharply with their previous lack of  involvement 
in the reform agenda when they held power. This strategy, however, cannot change the outcome 
of  a given reform when the government rules with a firm hand in the parliament. The situation, 
however, is very different in the context of  a referendum campaign, where the outcome depends 
entirely on the citizens.   
 
2.2.2. From consensual to divisive issues: the referendums on powers of  enquiry 
and Seanad abolition 
The failures at referendum of  the reforms to expand the powers of  enquiry of  the 
Oireachtas and to abolish the second chamber (Seanad), at first glance, seem very puzzling. 
                                                 
194 During an interview with the FF Senator Averil Power, she justified the position of her party as such: 
“Our party voted against in the Dáil because it was a legislation that dealt with two or three different 
things and the party was unhappy with the changes made to corporate donations funding. We had 
proposed that there should be a total ban on corporate donations, but in the end it was just reduced. And 
so the parliamentary party took the decision to vote against the bill on this basis (…). But we spoke in 
favour of quotas. (…) And we made proposals when it was in parliament to strengthen the legislation and 
bring in quotas for local elections and for the Seanad as well.” Interview with Averil Power, op. cit.  
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Indeed, both of  these political reforms benefited from widespread assent when they were put on 
the agenda, and most observers and polls foresaw an easy adoption by referendum. Yet, in both 
cases, the final outcome was the same: the rejection of  the reform by a small, but decisive, margin 
of  voters. These two referendum campaigns illustrate well how certain institutional reforms are 
being reframed as the process goes on, particularly when the government seeks to impose this 
measure without involving other political actors or civil society.  
 
a) The referendum on the powers of  enquiry: the revenge of  the lawyers 
The governing coalition took rapid action concerning the powers of  enquiry of  the 
Oireachtas, which was one of  the recommendations of  the Joint Committee on the Constitution 
(2011). This referendum sought to overturn a 2000 High Court judgment, referred to as the 
“Abbeylara judgment”, which considered that the Oireachtas had no inherent powers of  enquiry 
under the Constitution.
195 The proposed amendment would have given explicit power to the 
Houses of  the Oireachtas to conduct enquiries into matters of  “general public importance”, and 
to make findings in respect of  the conduct of  individuals. Sub-section 4 of  the proposal stated 
that “it shall be for the House (…) to determine the appropriate balance between the rights of  
persons and the public interest for the purposes of  ensuring an effective inquiry”. The 
consequences of  this point were relatively unclear; this caused major concern among law 
specialists in Ireland. Most lawyers interpreted it as a means of  making it very difficult for an 
individual before such an enquiry to defend his/her rights in court if  he/she felt wronged.
196
 
This last point was not debated thoroughly in parliament, and was put forward by Alan Shatter 
(FG Minister for Justice), and Brendan Howlin (Labour Minister for Public Expenditure and 
Reform). The elaboration of  the proposal was, undoubtedly, conducted solely by the  
government, with a very short parliamentary debate (only two hours for the second reading!). 
                                                 
195 The Abbeylara judgment refers to the shooting of John Carty, who suffered from bipolar disorder, by 
the Gardaí in 2000. As a consequence, an Oireachtas subcommittee tried to enquire into the 
circumstances of the shooting, before the High Court judged that the Oireachtas had no inherent powers 
to make enquiries, and more crucially, to establish findings of facts, or conclusions as to the personal 
culpability of individuals. Cf. O’Connell, Donncha. “Proposed inquiry amendment needs careful scrutiny”. 
The Irish Times, 16 September 2011. Daly, Eoin. “Oireachtas inquiries referendum needs more debate”. The 
Irish Times, 17 September 2011.  
196 This interpretation was confirmed to me by Alex White, a lawyer and Labour senator.  
Interview with Alex White, op. cit.. Brendan Howlin and Alan Shatter, the ministers in charge, were 
actually part of the sub-committee which was forced to halt its enquiry after the Abbeylara judgment, 
which had a clear and direct influence on the wording of the amendment.  
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Still, the main opposition party, Fianna Fáil, voted in favour of  this bill.
197
 Therefore, all main 
Irish political parties were in favour of  this measure.  
What proved decisive in explaining the “no” vote was the mobilisation of  both civil 
society and law specialists. Eight former holders of  the Office of  the Attorney General, the legal 
adviser to the government and the chief  law officer of  the state, spoke out against the 
constitutional amendment.
198
 Many constitutional lawyers also criticised this proposed 
amendment because of  the lack of  clarity of  its last sub-section. Eoin Daly, for example, stated at 
the time that, “[p]oliticians are not to be trusted in deciding the appropriate balance when it 
comes to the good name of  citizens. Their need for attention and for public approval 
undermines their capacity to act with necessary detachment when performing a quasi-judicial role 
as investigators.”
199
 
One month before the vote, opinion polls showed extensive support for the proposed 
measure (between 74% and 81%, Marsh, Suiter, and Reidy 2012, 9). The referendum was held on 
the same day as the presidential election, on 27 October 2011, and was rejected, with 53% of  
voters opposed and 47% in favour, and a turnout of  56%. This came as a clear blow for the 
government, all the more so because opinion polls showed that 74% of  those who voted in the 
referendum were actually in favour, as well as 58% of  the voters who voted “no” (Marsh, Suiter, 
and Reidy 2012, 11)!
200
 Experts gave three primary reasons to explain why the referendum was 
not adopted: the sense among voters that the amendment would give too much power to 
politicians, the lack of  knowledge on the topic (with a large number of  voters unable to recall the 
“yes” and “no” arguments), and the tendency to trust the experts calling for a “no” vote, such as 
Attorney Generals or legal specialists, more than politicians (Marsh, Suiter, and Reidy 2012).  
The outcome of  this referendum shows how an apparently consensual issue may be 
successfully reframed into a divisive one by reform opponents – in this case, the former Attorney 
Generals in particular. Several politicians also consider, in retrospect, that this referendum served 
as a reminder of  just how distrustful Irish voters were of  any measure to reinforce the power of  
politicians in the context of  the crisis.
201
 One can also interpret this referendum in light of  the 
fact that the leading coalition had underestimated the costs of  political reform. It had been 
                                                 
197 Whelan, Noel. “Coalition a victim of its own haste on referendum”. The Irish Times, 5 November 2011. 
198 Brennan, Michal, McDonald, Dearbhail. “Top legal experts call for No vote in new poll”. The Irish 
Independent, 24 October 2011. 
199 Daly, Eoin. “Oireachtas inquiries referendum needs more debate”. The Irish Times, 17 September 2011. 
200 http://per.gov.ie/wp-content/uploads/OIReferendum-Report-Final-2003-corrected.pdf 
The report draws on quantitative data provided by the poll company Red C. 
201 Interview with Alex White, op. cit.  
Interview with Eoghan Murphy, Teachta Dála (TD) for Dublin South-East since 2011, ex-Dublin city 
councillor from 2009 to 2011, FG, 24 May 2012, Leinster House, Dublin.  
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perceived as an “easy” and uncontroversial topic in the election, whereas the referendum showed 
that the actual adoption of  precise measures involved a great deal of  debate, effort, and 
coordination to avoid the possibility of  the opposition (here, outside of  the parliament) re-
framing the referendum, and even changing its outcome. The referendum on the abolition of  the 
Seanad provides an even better illustration of  these re-framing dynamics.  
 
b) The referendum on the abolition of  the Seanad: punishing the government 
The proposal to abolish the Seanad was one of the most highly visible proposals 
contained in the Programme for Government, and was present in the 2011 manifestos of all of 
the four main political parties. As was made clear in the first part of the chapter, the 
overwhelming focus on political reform in the 2011 election was the result of the emergence of a 
narrative linking the crisis with the failures of the political system. In this context, the Irish upper 
house served as a cheap expiatory victim. The Seanad, its functioning, and the lack of added value 
of an upper house in its existing form have been criticised for decades, but most of the debates 
concluded by calling for profound reform of the Seanad.  
The decision to abolish the Seanad if Fine Gael returned to power was made unilaterally 
by Enda Kenny and his advisors, without the consultation of the parliamentary party, and was 
announced by Kenny himself in October 2009 on the occasion of the Fine Gael presidential 
dinner. The proposal caught everyone by surprise, including (of course!) Fine Gael senators. It 
was soon directly or indirectly endorsed by politicians outside of the Fine Gael party, such as 
Noel Dempsey (FF), who declared that he was “not sure” that the Seanad still had a role, and Pat 
Rabbitte (Labour), who said he saw “merit” in Kenny’s proposition.202 This position was 
gradually endorsed by all of the major political parties, with a strong and explicit link drawn 
between the economic crisis, the need to reform the institutions, and the call to abolish the 
Seanad. When I asked one political adviser why Fine Gael chose the abolition of the Seanad as its 
“showcase” political reform, his answer was clearly directed towards political communication, 
rather than towards any grand, visionary plan for the way Irish political institutions should look:  
“Easy communication. (…) I think that was just a simple idea that could be easily 
communicated, whereas a lot of the other reforms, or issues about electoral reform, 
constituencies, lists, the public would find it difficult to understand without knowing how 
the system works an awful lot. It would have been harder to communicate on those issues 
than say, simple message of Seanad abolition, the reform agenda of the Seanad has not 
worked out, and therefore we put this out there”.
203 
                                                 
202 McGee, Harry. “Dempsey 'not sure' if Seanad has role”. The Irish Times, 19 October 2009. 
203 Interview with a political adviser, op. cit. 
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In other words, the idea to abolish the Seanad was not without populist overtones, but it was a 
consensual idea that seemed to be shared by a majority of politicians and of the people when it 
was first put on the agenda.204 Kenny, from the beginning, expressed the will to leave his mark on 
this reform. Right after his proposal, he declared, “I’ve taken a leader’s initiative on this and that’s 
what leaders are for”, on RTÉ’s Morning Ireland radio programme.205 Several of the experts and 
politicians I interviewed also emphasised the fact that, since political support had never been so 
low in Ireland as it was in 2009, the idea to get rid of politicians that cost money was very 
appealing. For example, Jimmy Devins explains: “There was a general feeling among the 
population that politicians are bad, they’ve got us into this crisis, if some of them are not going to 
have a nice safe job then great! Let’s get rid of them”.206  
In reality, soon after the election it became obvious that the abolition of the Second 
Chamber was an extremely complex legal matter: the Seanad is mentioned 67 times in the Irish 
constitution, in no less than 16 articles, which implies that its abolition would require the 
rewording of substantial sections of the constitution. Consequently, the date for the organisation 
of the Seanad referendum was delayed until October 2013. Moreover, and contrary to some of 
the marginal reforms discussed previously, the abolition of the Seanad would leave clear winners 
and losers in every single party in the parliament, the losers, of course, being the senators 
themselves. The rebellion against Seanad abolition started with the adoption of a non-binding 
motion by the opposition in June 2012, which proposed to include Seanad reform in the topics 
dealt with by the constitutional convention, with the support of three Labour senators,207 and the 
promotion by various influential former politicians of reform rather than abolition.208  
 The bill to abolish the Seanad was finally adopted in July 2013, with opposition from 
Fianna Fáil, and the referendum date was set for October 2013.209 According to Coakley,  
“it would be hard to argue that any ‘debate’ on the future of the Seanad took place between 
the time its abolition jumped onto the political agenda and the introduction of the abolition 
                                                 
204 In 2011, 58% of the people surveyed agreed with the proposition “the Seanad should be abolished’, 
22% neither disagreed nor agreed, and 20% only disagreed. The survey had been conducted by the Irish 
National Election Study of 2011. 
205 Collins, Stephen. “Bruton backs Kenny on abolition”. The Irish Times, 20 October 2009. 
206 Interview with Jimmy Devins, op. cit. 
207 Collins, Stephen. “Coalition defeated in Seanad as Labour Trio breaks ranks”. The Irish Times, 21 June 
2012. 
208 Collins, Stephen. “Six eminent former members start campaign to save Seanad”. The Irish Times, 23 July 
2012. These were TK Whitaker (ex-civil servant, minister, Seanad leader, and chair of the Constitutional 
Review Group), Mary O’Rourke (ex-FF minister and chair of the last report on the Seanad, Bríd Rodgers 
(former Northern Ireland ombudsman), Maurice Hayes (ex-independent politician), John A Murphy 
(historian)and Mary Henry (former Trinity College senator). 
209 Thirty-second Amendment of the Constitution (Abolition of Seanad Éireann) Bill 2013. Dublin: Stationery Office. 
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bill in the Dáil. Up to that point, no considered case for abolishing the Seanad was made, nor 
were the implications of abolition assessed in any degree of detail.” (2013, 131) 
During the official campaign, the reform was opposed by the main opposition party, Fianna 
Fáil,210 by some ex-Fine Gael211 and Labour politicians,212 by the Green Party,213 as well as by 
influential civil society advocates.214 For example, the Seanad Reform Group, comprised of sitting 
senators and former politicians, welcomed academics and experts who supported Seanad reform 
(see, for example, Quinn et al. 2012). The “yes” side, on the other hand, was supported by the 
government coalition, but also by Sinn Féin.215 The coalition against the reform attempted, and 
succeeded in de-legitimising the reform by re-framing it as a divisive issue, denouncing as cynical 
the motives of Enda Kenny, who had campaigned on the basis that voters should get rid of 
senators costing €20 million a year.216 David Farrell considers that “the posters were a 
disgrace”.217 Indeed, the main – if not the only – argument put forward by the Fine Gael party 
was the “savings” argument. The most striking element, in reviewing the press coverage, the 
debates on the abolition of the Seanad, and the interview notes is the almost complete failure on 
the part of the abolitionists to frame the debate along the lines of “do we need a second chamber 
and how should the parliament be organised vis-à-vis the government?”. Instead, the 
superficiality of most of the arguments pushing for Seanad abolition is abundantly clear: saving 
money, and getting rid of politicians. The opponents, on the other hand, all argued that the 
Seanad should be reformed, rather than abolished; virtually no one defended the Seanad in its 
existing state. Moreover, despite the fact that Kenny tried to focus the campaign purely on 
Seanad abolition – and therefore on a simple and unidimensional question – the contenders 
placed the question of the Seanad within a wider frame, insisting on democratic accountability 
and linking the issue with Dáil reform.218 Fine Gael tried to provide plans for Dáil reform 
                                                 
210 Martin, Michéal. “A no vote would signal that people want real reform”. The Irish Times, 24 September 
2013. 
211 Carroll, Steven. “Creighton despairs at the public’s desire for fewer politicians”. The Irish Times, 1 
October 2013. Lucinda Creighton and six other TDs who were expelled from the Fine Gael party because 
of their stance against the law on abortion adopted in 2013 have created the Reform Alliance.   
212 O’Regan, Michael. “Campaign trail attracts some strange political bedfellows on No side”. The Irish 
Times, 12 September 2013.  
213 Brennan, Michael. “Green party warns abolishing Seanad would concentrate power in smaller political 
circle”. Irish Independent, 5 September 2013.  
214 Cf. for example O’Toole, Fintan. “Say No to coalition’s reform charade”. The Irish Times, 1 October 
2013. 
215 Adams, Gerry. “Seanad must be abolished to create better democracy”. The Irish Times, 30 September 
2013. 
216 Cf. appendix 12.  
217 Farrell, David, conversation via Skype on 8 November 2013. 
218 This is, for example, the argument of influential TV journalist Vincent Browne. Browne, Vincent. 
“Cynical Seanad abolition stunt must not be rewarded”. The Irish Times, 17 July 2013. 
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concomitantly with the campaign for Seanad abolition.219 However, the negative campaigning 
over the Seanad issue led many of the undecided voters and experts220 to choose the “no” side in 
the referendum. In the end, against all odds, and despite the polls which consistently predicted 
the abolition of the Seanad by a comfortable margin,221 Kenny lost the referendum, with 51.7% 
of the electoral turnout voting against abolition, with a stronger “no” vote in Dublin and other 
urban areas.222 The turnout was amongst the lowest ever registered for a referendum in Ireland, 
with only 39.2% of voters actually going to the polls. The future moves are now very uncertain. 
Kenny spoke immediately after the vote about implementing the 1979 constitutional amendment 
to expand the composition of the University Panels to all graduates “as a first step”,223 although 
according to David Farrell, real Seanad reform is “a dead story”.224 Therefore, the result of the 
vote can be thought of as a mix of sanction against the government and Kenny’s cynical motives 
behind Seanad abolition, of the lack of mobilisation, of the consequences of the poor wording of 
the referendum,225 but also of the successful re-framing of the abolition of the Seanad as a 
divisive issue.  
 There are clear commonalities between the lost referendum on powers of enquiry and 
that on Seanad abolition. First of all, the issues benefited from a very wide assent of the citizens 
and major political parties in 2011. Secondly, the parliamentary majority has completely taken the 
lead on the elaboration of these proposals, neglecting inputs from the opposition parties and 
from the wider civil society. Thirdly, the outcome was, both times, an unexpected referendum 
defeat, after campaigns during which civil society and experts for the powers of enquiry and 
opposition parties, and other actors for the Seanad abolition have re-framed a consensual issue 
into a divisive one, mobilising voters to reject the proposal and punish the government. The 
referendum requirement has therefore proved to be particularly difficult to overcome. As noted 
                                                 
219 Cf. supra and the detailed proposals: http://www.merrionstreet.ie/index.php/2013/09/government-
publishes-programme-of-dail-reform-2/?cat=3 
220 Cf. for example the blog entry of David Farrell “Why I will be voting No in the Seanad referendum” of 
21 September 2013, in which he qualifies the campaign as such: “The Seanad referendum is an 
unfortunate distraction from the need for real and sustained political and constitutional reform.”  
http://politicalreform.ie/2013/09/21/why-i-will-be-voting-no-in-the-seanad-referendum/ 
221 In the last major Ipsos MRBI poll published, when undecided voters were excluded, the proposal was 
backed by 62% and rejected by 38% of the individuals surveyed. When including the undecided, 44% 
backed the proposal, 27% said they would vote to retain the Seanad, 21% did not know what they would 
vote, and 8% said they would not vote. Beesley, Arthur. “Seanad referendum set to pass as voters back 
argument for cost savings”. The Irish Times, 30 September 2013. 
222 O’Halloran, Mary. “Divide opens as Dublin rejects abolition while rural vote shows tighter margins”. 
The Irish Times, 7 October 2013. 
223 Carroll, Steven. “Kenny to extend Seanad votings rights”. The Irish Times, 14 October 2013. 
224 Farrell, David, Skype conversation on 8 November 2013. 
225 Citizens were to vote “yes” to abolish the Seanad and “no” to retain it, which caused some 
misunderstandings and confusion at the polls. 
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by Semetko and De Vrees, “despite the apparent simplistic nature of the referendum vote (Yes or 
No), the referendum issue is often multi-faceted and different aspects may trigger different 
perceptions among voters” (2013, 3). This is the essential point at stake here: I argue in the 
previous chapter that consensual reforms are more easily adopted when they are framed as 
unidimensional issues, not as multidimensional issues. The abolition of the Seanad and the 
expansion of the powers of enquiry may have been popular in and of themselves, yet as soon as 
reform opponents successfully re-framed these reforms into a complex, multi-faceted framework 
(“the power of politicians and their accountability”, “the power-grab of the government and the 
lack of checks and balances in the Dáil”), these issues became highly contentious and divisive. 
Many previous studies have demonstrated how much the arguments, the key messages and the 
framing of referendum campaigns can effect the final outcome (LeDuc 2002, Lupia 1992, Lupia 
and McCubbins 1998). In this instance, the fact that the government monopolised the 
elaboration of the reform, in order to claim credit for it, pushed the opposition and external 
political actors to re-frame the argument, eventually leading to the non-adoption of these two 
reforms.  
 
2.2.3. The delegation of  divisive reforms to the Constitutional Convention  
Along with Seanad abolition, the second important promise concerning political reform 
that was showcased in the Pfg was the organisation of  a constitutional convention. This 
convention was intended to report within one year of  the new coalition taking power. In fact, it 
was launched on 1 December 2012,
226
 and has made a large number of  recommendations going 
beyond its initial agenda (a). What is interesting for our argument here is the dynamic behind the 
constitutional convention: the government has deliberately delegated the most divisive issues on 
the political reform agenda to this device (b). 
a) The results of  the constitutional convention: from its launch to the referendum 
promises 
The very existence of this constitutional convention is certainly the aspect on which Irish 
civil society has had the most decisive impact on the coalition’s agenda regarding institutional 
reforms. The idea of the constitutional convention is based on existing experiences in various 
countries, where citizens were directly involved in the process of deliberation about certain 
important institutional issues. In Australia in 1998, a mix of professional politicians and citizens 
                                                 
226 The detailed terms of reference can be found in the Houses of the Oireachtas resolution of July 2012: 
https://www.constitution.ie/Documents/Terms_of_Reference.pdf 
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met to decide whether or not Australia should become a Republic (McAllister 2001). Two 
Canadian provinces (British Columbia in 2004 and Ontario in 2007), as well as the Netherlands in 
2006, organised citizens’ assemblies, composed exclusively of ordinary citizens, chosen randomly, 
to review their electoral systems (Fournier et al. 2011). Finally, in 2011, in the aftermath of the 
economic meltdown, Iceland organised a constitutional council to proceed with a thorough 
review and reform of the constitution, composed of elected citizens (Bergmann 2013). Political 
scientists involved in the deliberation of the Joint Committee on the constitution, and in 
particular Kenneth Benoit, presented this form of deliberation as advantageous for the purposes 
of reviewing contentious institutional aspects, and the electoral system in particular, because of its 
capacity to depoliticise the issues and to involve citizens in the production of propositions of 
reform, and because it is seen as more democratic and legitimate (Joint Committee on the 
Constitution 2010b, 154). As already mentioned, the organisation “We the citizens” organised a 
citizens’ assembly in 2011 in order to show the merits of this mode of decision-making, and its 
feasibility in the Irish context. Theoretically, the constitutional convention should be placed in 
the realm of “deliberative and participatory innovations” (Harris, Farrell, and Carney 2013, 201). 
The convention was set to report within 12 months, and to focus on eight topics: the 
reduction of the presidential term from 7 to 5 years and its alignment with the local and 
European elections (1); the reduction of the voting age to 17 (2); the review of the Dáil electoral 
system (3); the opportunity to give to citizens living abroad the right to vote at Irish embassies in 
presidential elections (4); the provision for same-sex marriage (5); the amendment of the clause 
on the role of women in the home and the encouragement of greater participation of women in 
public life (5); the increase of the participation of women in politics (6); the removal of 
blasphemy from the constitution (7); and, following the completion of these topics, the 
examination of any relevant constitutional amendment that may be recommended (8).227 The 
convention is comprised of 100 members, including a chairperson, 66 members of the public 
selected randomly from the electoral register, and 33 politicians, including members of each of 
the parliamentary parties, and parliamentarians from each of the political parties in Northern 
Ireland that accepted the invitation.228 The most significant aspect is without a doubt the non-
binding character of the recommendations made by the convention: “It is for the Government to 
decide whether or not to bring forward legislation proposing Constitutional change, and for the 
                                                 
227 Ibid. 
228 In relation to the non-inclusion of experts and members of civil society, the government declared: “The 
Government is conscious that a number of interest groups have signalled a desire to be represented at the 
Convention. However, as the Convention is intended to be a forum mainly for ordinary citizens.” Cf. 
http://www.merrionstreet.ie/index.php/2012/02/constitutional-convention-government-proposals-28-
february-2012/ 
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Oireachtas to decide on whether the matter should be put to the people in a Referendum.”229 
During the adoption of the resolution about the constitutional convention in July 2012 in the 
Oireachtas, the government committed to respond within four months to any proposals made by 
the constitutional convention, and if accepting the recommendation, to provide a time frame for 
a referendum.   
The organisation of the convention largely ignored the suggestions made by the Technical 
Group of Dáil Éireann in March 2012, which suggested the inclusion of experts and members of 
civil society in the constitutional convention, a time frame leaving more time for debate, the 
inclusion of topics such as the strengthening of the Oireachtas, a review of local government, and 
a thorough review of the constitutional articles relating to marriage, the family and religion, and 
fundamental rights. The convention has also been heavily criticised as hardly the “comprehensive 
constitutional review announced”, and has been referred to as both a “charade” and a “joke”.230 
Former politicians, such as Jimmy Devins, regard the constitutional convention as a “talking 
shop”, because of the absence of binding mechanisms to implement its suggestions.231 Elaine 
Byrne notes that the high number of politicians included will make it very difficult for ordinary 
citizens to get a grasp on the debate.232 The more optimistic analysts, such as David Farrell, 
consider that the very fact that such a convention has been organised is a big step, and a victory 
in itself as regards the inclusion of citizens.233  
Up to the time of writing (November 2013), the convention has made 24 
recommendations and has dealt with the eight topics it was assigned. Twelve of these 
recommendations require a referendum. David Farrell, the research director of the constitutional 
convention, considers that, “[t]he first thing to note is just how far the Convention members 
have gone in extending the remit of the Convention far beyond the eight topics assigned to it”.234 
Indeed, the suggestions made by the convention go much further than the initially narrow agenda 
that it was assigned. The constitutional convention has recommended against changing the length 
of the presidential term, but instead to reduce the age of candidacy and to give citizens some say 
in the nomination process. It has suggested the reduction of the voting age to 16, that Article 
41.2 of the Irish constitution should be made gender-neutral, and argues that the state should 
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231 Interview with Jimmy Devins, op. cit. 
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provide “a reasonable level of support” for carers. It supports the inclusion of an explicit 
provision on gender equality and the use of “gender-inclusive” language in the constitution, as 
well as some government action to encourage more female participation in politics. On gay 
marriage, the convention has agreed that the constitution should be amended to allow it, and to 
make the necessary modifications regarding related laws on family and parenthood if adopted. 
On the topic of the electoral system, the convention made proposals that go far beyond the 
national electoral system, and not requiring any referendum. It suggests the retention of PR-STV, 
but also a move to constituencies of at least 5 seats, the establishment of an Electoral 
Commission, extended polling hours, increased access to postal voting, an improved electoral 
register, and the introduction of education programmes to increase turnout. The convention also 
recommended the appointment of non-parliamentary ministers in the government, the 
introduction of a requirement for Dáil members to resign from their seats when appointed 
ministers, and the introduction of citizens’ initiatives, three provisions that would require  
referendums. Finally, it recommended that citizens abroad and in Northern Ireland should be 
given the right to vote in presidential elections, and the replacement of the offence of blasphemy 
with a provision against incitement to religious hatred. So far, the government has committed to 
three referendums, to be held sometime in mid-2015: on the voting age, on the age of 
presidential candidates, 235 and on same-sex marriage.236  
 
b) The constitutional convention: getting rid of the divisive issues and kicking to 
touch 
It was made clear in the first part of the chapter that the agenda of political reform was 
imposed on the government by a constellation of civil society actors. Still, it soon became 
apparent to the new government coalition that not all of the proposals of political reform were 
consensual, either within the coalition or for the Irish electorate. Indeed, most of the issues that 
were assigned to the constitutional convention are divisive, as evidenced by several polls. In 2011, 
for example, only 27% of the people surveyed agreed with the idea that “the electoral system 
should be replaced” (Coakley 2013, 15).
237
 In 2012, when asked how they would vote on a 
referendum on the topic, only 46% of people surveyed said they would vote yes “to reduce the 
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236 Collins, Stephen, Carbery, Genevieve. “Referendum on same-sex marriage to be held in 2015”. The Irish 
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term of the president from 7 to 5 years”, and 56% said they would vote no “to reduce the voting 
age to 17”.
238
 In June 2013, 49% were in favour of the removal of references to women’s “life 
within the home” from the constitution, and 62% were opposed to the reduction of the voting 
age (Coakley 2013, 16).
239
 On many of these topics, a large number of people claimed not to have 
an opinion. It is also important to note that certain issues examined by the convention appear to 
be very popular with the Irish electorate, in particular the right to vote for Irish emigrants in 
presidential elections: in 2012, 68% of people surveyed said they would vote yes on a referendum 
on the topic, and 72% declared they were in favour of this measure in 2013 (Coakley 2013, 17).  
Overall though, we are on safe ground in saying that there is no widespread agreement on 
many of the issues that made it to the agenda of the constitutional convention. Moreover, 
evidence suggests that the inclusion of several aspects on the agenda can be explained by the 
disagreement between Labour and Fine Gael on particular issues, making it easier to “kick it to 
touch” the convention.
240
 This is particularly true of the issue of gay-marriage, as stated by 
Matthew Wall: “I think that the government has managed to move an issue that would have been 
controversial for them to deal with to this body, so they killed two birds with one stone”. David 
Farrell recalls the process with which the Programme for Government was achieved: the Labour 
Party wanted a complete rewriting of the Irish constitution by 2016, whereas Fine Gael wanted 
the constitutional convention to look at very specific topics (voting at 17, the electoral system, 
and the role of women). In the end, he argues:  
“I think that some of it comes out of the need to find a compromise when they were locked 
away in a room together. (…) So, in splicing [the manifestos of the two parties] together, I’m 
guessing what happened is that they said we’ll court the constitutional convention, we won’t 
define what it is yet. (…) So it is just a compromise, it’s not systematic.”
241
 
In other words, the government allowed a certain number of issues to be added to the 
agenda of the constitutional convention, either because they were too divisive for the coalition to 
deal with (as with gay marriage), or because they did not really care about implementing them in 
the first place. For example, Kenny fought to specifically exclude the issue of Seanad abolition 
from the constitutional convention agenda, because he wanted to act upon it and to make it his 
showcase reform. One could add that the constitutional convention said nothing about Dáil 
reform, which could have significantly altered the balance of power between the executive and 
legislative powers. Some referendums will be held in 2015. The choice to hold a referendum on 
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voting age is particularly strange given the strong public opposition. Yet, one must not forget that 
a general election is planned in 2016, and there is no way of knowing whether the government 
will still be in power by then. The coalition has kicked to touch in several regards: by delaying the 
launch of the convention until late 2012; by postponing the referendums until 2015, and 
potentially leading to “referendum fatigue”;
242
 and by remaining quite unclear on the topics that 
the referendums will eventually tackle. The most likely outcome is that there will be a lack of 
time, political resources and momentum to implement most of the convention’s suggestions. 
This is not to say that the constitutional convention has not been an important and meaningful 
experience in itself, insofar as it has opened up opportunities for ordinary citizens to provide 
meaningful insights on the issue of political reform, confirming that these types of democratic 
innovations can enhance citizens’ knowledge and involvement with complex reform issues 
(Harris, Farrell, and Carney 2013). What this means, though, is that this externalised process of 
reform in all likelihood will lead to few significant reforms, as the politicians will continue to try 
to implement its suggestions only in the form of limited referendums, the results of which will be 
little more than a foregone conclusion. Fournier et al. argue: “Coupling a citizen assembly with a 
plebiscite may never actually result in policy change, since an unsophisticated public who lack 
awareness of the issues, the alternatives, and the process may systematically fall back on the less 
risky status quo” (2011, 155).  
 
Conclusion 
 
Even though the bundle of reforms under discussion in Ireland is not yet final, several 
conclusions can be drawn in relation to this process. First of all, the general “political reform” 
agenda was brought to the fore by the context of crisis and distrust of politicians and institutions 
in 2011. The narrative leading to the idea that institutions should be changed as a response to the 
crisis was forced upon political elites by a series of experts, analysts, and groups from civil 
society, who attributed responsibility for the crisis to the political system. The mode of 
emergence of the agenda on “political reform” could be qualified, to use Renwick’s terminology 
(2010), as elite-mass interaction. This mobilisation made it almost compulsory for politicians to 
talk about institutional reforms in 2011. To use Baumgartner and Jones’ terminology (2005), the 
attention paid to the issue of political reform resulted from the large amount of information 
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which identified the problem (the political system), but offered little – and highly contradictory – 
information about the implementation of viable solutions. 
As a result, the mode of bundling used in Ireland consisted of splitting the debate into 
multiple issues. This scattered bundle resulted in three configurations of reform and in significant 
variations in the final outcomes of reform. In the first of these configurations, consensual issues 
were successfully adopted through a majoritarian process, quite simply because the Labour Party 
and Fine Gael have a comfortable parliamentary majority. These consensual reforms dealt with 
relatively marginal and uncontroversial elements of the political reform agenda, and more 
importantly, they did not require negotiation of the referendum barrier. The second configuration 
still related to reforms that were consensual at the beginning of the process, and a majoritarian process 
in which the government kept a firm grip on the process of reform. The crucial difference was 
the referendum requirement, which proved fatal for two important referendums: one on the 
expansion of the powers of enquiry of the Oireachtas, the second on the abolition of the Seanad. 
In both cases, opponents managed to re-frame a consensual issue as a divisive one, by putting the 
reform in context and linking it to controversial elements (political accountability, or power of 
the executive). As a result, the referendums were defeated, showing how hard it is for the 
government to claim credit for a consensual reform while excluding the opposition from its 
conception, as it gives the opposition both incentive and opportunity to antagonise the majority. 
The third and final configuration of reforms concerns divisive reforms and an externalised 
process of reform, through the works of the constitutional convention. The Irish government has 
used the opportunity that this convention represents to fill its agenda with reforms that the 
coalition could not agree on, or did not care about implementing straight away. As a result, one 
can reasonably expect that the overwhelming majority of the 24 recommendations made by the 
convention will be neither implemented nor voted upon.   
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Chapter 7 An unexpected journey: the quinquennat and the 
reordering of  the electoral calendar in France, 2000-2001 
 
 
“The road goes ever on and on: 
Down from the door where it began. 
Now for ahead the road has gone,  
And I must follow, if I can”. 
J.R.R. Tolkien, 1954, The Fellowship of the ring 
  
In the particular institutional context of “cohabitation” of the socialist Prime Minister 
Lionel Jospin and the Gaullist president Jacques Chirac, two institutional reforms were adopted 
in 2000 and 2001: the constitutional reform reducing the presidential term from seven to five 
years (better known as the adoption of the quinquennat), and secondly, the reordering of the 
electoral calendar, extending the term of the National Assembly elected in 1997 by three months 
in order to hold the legislative elections of 2002 after the presidential election. Both of these 
reforms touch upon the presidential election: one to determine how long the president of the 
Republic is elected for, the second, to set the time at which the presidential election should be 
held in relation to the legislative elections. Following the dissolution of 1997, for the first time the 
presidential election had to take place right after the legislative elections. As a result, the issues of 
the length of the presidential term and of the electoral calendar became intrinsically linked at that 
particular moment, in 2000. Why was the first reform, the reduction of the presidential term, an 
essentially consensual matter that followed a supermajoritarian logic, whereas the reordering of 
the electoral calendar led to a tense political conflict that was eventually arbitrated by the Socialist 
Party?  
The chapter shows how, paradoxically, two reforms that followed logically from one 
another in the minds of reformers, and emerged around the same time after the 1997 dissolution, 
followed hugely distinctive logics in terms of emergence and adoption, were separated 
sequentially, and were supported by different coalitions each time. This chapter shows that this is 
the case because the reforms were perceived as having different natures: a consensual reform for 
the five-year term, a divisive reform for the reordering of the calendar. Whereas the quinquennat 
was debated and adopted through a supermajoritarian process involving deliberation and 
agreement among the vast majority of the political elites, the reordering of the calendar followed 
a purely majoritarian logic.  
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The first part of the chapter analyses the conditions of emergence of the two reforms: 
whereas the quinquennat was a long-debated, largely consensual, institutional topic in the story of 
the Fifth Republic, the matter of the reordering of the electoral calendar was a circumstantial 
result of the dissolution and proved very divisive. Both matters became topical around the same 
time in late 1999, with the mobilisation of similar actors inside the political system. The proper 
emergence of the issue of the length of the presidential term on the parliamentary agenda 
occurred earlier (May 2000), the major issue at stake being the ability to claim credit for the 
initiative, and later for the calendar (November 2000), in the shadow of selfish calculations 
regarding the 2002 elections by all parties. The adoption of the reforms, as demonstrated in the 
second part, followed a very different path. The issue at stake with the quinquennat was the 
competition to claim credit and appear as the main initiator of a popular reform which had been 
advocated for many years. Both the president and the PM also devoted energy to stopping the 
issue from drifting into other issues that would have divided the political class. For the electoral 
calendar battle, the majority, led by the Socialist Party, pretty much forced the issue with the help 
of centrist MPs and senators, despite fierce and resolute opposition from the rest of the 
parliament. 
 
1. The contrasting emergence and formulation of a consensual vs. a 
divisive reform  
 
The proposals to shorten the presidential term and to reverse the electoral calendar both 
emerged in the debate following the dissolution of the National Assembly in 1997. The 
quinquennat was never fully absent from the debate since the attempted reform of 1973, whereas 
the debate over the electoral calendar was caused by the unusual ordering of the elections 
stemming from the dissolution of 1997. Regarding the formulation of the two reforms, the five-
year term reform was dominated by act-contingent motivations and credit-claiming strategies, as 
illustrated by the institutional rivalry between the Prime Minister and the President, each vying to 
be seen as the main initiator of the reform. The electoral calendar only made headlines after the 
adoption of the shortened presidential term, and was structured around self-interested 
calculations regarding the 2002 election. This, in turn, led to very distinctive press coverage that 
illustrates the different nature of the two reforms: one being consensual, the other divisive.  
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1.1. The quinquennat: from a recurring debate to a fight over the initiative of the reform 
Before briefly recalling the moments at which the length of the presidential term was at 
stake in the French public debate, it is important to present the institutional context of 
cohabitation, a term used in the French context to describe a situation where the two heads of the 
executive are of different political orientations. The actual introduction of the five-year term in 
the parliament is the result of successful manoeuvring by the former president Giscard d’Estaing. 
He constrained all actors not only to take supportive positions on the consensual reform, but also 
to fight to claim authorship of the initiative.  
 
1.1.1. The context of cohabitation and the 1997 dissolution  
France is one of the most emblematic examples of a “semi-presidential regime” 
(Duverger 1970, 1986). Duverger considers a regime to be semi-presidential “if the constitution 
which established it combines three elements: (1) the president of the republic is elected by 
universal suffrage; (2) he possesses quite considerable powers; (3) he has opposite him, however, 
a prime minister and ministers who possess executive and governmental power and can stay in 
office only if the parliament does not show its opposition to them” (1980, 166).243 In the small 
world of semi-presidential regimes, France is quite peculiar insofar as the powers of the president 
have become considerable, whereas they are much less important in other semi-presidential 
countries such as Austria or Ireland. Much of the constitutional debate in France since 1958 has 
revolved around the powers of the president. Indeed, the constitution of the Fifth Republic and 
the adoption of direct election in 1962, in the peculiar context of the Gaullist political domination 
(Bartolini 1981), considerably reinforced the executive power (particularly that of the president) 
vis-à-vis the parliament, compared with the Fourth Republic. Historically, the left opposition has 
been very critical of the césariste “Republican monarchy” established in 1958 (see, for example, 
Mitterrand 1964). 
Over the course of the years, the French institutional system has had to deal with an 
unsolvable equation: the varying nature of the regime due to the “ambiguous bicephalism of the 
executive” (François 2004, 64). Grossman and Sauger (2009) call this the tension between the 
presidential and the partisan visions. In the first vision, the president is a consensual arbiter; in 
the second, he is the leader of a party and of his political camp. The two “visions” could also be 
considered as the opposition between parliamentary and the presidentialist readings of the 
                                                 
243 This definition has provoked criticism, which is discussed by Elgie (1999); however, it remains the 
more commonly accepted definition. 
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regime. With the former, the true leader of the executive is the PM, and with the latter, it is the 
president. Indeed, despite the fact that Art. 20 of the French Constitution states that the 
government “determines and conducts the politics of the nation”, in practice, the pre-eminence 
of the Prime Minister is only effective when the president and the PM are of different political 
orientations, whereas the president is the effective leader of the executive when he is a member 
of the same party as the parliamentary majority. The pre-eminence of the president has been 
enhanced by the fait majoritaire (majoritarian fact), i.e. the unconditional support by the majority of 
the executive, turning the president into a “super prime minister” (Grossman and Sauger 2009, 
423).  
 However, the dawn of the period of cohabitation in 1986, altered this presidentialist 
reading, and returned primacy to the PM, turning the president into an arbiter. As the president 
used to be elected for a seven-year term, and the MPs for a five-year term, every president would 
have had to face a legislative election at one time or another. There was thus the potential that a 
political majority of a different political orientation than that of the president would emerge. 
Prior to 1997, this situation had occurred between 1986 and 1988, and again between 1993 and 
1995; twice with a socialist president (François Mitterrand), and once with a RPR prime minister 
(Jacques Chirac, and Edouard Balladur). This constituted a sort of French functional equivalent 
of a “divided government” in the US, to which it is frequently compared (Conley 2007). It is 
interesting, in this regard, to note the gap between the relative indifference, or even mild 
benevolence, relative to the cohabitation, exhibited by a substantial element of the public,244 some 
of the politicians245 and political advisers with some hindsight.246 It is also worth noting the vast 
majority of politicians’ abhorrence of this political situation. A distinguished constitutional lawyer 
went so far as to call the cohabitation the “AIDS of the institutions”.247 Bernard Roman, a 
socialist MP who has been very involved in institutional matters within his party, notes: “Never 
                                                 
244 In an IPSOS poll conducted on 10 and 11 March 2000, 48% (vs. 45% in favour) of the people 
questioned were opposed to a system that would institutionally prevent situations of cohabitation. 
Anon. « Les français favorables au quinquennat ». Le Monde, 10 April 2000. 
245 “The cohabitation worked very well: everyone plays his part’’ (« La cohabitation a très bien marché : 
chacun joue son rôle. ») Interview with Pierre Mazeaud, member of the constitutional council between 
1998 and 2004, former secretary of state in the governments of Debré, Pompidou and Messmer, ex-MP 
for Haute-Savoie between 1988 and 1998, former president of the constitutional council (2004-2007), 
RPR, 5 March 2013, at his home in Paris. 
246 Interview with Yves Colmou, former director of cabinet of the minister in charge of parliamentary 
relations, and adviser to the minister of Home Affairs between 1997 and 2002, 11 March 2013, at his 
office in Paris. 
247 « Le SIDA des institutions. ». Jean Foyer quoted in Gicquel 1989, 78 
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have I heard a good thing about the cohabitation, or a resigned acceptance of the 
cohabitation”.248  
On 21 April 1997, Jacques Chirac, who was elected president of the Republic in 1995, 
decided to use his right of dissolution to call for a new legislative election in order to reinforce his 
shaky majority, which had been destabilised by irreconcilable divisions within its own camp. This 
was the first time that dissolution was used outside of circumstances of alternation or political 
crisis, “à l’anglaise” (“the English way”). This decision proved unfortunate, as the right and the 
RPR lost the legislative election. Lionel Jospin became the Prime Minister, leading a wide ‘left-
green coalition’ (Willerton and Carrier 2005) which soon became known as the gauche plurielle 
(plural left), composed of the Socialist Party (PS), the Citizen and Republican Movement (MRC), 
the Greens, the Radical Party of the Left (PRG), and the Communist Party (PCF). While this 
“failed dissolution” tactic (Duhamel 1998, 17) is now considered to be one of the most 
spectacular miscalculations in French politics, it paved the way for an unprecedented institutional 
configuration: a long-term cohabitation which lasted five years at the beginning of the presidential 
mandate. In the past, the cohabitation arrangement had only lasted for the two years at the end of 
the presidential term, making the situation irritating but acceptable for its main protagonists. In 
1997, on the other hand no one knew whether the situation would last until 2002, and there was 
great uncertainty about the way in which the president and the prime minister would negotiate 
this silent battle. It was in this general context that the debates over the length of the presidential 
term and the electoral calendar emerged: one in which the two heads of the executive were in 
competition on all topics where the presidential powers left leverage for action, including – 
crucially – institutional matters.  
 
1.1.2. The eternal return of  the quinquennat, 1973-2000 
The quinquennat was debated as early as 1973, with President Pompidou’s failed attempt to 
shorten the length of the presidential term from 7 to 5 years. The same issue then re-emerged 
periodically, without any concrete efforts being made to actually implement it. The first 
reflections on the quinquennat started in the early 1960s, mostly coming from left-wing groups 
which were opposed to the amount of power held by the president of the Republic (Devedeix-
Margueritat 2001). The orthodox Gaullist position, on the other hand, was that the president had 
                                                 
248 « Jamais je n’ai entendu un élément positif sur la cohabitation, ou une acceptation résignée de la 
cohabitation. » Interview with Bernard Roman, MP of the Nord (1997-now) and former president of the 
Commission des lois in the national Assembly (2000-2002), PS, 13 March 2013, at his office in Paris. 
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to be “above the parties”, and therefore elected for a longer period and at a different time than 
MPs (Boutin and Rouvillois 2000, 41).  
In April 1973, catching everyone off-guard, Georges Pompidou announced to the 
parliament his proposal to shorten the duration of the presidential term to five years. Pompidou 
justified his position, arguing that the reform would give greater legitimacy to the office of the 
president by putting the presidency before voters more often, avoiding the risk of what he called 
“the moral inferiority” of the president vis-à-vis the MPs (Boutin and Rouvillois 2000, 42). The 
explanatory memorandum of the proposed law states that the seven-year term “no longer 
corresponds to the role played by the President of the Republic in the definition of the general 
orientations of national politics” (ibid).249 Pompidou was, on the other hand, opposed to the 
simultaneity of legislative and presidential elections, and strictly forbade the parliament from 
amending the proposed text. The government bill was voted through on 16 October 1973 by 270 
votes against 211, and on 19 October 1973 by the Senate, by 162 votes against 111 
(Andrianarivony 2001), with the support of most - but not all – of the Gaullists. Still, the majority 
(three-fifths of the parliament) necessary to adopt a constitutional modification without 
consulting the citizens via referendum was not reached. The left and the centrist opposition 
refused to support the reform, arguing that the five-year term in itself was not acceptable in the 
absence of a reduction of the presidential powers for the left, or of the establishment of a 
genuine presidential regime for the centre.250 Mitterrand argued: “what is the point of rearranging 
the constitution, this huge scaffolding upon which the institutions rest, if we only loosen one 
bolt, all the more if this bolt is useless”.251 The text was also opposed by some of the “historical 
Gaullists”, who were afraid of the risk of lowering the primacy of the executive, including Michel 
Debré, the co-author of the 1958 constitution. Eventually, on 24 October, President Pompidou 
decided not to convene the Congress252 and to report the adoption of the project. After the 
unexpected death of Georges Pompidou on 2 April 1974, the project fell by the wayside. To 
explain Pompidou’s decision to propose this reform, given that he was very Gaullist, several of 
                                                 
249 « La règle du septennat ne correspond plus au rôle joué par le président de la République dans la 
définition des orientations générales de la politique nationale ».  
250 Cf. Assemblée Nationale, Discussion générale du texte en séance, 16 October 1973.  
 http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/histoire/quinquennat/1SP1-11.PDF 
251 « A quoi bon remanier la Constitution, cet énorme échafaudage sur lequel reposent les institutions si 
c'est simplement pour desserrer un boulon, surtout si ce boulon ne sert à rien ». Mitterrand quoted in 
Desaubliaux, Patrice-Henry. « Quand Pompidou a renoncé ». Le Figaro, 15 June 2000. 
252 As stipulated in Article 89 of the constitution, a constitutional modification coming from a government 
bill can be adopted through two means: either by calling a referendum or by obtaining a majority of three-
fifths of the valid votes in the parliament convened as a Congress in Versailles. 
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my interviewees argue that the sole reason for this reform was the fact that the president was 
sick.253  
Following Pompidou’s attempted reform, the position of the presidents in relation to the 
five-year term more or less followed the simple “not in my backyard” rule: a weak “yes, maybe” 
to the notion of the quinquennat before they came to power, which was soon forgotten about 
when they got elected. Giscard d’Estaing, the newly elected president in 1974, justified the 
absence of reform in the direction of the quinquennat on account of the fact that he would have 
had to count on the support of a Gaullist National Assembly, which would not have supported 
the project, and would have used the opportunity to destabilise the institutions (Avril and 
Gicquel 1984, 182). In 1981, Giscard d’Estaing contested his second presidential campaign and 
was unsuccessful, but since then he has relatively consistently defended the quinquennat,254 asking 
Chirac in 1987, Mitterrand in 1992,255 and Balladur in 1994 to take initiatives on the matter, with 
no success.256 The socialist François Mitterrand, elected president in 1981, was no less ambiguous 
concerning the five-year term. Mitterrand took a stance in 1972 in favour, and this measure was 
one of the 110 proposals of his presidential programme in 1981 (Albertini and Sicart 2001, 125). 
During his time in power, he hesitated between the non-renewable septennat, and a renewable 
quinquennat, but mostly took care of removing the debate from the agenda,257 whereas the RPR 
suddenly became a supporter of the five-year term.  
Chirac and Jospin, the two heads of the executive from 1995 and 1997, respectively, held 
distinctive positions regarding the five-year term before the debate was launched in 2000. After 
considering that the direct election of the president of the Republic was no longer a questioned 
matter (Jospin 1991),  the second round of the 1995 presidential election saw Chirac (RPR) and 
Jospin (PS) go head-to-head. During the traditional debate which took place between the two 
rounds, Jospin spoke in favour of the quinquennat, whereas Chirac preferred to kick the idea into 
                                                 
253 Interview with Pierre Mazeaud, op. cit. Interview with Didier Maus, constitutional lawyer and high civil 
servant, 20 February 2013, at his home in Paris. 
254 With an exception: in 1984, he advocated for a six-year term (Giscard d’Estaing 1984). 
255 Anon. « M. Giscard d’Estaing presse M. Mitterrand de faire voter le quinquennat », Le Monde, 20 
October 1992. 
256 Chagnollaud, Dominique. « A la recherche d’un mandat de plus ». Libération, 20 May 2000. 
257 For instance, during his second seven-year term, in 1992 Mitterrand created a Consultative Committee 
under the presidency of the Doyen Vedel with the mission to propose a revision of the constitution. The 
committee examined the septennat (renewable or not), the six-year term, and the quinquennat, with no clear 
results emerging, resulting in a recommendation to maintain the status quo (Comité consultatif pour la 
révision de la Constitution 1993, 2539). Michel Charasse, former minister under various governments 
during Mitterrand’s presidency gives this cryptic account: “they did not answer because, between us, we 
had more or less encouraged them not to answer” (« ils n’ont pas répondu parce que, entre nous, on les 
avait plus ou moins incités à ne pas répondre », Commission des archives constitutionnelles de la Ve 2011, 
467). 
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touch, and did not consider it to be an urgent debate. One of the commitments of Jospin’s 
legislative campaign in 1997,258 reasserted in his Déclaration de politique générale (general policy 
statement), was the harmonisation of all elected terms to five years (Assemblée Nationale 1997, 
6). After alternating between mild support and indifference, and fearing that the debate would 
drift onto the necessity of his resignation, Jacques Chirac became increasingly defensive on the 
topic of the quinquennat and asserted his opposition in 1997,259 1998, and in 1999, when he called 
it “a mistake”.260  
The dissolution and the third cohabitation soon gave new intensity to the debate on the 
quinquennat, making Chirac’s position increasingly isolated, with distinctive arguments: increasing 
the clarity and the coherence of the regime from the point of view of certain lawyers and political 
scientists; avoiding situations of cohabitation from the point of view of the politicians. Some 
influential academics defended in the press the need to adopt the five-year term, and to “change 
the Republic”, as early as May 1997.261 The main argument in favour of the shortening of the 
presidential term was then developed at length in a book (Duhamel 2000), and is also, in 
retrospect, the main argument of his friend, Guy Carcassonne, in justifying the activism of some 
of the academic world in favour of the quinquennat: “We gave more time with a quinquennat and a 
synchronisation of the electoral calendars than with a septennat and a quinquennat which implied 
that we did not know for how much time power was attributed”.262 The main motivation behind 
the support for the quinquennat was therefore to give the president five years to govern, thanks to 
the coincidence of the presidential and the legislative elections. In other words, from the very 
beginning, academics considered the matters of the presidential term and the electoral calendar to 
be intrinsically related.  
                                                 
258 Cf. Programme of the Socialist Party for the 1997 legislative elections, « Changeons d’avenir, 
Changeons de majorité : nos engagements pour la France».   
259 On 14 July 1997, during the traditional TV interview, he stated that the quinquennat “almost 
automatically leads, I would even say automatically, to the presidential regime. And I am hostile to it.” 
(« [Le quinquennat] mène presque automatiquement, je dirai automatiquement, au régime présidentiel. Et 
moi j’y suis hostile »). Jacques Chirac, quoted in Albertini and Sicart 2001, 128–129. 
260 Robert Diard, Pascale. « Jacques Chirac déterminé à rester à l'Elysée jusqu'en 2002 ». Le Monde, 16 July 
1999. 
261 Duhamel, Olivier. « Cinq raisons pour les cinq ans », Le Monde, 7 May 1997. This opinion piece was part 
of the reflections of an informal group comprised of five constitutional lawyers and political scientists, 
including Georges Vedel, Guy Carcassonne, Yves Portelli, Yves Mény, and Olivier Duhamel. This led to 
the publication of proposals on constitutional reforms in relation to the quinquennat, the end of the dual 
mandate, the extension of the use of referendums, a more ethical state and public sector, and a reform of 
local government. 
262 « On donnait davantage de temps avec un quinquennat et une synchronisation des calendriers des 
élections plutôt qu’avec un septennat et un quinquennat qui faisaient qu’on ne savait pas pour combien de 
temps le pouvoir était attribué ». Interview with Guy Carcassonne †, constitutional lawyer, professor at 
university Paris-X Nanterre, 4 February 2013, at his office in Paris. 
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 Outside of the academic world, increasingly numerous voices from the right, the left 
and the centre started to advocate ever more strongly for the shortening of the presidential term 
from 1997 onwards. In July 1999, Laurent Fabius (PS) called for a “quinquennat of coherence”263 
arguing that as long as the duration of the presidential and legislative mandate differed, the 
situation of cohabitation could not be avoided. The position of the centre and the right, on the 
other hand, changed quickly between 1999 and the beginning of 2000. On 11 July 1999, Giscard 
d’Estaing exhorted Chirac to adopt the quinquennat by referendum and to resign in 2000.264 Other 
centrists added their voices to the debate: the head of the UDF, François Bayrou, who sought the 
shortening of the presidential term and the reordering of the electoral calendar,265 De Charette 
(UDF),266  and Alain Madelin (DL).267 At the end of 1999, influential members of the RPR, such 
as Juppé, also officially called for the presidential term to be cut, arguing of the need to avoid 
cohabitation.268  
 To conclude, at the beginning of 2000, a significant number of influential experts, and 
more importantly, much of the political world, considered the adoption of the quinquennat to be a 
necessity. The emergence of the reform mainly took place endogenously to the French political 
system itself, unlike what happened in Ireland, where the consensual reforms on the agenda 
resulted from pressures external to the political system itself. The five-year term underwent a 
substantial transformation in the public debate, and went from being seen as “an electoral gadget 
for the sole use of the opposition” (Boutin and Rouvillois 2000, 48–49),269 to becoming a topic 
upon which academics and politicians from all parts of the political spectrum agreed in the run-
up to 2000.  
 
1.1.3. The fight over the initiative of  the reform: claiming credit for a popular idea 
 Valéry Giscard d’Estaing was the one who finally pulled the trigger that led to reform, 
by announcing in an opinion piece in Le Monde on 11 May 2000 that he had proposed a legislative 
bill to shorten the presidential term to five years, which was co-signed by around thirty UDF 
                                                 
263 Fabius, Laurent. « Pour un quinquennat de cohérence », Le Monde, 28 July 1999 
264 Anon. “Giscard : Le président doit abréger son mandat”, Le Monde, 11 July 1999. 
265 Chambraud, Cécile, Jarreau Patrick. « François Bayrou veut l'élection présidentielle avant les 
législatives ». Le Monde, 24 September 1999. 
266 Chambraud, Cécile. « Hervé de Charette et Alain Juppé prônent le quinquennat ». Le Monde, 19 April 
2000. 
267 Anon. « Madelin approuve Giscard ». Le Figaro, 13 July 1999. 
268 Anon. « Juppé suggère le quinquennat ». Libération, 15 December 1999. 
269 « Un gadget électoral à l’usage exclusif de l’opposition » 
208 
An Unexpected Journey: Two Institutional Reforms in France 
MPs.270 The former president argued that the political conditions were appropriate, that the 
public was massively in favour, and that this reform should not apply to the term of Jacques 
Chirac. He clearly stated that the aim of the reform would be to “make more probable the 
coincidence of the two presidential and parliamentary majorities, reducing the risk of 
cohabitation fundamentally contrary (…) to the Gaullist inspiration”.271 To use the words of 
Schrameck, the director of Jospin’s cabinet, Giscard d’Estaing provided a “decisive impulsion” 
(2001, 116), an interpretation confirmed in an interview with a former member of Jospin’s 
cabinet.272 On 16 May 2000, in the National Assembly, during the government’s question 
sessions, the PM, Jospin, declared:  
“Since I have become Prime Minister, I have not openly expressed myself on the presidential 
term in office, because I did not want a declaration from my side to be interpreted in the 
particular context of cohabitation (…). Today, I am told that the situation has changed and 
that a large agreement can be reached. Therefore, I confirm that I am naturally favourable to 
the implementation of this reform which should obviously not affect the current term of 
office” (Assemblée Nationale 2000a, 4213).273  
There are several important points in this declaration: firstly, the fact that the Prime Minister’s 
previous refusal to open the debate was due to his unwillingness to initiate a battle with the 
president; secondly, the fact that he changed his mind when he became aware that a 
supermajoritarian agreement was possible; and thirdly, his clear refusal to go down the dangerous 
road towards a reform that would apply to Chirac. Hence, the quinquennat only became possible 
because it was not initiated by one of the two “cohabiting” parties. As Pierre Guelman, Jospin’s 
adviser, argues: “in any case, no one could argue that Jospin was the only one to be in favour of 
the quinquennat, to wish for it and to propose it”.274 
 On 19 May 2000, Jospin declared to the press that he was willing to elaborate a 
government bill, which would then require the formal agreement of the president (Art 89). Had 
                                                 
270 Assemblée nationale. Proposition de loi constitutionnelle portant modification de l’article 6 de la Constitution n°2363. 
9 May 2000. 
271 « [Cette réforme] vise simplement a rendre plus probable la coïncidence des deux majorités 
présidentielle et parlementaire, en réduisant ainsi le risque de la cohabitation (fondamentalement contraire, 
rappelons-le, a l'inspiration gaulliste de la Ve République) ». Giscard d’Estaing, Valéry. « Et maintenant le 
quinquennat ! » Le Monde, 11 May 2000. 
272 Interview with Daniel Ludet, former advisor for justice in the cabinet of Lionel Jospin, 1 March 2013, 
at his office in Paris. 
273 « Depuis que je suis devenu Premier ministre, je ne me suis plus exprimé d’une manière explicite sur le 
mandat présidentiel, parce que je ne voulais pas qu’une déclaration de ma part pût être interprétée dans le 
contexte particulier de la cohabitation. (….) Aujourd’hui, on me dit que la situation a changé et qu’un large 
accord peut être réalisé. Dès lors, je vous confirme que naturellement je suis favorable à la mise en œuvre 
de cette réforme qui ne saurait bien évidemment concerner le mandat actuel » 
274 « En tout cas, personne n’a pu dire que Lionel Jospin était seul à être favorable au quinquennat, à le 
souhaiter, à le proposer ». Interview with Pierre Guelman, former advisor to the prime minister for 
parliamentary relations, 1997-2002, 5 March 2013, at his office in Paris. 
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the president not agreed with this path, Jospin indicated that he would let the parliamentary 
initiative develop. He therefore effectively gave Chirac an ultimatum: the reform would take 
place, with or without him. Backstage, there is evidence to suggest that Jospin and Giscard 
d’Estaing had actually planned this ballet perfectly, through phone calls, and possibly 
encounters.275 Advisers of Chirac describe the operation as a “political blow” from Jospin, aided 
by Chirac’s all-time political enemy.276 The president was therefore placed in a difficult political 
position, as the opportunity to initiate a popular reform passed him by. Secondly, as he had 
publicly opposed the quinquennat in the past, he would therefore have had to justify any reversal 
of position. He chose to save time, in order to prepare for a switch of position, by meeting the 
main leaders of all parties,277 and several constitutional lawyers.278 A close advisor of Chirac, 
Philippe Bas, explained Chirac’s switch to me in the following way: “He expresses precisely a 
form of indifference on the content that does not prevent the fact that in terms of opportunity, 
he thinks it is good to do it”.279  
Chirac adopted an extremely pragmatic position, and decided to support the five-year 
term for several reasons, all of which had to do with politics and tactics, and had very little to do 
with institutional engineering. Chirac considered that, in itself, the quinquennat would not change 
the institutional balance of the Fifth Republic, but that it was a reform which had been supported 
by more than 75% of the French citizens for decades.280 Inaction on the five-year term would 
have given Jospin a big political advantage. Moreover, Chirac was 69 years old, and it was fairly 
clear to all that it was easier to ask for an additional five-year term than for a seven-year term. 
Duhamel went so far as to state that the whole reform was a consequence of the “captain’s age” 
(2000, 20).  
                                                 
275 This contact has been confirmed by Yves Colmou and Valéry Giscard d’Estaing himself. Interview 
with Yves Colmou, op. cit. Interview with Valery Giscard d’Estaing, MP of the Puy de Dôme (1956-73, 
1984-2002), former President of the Republic between 1974 and 1981, 11 March 2013, at his home in 
Paris. 
276 Interview with Olivier Dutheillet de Lamothe, former deputy general secretary of the Presidency of the 
Republic between 1997 and 2000, 20 March 2013, at his office in Paris. The quinquennat was the 
umpteenth episode in a deep hostility that began when Chirac, Giscard d’Estaing’s PM between 1974 and 
August 1976, resigned and created the RPR, and only escalated over the years (to read accounts from each 
side, Cf. Péan 2007; Giscard d’Estaing 2006). 
277 Bresson, Gilles, « Jacques Chirac inaugure des consultations tous azimuts ». Libération, 19 May 2000 
278 Interview with Olivier Dutheillet de Lamothe, op. cit. 
279 « Il exprime exactement une forme d’indifférence sur le fond qui n’empêche pas qu’en opportunité il 
juge que c’est bon de le faire ». Interview with Philippe Bas, former deputy general secretary of the 
Presidency of the Republic between 2000 and 2002, 19 February 2013, in his office. 
280 For example, an IFOP/JDD poll conducted on 11 and 12 May 2000 indicated that 75% of the people 
questioned were in favour of the quinquennat. 
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Hence, the president’s underlying dilemma can be broken down as follows: avoiding the 
reform to touch upon other significant dimensions, and finding a way to associated himself with 
its initiative. This took the form of two initiatives on the part of the president: the so-called 
“quinquennat sec” (“dry five-year term”), and the organisation of a referendum to adopt the reform. 
On 5 June 2000, Chirac announced his support for the five-year term publicly on TV, through a 
particularly convoluted and unsuccessful interview in which he explained that he had acquired the 
conviction that the quinquennat could be adopted “without changing the institutions”. He added 
that he would sign the government bill, but stop the parliamentary procedure immediately should 
any amendment be adopted (what would later be labelled the “dry quinquennat”), and finally, he 
explained his decision to propose a referendum to adopt the project, also mentioning that all 
would be “very well”, whatever answer was given.281 Hence, Chirac made the explicit and clear 
choice to strictly limit the institutional discussion to the issue of the five-year term, de facto 
refusing to address any considerations about its consequences or the evolution of the regime. 
Secondly, the referendum route was a clear way to regain control of the situation, and eventually 
become associated with the adoption, and be perceived as one of, or even the main instigator of 
the reform. Dominique Paillé bluntly concludes: 
“If we had used the Congress, the victory would have been more patent for the left. Chirac 
thought as well: if I do a referendum on that, I can only win it. (…) This question, French 
people want it, the positive answer, they want to be able to give it, therefore if I want to 
benefit from it, I have to take the initiative on the operation.”
282   
 
1.2. The reordering of the electoral calendar in the shadow of 2002 
Unlike the five-year term, an idea that had been debated for decades, the topic of the 
modification of the electoral calendar, on the other hand, was purely circumstantial, and largely 
arose from the reflection on the duration of the presidential term. The calls to modify the 
calendar remained isolated until Lionel Jospin’s decisive switch in November 2000. This move 
was the result of calculations based on the (at that point forthcoming) 2002 elections, emerging 
                                                 
281 For a transcript of the interview, Cf. anon. « Une décision qui s'impose aujourd'hui, sans mettre en 
cause nos institutions ». Le Monde, 7 June 2000. For an account about the reactions of Chirac’s own camp, 
cf. for example Bresson, Gilles. “La droite affligée par Jacques Chirac. Comme la dissolution, en pire 
». Libération, 7 June 2000. 
282 « Si on était passé par un congrès, par exemple, la victoire aurait été plus patente pour la gauche. Chirac 
s’est dit également : si je fais un referendum là-dessus, je ne peux que le gagner. (…) Cette question, les 
français la veulent, la réponse positive, ils veulent pouvoir la donner, donc si je veux en tirer bénéfice, il 
vaut mieux que je sois à l’origine de cette opération ». Interview with Dominique Paillé, former general 
delegate of the UDF and UDF MP, 3 April 2013, at his office in Paris. 
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as a very divisive issue, based first and foremost on self-interested, outcome-contingent 
motivations.  
.  
1.2.1. The electoral calendar of  2002: a debate caused by the circumstances  
The topic of the electoral calendar arose because, given the absence of reform before 
2002, the legislative elections would, for the first time, have preceded the presidential elections by 
a couple of weeks. This was the result of two sets of circumstances (the death of President 
Pompidou and the timing of the dissolution in 1997), and of two different norms regulating the 
lengths of the terms of the National Assembly (organic law) and of the president of the Republic 
(Article 7 of the Constitution).  
The organic law of 1995 on the organisation of the legislative elections stated that “the 
powers of the National Assembly expire the first Tuesday of April of the fifth year following its 
election”.283 The electoral code indicates that legislative elections should be held during the 60 
days preceding the expiration of the powers of the National Assembly.284 Since the National 
Assembly was dissolved on 21 April 1997, the next legislative elections were to be held around 
March 2002 in the absence of reform. Article 7 of the French constitution provides that the new 
presidential election should be organised between 20 and 35 days prior to the conclusion of the 
sitting president’s term in office. Secondly, in cases of “vacancy of power”, or of “definitive 
impediment”, “the election of the new president takes place (…) 20 days at least, and 35 days at 
most, after the opening of the vacancy or after the impediment has been declared definitive”.285 
Georges Pompidou died on 2 April 1974, so French presidential elections since then have been 
held around the end of April or early May, as would have been the case in 2002. 
At first glance, the matter of the calendar may appear to be a purely technical matter. Still, 
one should insist on the singularity of the 2002 configuration. During the lifespan of the Fifth 
Republic, since the direct election of the president of the Republic was established in 1962, two 
different scenarios had taken place. First of all, the scenario in which the legislative elections were 
held immediately after the presidential elections in 1962, 1981, 1988, on each occasion because of 
the president’s decision to dissolve the National Assembly in order to secure a parliamentary 
majority. Therefore, quite clearly, victory for a presidential candidate from a particular political 
                                                 
283 « Les pouvoirs de l'Assemblée nationale expirent le premier mardi d'avril de la cinquième année qui suit 
son élection. » Loi organique n°95-1292 du 16 décembre 1995 prise pour l'application des dispositions de la loi 
constitutionnelle n° 95-880 du 4 août 1995 qui instituent une session parlementaire ordinaire unique, art. 1. JO n°265 
of 20 December 1995, p.18423 
284 Code électoral, art. LO122. 
285 Constitution du 4 octobre 1958, Art.7. 
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side did give an advantage to his own camp in the legislative elections. The second scenario was 
one in which the legislative elections were held at the “normal” time, in the middle of the 
legislature: two years before the next presidential elections in 1967, 1986 and 1993, three years 
before the end of the term if Pompidou had lived in 1973, and finally three years before the next 
election in 1978. In such instances, on the other hand, the country had witnessed situations in 
which the camp of the president had won, or lost, the legislative elections.  
Therefore, at the time, no one was in a position to make any robust predictions about 
what the 2002 scenario might imply: at best, there may have been some conjecture about what it 
might mean for the balance between the presidential and legislative powers, and about the 
likelihood of witnessing a domino effect, with the results of the legislative elections impacting on 
the presidential elections. The fundamental paradox of the electoral calendar debate was that, in 
that case, the choice not to reform would have led to a de facto reform, insofar as it would have 
created an unprecedented situation in 2002, no matter what the outcome was regarding the length 
of the presidential term. More importantly, to observers, and in the context of early 2000, when 
the reform of the quinquennat was becoming a hot topic, the importance of the reform of the 
calendar became even more apparent. Indeed, if the presidential term was to be shortened after 
the 2002 election, the question of the ordering of the legislative and the presidential elections 
would have become recurrent.  
 
1.2.2. An institutional issue arising from the terms of  the debate of  the 
quinquennat, with a late turning point 
 The two main arguments defending the quinquennat, as explained above (giving time for 
the president to govern and avoiding cohabitation) were, in many ways, two sides of the same 
coin. The supporters of the quinquennat saw this reform, in a more or less lucid and conscious 
manner, as a way to finally assert the supremacy of the President of the Republic over the Prime 
Minister. This reasoning would only apply if the simultaneity of the presidential and the legislative 
elections was institutionally secured. The implicit “working hypothesis” was the following: the 
permanent coincidence of the presidential and legislative elections (postulating that presidents 
should neither die, nor resign, ed.) would mean that, in all likelihood, the French citizenry would 
elect a president and a National Assembly of the same political persuasion, and reassess the pre-
eminence of the presidency in the French institutions.  
 It is quite fascinating to see the almost complete absence of conceptualisation or 
anticipation of the consequences of the scenario in which the legislative elections would have 
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preceded the presidential election by a couple of weeks,286 from both politicians and academics. 
With some hindsight, Pierre Avril argues:  
“The natural evolution of the calendar would have led to make durable, in a certain way, the 
status quo, that was a status quo re-establishing the legislative elections in the forefront (...) A 
sort of Portuguese evolution in a way”.
287  
Avril concludes: “The fact that the reform of the calendar was nipped in the bud by the 
quinquennat, this was obvious.”288 
 Indeed, a political adviser of Chirac's, Olivier Dutheillet de Lamothe, remembers: 
“During the consultations [about the quinquennat] people like Vedel and Carcassonne said: the 
next step is the reordering of the calendar. The constitutional lawyers considered that this was a 
logical consequence.”289 Despite this rational link for those following the reasoning of the 
partisans of the quinquennat, very few observers within the public sphere linked the issue of the 
quinquennat with that of the ordering of the 2002 (and possibly subsequent) elections from the 
beginning. Moreover, the concrete ways that such a reordering could take place were not easy to 
implement: the revision of Article 7 of the Constitution to hold the presidential elections in 
February or March, the resignation of the president before 2002, or the prolongation of the term 
of the National Assembly, which would have to be voted on by the National Assembly itself, a 
particularly tricky twist.  
 The first politician to defend the reform of the 2002 electoral calendar was François 
Bayrou, the leader of the centrist UDF party, who proposed in an interview with Le Monde in 
1999, a prolongation of the duration of the term of the National Assembly that had been elected 
in 1997.290 In the minds of the bayrouists, the issue of the calendar was paramount, and 
intrinsically linked with the quinquennat, and the aim was to avoid cohabitation. At the time, 
members of both the PS and of the RPR abruptly closed the debate, considering on the one hand 
                                                 
286 The main exception is Bastien François, who argues that, if French citizens elected their MPs before 
the president of the Republic, it would necessarily lead to a more parliamentarian vision of the regime, 
either because the president would be more dependent of the wishes of his majority, or because of long-
term cohabitation (2000) 
287 « L’évolution naturelle du calendrier aboutissait à pérenniser, en quelque sorte, le statu quo, qui était un 
statu quo rétablissant les élections législatives au premier plan (…) Une évolution à la portugaise en 
quelque sorte. » Interview with Pierre Avril, ex-Professor of public law at Institut d’Etudes Politiques of Paris, 
6 February 2013, at his home in Paris. 
288 « Que la réforme du calendrier soit contenue dans l’œuf par le quinquennat, c’était évident.» Ibid. 
289 « Pendant les consultations [sur le quinquennat] des gens comme Vedel et Carcassonne disaient : la 
prochaine étape, c’est l’inversion du calendrier. Les constitutionnalistes estimaient que c’était une 
conséquence logique ». Interview with Olivier Dutheillet de Lamothe, former deputy general secretary of 
the Presidency of the Republic between 1997 and 2000, 20 March 2013, at his office in Paris.  
290 Chambraud, Cécile, Jarreau, Patrick. « François Bayrou veut l’élection présidentielle avant les 
législatives ». Le Monde, 24 September 1999.  
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that it was the result of internal dissent within the right-wing camp,291 and on the other hand, that 
after the disastrous dissolution, politicians should stop playing “the sorcerers”.292 In June 2000, in 
the midst of the parliamentary debate on the quinquennat, Bayrou insisted on talking about the 
“dingo electoral calendar”.293 Badinter (PS) added his voice to the support for the modification of 
the calendar as early as July 2000.294 The pressure quickly increased after the adoption of the 
quinquennat on 24 September 2000 by referendum.295 Politicians from the MDC, the PS, 296 the 
UDF, 297 and the PRG (Maus 2001, 302) publicly declared themselves in favour of the five-year 
term. Several organic bills were proposed, as a consequence, to extend the term of the MPs by a 
couple of weeks.298 Academics also published an opinion piece on 13 October called “Let’s not 
vote with our heads upside down”, in which they argued strongly for the merits of this reform, 
for the purpose of ensuring both “majoritarian coherence” and “majoritarian pluralism”.299 At the 
time, the socialist leaders still refused to discuss the matter:300  
Despite the multiplication of voices in favour of the inversion – of both experts and 
politicians – between September 2000 and late November 2000, Chirac and Jospin refused to 
take a clear stand on the electoral calendar. The turning point occurred on 26 November 2000, at 
the Socialist Party Congress in Grenoble. Jospin surprised all during his declaration, declaring 
that the order of the elections was “not coherent”. He argued: “what one should wish is that the 
spring of 2002 would not be the spring of confusion and of the choices of convenience, but a 
spring of clarity”.301 Jospin’s former advisers have tended to confirm that it was a single-handed 
                                                 
291 Anon. « Cambadélis : ‘Aller jusqu’au bout’ ». Le Figaro, 19 October 1999. 
292 A quote from an interview with Philippe Séguin in La vie. Cf. Désaubliaux, Patrice-Henry. « Polémique 
sur le calendrier électoral de 2002 ». Le Figaro, 1 October 1999. 
293 Bayrou François. « Pour un régime présidentiel équilibré ». Le Monde, 13 June 2000. 
294 Robert Diard, Pacale. « Quel calendrier électoral pour 2002 ? » Le Monde, 7 July 2000. 
295 Cf. infra. 
296 Anon. « Forni pour une inversion ». Le Figaro, 9 October 2000. 
297 Barre, Raymond, Rocard, Michel. « Voter la tête à l’endroit ». Le Monde, 18 November 2000. 
298 Assemblée nationale. Proposition de loi organique de M. George SARRE relative à l’antériorité de l’élection 
présidentielle par rapport à l’élection législative n°2602. 3 October 2000. 
Assemblée nationale. Proposition de loi organique de M. Raymond BARRE modifiant la date d’expiration des pouvoirs 
de l’Assemblée nationale n°2741. 22 November 2000. 
299 Carcassonne, Guy, Duhamel, Olivier, Vedel, George. « Ne pas voter la tête à l’envers ». Le Monde, 13 
October 2000. 
300 Gurrey, Béatrice, de Montvalon, Jean-Baptiste. « Le gouvernement ne paraît pas disposé à modifier le 
calendrier électoral de 2002 ». Le Monde, 6 October 2000. 
301 « Ce qu’il nous faut souhaiter, c’est que le printemps de 2002 ne soit pas un printemps de la confusion 
et des choix de convenance, mais un printemps de la clarté. » Chambraud, Cécile, Gurrey Béatrice. 
« Lionel Jospin déclenche la polémique sur le calendrier électoral de 2002 ». Le Monde, 28 November 2000, 
Waintraub, Judith. « Jospin : cap sur l'Elysée ». Le Figaro, 27 November 2000. 
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decision, made by the Prime Minister, with only his director of cabinet in the secret.302 Olivier 
Schrameck, in his book Matignon rive gauche,303 explains how he advocated in favour of the 
inversion following “intense and dense” discussions with Carcassonne, Duhamel and Badinter 
(Schrameck 2001, 119), and how the decision was only leaked to François Hollande (first 
secretary of the PS) and Robert Hue (leader of the PCF) on the very same day of the 
intervention.  
To conclude, similarly to the quinquennat, the inversion of the calendar was advocated for 
by voices from academia and from both sides of the political spectrum. However, despite the fact 
that the two issues were linked in the minds of many from the very beginning, the timing of the 
debate’s emergence, and its turning point, occurred only a few months after the quinquennat.  
  
1.2.3. A divisive issue: the shadow of  the electoral fortunes of  2002 
Following Lionel Jospin’s initiative in late November 2000, the debate on the electoral 
calendar was framed as a wholly different battle than that of the quinquennat in the minds of the 
political parties, for two reasons. First of all, despite the fact that the issue was initially put on the 
table by the UDF, the concrete initiative was not merely socialist, but came from its leader, 
Jospin. Secondly, unlike the quinquennat, the topic of the electoral calendar was perceived by the 
political parties and their MPs through the filter of electoral predictions about the 2002 election. 
Quite significantly, before the debate started in the parliament, and despite the fact that 64% of 
the people questioned in a poll on 30 November 2000 supported the reform, 51% of them 
thought it was an electoral manoeuvre on the part of the PM.304 
At the time, it was widely perceived that Jospin, who had a good track record, was the 
most solid contender in the 2002 presidential election, and in all likelihood, would be the future 
President of the Republic. Avril calls him “the man who wanted to become king” (2003, 367) and 
explains how the potential re-parlamentarisation of the regime, which would have been possible 
during the fortuitous calendar of 2002, was never seriously contemplated by Jospin, who had a 
                                                 
302 I had the opportunity to consult the initial versions of the discourse in the national archives.  This 
announcement is absent from the rough copy of 18 November, written by Pierre Guelman, and from the 
version transmitted of 24 November 2000. Interview with Pierre Guelman, op. cit. 
303 Despite repeated attempts, I have unfortunately been unable to meet Olivier Schrameck. He has, 
however, published a book in 2001, with the agreement of Lionel Jospin, hence before leaving office, in 
which he talks extremely freely about his functions, his important decisions, and his role of eminence grise 
of the Prime Minister. The book is a severe indictment against the cohabitation and Chirac, and is quite 
unusual: senior civil servants in France rarely testify about their roles, and even less so before leaving 
office. 
304 IFOP Poll commented in the following article: anon. « Jospin passe en force ». Libération, 29 November 
2000 
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deep-rooted ambition to beat Jacques Chirac in a mano a mano in 2002. From the side of the 
socialist MPs, Bernard Roman insists on the fact that the context was exceptionally favourable to 
the socialists: “we were wondering what we would do with the revenue windfall! We said to 
ourselves that we had created one million jobs!”305 As a consequence, no one doubted Jospin’s 
victory, and the socialist MPs were confident of their re-election should the legislative elections 
follow the presidential one. Jospin did not even deny the tactical aspect of the operation, arguing 
that “there are also beautiful manoeuvres”.306  
The outcomes of the legislative elections, which are often described as 577 distinctive 
electoral contests, were on the other hand seen to be more open. Some members of the socialist 
cabinets published electoral analyses showing how the unexpected victory of the socialists in 
1997 was, in many regards, the result of the high number of triangulaires.307 The same analyses 
concluded that the electoral results for the left in 2002 were less certain, given the predicted lower 
number of triangular contests (Perraudeau 2000). From Chirac’s side, Philippe Bas sums up the 
situation as follows:  
“what we call the reversal of  the electoral calendar is the reconciliation of  the calendar of  the 
presidential and legislative elections in conditions that are not contestable on the substance. If  there 
has been a political fight on this, this is because of  the electoral competition that had already 
started at the time. On the right, some may have had the ulterior motive that the election of  
Jacques Chirac would be difficult, and that it would be easier if  there were in the first place 
legislative elections won by the right. On the left, people thought the contrary!”
308
 (emphasis 
added) 
 Chirac reacted by talking about a “circumstantial manoeuvre” and a “combination”.309 In 
late 2000, at least four right-wing candidates were considering running for the presidential 
elections, in addition to Chirac for the RPR: Bayrou for the UDF, Pasqua for the RPF, Madelin 
for DL, and de Villiers for the MPF. Regarding the UDF and DL in particular, because the 
                                                 
305 « On se demandait ce qu’on allait faire de la cagnotte ! On se disait qu’on avait créé un million 
d’emplois ! » Interview with Bernard Roman, op. cit. Indeed, between 1997 and 2002, the economic 
situation in France was very prosperous. 
306 « Il y a aussi de la belle manœuvre ». Chemin, Ariane, Robert Diard, Pascale. « La longue histoire du 
rétablissement du calendrier électoral ». Le Monde, 19 December 2000. 
307 In French, triangulaires (roughly translated as “triangular contests”) are contests in which the second 
round of the legislative elections oppose three candidates, usually the Socialists, the RPR, and the National 
Front. In 1997, Ysmal estimated that around 20 constituencies were held by the left thanks to this peculiar 
situation (1998). 
308 « Ce qu’on appelle l’inversion du calendrier électoral, c’est la mise en concordance du calendrier des 
élections présidentielles et législatives dans des conditions qui sur le fond ne sont pas contestables. Et s’il y 
a eu un combat politique là-dessus, c’est en raison de la compétition électorale qui était déjà commencée à 
cette époque. A droite, certains avaient peut être l’arrière pensée que l’élection de Jacques Chirac serait 
difficile, et que ça serait plus facile s’il y avait d’abord des élections législatives gagnées par la droite. A 
gauche, on pensait le contraire ! ». Interview with Philippe Bas, op. cit. 
309 Robert Diard, Pascale. « M. Chirac s’oppose à la combinaison de M. Jospin pour 2002 ». Le Monde, 16 
December 2000. 
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election of their MPs was conditioned upon their alliance with the RPR in the legislative 
elections, Chirac’s supporters were aware that it would be easier to put his troops on the line for 
the presidential elections if the opposition was constrained to a union of the centre-right for the 
legislative elections.310 The UDF was particularly divided over this issue. Clearly, Bayrou’s early 
campaign in favour of the reordering of the electoral calendar was mainly driven by his firm 
intention to be the UDF presidential candidate in the 2002 election. The rest of the party, 
however, was divided between supporters of Bayrou, and MPs who feared for their re-election 
and sought to preserve the relationship with the RPR, as illustrated by the Congress of the UDF, 
held on 2 December 2000, which witnessed the victory of Bayrou's motion. 311 
 Finally, the small parties of the left reacted in various ways. The PRG and the MDC, who 
historically supported a presidential regime, stayed put.312 The Communists denounced the 
change as “dangerous for democracy” and a form of “pluralism”.313 Indeed, the PCF feared a 
disappointing result in the presidential election, which would limit their ability to negotiate 
constituencies in pre-electoral agreements for the legislative elections with their socialist partners. 
The same reasoning was followed by the Greens, who from early on, tried unsuccessfully to link 
their votes on the calendar with the introduction of PR.314   
One can summarise the positions of all the parties on the modification of the electoral 
calendar quite simply: those who believed that they would lose the presidential elections, or who 
were not in position to reach the second round of the presidential elections, opposed the 
proposal (so the RPR, the non-Bayrouist wing of the UDF, PCF, Greens). On the other hand, 
“those who [were] convinced of immediate alternation, like the socialists, or those who [were] 
convinced by their destiny, like François Bayrou”, supported the reform.315 In conclusion, the 
reform of the electoral calendar serves to illustrate the link between divisive reforms and 
outcome-contingent motivations (here, the electoral prospects for 2002) perfectly.  
                                                 
310 Robert Diard, Pascale. « Le premier ministre endosse les habits du candidat ». Le Monde, 26 November 
2000. 
311 De Montvalon, Jean-Baptiste. « François Bayrou entre en champagne face à des chiraquiens réduits au 
silence ». Le Monde, 5 December 2000. The real debate was actually much deeper, and regarded projects to 
regroup the political forces of the right into a single entity. Interview with Dominique Paillé, op. cit. 
Indeed, on 23 April 2002, the UMP (at the time, “Union for a presidential majority”) was created in order 
to reunite all the right, except for the far-right. Despite its refusal to be incorporated into the new party, 
many of the UDF leaders and MPs left at that time (Sauger 2008). 
312 Anon. « Jospin sème la pagaille à gauche ». Libération, 1 December 2000. 
313 Beuve Méry, Alain. « Le PCF refuse un changement dangereux pour la démocratie ». Le Monde, 30 
November 2000 
314 Anon. « Jospin sème la pagaille à gauche », op. cit. 
315 « Ceux qui croient dur comme fer à l’alternance immédiate, comme les socialistes, ou de ceux qui 
croient dur comme fer à leur destin, comme François Bayrou ». Interview with Dominique Paillé, op. cit. 
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1.3. Analysis of the press coverage of the two reforms 
Before we turn to the analysis of the adoption of the reform, an analysis of the press 
coverage will provide interesting insights about the turning points in the debates, but also about 
the recurring arguments, illustrative of the different natures of the two reforms. I will first show 
that the two reform debates have clearly been covered separately rather than concomitantly, 
illustrating the sequential logic that was followed for the two reforms, with one clearly following 
the other in time. Secondly, I will demonstrate that the debate on the quinquennat focused on 
arguments about “modernity”, “democracy”, and the shape of the regime, whereas the debate on 
the calendar focused more on accusations of manipulation, and on the centrality of the 
presidential function.  
 
1.3.1. The coverage over time: volume and turning points 
This analysis is based on the hand-coding of the arguments contained in 1023 articles 
published between 1 July 1999 and 30 June 2001 in the three main French daily newspapers on 
the five-year term and the electoral calendar.316 I could have used more complex research strings, 
or a longer time frame, which would have helped to make up an even more exhaustive corpus. 
However, I am confident that it already gives a very fair idea of the quantity of writing, and the 
tone of the debate, on both of these reforms. On the issue of the volume of debate, several 
questions are important: did the coverage of the reform differ widely across newspapers? Do 
there appear to be turning points during the debates? Were the two reform issues under scrutiny 
considered together, or at different times? And finally, were other institutional reforms 
considered concomitantly, and if so, which ones?  
There was little difference in the coverage between newspapers, in terms of quantity. 
Overall, in regards to both the quinquennat and the reform of the electoral calendar, Le Monde’s 
coverage was slightly more extensive (391 articles) than that of Le Figaro (353) or Libération 
(279).  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
316 Cf. appendix 13. 
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Figure 13. Coverage of the reforms of the quinquennat and of the electoral calendar by newspaper, July 1999-
June 2001 
 
Still, as Figure 13 shows, the peak coverage in all the newspapers occurred at exactly the same 
moment: May and June 2000 (legislative bill proposal and discussion of the quinquennat in the 
parliament), September 2000 (referendum on the quinquennat), and December 2000 (parliamentary 
discussion on the reordering of the electoral calendar).317 When looking at the coverage of the 
newspapers by theme (Figure 14), it becomes clear that the two issues have been covered 
separately. In 1999, after a brief moment of interest in the quinquennat, following Chirac’s 
declaration on 14 July that it was “a mistake”, the issue fell down the agenda until May 2000. 
Until late September, the shortening of the length of the presidential term was covered quite 
extensively, before it fell off the agenda altogether after its adoption by referendum in September 
2000. The issue of the electoral calendar started to gain momentum in September 2000, and this 
interest reached its peak in December, before slowly tapering off in 2001. Finally, Figure 14 
shows that the two issues have rarely been considered concomitantly, with small exceptions in 
June and September 2000. The coverage was more than twice as extensive for the quinquennat 
(633 articles) than for the electoral calendar (306 articles), and only 84 of the 1023 articles coded 
(8.2%) dealt with both reforms at once. Having been put on the agenda at around the same time 
in 1999, the two reforms followed a clearly sequential logic: first, the quinquennat, and only then, 
the calendar. This provides quite a graphic illustration of the manner in which bundles of reforms 
can take the form of a sequence, rather than a package deal, as in the following chapter.318 This 
also shows that the two reforms were covered in the public debate as two separate issues, which 
proved crucial during the period of adoption.319  
                                                 
317 Cf. infra. 
318 Cf. chapter 8. 
319 Cf. infra. 
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Figure 14. Coverage of the reforms by theme, July 1999-June 2001 
 
Finally, I have assessed whether the two institutional reforms of the quinquennat and the electoral 
calendar have been examined in the light of other institutional reform themes, either those 
deemed necessary, or those currently being discussed. Indeed, despite the fact that the political 
elites only chose to examine these two reforms in the same sequence concomitantly, it could have 
been possible that the public debate linked these reforms to a wider debate on the institutions. 
Among the 633 articles dealing with the quinquennat, 28.4% also mentioned other institutional 
reforms, whereas 21.6% of the 306 articles dealing with the reordering of the electoral calendar, 
and 36.9% of the 53 articles dealing with both reform issues do so. Therefore, contrary to what 
has happened in Ireland, for example, where the public debate focused on multiple institutional 
issues at once, in France, the two reforms in question were generally presented 
“unidimensionally”. It appears that the quinquennat was sometimes considered together with the 
duration of other terms in office, particularly that of the senators. The debate on the electoral 
calendar led to reflections on the electoral system for the legislative elections. The themes of the 
status of Corsica, and of decentralisation in general, were also present to a marginal extent on the 
back of the two reform debates.320 What is, perhaps, more interesting than the most commonly 
mentioned institutional themes, are those that are rarely referenced: the reform of Articles 5 and 
20 regulating the roles of the President and the Prime Minister (3 articles only!), to give one 
example. Therefore, the debate was not structured in any real way around definitive proposals to 
adapt the wider institutional system, and in particular the presidential role. Rather, most of the 
                                                 
320 Cf. appendix 14. 
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other reforms referenced appear to be demands for payback: more decentralisation, a more 
powerful parliament, the introduction of PR in the legislative elections, shorter terms in office for 
senators, the resolution of the issue of Corsica, etc. In other words, these two reforms were not 
part of any grand institutional plan to redesign the institutions in the public debate. Rather, the 
press coverage shows two issues which have been examined separately, detached from the wider 
institutional context.  
 
1.3.2. The main arguments related to each reform: an illustration of  the different 
natures of  the reforms 
 To understand the differences in framing in the coverage of the two reform debates, let 
us now analyse the most frequent arguments utilised, either in defence of or opposition to the 
reforms. The complement of articles we will examine are the 556 out of 1023 articles in which 
the treatment of information has not been purely descriptive and factual, but contains either 
tactical considerations about the reforms, and/or arguments that defend or oppose them.  
 The first observation one can make is that, of these 556 articles, no less than 38.1% 
contain tactical considerations, i.e. speculations by the actors, either as to the potential 
consequences of the reform for them (outcome-contingent motivations), and/or the desirability 
of being seen to support the reform and its process (act-contingent motivations) (Reed and Thies 
2001). These considerations also feature in more than half of the articles on the electoral calendar 
issue (Table 16).  
Table 16. Articles containing tactical considerations about the quinquennat and/or the electoral calendar 
Theme N % Total 
Quinquennat 88 29.2 301 
Electoral Calendar 102 52 196 
Both 22 37.3 59 
Population: the 556 articles in which the treatment of the reforms is not purely factual.  
The fact that newspapers pay attention to these tactical considerations is not surprising per se. On 
the other hand, the gap in the coverage – in terms of tactical considerations – of the two reform 
issues clearly proves that the quinquennat was viewed through the prism of tactical politics by the 
newspapers (and therefore by the political actors) to a far lesser extent than the calendar reform. 
Therefore, this suggests that the reforms were perceived as having different natures, the second 
reform being framed in terms of outcome-contingent calculations much more than the first. The 
contrasting treatment of the two reforms is even more apparent when one examines the 
222 
An Unexpected Journey: Two Institutional Reforms in France 
arguments which are most commonly called upon for, or against, the reforms (among the 440 
articles containing some form of argumentation).  
Figure 15. Arguments presented among the articles containing argument for or against the reforms of the five-year 
term and electoral calendar, July 1999-June 2001, in % 
Quinquennat: N=246 
 
Electoral Calendar: N=143 
 
Reading: among articles mentioning pro, anti, and neutral reform arguments on the quinquennat, 31.3% evoke the 
rise/decrease of the risk of cohabitation.  
The articles about the length of the presidential term tended to be slightly skewed in favour of 
change, whereas the articles on the electoral calendar tended to contain anti-reform arguments 
more often than pro-reform arguments. Out of the 246 articles that contained some 
argumentation on the quinquennat, 55% contained pro-reform arguments, 46.3% anti-reform 
arguments, whereas of the 143 articles discussing the electoral calendar, 53% contained 
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arguments in favour, versus 60.1% against.321 The two debates have undoubtedly gone down 
different routes. In the case of the presidential term, the most common argument concerns the 
risk of a drift by the French regime either towards more presidentialisation, or, less often, 
towards a “regime of parties”. The matter of cohabitation comes in second place, with almost 
one third of the articles mentioning some sort of arguments for, or against the reform also 
referring to the quinquennat’s potential capacity to prevent this institutional configuration. Other 
frequent reform arguments concern the “democratic” character of the quinquennat (27.2% of the 
arguments), or its “modernity” (24%). Therefore, overall, the framing is as follows: a debate on 
the ability of the quinquennat to prevent cohabitation and to bring about greater democracy and 
modernity, and the possible threat of presidentialisation. When it comes to the debate on the 
electoral calendar, the picture is quite different. Among the 143 articles containing argumentation 
on the matter, almost half of them contain discussion on the centrality (or marginality) of the 
presidential function in the French institutional regime. Strikingly, no less than 49% of these 
articles contain a reference to some sort of “trick”, or to “electoral manipulation”. Almost one-
third of the arguments also deal with the possible drift of the regime (again, mostly towards 
presidentialisation). Hence, there are no nice evocations of modernity or democracy here: it is 
clear, by looking at the press coverage, that electoral considerations about 2002 and fears about 
the role of the president were at the forefront of the debate.  
 In conclusion, the two issues have been examined sequentially, and have been framed 
very differently: whereas the five-year term was essentially a consensual issue, the electoral 
calendar was perceived as both divisive and manipulative.  
 
2. Two reforms of different natures leading to highly distinct 
processes of adoption  
 
The study of the process of emergence and formulation of the reforms has shown that the 
main difference between the two lies in what the political actors perceive as their different 
natures: a consensual reform guided by competition for the initiative on the one hand for the 
quinquennat, a divisive reform driven by self-interest for the electoral calendar. As a consequence, 
the debate on the five-year term was characterised by a supermajoritarian process, in which 
credit-claiming and blame-avoidance were paramount, whereas the electoral calendar reform 
                                                 
321 Note that the total is not 100%, as one article can contain both pro- and anti-reform arguments. Cf. 
appendix 15. 
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followed a purely majoritarian logic, in which the opposition unsuccessfully attempted to delay 
the reform and to break up the PS-UDF reform coalition.  
 
2.1. Institutional competition over a consensual reform: the supermajoritarian logic in 
action 
The quinquennat was adopted in the parliament despite the many ambiguities hidden 
behind the parties’ support: everyone supported the reform expecting different results. By 
limiting the debate to the length of the presidential term (the so-called “quinquennat sec”), thus to a 
single-dimensional issue, the executive managed to adopt the reform with a wide majority. The 
process shifted from credit-claiming to blame avoidance during the phase of final adoption, as 
Chirac was the sole initiator of the referendum. I conclude on the characteristics of 
supermajoritarian processes when consensual reforms are at stake.  
 
2.1.1. The “quinquennat sec” and the “yes” of  all ambiguities in the parliament 
The government bill, proposed by the PM with the initiative of the president, was 
submitted on 7 June 2000.322 It consisted solely of the replacement of the word “seven” with the 
word “five” in Article 6 of the Constitution. The explanatory memorandum, which was extremely 
short, only stipulated that this would contribute to the “vitality of the democratic debate” without 
endangering “the balance of the institutions”, and would bring greater coherence to a system 
where the president is the central figure. The debate in the parliament was extremely short: five 
sessions over two-and-a-half days in the National Assembly, and one session over a single day in 
the Senate. Some authors even blamed the “parlement godillot”323 (Jaume 2000, 224). 
The debate began on 8 June 2000, in the Commission of Laws. Gérard Gouzes, the 
rapporteur, gave a detailed account of the reform arguments, underlining, among other things, 
the centrality of the presidential role, the fact that the quinquennat would reduce the risk of 
cohabitation and reinforce clarity. He described the reform as the passage from “a monarch 
president to a citizen president”, which would represent a “modernization of political life” 
(Gouzes 2000, 14). Whereas almost all of the participants were in favour of the quinquennat, a 
majority of the participants, especially among the small parties, regretted that the institutional 
                                                 
322 Assemblée Nationale. « Projet de loi constitutionnel relatif à la durée du mandat du président de la République 
n°2462 », 7 June 2000. http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/11/pdf/projets/pl2462.pdf 
323 Literally, “clodhopper parliament”. This French expression is used to describe a disciplined parliament 
that follows orders without discussing them. 
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reform was limited to this single aspect. Alain Tourret, (PRG) and Jean-Pierre Michel (MDC) 
defended a presidential regime and the reinforcement of the parliament. On the other side, the 
Greens presented a large number of amendments, including the adoption of PR, decentralisation, 
and the right to vote for foreign residents, whereas the Communists supported dispositions to 
strongly reinforce the parliament. None of these provisions were adopted, but what becomes 
clearly apparent is that the supporters of the quinquennat were heterogeneous, and that individual 
reservations remained over the form and content of the reform. During the general discussion, 
Guigou (PS Minister for Justice) noted that the debate could he held “without ulterior motives” 
and bring together a large majority (Assemblée Nationale 2000b, 5337–5338). She then 
preventively closed the debate to any other matter, arguing: “this reform is sufficient for the time 
being. For the rest, it will be time to see afterwards”.324  
During the discussion, the only true opponents were the members of the RPF, a right-
wing, anti-European, and sovereignist political force. Philippe de Villiers argued, in a very lengthy 
intervention, that “the proposed reform devastates (…) all the balance of our institutions” by 
harming the “cardinal principle” of the presidential function – duration, by degrading the 
president “to the rank of Prime minister”, and finally, by impeding de facto the president's use of 
his strongest weapon: dissolution (Assemblée Nationale 2000c, 5347). For each of the big parties, 
the PS and the RPR in particular, most of the debate was devoted to demonstrating to their 
opponents that their own party had defended the quinquennat with greater enthusiasm and for 
longer than anyone else.325 Whereas the socialists argued that “the vote of the quinquennat is an 
opened gate towards a more complete revision of the institutions of the Fifth Republic”,326 the 
RPR insisted that the reform of the quinquennat was desirable, as it did not endanger the structures 
of the institutions.327 Therefore, a strange situation arose during the explanations before the final 
vote in the National Assembly. Many parties voted for the reform hoping it would lead to further 
reforms, which were often contradictory: real local democracy for DL, a balanced presidential 
regime for the PRG and the MDC, decentralisation, PR, suppression of the dual mandate and a 
strong parliament for the Greens. The Socialists supported the reform, swearing, in order to calm 
down the smaller coalition partners, that the institutional discussion would be reopened again in 
2002. The RPR voted for a reform that the Gaullists had initiated in 1973. The PCF abstained, 
not because they were against the quinquennat, but because this was the only institutional reform 
                                                 
324 « Cette réforme suffit dans l'immédiat. Pour le reste, il sera temps de voir ensuite. » Ibid. p. 5339 
325 Cf. the interventions of Devedjian (RPR), Floch (PS), ibid. 
326 Cf. the intervention of Jacques Floch, (PS) “le vote du quinquennat est une porte ouverte sur une 
révision plus complète des institutions de la Ve République. » Ibid. p.5358 
327 Cf. the intervention of Jean-Louis Debré (RPR), ibid. 
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up for discussion, therefore leading to further presidentialisation and bipolarisation.328 The 
reform was adopted on 20 June 2000, with 466 votes in favour and 28 votes against. Therefore, 
many parties voted in favour of the reform with very different expectations and based on very 
different reasoning, meaning that the consensus behind the length of the presidential term was 
based on multiple, and sometimes opposite, expectations.  
Despite this widespread agreement, there was also evidence of silent internal dissent in 
some parties, particularly the UDF in which 14 MPs opposed the project (vs. 51 in favour). The 
discussion in the Senate on 29 June 2000 brought no new elements to the table, apart from the 
fact that Robert Badinter (PS) mentioned the “chronology of the elections”,329  considering that if 
the legislative elections preceded the presidential election, the fate of the latter would depend on 
the outcome of the former. It is interesting to note the offended reaction of the RPR senators at 
the suggestion of a possible inversion of the 2002 electoral calendar.330 Some arguments about 
the genesis of the reforms were exchanged again, with the RPR recalling Mitterrand’s position in 
1973, wondering “who are the converted”, adding that “history will recall that the reform of the 
quinquennat has been initiated by the president, Pompidou, and has come good under the 
presidency of Jacques Chirac”.331 In any event, as was the case in the Assembly, an extremely 
wide majority of the senators adopted the text without amendment, with 228 in favour and 34 
against, leading to the definitive adoption of the text in the parliament.    
This quick, and apparently consensual adoption leads us to one question: how could so 
many parties, and individuals with very different visions of the desirable institutions agree on this 
particular institutional reform? The answer is twofold. Firstly, the quinquennat seemed a desirable 
reform for the vast majority of those concerned, because they all considered that their interest 
was best served through supporting it; either because it would be a first step towards further 
reforms that were seen as necessary or profitable (outcome-contingent motivations), or because it 
was seen to be in their best interest merely to be seen to support the reform (act-contingent 
motivations). Secondly, the leaders of the main parties successfully limited the debate to one 
aspect – the five-year term, even at the cost of making opponents remain silent, in order to rush 
the debate and avoid the development of dissent.  
                                                 
328 Intervention of Jacques Brunhes (PCF) Assemblée nationale. « Compte rendu intégral de la deuxième 
session », 20 June 2000, 5604. http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/11/cri/html/20000231.asp 
329 Sénat, « Compte rendu intégral de la session », 29 June 2000.  
http://www.senat.fr/seances/s200006/s20000629/s20000629_mono.html 
330 ibid. 
331 « Je me demande qui sont les convertis (…) L'histoire retiendra que la réforme du quinquennat a été 
engagée par le président Pompidou et a abouti sous la présidence de M. Jacques Chirac » Cf. the 
intervention of Henri de Raincourt (RPR), ibid. 
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As the debate was voluntarily limited to the so-called “dry quinquennat”, many of the 
ambiguities, and sometimes opposed positions, were successfully reconciled within that reform. 
Jospin’s parliamentary relations adviser, Pierre Guelman, explains the PM’s position regarding the 
disallowing of amendments to the project and linking to other institutional dimensions:   
“The opening of  a wider debate than one addressing only the quinquennat would have taken us I 
do not know where. First, we are in a ‘plural majority’. The dry quinquennat is not acceptable to 
a portion of  the leftist plurality, who believe that more ambitious reform of  the institutions 
should be undertaken. (…) That majority was not elected to implement a programme of  
institutional reforms of  the Fifth Republic. So, through the implementation of  a common-
sensical measure, namely a calendar that is coherent with that of  the big democracies, going 
beyond it, effectively asking questions of  the nature of  the regime itself  (…) Where did that 
take us?”
332
  
From the point of view of the opposition, Dominique Paillé tells me, with irony, that that 
parliamentarians of the RPR were convinced by Chirac that it would be in his interest, and 
ultimately in theirs, at election time, to support the project without amending it. He concludes: 
“as MPs have two priorities, the first being to get reelected and the second, to have as little 
trouble as possible with their party, they have followed even when they disagreed”.333 Didier 
Maus confirms the versions from both sides, recalling: “both from the left and from the right, 
there were people who were fundamentally hostile to the quinquennat. And it has been told, to one 
and all, ‘shut up!’”334 To summarise, the issue of the divisive consequences of the reform has 
been successfully avoided by focusing on the sole, consensual, question of duration. This 
confirms the idea presented in Chapter 5 that consensual reforms are easier to adopt with a wide 
majority when they are limited to single-dimensional issues.  
 
2.1.2. Avoiding blame: the deafening silence of  the referendum on the 
quinquennat 
After the adoption of the constitutional project by the parliament, the campaign for the 
referendum could be opened. Despite a certain number of advocates, both from the PS and the 
                                                 
332 « L’ouverture d’un débat plus large que celui du simple quinquennat nous emmenait je ne sais pas très 
bien où. D’abord, on est en majorité plurielle. Le quinquennat sec ne plaît pas beaucoup à une partie de la 
gauche plurielle qui considère qu’il fallait être un peu plus ambitieux dans la réforme des institutions. (…) 
Cette majorité n’avait pas été élue pour engager un programme de réformes constitutionnelles de la 
Cinquième République. Donc à travers une mesure de bon sens, c'est-à-dire un calendrier cohérent avec 
celui des grandes démocraties, aller au delà, poser la question du type de régime… (…) Où est-ce que tout 
ça nous emmenait? » Interview with Pierre Guelman, op. cit.  
333 « Comme les parlementaires ont deux priorités : la première, c’est de se faire réélire, et la deuxième, 
c’est d’avoir le moins possible d’emmerdements avec leur parti, ils ont suivi même quand ils n’étaient pas 
d’accord ». Interview with Dominique Paillé, op. cit 
334 « Aussi bien à gauche qu’à droite, il y avait des gens étaient fondamentalement hostiles au quinquennat. 
Et on leur a dit, aux uns et aux autres, ‘bouclez-là !’ » Interview with Didier Maus, op. cit. 
228 
An Unexpected Journey: Two Institutional Reforms in France 
opposition, pushing for Chirac to use the Congress, he was steadfast in his decision to consult 
the French citizens.335 It is now surely remembered as one of the dullest referendum campaigns in 
the history of the Fifth Republic, leading to a paradoxical result: an overwhelming “yes” in favour 
of the quinquennat (73.2%), but with the lowest voter turnout ever registered for a national 
consultation (30.2%). One question immediately comes to mind: why did the political parties put 
so little energy into defending a reform that almost all of them supported in the parliament? 
There are two main reasons for this: the fact that the referendum was a presidential initiative, and 
also the perception that the referendum result was a foregone conclusion. Parties feared being 
blamed for calling a referendum on a topic that was not of great interest to the citizens, rather 
than sensing the potential gains in the case of referendum victory, which explains their policy of 
wait-and-see. This strategy was made easier by the fact that Chirac was clearly the sole, and 
therefore main actor responsible for the referendum. There are two underlying conditions for 
blame here: firstly a perceived harm, in this case a futile referendum, and secondly a perceived 
responsibility, in this case Chirac (Hood 2010, 6). Thus, all parties except the RPR saw the 
referendum as an opportunity to weaken the president. In other words, whereas the adoption of 
the five-year term in the parliament was guided by credit-claiming motives, the adoption by 
referendum of the quinquennat clearly obeyed blame-avoidance logic, as described by Weaver (1986, 
1988). 
On 8 July 2000, Chirac (finally) clearly asked the French citizens to vote “yes” to the 
reform in the referendum of 25 September 2000.336 The only political force that actively 
campaigned against the referendum was the small RPF, however the National Front (FN) and the 
Mouvement National Républicain (MNR) idly advocated for a “no” vote. The leader of the RPF, 
Charles Pasqua, ended up declaring: “I have the impression of being all alone”.337 The PCF 
supported a “critical and offensive abstention” (sic).338 The Greens didn’t even manage to agree 
on an official position on the referendum, despite having supported the quinquennat in the 
parliament.339 The UDF, having launched the reform, basically refused to take any part in the 
                                                 
335 Fabre, Clarisse, Robert-Diard, Pascale. « Les partisans du Congrès se multiplient à droite ». Le Monde, 17 
June 2000.  
Noblecourt, Michel. « François Hollande sceptique sur l’intérêt d’un référendum ». Le Monde, 20 June 
2000.  
The leaders of the RPR senators, like Poncelet, or Josselin de Rohan, were particularly reserved about the 
opportunity of the referendum. 
336 Anon. « Maintenant c’est à vous de choisir ». Le Monde, 8 July 2000. 
337 Schneider, Vanessa. « Pasqua – Je me sens seul ». Libération, 16 September 2000. 
338 Beuve Méry, Alain. « Pour les communistes, Robert Hue prône une abstention critique et offensive ». 
Le Monde, 20 June 2000. 
339 Gurrey, Béatrice. « Les Verts ne parviennent pas à adopter une position claire sur le quinquennat ». Le 
Monde, 29 August 2000.  
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campaign. In the Socialist Party, despite the nonchalant organisation of a few meetings, most 
protagonists implicitly or explicitly admitted that their best interest was in blaming the abstention 
on Chirac. Hollande, on 1 September 2000, made the following declaration: “we prefer the 
quinquennat rather than the septennat. The head of state, on the other hand, prefers the referendum 
rather than the Congress. Therefore, everyone will be judged on the decisions one has taken”.340 
The RPR of Jacques Chirac was therefore the most active party advocating for a “yes” in the 
campaign.341  
Figure 16. Poll predictions for “yes” vote and turnout for the referendum on the quinquennat, June-September 
2000 
 
Source: Figures reported in the French newspapers Libération, Le Monde and Le Figaro between June and September 
2000.  
On the side of the experts and the commentators, the constitutional lawyers, who were quite 
active in helping to bring the issue of the quinquennat forward were, on the whole, silent.342 The 
press coverage of the campaign mainly consisted of comments about the polls announcing an all-
time low turnout, and on the lack of interest of French people in the matter. As figure 16 shows, 
the enthusiasm for the “yes” vote slowly decreased between June and the referendum, while the 
predicted turnout followed the same declining trend, and still overestimated the actual turnout.
  
                                                 
340 « Nous préférons le quinquennat au septennat. Le chef de l'Etat, lui, a préféré le référendum au 
Congrès. Donc, chacun sera jugé sur les décisions qu'il a prises. » Mauduit, Laurent, Noblecourt, Michel. 
« Il faut redonner aux Français les dividendes fiscaux de la croissance ». Le Monde, 1 September 2000. 
341 The financial sums devoted by the state and the parties to the referendum give a clear idea of their 
disinterest in the campaign. The state spent €30.5 million on the referendum, whereas the European 
election of 1999 cost €101 million. Whereas the PS and the RPR spent around €300,000 in campaigning, 
parties like the UDF only spent €2300! Bulletin quotidien. 19 September 2000, found in the national 
archives. 
342 One exception is an opinion piece by Vedel: Vedel, Georges. « Voter oui et comprendre ». Le Monde, 16 
September 2000. 
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After interrogating politicians, advisers and experts about the insider version of the 
referendum, their impressions and interpretations were quite unanimous. When I asked Yves 
Colmou about the reasons why the parties, including the PS, put so little energy and so few 
resources into the campaign, he candidly answered: “because there was nothing at stake!”343 Maus 
gives a variation on this argument: “people did not understand what was at stake”.344 Mény gives 
me an interesting account of the referendum, arguing that there was simply no “social demand” 
for such a referendum: “these are problems of political organization that are not perceived as 
political problems, but as problems of the political class”.345 Obviously, from the point of view of 
the political actors, tactical aspects were at the forefront, which explains this lack of implication. 
Guelman, advisor to Jospin, notes that, for the Socialist Party, there was simply no perception of 
potential political gains to be made by campaigning, given that the positive result was 
inevitable.346 From the point of view of the UDF, Dominique Paillé argues that after initiating the 
reform, “if we had been little soldiers in that story, we would have been the little soldiers of 
Chirac even though the RPR, given its divisions, was much less compact on the topic than us.”347 
In conclusion, given that French people has supported the concept of the quinquennat for 
decades, most of the political actors believed there to be more drawbacks to campaigning than to 
staying put, all the more so seeing as the initiative for the referendum clearly came from Jacques 
Chirac. This referendum was perceived as potentially risky, mostly because the issue at stake was 
not strongly politicised. This says quite a bit about institutional reforms and supermajoritarian 
logics. The fight over the initiative of the reform was quite fierce (in terms of pure credit-claiming 
reasoning), whereas the final adoption clearly followed a blame avoidance logic. Indeed, as 
everyone was aware that the turnout would be meagre, given the lack of public interest in the 
matter, it was more important to maintain distance from the referendum than to defend a 
measure that had been overwhelmingly approved in the parliament.  
 
 
 
                                                 
343 « Parce qu’il n’y avait aucun enjeu! » Interview with Yves Colmou, op. cit. 
344 « Les gens ne comprenaient pas l’enjeu ». Interview with Didier Maus, op. cit. 
345 « Ce sont des problèmes d’organisation politique qui ne sont pas perçus comme de vrais problèmes 
politiques, mais comme de problèmes de la classe politique. » Interview with Yves Mény, political scientist 
and specialist of the institutions, ex-director of the European University Institute, 31 January 2013, at a 
café in Paris.  
346 Interview with Pierre Guelman, op. cit. 
347 « Si on avait été des petits soldats dans cette affaire, nous aurions été les petits soldats de Chirac alors 
même que le RPR, compte tenu de ses divisions, était beaucoup moins soudé sur le sujet que nous. » 
Interview with Dominique Paillé, op. cit. 
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2.1.3. Consensual reform, supermajoritarian adoption: the quinquennat 
The examination of the press articles, the parliamentary debates, the interviews and the 
archives has shown that the reform of the length of the presidential term was framed by the 
political elites as a consensual reform, i.e., a reform for which the political actors had a general 
perception of widespread agreement on the desirability of the alternative contemplated. As a 
consequence, parties paid particular attention to act-contingent motivations, i.e. on being seen to 
support the act of reform. Of course, the reasons why the different parties believed the 
quinquennat would benefit them differed, but overall, the reasoning was that the reform was 
modern, more democratic, supported by a great majority of the citizens, did not risk upsetting the 
balance of powers within the political system, and might open the door for further, beneficial, 
reforms. The accuracy of these perceptions is not what is at stake here: what is important is that 
the way in which this reform was perceived by the French political actors paved the way for 
cross-party adoption, which was confirmed later on by the results of the referendum, despite the 
low turnout.  
The reform followed a supermajoritarian logic: all of the actors in the political system had 
an input in the process, from the elaboration to the adoption. The UDF, through the voice of 
Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, introduced the topic in the parliament through a proposition of law. 
The socialists, led by Jospin, gave their support to this proposal, and negotiated with the 
president of the Republic, Chirac, who finally agreed to support a government bill. The main 
preoccupation of the parties was the struggle to associate themselves with the initiative of the 
reform, particularly for the RPR and Chirac, as they jumped on the bandwagon. The choice of a 
referendum constituted a good illustration of this credit-claiming logic: it was perceived as a way 
for Chirac to recover some of the credit for a popular reform, having been cut off from its 
initiative. This is also the reason why most of the parties did not mobilise during the referendum 
process, and why the dominant strategy shifted from credit-claiming to blame avoidance: 
campaigning for the passing of the referendum would have meant giving credit to Chirac.  
To conclude, there is a link between the fact that the quinquennat was perceived as a 
consensual reform and the logics of adoption which followed, involving all of the political class, 
and following logics of credit-claiming for what was seen as a “good-policy”. This first 
archetypical path of adoption of a consensual institutional reform can be contrasted against the 
logic behind the electoral calendar reform.  
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2.2. Self-interest guiding a divisive reform: the adoption of the reordering of the electoral 
calendar 
After Lionel Jospin’s announcement in late November 2000, things moved quickly for the 
reordering, or “reinstatement” of the electoral calendar. A proposition of organic law was 
discussed in the Parliament as early as December 2000, and was only definitively adopted in April 
2001, after a fierce parliamentary battle, most notably in the Senate. This proposal led to a 
peculiar split of forces within the parliament: on the one hand, the socialists, supported by 
around half of the UDF, who defended the switch; on the other hand, the Greens, the 
Communists, the RPR and the other half of the UDF, who fought to keep the legislative 
elections before the presidential one. This process illustrates a configuration where the 
government unilaterally leads a majoritarian process of reform on a divisive issue.  
 
2.2.1. La guerre des nerfs: five months of  fierce parliamentary battle  
The adoption procedure for the reordering of the electoral calendar in the Parliament led 
to no less than five months of debate between the first meeting of the Commission of Laws on 
12 December 2000, and the final adoption on 24 April 2001, with three readings in the National 
Assembly, two in the Senate, and one Commission mixte paritaire (mixed joint commission).348 The 
uncertainty of the process has its basis in two elements. Firstly, the socialists, who did not have 
the support of several of their allies (PCF, Greens) needed some centrist MPs to support the 
project. Secondly, whereas the left had the majority in the lower Chamber, the centre-right still 
had a clear majority in the Senate. This enabled the opposition to engage in a long battle to slow 
down the adoption of the text. The format of the procedure is important in the analysis of the 
adoption of this text. Indeed, the government attempted to use all of the available tools to 
accelerate the adoption of the law: using a proposition of law rather than a government bill (as 
any government bill would have to be approved by the Conseil d’Etat before discussion in the 
Parliament), and choosing an emergency procedure in order to limit the number of readings in 
each chamber. On the other hand, through its majority in the Senate, the opposition led a long 
battle of filibustering, using all the tools allowed by the standing orders. Yet in the end, the 
heteroclite PS-half-UDF coalition managed to pass the law, as the National Assembly has the last 
word in French parliamentary procedure.  
                                                 
348 The mixed joint commission is an organ of resolution for conflicts between the lower and the upper 
chambers. Composed of seven MPs and seven senators, it is convened by the PM in order to facilitate the 
adoption of a common text by both Chambers. The PM must wait for two readings of the text, unless the 
emergency procedure has been decided, as was the case on this text (Art. 45 of the Constitution). 
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Before the debate took place in the assembly, secret negotiations and intimidation began. 
The PS wanted to be sure that the UDF, or most of it, would support the project, whereas the 
RPR attempted to intimidate the supporters of the text. This led Barre, former UDF Prime 
Minister and MP, to declare (regarding the RPR parliamentarians): “I could ask them who led the 
Fifth Republic astray the most, and this for the cohabitation in which they wallowed simply to 
share power”.349 From Jospin’s side, faxes were exchanged with friends in which one MEP 
advised the PM that “Chirac [was] afraid of the French people”, a “chicken”, with a “cushy 
job”.350 Therefore, from the beginning, the tone of the debate was extremely harsh and in 
complete contrast to the debate on the presidential term. Six proposals of organic laws aiming to 
change the electoral code in order to modify the order of the 2002 elections were examined 
during the meeting of the Commission of Laws of the national Assembly on 12 December 
2000.351 Bernard Roman’s report began with the title, “take the heat out of the debate: a simple 
reinstatement of calendar” (Roman 2000).352 Roman, socialist president of the Commission of 
laws, insisted on the fact that the calendar of 2002 appeared by chance, and that the text aims to 
preserve “one of the main benefits of the Fifth Republic: (…) the majoritarian fact” (Roman 
2000, 5). The report dismissed the arguments about the Socialist Party’s ulterior motives in 
relation to the reform (2000, 6), and argued about the practical difficulties arising from the 
electoral calendar if it remained unchanged. It concluded by stating that the constitutional council 
had changed the dates of expiration of municipal and local assemblies before, arguing therefore 
of the existence of a legal precedent. Paradoxically, and contrary to the institutional (official) 
tradition of the PS, which considers that the parliament is not powerful enough in the French 
Fifth Republic, the main line of argument consisted of arguing that the presidential election was 
the keystone of the French institutions.353 From the very beginning of the debates in the 
                                                 
349 “Je pourrais leur demander qui a dévoyé le plus la Ve République, et cela depuis la cohabitation dans 
laquelle ils se sont vautrés simplement pour partager le pouvoir » Anon. « La réplique cinglante de 
Raymond Barre ». Le Monde, 5 December 2000. 
350 “Chirac a peur des Français”, “le planqué de l’Elysée”, “trouillard”. These are some of the abstracts 
from the exchanges of faxes between Lionel Jospin and a French Socialist MEP, of 29 November 2000 
and 12 December 2000, consulted in the national archives. 
351 Cf. Proposals n°2602 of George Sarre (MDC), n°2665 of Bernard Charles (PRG), n°2741 of Raymond 
Barre (UDF), n°2756 of Hervé de Charette (UDF), n°2757 of Gérard Gouzes (PS) and n°2773 of Jean-
Marc Ayrault (PS). All of the proposals aimed to hold the presidential election before the legislative 
elections, except for Charles’ proposal that they be concomitant. 
352 The subtle difference between “reversal” and “reinstatement” is quite a good way of differentiating the 
opponents from the supporters of the measure. When I met Guy Carcassonne and started asking 
questions about the “reversal”, I was told to “ban [the word] from [my] vocabulary”. Interview with Guy 
Carcassonne, op. cit. I have personally chosen to refer to the “reordering”, as other academic articles use 
the same terminology (Jérôme, Jérôme-Speziari, and Lewis-Beck 2003). 
353 In reality, the centre-left had long accepted and even converted the cardinal principle of the presidential 
pre-eminence in practice, when the possibility of governing became realistic (Duhamel 1980). 
234 
An Unexpected Journey: Two Institutional Reforms in France 
commission, and unsurprisingly, the Greens and the Communists opposed the text on the 
grounds that it would reinforce presidentialism. Mamère (Greens) ironically noted that the 
president at the time, Chirac, “killed Gaullism”, while the Prime minister became “the first 
Gaullist of France” (Roman 2000, 19).  
The first reading in the Assembly mainly consisted of the granting of symbolic tokens by 
the Socialist Party to the UDF, in order to secure their support. On 19 December 2000, the 
discussion started in the assembly with a so-called “debate on the future of the institutions”, 
which was an explicit demand from the UDF to the socialists.354 Most of the debate was devoted 
to the accusations by the RPR, DL and half of the UDF of political opportunism from Jospin, 
and of presidentialisation from the PCF and the Greens.355 The second guarantee that was given 
to the UDF consisted of socialist support for an UDF proposition on local experimentation.356 
The third took the form of a collaboration between UDF and PS specialists in writing certain 
technical amendments.357 Yves Colmou explained to me, “the fact that it was an UDF MP who 
initiated this new redaction was a political sign to reach an agreement and broaden this 
majority”.358 The voting patterns in the first reading of 19 December 2000 only confirmed the 
initial positions: the small PRG, the MRC and the smaller ‘half’ of the UDF stood with the PS 
despite the reiteration of pressures from the Chiraquians.359 On the other hand, a majority of the 
UDF, the RPR, the Communists, and the Greens voted against the text. As a result, with 300 
votes in favour and 244 against (with 25 UDF in favour and 31 against), the first version of the 
text was adopted, including two articles: the first stating that the powers of the Assembly would 
expire on the third Tuesday in June; the second stating that the law is applicable only to the 
Assembly elected in 1997.  
The remainder of the debate consisted of a long battle to delay the adoption in the 
Senate, led by the RPR. In France, a sort of unofficial rule supposedly states that one does not 
change the rules a year before an election. Hence, the senators tried to use that rule, and went as 
                                                 
354 Robert Diard, Pascale. « Lionel Jospin défendra l’inversion du calendrier à l’Assemblée ». Le Monde, 7 
December 2000. 
355 Assemblée Nationale, « 1ère Séance du 19 décembre 2000, compte-rendu intégral ». http://www.assemblee-
nationale.fr/11/cri/html/20010101.asp 
356 Fabre, Clarisse. « Le droit à l'expérimentation locale prépare le débat sur la Corse ». Le Monde, 16 
January 2001. The text was eventually adopted in 2003 over the course of the constitutional law about 
decentralisation. http://www.senat.fr/dossier-legislatif/pjl02-024.html 
357 The amendment of Blessig (UDF) adopted on 20 December 2000 aimed to set the date of expiration of 
the powers of the national assembly on the third Tuesday in June, in order to avoid starting the work of 
the assembly with an extraordinary session, or during a weekend. 
358 « Le fait que ça soit un député UDF qui soit à l’initiative de cette nouvelle rédaction était un signe 
politique pour aboutir et élargir cette majorité ». Interview with Yves Colmou, op. cit. 
359 Huet, Sophie, Roquelle, Sophie. « Calendrier : la journée de tous les calculs ». Le Figaro, 20 December 
2000. 
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slowly as possible, so that the final adoption would take place less than one year before the 2002 
presidential election. When the text was first discussed in the upper chamber in the Commission 
of laws, on 16 January 2001, the main conclusion of the rapporteur, Christian Bonnet, RPR, was 
implacable: “no general interest motive justifies the measure that is proposed” (Bonnet 2001, 4). 
Following the report, the debate in the Senate for the first reading lasted no more than three 
weeks, of which seven days were devoted exclusively to the general discussion, during which five 
senators spoke in favour of the text, and 53 against. Finally, on 7 February 2001, the Senate 
adopted seven articles which modified the text completely, including multiple clauses of 
ineligibility concerning members of municipal councils, departmental councils (conseils généraux), 
and MPs. This was actually The Senate’s attempt at a clever trick: by adopting these articles, and 
since the electoral code states that the conditions of ineligibility for MPs also apply to senators, 
the Senators argued that the text now fell under Article 46.4 of the French Constitution, which 
states that organic laws relative to the Senate must be approved in the same terms by both 
Chambers. This lengthy discussion successfully delayed the final adoption until after the 
municipal elections of 2001, which took place on 11 and 18 March 2001.360  
This disagreement led to the meeting of the commission mixte paritaire (mixed Joint 
Commission) on 29 March 2001, during which no agreement was reached, meaning that the 
National Assembly had the final word on the text. Before the second reading of the text in the 
National Assembly on 3 April 2001, Bernard Roman, in his report to the Commission of laws, 
denounced a “caricatural opposition” in the Senate, which he called a “parliamentary guerrilla” 
(Roman 2001, 8). After another reading in each of the chambers, the marathon ended on 24 April 
2001, with a final vote of 308 MPs in favour, and 251 against in the National Assembly. In other 
words, the socialists even managed to broaden their UDF support, compared to the first reading. 
Much could be said about the final epilogue of the manoeuvres in the presidential 
election of 2002, when Jospin failed to get into the second round, leading to an unforeseen duel 
between Jacques Chirac and the far-right candidate, Jean-Marie Le Pen, a duel which saw Chirac 
win with an overwhelming majority of 82%. Dozens of books, hundreds of academic articles, and 
thousands of press articles attempted to understand this apparently implausible scenario.361 Still, 
                                                 
360 Analysts note that these elections delivered an ambiguous verdict (Dolez and Laurent 2002), also 
meaning that the national balance of power was not fundamentally affected by this consultation 
361 The debate about the rupture these elections represented for the French electoral order has been 
particularly fierce. Martin (2002) argues that such an order, in place since 1984, is not disrupted by the 
presidential election, arguing that the PS remains the dominant party in the left, that the far-right result is 
not confirmed in the legislative elections, and that the domination of the chiraquians is all that is 
confirmed. Mayer (2003) argues on the other hand that there a shift occurred in the supporters of Le Pen. 
One edited book talks about the “vote of all refusals” (Perrineau and Ysmal 2003). Dolez and Laurent 
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just as it was designed, the legislative elections did nothing but confirm the verdict of the 
presidential elections, with a blue wave and a very strong right-wing parliamentary majority. 
Coming back to the process of adoption of the electoral calendar, a few conclusions are clear. 
First of all, this divisive institutional reform was adopted thanks to the ability of the Socialist 
Party to convince half of the centrists, and thus to have an overall majority. Secondly, the 
opponents used all of tools at their disposal to delay the reform, denounce it, and make it appear 
illegitimate.  
 
2.2.2. Divisive reform, majoritarian adoption: the reordering of  the electoral 
calendar 
The issue of the electoral calendar appeared on the agenda through the joint mobilisation 
of a small team of constitutional and political experts, and the individual initiatives of leaders 
coming from both the left and the centre. Yet, following the agenda-setting process, the process 
of adoption of the reform of the electoral calendar can be contrasted, point by point, against that 
of the quinquennat. The initiative to examine the law in the Parliament was taken unilaterally by the 
Socialist Party, and most particularly by its leader Lionel Jospin. The reform was perceived from 
the very beginning as being a divisive reform, with calculations involving the 2002 elections, 
which seemed to be the only thing guiding the position of the political parties in the parliament, 
regardless of their institutional tradition (in particular for the PS and the RPR).  
Therefore, this process shows that majoritarian processes of reform involving divisive 
issues are guided primarily by outcome-contingent motivations. Here, the process of adoption 
resulted from the perception of anticipated gains and losses, analysed almost purely in terms of 
self-interest by the actors involved. The underlying logic was purely majoritarian: there were no 
attempts to involve all of the actors within the political system, like in the debate on the 
quinquennat. The initiative was unilateral, and the adoption corresponded to the convention of an 
ad hoc parliamentary majority composed of the Socialists, and some of the UDF, who considered 
that they stood to benefit from the new ordering of the elections (see synthesis table 17).  
  
                                                                                                                                                        
note that the inversion of the electoral calendar led to the proportionalisation of the first round of the 
presidential election, and to the dispersion of the votes for the left (2003). Laver, Benoit and Sauger refer 
to Jospin’s strategic error in drifting too close to the centre to secure the left-wing vote (2006). Lewis-Beck 
(2003) summarises the reasons why the French voters voted the way they did in 2002, showing elements 
of both strong continuity and discontinuity in the 2002 vote. 
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Table 17. Summary of the processes of emergence and adoption of the reforms of the quinquennat and the 
reordering of the electoral calendar 
 Agenda-
setting 
Initiative of the 
reform in the 
parliament 
Type of 
reform 
Process of 
adoption 
Dominant logic of 
the political actors 
Quinquennat Cross-party, 
academics 
UDF Consensual Supermajoritarian Credit-claiming 
Electoral 
Calendar 
Cross-party, 
academics 
PS Divisive Majoritarian Self-interest 
Most importantly, there are strong reasons to believe that, had the two reforms of the 
quinquennat and the electoral calendar been discussed simultaneously rather than at different 
points in time, the logic that would have prevailed would have been self-interest and the 
majoritarian process of adoption, as the parties were particularly sensitive to gains and losses. In 
other words, the fact that the two reforms obeyed different logics of adoption is due, first, to 
their different nature, and second, to the fact they were adopted sequentially and not as part of a 
single package deal. In addition, both of these processes of reform illustrate the fact that the 
French political actors took position, first and foremost, based on what they stood to gain or to 
lose from the reforms: either from the act of reform, or from its outcomes. Philippe Bas, Chirac’s 
adviser, described this to me in extremely direct terms, summarising the whole game:  
“So, you see that in both cases the substantive arguments are completely secondary (…) I 
would say that politics has its own laws: from the moment when you do not damage the 
proper functioning of the Fifth republic, I am in no way shocked that in democratic 
competition, you take positions that are not essentially based on content, but tactical 
positions”.
362  
  
 
Conclusion 
 
Pierre Avril, summarising the two reforms of the quinquennat and of the electoral calendar, 
talks about:  
“a battle, a situation, a chance to seize, with in the background the dogma of the fifth 
Republic that had been interiorized by everyone, namely that the government (…) had to be 
a presidential government, and that situations of cohabitation (…) were abnormal situations. 
                                                 
362 « Donc vous voyez que dans les deux cas les arguments de fond sont complètement secondaires. (…) 
Je dirais que la politique a ses droits : à partir du moment où vous n’abîmez pas le bon fonctionnement de 
la Cinquième République, cela ne me choque nullement que dans la compétition démocratique, vous 
preniez des positions qui ne sont pas essentiellement des positions de fond, mais des positions tactiques » 
Interview with Philippe Bas, op. cit. 
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(...) And finally, the representations have in a certain way forced the political behaviour to 
comply with the new constraints of the quinquennat and the electoral calendar”363 
In other words, both reforms largely derive from each other, as they are two sides of the same 
coin, in order to ensure the pre-eminence of the presidential reading of the French constitution 
over the parliamentary one. And yet, despite this logical link, both reforms are of a very different 
nature: one was perceived as a consensual reform, the other as the premise of the electoral battles 
of 2002, and as a result, a divisive reform. Consequently, the processes of adoption, the size of 
the coalitions supporting the reforms, and the nature of the battle in the parliament leading to the 
adoption were quite different: a supermajoritarian process, a very broad coalition, and credit-
claiming strategies on the one hand, and a purely majoritarian process, with a small majority, and 
self-interested strategies on the other. Therefore, what is paramount here for the purposes of 
understanding the final outcome of the reforms, and to predict the scope of the coalition 
supporting the reform, is neither their “object”, nor their processes of emergence, but rather the 
perception by the political actors as to the nature of these reforms, and the subsequent processes 
of adoption. I have also mentioned over the course of the chapter the fact that these two reforms 
followed a sequential logic: rather than examining both reforms together, the reformers paid 
particular attention to separating these two institutional issues. This sequential strategy has surely 
influenced the paths and the outcomes of the two reforms. The final case study of this thesis, on 
the other hand, goes back to the analysis of the bundling logic, and its consequences for the 
Italian institutional reforms between 2001 and 2006.  
  
                                                 
363 « Une bataille, une situation, une chance à saisir, avec en toile de fond le dogme de la Cinquième 
République qui avait été intériorisé par tout le monde, à savoir que le gouvernement (…) devait être un 
gouvernement présidentiel, et que les situations de cohabitation, même si cela marchait apparemment, 
étaient une situation anormale. (…) Et finalement ce sont les représentations qui ont en quelque sorte 
forcé les comportements politiques à se plier aux nouvelles contraintes du quinquennat et du calendrier 
électoral ». Interview with Pierre Avril, op. cit. 
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Chapter 8 Bundling the bundles: coalition dynamics and 
institutional reforms in Italy, 2003-2006 
 
 
« Ora vi conto tutto. 
Ma tenetevi forte alle sedie. 
Perché tutto si tiene, tutto si tocca, tutto si collega ».  
Il Divo, 2008, regia di Paolo Sorrentino 
 
 
 Discussing and occasionally enacting institutional reforms is almost a national sport in the 
Italy of the so-called “Second Republic”. During the fourteenth legislature (2001-2006), 
discussions and negotiations about the Italian institutional system have come to a peak, leading to 
the adoption in the Parliament in 2005 of a reform modifying around 50 articles of the Italian 
constitution; repelled in a referendum, and the replacement of the mixed-member majoritarian 
electoral system adopted in 1993 by a mixed system (Bedock and Sauger 2013) combining PR 
with a majority bonus. 
The failed constitutional reform and the successful electoral reform constitute 
archetypical examples of the dynamics behind divisive institutional reforms conducted through a 
majoritarian process. This chapter is guided by two puzzling interrogations: how could an 
extremely heterogeneous government coalition adopt a set of far-ranging institutional reforms in 
the parliament, and why did the constitutional reform eventually fail while the electoral reform 
was adopted? The main argument of this chapter is that the very presence of four coalition 
partners with different priorities has led to the formulation and negotiation of an ever wider 
bundle of institutional reforms. First, this large bundle has been built in order to accommodate 
the diverging priorities and preferences of the government coalition by giving something to each 
party, a condition without which no deal could have been reached. Secondly, the very dynamic of 
tradeoffs and the anticipation of the effects of the reforms have led the reformers to include 
more and more provisions in the deal, eventually evidencing the crucial importance of time 
management in the final outcome of the two reforms. Hence, the bundling logic is double here: 
both in terms of package-deal, and in terms of sequence. The second crucial argument regards 
the link between a majoritarian process of adoption of divisive institutional reforms, and their 
final outcome. The electoral reform was adopted by the centre-right majority in the parliament. 
The constitutional reform, on the other hand, has been repelled by the voters in 2006 in a 
confirmative referendum in the aftermath of an alternation in power. This failed referendum can 
240 
Bundling the Bundles: Coalition Dynamics and Institutional Reforms in Italy 
be thought as the direct consequence of the inability of the centre-right to close the deal on the 
constitutional reform enough time before the 2006 parliamentary elections.  
 The first part of the chapter focuses on the convergence in 2003 of four aspects of the 
constitutional debate in a unique discussion: federalism, “forma di governo” (“form of 
government”), bicameralism, and to a much lesser extent the electoral reform. The second part of 
the chapter is devoted to the analysis of the adoption of the reforms, focusing on the expansion 
of the scope of the discussion on the institutional reforms, and on the final outcome of the two 
reforms: definitive adoption on the one end, rejection on the other han Discussing and 
occasionally enacting institutional reforms is almost a national sport in the Italy of the so-called 
“Second Republic”. During the fourteenth legislature (2001-2006), discussions and negotiations 
about the Italian institutional system came to a head, leading to the adoption by the Parliament in 
2005 of a reform to modify around 50 articles of the Italian constitution, which was rejected at 
referendum, and the replacement of the mixed-member majoritarian electoral system adopted in 
1993 with a mixed system (Bedock and Sauger 2013) combining PR with a majority bonus. 
The failed constitutional reform and the successful electoral reform constitute 
archetypical examples of the dynamics behind divisive institutional reforms conducted through a 
majoritarian process. This chapter is guided by two puzzling questions: how could an extremely 
heterogeneous government coalition adopt a set of far-ranging institutional reforms in the 
parliament, and why did the constitutional reform eventually fail while the electoral reform was 
adopted? The main argument of this chapter claims that the presence of four coalition partners, 
each with different priorities, led to the formulation and negotiation of an ever wider bundle of 
institutional reforms. This large bundle was constructed in order to accommodate the diverging 
priorities and preferences of the government coalition by giving something to each party, a 
condition without which no deal could have been reached. Also, the very dynamic of trade-offs, 
along with the anticipation of the effects of the reforms led the reformers to include more and 
more provisions in the deal, demonstrating the crucial importance of time management in the 
final outcome of the two reforms. Hence, the bundling logic is doubled here: both in terms of 
package-deal, and in terms of sequence. The second crucial argument regards the link between a 
majoritarian process of adoption of divisive institutional reforms, and their final outcome. The 
electoral reform was adopted by the centre-right majority in the parliament. The constitutional 
reform, on the other hand, was rejected by voters in 2006 in a confirmative referendum in the 
aftermath of an alternation in power. This failed referendum can be thought of as a direct 
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consequence of the centre-right’s inability to close the deal on the constitutional reform with 
enough prior to the 2006 parliamentary elections.  
 The first part of the chapter focuses on the convergence, in 2003, of four aspects of the 
constitutional debate in a unique discussion: federalism, “forma di governo” (“form of 
government”), bicameralism, and to a much lesser extent, the electoral reform. The second part 
of the chapter is devoted to an analysis of the adoption of the reforms, focusing on the 
expansion of the scope of the discussion on the institutional reforms, and on the final outcome 
of the two reforms: definitive adoption in the one case, rejection in the other. 
 
1. From separate discussions to the convergence of the institutional 
debate in 2003 
 
Before the fourteenth legislature, Italy seemed to have all of the conditions, both long and 
short-term, which are favourable to institutional reforms and were identified in the first part of 
this thesis: the lowest level of political support in Western Europe, very high electoral volatility, 
and successive political alternations since 1993. This led to the formulation of a narrative 
advocating the use of institutional reforms as a way to end the “Italian transition”. The four main 
elements that have structured the debate about institutional reforms since the 1990s have 
followed different paths. Whereas the questions relating to the form of government, 
bicameralism and electoral reform have tended to be associated, the matter of federalism only 
appeared later in the debate, not least because of the efforts of the Lega Nord. During the 
thirteenth legislature, the centre-left government attempted a major revision of the constitution 
linking all aspects together, which eventually led to the adoption of a federalist constitutional 
reform in 2001, which gave major legislative authority to the Italian regions. The institutional 
reforms of the fourteenth legislature direct consequences of the unresolved issues posed, in 
particular, by the 2001 reform. In 2003, after the failure to implement several separate projects of 
reform, the multiple elements of the debate were linked together again, leading to an initial deal in 
the summer of 2003 between the four components of the centre-right majority.  
 
1.1. The institutional debates of the “Second Republic” before 2001 
Before we deal with the beginning of the fourteenth legislature, it is important to recall a 
few contextual elements in order to understand the debate on institutional reforms in Italy over 
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the last few decades. After the collapse of the Italian party system of the First Republic in 1993, 
experts and politicians progressively became convinced of the centrality of institutional reforms 
in order to close the so-called “transition”. There were numerous attempts, up until the adoption 
of a major decentralising reform in 2001 following the third Bicameral Commission of D’Alema’s 
failed attempt to adopt a major revision of the Italian constitution. This reform largely set the 
standard for the reforms adopted in 2005, both because of its content, and because of the way in 
which it was adopted.  
 
1.1.1. Dissatisfaction with democracy, electoral uncertainty, alternations, and 
“transition” in the aftermath of  1993 
Any debate on the Italian institutions since 1993 has to be placed in the context of the 
major crisis within the Italian institutional and party system in the early 1990s, which arose from 
the combination of three main contingent catalysts: the modification of the electoral demands 
resulting from the erosion of traditional political identities and communist and catholic 
subcultures (as a result of the fall of the USSR), the consequences of the judicial enquiries of 
Mani Pulite, and the impact of the referendum on the electoral law in the Senate (Cotta and 
Isernia 1996, Katô and Di Virgilio 2001, Morlino 1996). Other authors consider the combination 
of these elements to be insufficient to explain the crisis in the Italian political system, and talk 
about the widespread dissatisfaction that had been present in the society since the 1940s, and 
only found opportunity for expression in the 1990s (Morlino and Tarchi 1996). Still others note 
that during the 1980s, the internal competition of the parties of the majority (pentapartito) had 
become extremely harsh, leading the institutions to become dangerously permeable to interest 
groups, leading to corruption (Ceccanti and Vassallo 2004a).   
No matter what explanations are advanced, the level of distrust in the democratic system 
reached an alarming level: only 11.9% of the Italian respondents in the Eurobarometer survey of 
1993 said that they were very or fairly satisfied with the functioning of their democracy. This 
intense dissatisfaction took the form of earthquake elections in 1994, where the level of volatility 
reached 36.7% (Bartolini and D’Alimonte 1995), the highest registered in Western Europe since 
1945.364  These levels peaked again in 2001 at 20.4% (D’Alimonte and Chiaramonte 2007, 379). 
                                                 
364 Cf. the 2011 blog entry by Peter Mair, “One of Europe’s most volatile 
election”http://politicalreform.ie/2011/02/28/one-of-europe%E2%80%99s-most-volatile-elections/ 
The 2013 Italian election reached a level of volatility of 39%, according to the calculations of Chris 
Hanretty.  
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The Italian party system underwent a profound transition during the same period, with the 
disappearance of all the major actors of the Italian First Republic, and the advent of a 
“fragmented bipolarism” (Chiaramonte 2010), with the alternation in power of vast, ideologically 
heterogeneous centre-left and centre-right coalitions with each election. These two poles 
progressively concentrated the quasi-totality of votes and seats, although the two main parties in 
each camp (Forza Italia for the right and Democratici di Sinistra for the left) never obtained more 
than 46.4% of the total votes between 1994 and 2001 (Bartolini, Chiaramonte, and D’Alimonte 
2004, 4). After a very short-lived centre-right government, that fell only a few months after the 
election in late 1994, a technical government directed by Dini and supported by the League and 
the centre-left was put in place, which lasted up until the 1996 elections, in which the centre-left 
was victorious, despite the fact that the centre-right obtained more votes than them (D’Alimonte 
and Bartolini 1997; D’alimonte and Bartolini 1998). There were no less than four successive 
governments between 1996 and 2001, before the centre-right managed to win an election. Both 
the Berlusconi I government (centre-right) and the Prodi I government (centre-left) fell because 
of the internal tensions caused by the most extreme elements inside their parliamentary coalition: 
the Northern League on the one hand, and Rifondazione Comunista on the other (D’Alimonte 
and Bartolini 2002). As a result, the government formed in 2001 was a heterogeneous centre-right 
coalition led by Silvio Berlusconi, and comprised of four parties: Forza Italia, Alleanza Nazionale, 
the Unione Democratica di Centro, and the Lega Nord. These four parties were diverse in every 
possible way: political history and ideology, traditions of organisation, electoral strength, but also 
geographical strongholds.  
In this context of deeply rooted uncertainty and party system recomposition, the general 
consensus among Italian political scientists and lawyers associated the need to reform the 
institutions, with a way to end the Italian transition365 (among many others, see Ceccanti and 
Vassallo 2004,  D’Amore 2007, Fabbrini 2003, Lanzalaco 2005). This paradigm can be associated 
with the intense feeling of the intrinsic abnormality of the “anomalous” Italian political system, 
and of the need to regularise it through the transformation of the institutions:  
“The Italian political debate has long been characterized on the one hand by a general 
consensus that fundamental institutional reform is needed, and, on the other, by a lack of 
agreement over what needs to be changed. Furthermore, since the end of the 1990s, there 
                                                                                                                                                        
http://chrishanretty.co.uk/blog/index.php/2013/02/25/the-most-volatile-western-european-election-
ever/ 
365 This position is criticised by other specialists of the Italian political system, who underline the 
“inherently problematic nature” of the “transitional myth” (Bull 2012). Newell talks about “the man who 
never was”, referring to the same “transition” (Newell 2009), considering that something lasting for more 
than fifteen years cannot be accurately called a transition. 
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has been deep-seated disagreement over the best (or ‘legitimate’) method by which such a 
reform might be achieved – beyond acceptance of the formal procedures for reform laid 
down by the Constitution. As a consequence of these three factors, the debate over 
institutional reform has become an intimate part of the substantive struggle for political 
power.” (Bull and Newell 2009, 43). 
 
1.1.2. Form of  government, bicameralism and electoral reform: attempts to 
enable the advent of  a majoritarian democracy 
The Italian institutional system instituted by the 1948 Constitution is a parliamentary 
democracy characterised by a weak executive power, a strong Parliament, a president of the 
Republic indirectly elected with relatively vast formal powers (including dissolution and 
nomination of the head of government), and a symmetric bicameralism with no equivalent in 
other democracies. Up until 1993, this form of government was associated with a proportional 
electoral system which led systematically to coalition governments, constituting the archetype of a 
“polarized pluralism” as defined by Sartori (1976), with many traits resembling the 
“consociational democracy” described by Lijphart (1969).  
In the aftermath of 1993, the debates on the revision of the Italian institutions 
progressively focused on the means to make the executive stronger, to revise the symmetric 
bicameralism, and to modify the electoral system in order to ensure the governability of the 
institutional system. In other words, form of government and bicameralism and electoral reform 
have been thought of as two sides of the same coin. The matters of the form of government 
and/or bicameralism have been discussed in virtually every legislature since the 1980s, with more 
“radical” solutions proposed (but never implemented) since 1994, and the advent of the so-called 
Second Republic.  
The Bozzi commission (1984-1985), also known as the first Bicameral commission and 
reporting in the ninth legislature, was one of the first major attempts to review the Italian 
Constitution of 1948. Still, its proposals regarding the form of government were minor, leaving 
the principles already in force essentially untouched. During the eleventh legislature, the De Mita-
Iotti Commission (1992-1994), also known as the Seconda Bicamerale, were working on a 
constitutional project that, if adopted, would have led to the reinforcement of the powers of the 
prime minister (powers of nomination and revocation), but also to the institution of mechanisms 
such as the constructive motion of no-confidence. Yet another committee, in this case the 
Speroni committee (July-December 1994), proposed the following provisions: either the direct 
election of the prime minister in a system where the president of the Republic would play the role 
of guarantor, or the institution of a semi-presidential regime inspired by the French model. 
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During the course of the D’Alema third Bicameral commission instituted in 1997, an agreement 
between the different political forces was reached on the following points: the direct popular 
election of the president of the Republic with a two-round system, the strong connection 
between the nomination of the PM and the results of the elections for the Chamber of Deputies, 
the end of the symmetric bicameralism, the prevalence of the prime minister, and a 
reinforcement of the powers of the government regarding control of the legislative procedure 
(Servizio studi 2013). Therefore, between the mid-1990s and 2001, the solutions considered 
alternated between the institution of a semi-presidential regime largely inspired by the French 
experience, or a strong reinforcing of the head of government, inspired by the British 
Westminster institutional system. As noted by Ceccanti and Vassallo, the positions of the main 
Italian parties, those of the centre-left and those of the centre-right, were (and remain) fairly close 
in relation to institutional matters (2004a, 17). Unlike the differences between left and right, the 
differences within fragmented coalitions, including parties with polarised positions on the matter, 
or in others words, “the veto players within each coalition” (Bull and Newell 2009, 54), made any 
change impossible. To summarise, the “big” parties in both poles (FI, DS, AN and, somehow, 
the Margherita) supported the reinforcement of the executive – either through semi-
presidentialism or through a strengthening of the role of the PM, while the small parties, and in 
particular the heirs of Christian Democracy, opposed it in order to privilege parliamentarism with 
a weak executive.  
Electoral reform was also on the agenda for a long time in Italy, but unlike with the form 
of government, major changes (i.e. the replacement of the former electoral system with a new 
one) have actually taken place thanks to the positive outcomes of two major abrogative 
referendums, promoted by political actors at the margins of the political system. The electoral law 
has been used as a scapegoat in order to explain the institutional inadequacies of the country by 
these “elite outsiders” (Donovan 1995). In 1991, 95.6% of the citizens voted in favour of the 
abrogation of the multiple preferences. In April 1993, 82.7% of the citizens voted for the 
abolition of the PR system in the Senate, obliging the legislators to modify the electoral law in 
both the Chamber and in the Senate because of the symmetric bicameralism in Italy. It is safe to 
say that the modification of the electoral system in 1993, which led to the adoption of a rather 
baroque mixed-member majoritarian system, was the result of very strong constraints on the 
political actors, which led to a system that elected 75% of the parliamentarians from single-
member districts, and the 25% remaining with PR, with multiple and complex provisions 
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regarding compensation, thresholds, etc.366 The final, complex outcome (the so-called 
“Mattarellum”)367 is a typical case of a reform process resulting from elite-mass interaction 
(Renwick 2010). Most of the parliamentary negotiations were the result of self-interested 
strategies adopted by the parties of the First Republic, which endeavoured to temper the 
majoritarian injunctions of the referendum as much as was possible (Chiaramonte and Virgilio 
2006,  Katz 2003), in a context of “extreme uncertainty” (Andrews and Jackman 2005). Following 
the adoption of the Mattarellum, attempts to modify the system again in the 1990s sought to make 
it fully majoritarian. Two abrogative referendums held in 1999 and 2000 sought to abolish the PR 
part of the electoral system, both times with widespread approval from voters (91% and 70.6%, 
respectively), but without reaching the 50% quorum of registered voters (49.7% and 32%, 
respectively). Parliamentary attempts have been no less numerous, although also unsuccessful, 
again because of opposition from small parties in each camp, opposed to a fully majoritarian 
system that would have largely prevented their presence in the Parliament. 
 
1.1.3. Federalism: from a leghist emblem to the reform of  Title V in 2001 
Italy has been relatively centralised for most of its democratic history. The initial 
institutional model concerning the organisation of the state gave the regions limited, concurrent 
legislative powers on specifically listed matters368 which had to comply with the national interest, 
with considerable means of control by the State.  
The debate on so-called “federalism” only came into play at the end of the 1980s, with 
the voice of the party which would later become the Lega Nord. The Lega is one of the main 
“innovations” of the Italian party system since the 1990s, jumping from two to 80 
parliamentarians in 1992, and borne of various leagues expressing “localist claims and (…) 
antagonism with respect to the traditional political system” (Diamanti 1993, 4). The Lega is 
characterised by an anti-centralist rhetoric, which is often violent and emphatic. The politicisation 
of the matter of “federalism” is clearly one of its major policy achievements. Previously, the 
proposals of reforms placed emphasis on the need to make minor revisions to the existing 
system. After the first big electoral successes of the Lega Nord, the word “federalism” became a 
                                                 
366 This description is inappropriate, as the electoral system adopted in 1993 is exquisitely complex, with 
subtle and significant differences between the Chamber and the Senate. For a useful synthesis, cf. 
D’Alimonte 2005, 256–261. 
367 The nickname “Mattarellum” was coined by Giovanni Sartori, after the name of the rapporteur, Sergio 
Mattarella. 
368 Except for regions with special status that had a certain number of exclusive legislative powers on 
particular matters. The first regional elections occurred only in 1970. 
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recurring element in the Italian institutional debate (Morrone 2004, 248–249). In an interview, 
Salvatore Vassallo notes: “until 1989, federalism was a concept practically inexistent in the public 
debate. (…) In 1992, it was considered a violent word, a polemic used by Bossi to enter the 
political market. But already in 1994, 1995, it is very widespread”.369  
During the De Mita-Iotti Commission (1992-1994), the majority of the political forces 
supported a “neo-regionalist” model, which included, in particular, the assignment to the regions 
of all matters not explicitly attributed to the State, for the regions with special status (in Italian, 
“rovesciamento della potestà legislativa”, reversal of the legislative authority). The Speroni Committee 
did not welcome the federalist (actually, confederal) proposals of the Lega, and again proposed 
the attribution to the regions of the so-called residual legislative competency, more financial and 
statutory autonomy, and the repartition of the administrative functions between the state and the 
regions (Servizio studi 2013a).  
The tone of the debate changed after the ambiguous convergence between the Lega Nord 
and the centre-left parties during the Dini government.370 Bossi, running on his own in 1996, 
obtained very positive electoral results (10.4% of the votes and 87 parliamentarians), which led 
him to switch his discourse from federalism to secessionism. As a result, the federal option 
became more respectable, and was seen as endorsable by the mainstream centre-left parties 
(Morrone 2004, 248–249). This third bicameral Commission of D’Alema had been working on 
the federalist option, “especially to contrast the right for secession that the Lega wanted to 
introduce in the new Constitution”.371 As a consequence, all of the parties, except for the League 
and Rifondazione Comunista agreed upon a “federal organization” (Morrone 2004, 249). The 
actual implementation of this option took place with the adoption of two constitutional laws: one 
in 1999, and two in 2001.  
The constitutional laws 1999/1 and 2001/2 recognised the full statutory autonomy of the 
ordinary regions and of the regions with special status, and also implemented the direct election 
of the president of the region, who gained substantial powers of direction and government. 
                                                 
369 «Fino al 89, il federalismo era una parole pressoché inesistente nel dibattito pubblico. (...) Nel 92, é 
considerata una parola violenta, polemica usata da Bossi per entrare nel mercato politico. Ma già nel 94, 
95, é molto diffusa. » Interview with Salvatore Vassallo, Professor of Political Science and Comparative 
Politics at University of Bologna, former MP of Emilia-Romagna between 2008 and 2013, PD, 11 June 
2013, at his office in Bologna.   
370 The short-lived Berlusconi I government fell because, as early as late 1994, Bossi withdrew his support 
for Berlusconi and his allies. This ribaltone (reversal) seems to have been a rather traumatic experience for 
Berlusconi, so much so that preserving the alliance with the temperamental Bossi became an obsession 
when he returned to power in 2001. 
371 « Sopratutto per contrastare il diritto alla secessione che la Lega voleva introdurre nella nuova 
Costituzione ». 
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These laws were approved by a very wide majority in both Chambers. The rest of the reform of 
Title V, however, ended up being adopted by a very small majority of five votes by the centre-
left, a few days before the end of the legislature. This adoption “a colpo di maggioranza” (by the sole 
majority) was a first in Italian constitutional history, where the previous attempts had tried to 
unite opposition and majority in the constitutional reforms. The main provisions of this reform 
include (1) the constitutionalisation of all of the entities forming the Italian Republic; (2) the 
inversion of the legislative powers with a differentiation between matters of exclusive 
competence of the state, concurrent matters, and all remaining matters going to the regions; (3) 
the distribution of the administrative competences on the basis of the principle of subsidiarity; (4) 
the creation of the so called “differentiated regionalism”, with the possibility for ordinary regions 
to obtain extra legislative competences; (5) the suppression of any mention of the preservation of 
the national interest; (6) the extension of the financial autonomy of the regions; and (7) the 
suppression of various instruments of control exercised by the state on the regions and the local 
entities.  
At the time, it was opposed by the centre-right in the parliament on the grounds that it 
was “a set of feeble half-measures designed to curry favour with voters while doing little to 
change the actual substance of the highly centralized Italian constitutional order” (Amoretti 2002, 
127). The reform was adopted thanks to a confirmative referendum in late 2001,372 during which 
the centre-left defended the reform while the centre-right challenged it for not going far enough 
towards decentralisation, although many individuals still took a position in favour (Amoretti 
2002, 128). The referendum was only opposed by the Lega Nord and Rifondazione Comunista, 
for the absolute opposite reasons,373 and resulted in a positive outcome (64.2% “yes” vote).  
This law, which was adopted in a rush before the end of the legislature, was soon 
criticised for its serious limitations: the absence of a transitory discipline, the very disputable and 
rigid repartition of competences which it operates - taking away from the legislative competences 
of the state on strategic matters in the national interest,  the absence of any revision of the high 
Chamber to enable it to adapt to this new “federal” organisation (Morrone 2004, 260), but also 
the absence of a supremacy clause,374 and the lack of subsequent ordinary laws to actually 
                                                 
372 « Sopratutto per contrastare il diritto alla secessione che la Lega voleva introdurre nella nuova 
Costituzione ». 
373 RC used the opportunity of the referendum to protest against privatisations. Padovani, Gigi. 
«Bertinotti: un no per fermare chi cerca di privatizzare l’Italia». La Stampa, 5 October 2000. 
374 Interview with Carlo Fusaro, Professor in the department of legal sciences in the università degli Studi 
of Florence, 10 June 2013, at his office in Florence. 
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implement the constitutional clauses.375 Moreover, one has to keep in mind the rather cynical 
reasons which guided the implementation of this reform. According to Giovanni Tarli Barbieri, 
“this reform (...) was imposed by the centre-left for political reasons, all political, in order to 
snatch the flag of federalism from the hands of the Lega Nord and of the centre-right”.376 
Salvatore Vassallo explains that a few months before the 2001 elections, “the idea got ground in 
the centre-left (...) that there was a need to give a sign to the electorate of the Centre-North 
attracted by the Lega, that however could be recaptured by the centre-left, of attention towards 
the North”.377 The fact remains that the reform of Title V adopted in 2001 was the most 
important constitutional reform adopted in Italy since 1948, and would largely influence the 
emergence of the package of reforms from 2003 onwards.  
 
1.2. The convergence of the debates on federalism and form of government in 2003 
From the beginning of the legislature, the discussion on institutional reforms remained on 
the agenda, with the examination of various topics including the reinforcement of the Prime 
Minister (“premierato”), and the so-called devolution supported by the Lega. Both of these projects 
soon reached a dead-end, partly because of the prejudicial attitude of the centre-left opposition, 
and more crucially, because of the internal divisions within the centre-right. Two roads to reform 
were closed: the supermajoritarian one involving the opposition (as evidenced by the failure of 
the premierato), and “non-bundled” reforms trying to modify a single aspect of the institutional 
system (as evidenced by the dead-end reached by devolution). 
 
1.2.1. The bipartisan attempt on the “premierato” 
At the beginning of the legislature, the centre-right, who had made a certain number of 
promises in its coalition manifesto regarding the institutional reform,378 chose not to institute a 
bicameral commission. In mid-2002, the reformist part of the opposition in the Senate, through 
                                                 
375 Interview with Giovanni Tarli Barbieri, Professor of constitutional law at Università degli Studi of 
Florence, 17 June 2013, at his office in Florence. 
376 « Questa riforma (...) fu imposta dal centrosinistra per affini politici, tutti politici, cercare di strappare la 
bandiera del federalismo dalle mane della Lega Nord e del centro destra ». Interview with Giovanni Tarli 
Barbieri, op. cit. 
377 « Passò l’idea nel centrosinistra (...) che bisognava dare un segno verso l’elettorato del centro-nord 
attratto dalla Lega, che pero si riteneva potesse essere riconquistato dal centrosinistra, di attenzione verso 
il nord. »  Interview with Salvatore Vassallo, op. cit. 
378 The 2001 manifesto promises the implementation of “devoluzione” for health, instruction and training. 
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the voice of the DS senator Giorgio Tonini, presented a legal project379 which aimed to reinforce 
the head of the executive, instituting the direct election of the prime minister as head of an 
identifiable parliamentary majority with powers of dissolution and the creation of opposition  
status. There were encouraging signs of dialogue in late 2002, with Pera, the president of the 
Senate, supporting the premierato option,380 despite the fact that Berlusconi had clearly indicated 
his preference for presidentialism, something more in line with the preference for a strong, 
personalised head of the executive.381 Tonini, explaining the positions of the centre-left, notes 
when discussing the Third Bicameral Commission vote in favour of the French system: “This 
model, a bit like in France, has never been liked by the centre-left, which preferred to reason on 
the reinforcement of the powers of the Prime Minister”.382 Reacting to Tonini’s project, Lucio 
Malan (FI), under the impulsion of Quagliarello - the influential founder of the Magna Carta 
foundation close to the centre-right - presented a very similar design.383 Therefore, at the 
beginning of 2003 when the discussion on these texts began, there seemed to be a degree of 
convergence between a good part of the centre-left and the centre-right on the crucial question 
of the premierato, which also took the form of encounters between the reformists from each camp, 
such as Fini (AN) and Amato (DS).384 The move towards the premierato is therefore to be 
understood as a concession by the centre-right to their adversaries in order to facilitate an 
agreement. Thus the logic was clearly an attempt to build a bipartisan agreement, through a 
supermajoritarian logic involving both the opposition and the government.  
It soon became clear, however, that the hypothesis would not enjoy more than a few days 
of discussion, in late January and early February, because of internal oppositions within each 
camp. The small parties of the centre-left (far-left, Greens) supported something closer to the 
German system, with a weaker PM figure.385 Within the centre-left, much opposition came, not 
only from the small allied parties, but also from a significant element of the Democratici di 
                                                 
379 Disegno di Legge Tonini e altri, A.S. 1662. 
380 Ceccanti, Stefano. « Al Senato c’è qualcosa di nuovo: Pera ». Il Riformista, 29 October 2002. 
381 Anon. « Si muove il partito del premierato». Il Riformista, 7 December 2002. 
382 « Questo modello, un po’ come in Francia, non è mai piaciuto al centrosinistra che piuttosto preferiva 
ragionare su un rafforzamento dei poteri del Primo ministro ». Interview with Giorgio Tonini, senator of 
Marche between 2001 and 2013, senator of Trento since 2013, DS, 4 July 2013, at his office in Rome. 
383 Disegno di legge Malan e altri, A.S.1889 
384 Anon. « Tra Fini e Amato prove di dialogo sul premierato forte ». Il Sole 24 Ore, 12 February 2003. 
385 Salvati, Michele. « L’urgenza delle riforme e i dubbi del centrosinistra », La Repubblica, 11 February 
2003.  
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Sinistra and of the Margherita, the two parties comprising the Ulivo.386 Commenting on the 
discussion within his own party at the time, Tonini states:  
“This thing [the premierato] was very opposed to in the centre-left, because reinforcing the 
Prime minister meant in the public debate reinforcing Berlusconi. (…) The majority said: 
‘Berlusconi is already almighty, if we give him other powers, he becomes God!”
387  
What is important, beyond the “B factor”388 in this particular instance, is that the centre-left 
opposition showed little will to enter into a dialogue with the centre-right on institutional 
reforms, even when the initiative was actually coming from its own camp. Tonini is very clear on 
this point: his position was “absolutely in the minority”.389 Not only would this largely condition 
the attitude of the opposition for the rest of the debate, but it also explains why the institutional 
reforms up until the end of the legislature were largely, if not exclusively, internal matters for the 
centre-right, despite the fact that centre-left proposals, such as the premierato, were completely 
accommodated in the subsequent proposals.390  
Within the centre-right, the main opposition came from the newly formed UDC (Movarelli 
2013, 60),391 which was opposed to any radical change in the form of government, and supported 
the so-called “cancellierato” (chancellor), German style: i.e., parliamentary election of the head 
executive, the introduction of the constructive motion of no-confidence, and PR. This position 
was in line with the institutional vision of the post-DC parties in Italy, rooted in a proportional 
and parliamentary tradition. Forza Italia was also internally divided between those in favour of 
presidentialism and devolution,392 such as Tremonti, and those in favour of bipartisan dialogue, 
such as Pera (Tonini 2003, 116–117). In the middle, AN and Fini were stuck between the support 
for presidentialism, and an unacceptable devolution (Tonini 2003, 118). In this extremely 
                                                 
386 The Ulivo (Olive Tree) was a centre-left coalition created in 1996 by Romano Prodi, composed initially 
of the Democratici di Sinistra (heir of the PCI) and the Partito Popolare Italiano (PPI), heir to the DC. In 
2001, the PPI became united with other small Christian democratic parties within the Margherita. 
387 « Questa cosa nel centrosinistra era molto osteggiata perché rafforzare il primo ministro voleva dire nel 
dibattito pubblico italiano rafforzare Berlusconi. (...) La maggioranza diceva : ‘Berlusconi è già 
ognipotente, se gli diamo altro potere diventa Dio, insomma! » Interview with Giorgio Tonini, op. cit. 
388 The term “fattore B.” can be attributed to Giovanni Sartori. He argued there was a “B factor” 
endangering democracy, just like there used to be a “K factor” in the 1970s, with the strong communist 
party. Pi. Sa. « Il ‘fattore B.’ è il cancro della democrazia ». L’Unità, 5 February 2002. 
389 « Una posizione assolutamente minoritaria », Interview with Giorgio Tonini, op. cit. 
390 Domenico Nania, one of four senators appointed to create the organic constitutional proposal of the 
centre-right explains: “Take into account that the final proposal of premierato was passed through by 
Giuliano Amato. (...) In writing they made us have it!” (« Tieni conto che la bozza finale di premierato, a 
noi l’ha passata Giuliano Amato. (...). Per iscritto c’è l’hanno fatta avere! »). Interview with Domenico 
Nania, senator of Sicilia and president of the AN parliamentary group in the Senate from 2001 to 2006, 
MP of Sicilia between 1987 and 2001, AN, 26 June 2013, at the Senate, Rome. 
391 Unifying on 6 December 2002 the Centro Cristiano Democratico (CCD), the Cristiani Democratici 
Uniti (CDU), and Democrazia Europea. 
392 Cf. infra. 
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embryonic institutional discussion, it soon became clear that sealing a deal on institutional 
reforms would not be easy, and would lead to the discussion of other institutional issues, such as 
devolution or electoral law, within the centre-right coalition and without the opposition. To put in 
the words of Silvio Berlusconi, “better with them, but also on our own”.393 
 
1.2.2. The majoritarian attempt: the interrupted road towards devolution 
The Northern League started the legislature of 2001 with one, single obsession: to once 
again reform Title V of the Constitution after the centre-left’s “fake” reform to move towards a 
harder, better, faster and stronger federalism. Inspired by the Scottish experience,394 the new 
expression en vogue within leghist circles was the term “devolution” (used in English instead of the 
Italian devoluzione). The aim, clearly, was to take back from the centre-left the reform of the state, 
substituting federalism with something “tougher”, although ill-defined. This soon took the form 
of a project of law, initiated by Bossi, minister “for institutional reforms and devolution”,395 
which attempted to again modify Article 117 of the Italian Constitution, in which the respective 
legislative competences of the state and of the regions are distributed. The project aimed to give 
the regions “exclusive legislative competency” over four matters: health assistance and 
organisation, school organisation and management of the schools and training institutes, the 
definition of the school and training programmes of specific interest to a region, and local 
police.396 The proposal was approved at its first reading in the Senate on 5 December 2002, 
following threats from Bossi that he would impede the adoption of both the financial law, and 
the Cirami law397 (Tonini 2003, 116). It was then also approved in its first reading in the Chamber 
of MPs on 29 April 2003, with the League threatening to run on its own in the upcoming 
administrative elections. This adoption is the consequence of a fragile internal deal within the 
majority. However, there was strong evidence of the impossibility of going through with the 
devolution reform, clearly identified as the “toy” of the Lega, in the absence of concessions to 
                                                 
393 « Meglio con loro, ma anche da soli ». Minzolini, Augusto. « La strategia del cavaliere ». La Stampa, 10 
January 2003.   
394 Indeed, when Tony Blair came to power in 1997, he soon launched a process of devolution that gave 
important legislative competences to the newly formed Scottish Parliament. 
395 Disegno di Legge S.1187 and C. 3461.   
396 As stated in the version of the text approved in the Chamber of Deputies 
397 This law, voted in November 2002, enables the main suspect or the Public ministry to require the 
process to take place in a different court if they suspect the partiality of the judge, also obliging the new 
judge to re-start the enquiry from scratch. It is considered as one of Berlusconi’s ad personam laws, i.e. a law 
designed to ease his judicial problems. 
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the other parties of the majority. This dead-end gave way to the bundling and “deal expansion” 
logic that would guide all of the remaining steps of the process of institutional reforms.  
There were two camps at the beginning of 2003 regarding devolution: those in favour 
including, obviously, the Lega Nord, but also a part of Forza Italia which supported devolution 
and “presidentialism”, to be understood as something resembling the French system (Tonini 
2003, 117). On the other hand, some of FI, the UDC and Alleanza Nazionale were opposed to 
further reforms of Title V, partly because of their centralist tradition, but mostly in opposition to 
the league.398 During our interview, Tonini explains very well why, discussed on its own, the 
devolution project was unacceptable for the majority of the components of the centre-right: 
“One needs not to forget that the centre-right in Italy (…) has always had two souls: the 
Northern soul where the Lega has always been hegemonic, (…) and then, however, there is a 
Southern soul (…) with Sicily that has always been a stronghold, and in general in the regions 
of the South where the centre-right is very strong. And these ones were absolutely opposed 
to the devolution of Bossi. So, this road revealed itself to be blocked”.399 
Consequently, the UDC presented proposals for a wider reform of the Title V to better 
delineate the competences of the State and of the regions. AN tried to impose amendments soon 
nicknamed the “Salva Italia” clauses (“Save Italy”) to specify that no norm of the regions could be 
against the national interest.400 The solution came from the adoption of a bundling logic: the 
UDC eventually successfully negotiated that the devolution would be reformed within a wider 
reform of Title V, whereas Bossi was given the assurance that his text would not be modified in 
the Chamber before the administrative elections of 2003, allowing him the chance to capitalise on 
this moral victory.401 As a consequence, at the beginning of April 2003, the centre-right reached a 
new agreement on a wider project of reform elaborated by the minister of regional affairs, La 
Loggia, “mixing” devolution with the reform of Title V, re-attributing certain exclusive 
competences to the state, while also implementing devolution. The commentators soon 
presented the agreement as a package deal, in which everyone thought he had won,402 paving the 
                                                 
398 Cf. infra. 
399 « Bisogna non dimanticare che il centrodestra in Italia (...) ha sempre avuto due anime : l’anima 
Nordista dove la Lega è sempre stata egemone, (...) e poi però invece c’è un’anima meridionale (...) con la 
Sicilia che è sempre stato un roccaforte, e in generale nelle regioni del Sud dove il centrodestra è molto 
forte. E questi erano assolutamente contrari alla devolution di Bossi. Quindi quella strada si rivela 
inpercorribile ». Interview with Giorgio Tonini, op. cit. 
400 Fuccaro, Lorenzo. « Devolution, i centristi lanciano la sfida alla Lega ». Corriere della Sera, 18 February 
2003. 
401 Fuccaro, Lorenzo. « Accordo nella maggioranza, sì alla devolution ». Corriere della Sera, 21 February 
2003. 
402 La Mattina, Amedeo. “Venerdì la riforma in consiglio dei ministri, da lunedì alla Camera si vota sul 
testo leghista ». La Stampa, 8 April 2004. 
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way for the general logic of the remainder of the process: bundling reforms in order to make 
concessions to every party.  
To conclude, in the first months of 2003, it was already clear that two ways to reform the 
institutions were essentially closed: one involving the opposition, which had shown its lack of 
availability to participate in the premierato, and secondly, one consisting of reforming single aspects 
of the institutional framework, as evidenced by the divergences of the majority on devolution. In 
other words, a comprehensive institutional deal soon appeared to be the only option, a bundle of 
reforms, instituted, and adopted with only the votes of the parliamentary majority.  
 
1.3. The initial deal of Lorenzago di Cadore: overcoming the tensions in the coalition 
During the summer 2003, the centre-right coalition was hanging by a single thread, not 
least because of the tensions regarding institutional reforms. Not only did all of the four parties 
of the majority have different preferences, they also had diverging priorities concerning the 
Italian institutions. Four topics were essentially at stake: the form of government, bicameralism, 
federalism, and the electoral system. The conflict between the four components of the majority 
was resolved in Lorenzago di Cadore by four “wisemen” through the construction of a bundle of 
reforms on the three first topics. There were two logics behind the bundling strategy. The first 
consisted of enabling mutual concessions, making the overall reform acceptable to everyone. The 
second consisted of the reform of bicameralism, as it had implications both for the form of 
government and actually made a comprehensive deal necessary for federalism.  
 
1.3.1. Tensions and diverging priorities within the centre-right coalition 
The positions of the four parties of the centre-right coalition have to be summarised in 
order to understand the deal reached by the four “wise men” at Lorenzago di Cadore in August 
2003. Internal differences on one or several of the four main topics (form of government, 
bicameralism, federalism and electoral reform) existed within each of the four parties. However, 
the elaboration of the general position on institutional matters was essentially disallowed by the 
leaders of the parties, who delegated their power to the “wise men”, and a few experts 
surrounding them. For that reason, it is possible to schematise the positions of the four parties of 
the centre–right coalition (Figure 17). The centre-right’s project of reform delineated four main 
themes of reform (form of government, bicameralism, federalism and electoral reform), and each 
of these four themes had different significance for each party. In other words, beyond the 
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position on each theme, what is crucial in explaining the final deal is the salience of these themes 
for each of the four coalition partners.  
The following conclusions can be drawn from the study of the deal reached in Lorenzago. 
Firstly, each of the four parties focused only on pushing forward its preferred position on its own 
priorities, and was relatively indifferent about the outcome of reform on other issues. In other 
words, each of the four coalition partners had some “blind spots”, and only cared about certain 
elements of the deal, but not about others. Hence, a priority can be defined here as something 
sufficiently salient for a party to make it block the deal if its position is not taken into account. 
Secondly, the negotiators managed to reach a deal on a comprehensive institutional reform 
because each of the four parties had its own position successfully accommodated on at least one of 
its leading priorities.  
Figure 17. Initial positions in summer 2003 of the four parties of the majority on the four main institutional 
themes 
 
Note: the text in bold indicates the leading priorities of each party. For example, the priorities of the Lega Nord 
related to bicameralism and federalism.  
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In other words, in discussions of divisive institutional reforms involving coalition partners with 
diverging priorities and positions, the dominant logic is that of mutual concession. Here, each 
party wanted to “take something home”; otherwise, the deal would have been impossible.  
Looking at Figure 17, it appears that only one theme was relatively unproblematic, i.e. the 
matter of bicameralism. The leaders of Forza Italia and the Lega Nord supported the so-called 
“federal Senate”, whereas Alleanza Nazionale and the UDC supported of the end of symmetric 
bicameralism, although this was not a priority. As Andrea Pastore, one of the four wise men 
notes: “Everyone of us wanted the federal Senate”.403 That being said, however, two points 
appeared particularly problematic in that they concerned diverging preferences on themes that 
were a priority for several of the coalition parties: form of government and federalism. 
On the form of government, both Alleanza Nazionale and Forza Italia were in favour of 
presidentialisation “generically”,404 or at least of a strong reinforcement of the executive, because 
of its post-fascist institutional tradition for the former, and because of its rhetoric on 
personalisation for the latter. Conversely, the UDC was more than reluctant and only supported 
the status quo or a limited reinforcement of the powers of the PM. Andrea Pastore explains that 
the UDC “is a force, because it comes from Christian Democracy, which has been very happy 
with parliamentarism.”405 On federalism, the Lega Nord, which was supportive of devolution, 
faced the opposition of both Alleanza Nazionale and the UDC who wanted a re-centralisation of 
competences as compared to the 2001 reform.406 Finally, electoral reform was one of the 
priorities of the UDC in supporting the return to PR, whereas the other parties of the coalition 
held different positions, but did not consider the electoral reform to be a priority either. 
This summary illustrates several blocks, with varying alliances according to the topic in 
question: Lega vs. AN and UDC on federalism, FI and AN vs. UDC on form of government, 
UDC vs. everyone else on electoral reform. UDC was the party that had the most divergences 
with its coalition partners, in that its positions on its own priorities clashed with those of each 
                                                 
403 « Il Senato federale lo volevammo tutti ». Interview with Andrea Pastore, senator of Abruzzo between 
1996 and 2013 and president of the Commission Affari Costituzionali I between 2001 and 2006, FI, 19 
June 2013, at his office in Pescara.  
404 Interview with a councillor of the Camera dei Deputati, 28 June 2013, at his office in Rome. Cf. also 
supra. 
405 « È una forza, perché è della Democrazia Cristiana, che nel parlamentarismo si è trovata benissimo. »  
Interview with Andrea Pastore, op. cit. 
406 Cf. supra. 
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one of its coalition partners on at least one matter. This would prove crucial, particularly when 
the electoral reform was dealt with.407  
 
1.3.2. The deal of  Lorenzago: the bundle logic at work 
The agreement of August 2003 provides a very concrete illustration of the bundling 
logic’s facilitating role in closing a deal on institutional reforms. Indeed, the above-mentioned 
divergences notwithstanding, a pact on a comprehensive package of reforms was reached after a 
few days of discussions, accommodating the priorities of each of the coalition partners into a 
single text. The agreement explicitly dealt with the matters of the form of government, 
bicameralism, and federalism, but not with the electoral reform. The “deal of Lorenzago” has 
been somehow mythologised by the press as the founding moment of the constitutional 
reform,408 when it was, in reality, only a consequence of the failure to reach reform by other 
means and the continuation of institutional reflections which began at the beginning of the 
legislature, conducted by expert committees.409 It was also certainly a last resort meeting for a 
cracked coalition. To put it in the words of one of the participants, “all of the observers were 
forecasting the breakup of the centre-right alliance and the crisis of the Berlusconi government” 
(Nania 2009, 74).410 More prosaically, the deal of Lorenzago doubly illustrates the bundling logic 
at work: firstly, as a concrete means of reaching agreement on topics on which parties have 
diverging positions and priorities, and secondly, as a necessary consequence of the systemic 
character of institutions. Andrea Pastore for FI, Domenico Nania for AN, Francesco D’Onofrio 
for the UDC and Roberto Calderoli for the Lega, all of whom were senators at the time, along 
with a couple of experts and public servants, were put in charge of ironing out the differences 
within the government majority in order to present a draft of institutional proposals that could 
turn into a concrete text. This attempt was launched as a result of the dead-end reached in Bossi’s 
devolution project. As Vassallo notes,  
                                                 
407 Cf. infra. 
408 Cf. for example anon., « Appuntamento sulle Dolomite: e i quattro saggi si preparano al conclave per 
cambiare lo Stato ». Il Giornale, 13 August 2003. 
409 Bossi established the Comitato di Studio Brigandì in February 2002, comprised of constitutional 
experts (Armaroli, Benvenuti, Ciaurro, Frosini, Fusaro, Salerno and Tucciarelli) with different political 
sensibilities, in order to reflect about the federal Senate, the form of government, and parliamentary 
immunities. 
410 « Tutti gli osservatori pronosticavano la rottura dell’alleanza di centrodestra e la crisi del governo 
Berlusconi.» Another participant confirms that the failure of the meeting in Lorenzago would probably 
have meant the end of the coalition. Interview with a councillor of the Camera dei Deputati, op. cit. 
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“if the reform proposed by Bossi had been approved in isolation and if the centre-left had 
initiated a referendum on that bill, the outcome would probably have been disastrous for the 
government. That is why it was necessary to link devolution to a package of reform with which 
each party leader could claim to have made a contribution. In other words, if the issue of 
constitutional reform had to be confronted, then the government bill could be the result only 
of a package deal agreed to by all of the partners of the majority coalition” (2005, 127, 
emphasis added) 
Several texts constitute the starting point for the discussion: the works of the Third 
Bicameral Commission of D’Alema, the conclusions of the Brigandì Committee (Presidenza del 
consiglio dei ministri 2004), Bossi’s interrupted project of law on devolution, the project of 
reform of Title V of La Loggia, and the designs of Tonini and Malan in relation to the premierato. 
Each party came to the table of negotiations with non-negotiable and negotiable requests, based 
on the positions previously mentioned. As Andrea Pastore (FI) explains, “[they prepared] a draft 
that took into account the positive and negative will, that is to say the yeses and the noes of the 
components of the centre-right coalition”.411 Indeed, the deal reached in Lorenzago was the result 
of “many tradeoffs of differing proportions” (Vassallo 2005, 127). To expose only a few 
highlights, on the form of government, in order to accommodate the presidentialist vision of FI 
and AN and the parliamentary vision of the UDC, a consensus was reached on an intermediary 
solution, i.e. the premierato initially suggested by the centre-left.412 The four parties decisively 
agreed upon a directly elected Prime Minister with full powers of nomination and revocation in 
relation to ministers, and power of dissolution. On the reform of bicameralism, the agreement 
indicated a new division of powers between the Chamber of Deputies, the only chamber whose 
confidence would have been required for the government, and the new “federal Senate”. The 
Chamber would be put in charge of legislation regarding matters of exclusive competency of the 
state, the Senate being responsible for the concurrent matters. The content of the deal on 
federalism is probably the best illustration of the trade-off logic of the negotiations. The Lega 
obtained the inclusion of devolution. However, the constitutional deal agreed upon in August 
2003 contained a decisive element of re-centralisation, with the reintroduction of the principle of 
national interest. Finally, on the electoral reform, the UDC obtained only a vague promise that 
this aspect would be dealt with later on, although as D’Onofrio, the centrist negotiator, told me: 
“For our part, I said: ‘you see, if there is no PR, the law will not happen. Because for us, PR is 
fundamental’.”413 Yet, electoral reform was widely perceived as a secondary topic, as confirmed 
                                                 
411 « E preparammo una bozza che tenesse conto delle volontà in positivo e in negativo, cioè i si e no, dei 
componenti della coalizione di centrodestra. » Interview with Andrea Pastore, op. cit. 
412 Cf. supra. 
413 « Per parte nostra, dicevo, ‘vedete, se non c’è il proporzionale, non si fa la legge. Perché per noi il 
proporzionale è fondamentale’. » Interview with Francesco D’Onofrio, senator of Lazio (1983-1987, 
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by Nania: “In fact, the electoral law was not an argument within the perimeter of the reforms. It 
was a marginal argument”.414  
In the negotiation conducted in August 2003, the bundling logic intervened in two ways. 
Firstly, in order to “give” something to everyone and reach an agreement, the building of a 
bundle of reforms was inevitable, and secondly, due to the fact that all aspects were linked 
together. The first of these points is clearly admitted by Roberto Calderoli himself: “If we faced 
the questions individually, problems always came out. Put all together on the table, on the 
contrary, even the issue of the national interest has been resolved”.415 All of the other participants 
also clearly state the importance of each party’s ability to claim credit for one part of the reform 
in the achievement of a successful outcome: devolution for the League, some form of 
presidentialism and the national interest for AN, a stronger PM linked to a majority defined 
before the elections for FI, and the promise of a return to PR for the UDC (Vassallo 2005). 
However, it would be cynical to reduce the scope of the constitutional deal to this sole strategic 
necessity. As noted by several experts during my interviews, it was difficult to treat these aspects 
individually, in particular because “there is something that is in the middle, which is the 
composition and the functions of the Second Chamber.”416 Indeed, reforming perfect 
bicameralism, giving greater power to the PM, or reinforcing federalism invariably call into 
question the role of the Italian Senate, which is key to the whole dispositive.  
Yet, it would soon become clear that the August 2003 deal, although it would constitute 
the backbone of the constitutional reform, contained many grey zones on the specifics of the 
reform, which would lead to fierce debate during the parliamentary procedure, and to the 
expansion of the initial project concerning 29 articles of the constitution to include no less than 
45 after final approval (Fusaro 2004), and with the adoption of a brand new electoral system.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
1996-2008) and president of the parliamentary group from 2001 to 2006, ex-MP of Lazio  between 1990 
and 1996, UDC, 25 June 2013, at his home in Rome. 
414 « Ma in effetti la legge elettorale non era un argomento dentro il perimetro delle riforme. Era un 
argomento a margine. » Interview with Domenico Nania, op.cit. 
415 « La novità -dice Calderoli-è che se affrontavamo le questioni singolarmente saltavano sempre fuori 
problemi. Messe tutte sul tavolo, invece, si è risolto anche il problema dell'interesse nazionale» Cerruti, 
Giovanni. « Approvato il documento finale della ‘tre giorni di Lorenzago’ ». La Stampa, 24 August 2003. 
416 « Perché c’è una cosa che sta in mezzo, che è la composizione e le funzioni della seconda Camera. » 
Interview with Stefano Ceccanti, Professor of Comparative Public Law at university La Sapienza of Rome, 
senator of Piemonte between 2008 and 2013, PD, 26 June 2013, at a café in Rome.   
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2. The expansion of the bundle and the different destinies of the 
constitutional and electoral reform 
 
The process of adoption of the constitutional reform in the parliament in 2005 led to the 
progressive expansion of the institutional deal to include greater detail, because of the remaining 
reservations of both some coalition partners, and of the senators. This expansion went so far as 
to lead to an upsurge regarding the matter of electoral reform during the final stages of the 
parliamentary procedure of the constitutional reform, in order to close the final deal. This 
eventually contributed to the creation of a “bundle within the bundle”, with a rushed electoral 
reform responding to exactly the same logic as the constitutional reform: mutual concessions and 
trade-offs. Yet, the hard-won constitutional reform was rejected by referendum in June 2006. 
This failure illustrates the difficulties arising from a majoritarian logic of adoption of institutional 
package deals: the reform was rejected because the referendum was lost, the referendum was lost 
because the centre-left had won the elections a couple of months previously, and the 
confirmative referendum was organised after the elections because of the very long negotiations 
required to finalise the agreement on the constitutional reform.  
 
2.1. The discussion of the constitutional reform in the parliament: between coalition and 
self-survival logics 
The parliamentary procedure followed by the constitutional reform lasted for almost two 
years, from the introduction of the bill in October 2003 until its final adoption in November 
2005. This section focuses on the reasons behind the expansion and the modification of the 
initial aforementioned Lorenzago deal. There were essentially two dynamics at stake during that 
long parliamentary procedure: again, the coalition logic leading to trade-offs at each stage of the 
negotiation, and also, the self-survival strategy of the senators.  
 
2.1.1. A summary of  the main modifications enacted by the constitutional 
reform 
There have been two readings of the constitutional law in the Senate,417 and two in the 
Chamber of Deputies.418 However, in order to finish the parliamentary procedure before the end 
                                                 
417 Disegno di legge S.2544 and S.2544b respectively  
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of the legislature, no amendments were adopted during the second reading of the text in both 
chambers. Therefore, three alternative versions of the text have been examined: the bill 
introduced by the government, the second version after the first reading in the Senate, and the 
final version after the first reading in the Chamber of Deputies (Table 18).419  
Table 18. Main modifications enacted from the first to the final version of the constitutional reform 
Version  Articles 
modified 
Dimension Main modifications compared with the previous versionª 
Text of the 
government 
29 Form of 
government 
Modification of the electoral college of the president of the Republic 
to give more voice to the regions. The president cannot be reelected. 
   The president of Council is replaced by the Prime Minister. The PM 
candidate is linked on the ballot with candidates for the Chamber of 
Deputies. The president must nominate the candidate PM linked to 
the majority that has won the election. 
   The president of the Republic can dissolve only after the request of 
the PM. Dissolution is automatic in case of the adoption of a motion 
of no-confidence, or of the rejection of a motion of confidence.  
   The PM appoints and dismisses ministers. 
  Bicameralism The Senate becomes the federal Senate, elected by universal suffrage. 
It is composed by 206 senators, no more than 5 senators for life, and 
representatives of the regions who participate in the debate but 
cannot vote. The number of MPs is reduced to 412. Lowering of the 
minimum age to be elected: from 40 to 25 for senators, from 25 to 
21 for MPs. 
   Only the Chamber of Deputies, and not the Senate anymore, is 
responsible in front of the government. End of the symmetric 
bicameralism, replaced by an asymmetric one with prevalence 
depending on the type of laws. 
   New legislative procedure with three types of laws: (1) the laws 
where the Chamber prevails (for matters of exclusive legislative 
competence of the State), (2) the laws where the Senate prevails (for 
matters of concurrent legislative competence with the regions), and 
the bicameral laws (e.g., electoral laws). The presidents of both 
Chambers regulate conflicts of competences.  
  Federalism Introduction of devolution: the regions have exclusive legislative 
authority on healthcare and its organisation, organisation of 
education and management of educational and training 
establishments, content of the educational and training programmes 
with areas of specific interest to the regions, and local police. 
   Rome is the capital of the federal Republic and benefits from 
particular forms of autonomy.  
   Reintroduction of the national interest: if a regional law is deemed 
contrary to the regional interest, the government can ask the Senate 
to deal with the question. The Senate has the ability to cancel a 
                                                                                                                                                        
418 Disegno di legge C.4862 and C.4862b respectively. 
419 On the chronology of the parliamentary procedure for the two reforms, cf. appendix 17.  
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regional law is this law is not modified by the incriminated region. 
End of “two-speed federalism”: suppression of the article 116.3 that 
gave the possibility to ordinary regions to get extra competences. 
  Other Transitory dispositions: some dispositions entering into force 
immediately (ex. devolution), others in 2011 (ex. new composition of 
the Chambers) 
1st reading 
Senate 
34 Form of 
government 
Reinforcement of the regional component in the election of the 
president of the Republic, stronger qualified majority in the first four 
rounds. Suppression of the term limit for the president of the 
Republic 
   Relaxing of the link between PM and parliamentary majority: the 
president does not dissolve if within 10 days after the request of the 
PM the MPs of the majority present a motion to continue the 
legislature with the name of a new PM. 
   Suppression of the reference to the publication of the PM candidate 
on the ballot. 
  Bicameralism Introduction of the contextual election of the Senators with the 
regional councillors. Term of the regional councils subordinated 
with the term of the senators. 
   Cancellation of the lowering of the age of eligibility in the Senate, in 
the Chamber and to run as president of the Republic. 
   Relaxing of the rules to recall the law adopted by the other chamber, 
reinforcement of the procedures of conciliation between the two 
chambers in case of conflict with a joint commission. The Senate 
cannot be dissolved. 
1st reading 
Chamber 
43 Form of 
government 
Reduction of the regional component for the election of the 
president of the Republic, relaxing of the qualified majority required 
from the third round onwards. 
   Lowering of the minimum age to be elected president, confirmation 
of the suppression of the term limits. 
   Confirmation of the relaxing of the link between PM and 
parliamentary majority. The motion must not only be presented, but 
adopted by absolute majority. 
   PM candidate can be linked with candidates, and with lists. 
   “Anti-ribaltone” mechanism: the PM must resign not only if he 
loses a motion of confidence, but also if the motion of 
confidence is rejected by votes not coming from MPs of the 
majority determined by the election. 
   Creation of constructive no-confidence vote that can be presented 
by the MPs belonging to the majority expressed by the elections. 
  Bicameralism Term of the senators aligned with the term of the regional councils. 
   Limitation of the reduction of the number of senators and MPs: 
from 1/3 to 20%: 252 senators and 518 MPs including 18 elected 
abroad, replacement of senators for life by MPs for life. 
   Re-installment of the lowering of the age of eligibility in the Senate, 
in the Chamber, and to run as president of the Republic. 
   Creation of a procedure to bypass the Senate for laws in which the 
Second Chamber prevails, in case the adoption of a given law is 
deemed as necessary for the realisation of the programme of 
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government. It requires the agreement of the president of the 
Republic.  
   In case a law is deemed contrary to the national interest by the 
government, it can be repelled by the Parliament in common session 
(and not by the Senate like initially formulated). 
  Federalism The police devoluted to the regions is the administrative, local and 
regional police. 
   The State gets back a number of legislative matters of 
exclusive competence including, among others, protection of 
health, strategic networks of transportation and navigation, 
transportation and distribution of energy… 
   Constitutionalisation of the State-region conference to solve 
conflicts between the State and the regions.  
  Other Extension and precision of the transitory norms. Reform would be 
fully operative in 2016.  
 
Source: Fusaro 2004, Martin J. Bull and Newell 2009, Servizio studi del Senato 2004 & 2005, D.D.L S.2544, C.4862, 
S.2544b. ª The previous version refers for the text of the government to the constitution of 1948. The provisions in 
bold are the most important modifications enacted in the debate.  
That table presents the most important modifications of the text that occurred during the 
parliamentary procedure (note that this is far from an exhaustive list, and only contains what I 
consider to be the most significant changes to the text at each stage). If one compares the final 
text after the parliamentary procedure with the initial text, one might note a substantial 
difference, both in content and in length. These successive readings have significantly altered the 
initial project, leading to an increase in the number of modifications to the constitution, which 
were not included in the preliminary deal, but also to substantial modifications of the content of 
the law. 
 
2.1.2. Coalition logic and institutional logic: the reasons behind the expansion of  
the reform 
What happened in the parliamentary arena during the debate on the constitution led to 
substantial modifications which were the result of two elements: the continuation of the conflict 
between the coalition partners of the centre-right, leading to further concessions in particular to 
the AN and the UDC (coalition logic); and the logic of self-survival of the senators, who 
attempted to limit the damage to themselves and to their institution during the course of the 
discussion (institutional logic). Two of the most important modifications, the re-attribution to the 
state of an important number of exclusive legislative competences, and the creation of the so-
called “anti-ribaltone” mechanism (anti-reversal of parliamentary majority), were primarily caused 
by the conflict within the coalition. The “strong contextuality” (i.e., the concomitant election of 
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the senators and of the regional councillors), on the other hand, serves as an example which 
illustrates how the Senate tried to maintain some ground as an institution.  
Regarding the coalition logic, the parliamentary activism during the debate is in line with 
the findings of Pedrazzani and Zucchini. The two authors find that the statistical models that 
enabling to explain the number of amendments for a given law in Italy between 1987 and 2006 
depends on “the coalitional nature of executives” (2013, 705). As the authors put it, “Parliament 
appears to be an arena at the coalition partner’s disposal, where a second, decisive round of the 
cabinet decision-making process is played” (ibid.). Indeed, although the leaders of each of the 
four coalition parties reached an argument thanks to the mediation of Lorenzago, some elements 
of the government proposal were unacceptable without changes for many of the 
parliamentarians, and in particular those of AN and UDC. The subsequent modifications during 
the parliamentary procedure certainly didn’t help to simplify the project, and tempered the 
government’s initial intention, both in terms of giving more powers to the regions, and in terms 
of reinforcement of the PM.  
The devolution, in particular, was an extremely problematic element. Francesco 
D’Onofrio (UDC), rapporteur of the law in the Senate, recalls the difficulties encountered on the 
topic of federalism: “I was one of the very few in my party to be in favour of federalism (…) 
Because in the Senate, many of those from Southern Italy heard their own voters who said ‘but 
this is what the Lega Nord wants, we do not want that’”.420 Many of the AN senators and MPs 
were equally ill at ease with devolution. Domenico Fisichella (AN), the vice president of the 
Senate at the time, even resigned from his party following the final adoption of the text in the 
Senate, in protest against devolution.421 These reservations eventually led to new guarantees being 
given to the centralist wing of these two parties, in order to pass the reform. This took the form 
of the re-centralisation of a series of legislative competence ranging from international monetary 
policy, credit, and common organisation of the market for finance; big strategic networks of 
transportation and navigation considered to be in the national interest; strategic production, 
national transportation and distribution of energy for industry and economy; protection of health 
and food security for regulation, etc. There is an evident contradiction in the fact that the state 
regained the protection of health in its exclusive legislative competences, whereas the 
                                                 
420 «Io ero del mio partito uno dei pochissimi favorevoli al federalismo (...) Perché al Senato, molti 
dell’Italia meridionale sentivano i propi elettori che dicevano ‘ma questo lo vuole la Lega Nord, noi non lo 
vogliamo ». Interview with Francesco D’Onofrio, op. cit. 
421 Interview with Domenico Fisichella, Lazio senator between 1994 and 2005, independent senator 
between 2005 and 2006, vice-president of the Senate from 2001 to 2006, AN, 3 July 2013, at his home in 
Rome. 
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constitutional project devolved the organisation of healthcare to the regions. In fact, some of the 
constitutional experts that I have spoken with consider that, if anything, the reform was a 
centralist one. Ceccanti explains it in a lapidary way: “Devolution (…) was fake more than 
anything else”.422 Fusaro offers the same diagnosis: “In reality then, in the Title V, everything is 
more centralist. Poor Bossi and the League had to satisfy themselves with slogans”.423 Similarly, 
Vassallo calls devolution a “myth” (2006).   
Similar reflections could be made about the introduction of the so-called “anti-ribaltone” 
mechanism, supported in particular by AN in order to impede changes to parliamentary 
majorities, and which “guaranteed that it did not have to risk approving a reform that 
contemporarily would have put it out of the game”.424 It is worth keeping in mind that AN was a 
direct heir of the Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI), a small fascist party that was excluded from 
forming any coalition from 1948 until 1992. The Senate adopted in the first reading a mechanism 
that enabled a change of PM without dissolution in the case that the majority that emerged from 
the elections presented a motion proposing an alternative PM. During the first reading in the 
Chamber of deputies, the proposal of the Senate was accepted with slight modifications,425 and 
the MPs adopted a norm disallowing the Prime Minister from winning a confidence vote through 
the votes of MPs coming from outside of the majority. By reinforcing the majority expressed in 
the elections, these two elements also weakened the figure of the PM. Calderisi, one of the most 
eminent constitutional experts of the centre-right, explains the contradiction between the 
premierato and the anti-reversal mechanisms: “instead of being a power for the PM, it becomes a 
power for a small minority, the one (…) that is able to transform your absolute majority into a 
relative majority.”426 Indeed, all parties effectively get blackmailing power vis-à-vis the Prime 
minister. To summarise, the conflict between the four centre-right components led to the 
subsequent adoption of trade-offs, always with the aim of closing the parliamentary procedure 
before the end of the legislature. Yet, these trade-offs tended to contradict the initial proposal, 
counter-balancing both the advancement of federalism and the reinforcement of the PM figure.  
                                                 
422 « Devolution (…) era più finta che non altro ». Interview with Stefano Ceccanti, op. cit. 
423 « In realtà poi, sul Titolo V, tutto è più centralista. Il povero Bossi e la Lega si accontentavano degli 
slogan ». Interview with Carlo Fusaro, op. cit. 
424 « Una riforma che garantiva che non rischieva di approvere una riforma che contemporaneamente la 
metteva fuori gioco elettoralmente ». Interview with Francesco D’Onofrio, op. cit. 
425 The replacement of the PM must not only be presented, but also voted on by the MPs of the majority 
that emerged in the elections. 
426 « Anziché di essere un potere in capo al premier, diventa un potere in capo ad una piccola minoranza, 
quella (...) che è capace di trasformare la tua maggioranza assoluta in maggioranza relativa. » Interview with 
Giuseppe Calderisi, councillor for the president of the Senate between 2001 and 2006, 4 July 2013, in his 
office, Rome. Stefano Ceccanti, from the side of the experts of the centre-left, shares exactly the same 
analysis in retrospect. 
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The institutional logic, although it had less influence on the final text, is perceptible in 
important aspects. The Senate was the institution that would have been most severely affected by 
the reform, with major changes not only to its functions, but also to its composition. Getting the 
support of the senators was the main reason behind the very long transitory norms, which would 
have meant that the constitutional reform, and in particular the new composition of the Senate, 
would only become effective in 2016. The adoption of the so-called “strong contextuality”, a 
proposal that actually came from the Left Democrat senator Morando, and linked the office of 
the senators with the office of the regional councillors, illustrates the logic of self-survival 
incorporated by the senators. The initial proposal made by the Senate would have implied that 
the “duration in office of the regional councils would have depended of the length of time in 
office of the senators” (Vassallo 2005, 120),427 whereas the final version linked the office of the 
senators with that of the regional councillors. This would have meant that the Senate would have 
been partially renewed at each regional election contest. It may seem paradoxical that the 
members of the “federal Senate”, who supposedly represent the regional entities, share only the 
fact of their election on the same day to link them to their respective regional councils. Other 
solutions, closer to the model of the German Bundesrat, were considered when the text was 
elaborated. However, it soon became clear that the senators would not accept a system in which 
they would have not been directly elected. D’Onofrio recalls: “there was very strong pressure. 
Here is why in the end I succeeded in introducing the contextual election with the regional 
councillors: because this was the minimum point that the senators accepted. We want to be 
elected. We do not nomination by external people”.428  
In other words, not only was the final deal on the constitutional reform wider than the 
initial one because of the modification of more articles, it was also both more ambiguous and less 
readable in terms of its intentions and expected outcomes. However, these modifications and 
ambiguities were necessary to successfully take the reform home, given the institutional and 
coalition disagreements which had not been dealt with at Lorenzago. A major disagreement was 
yet to be dealt with, though: the matter of the electoral system. The tricky question of the 
electoral reform, which was largely avoided between 2003 and mid-2005, was to make a dramatic 
entrance during the very last moments of the discussion on the constitutional reform in the 
Parliament.  
                                                 
427 In practice, this meant that in case of dissolution of a council, elections were to take place, which would 
be followed by new elections when the term of the senators came to an end. 
428 « Ci fu una fortissima pressione. Ecco perché io alla fine riuscì a far passare l’elezione contestuale ai 
consiglieri regionali: perché questo era il punto minimo che i senatori accettavano. Vogliamo almeno 
essere eletti. Non accettiamo che siamo nominati degli esterni. » Interview with Francesco D’Onofrio, op. 
cit. 
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2.2. The upsurge of the electoral reform: closing the final deal429 
At first glance, the electoral reform of 2005 is a puzzle, not only in terms of content, but 
also in terms of process. Why would such a major electoral reform, which led to a switch back to 
PR, succeed, when all of the previous attempts to reform the electoral law had been in the 
direction of making it more majoritarian, and had failed?430 Why would this reform, which at the 
beginning was supported only by the UDC, be adopted by a heterogeneous centre-right coalition 
made up of actors with different, if not opposing, partisan interests? The answer to the first 
question implies, again, the re-positioning of that electoral reform within a wider bundle of 
reforms, namely as a dimension of negotiation of the constitutional reform. The answer to the 
second question echoes the dynamics of the constitutional reform: the agreement reached on a 
complex electoral reform with multiple incentives is, once more, a result of multiple trade-offs 
among the coalition, in attempting to give something to each party.  
 
2.2.1. Blackmail, constitutional reform, and fear of  losing: the reasons behind the 
re-emergence of  the electoral reform 
D’Alimonte calls electoral reform the “fiume carsico” (underground river) of the Italian 
political debate, referring to a debate that is always present, even when not visible on the 
surface.431 If no modifications were made to the electoral system adopted in 1993 in Italy until 
2005, this was not for want of trying. The difference between this and the previous failed 
attempts is that, in 2005, the electoral reform was considered to be the final piece of the giant 
institutional jigsaw that began in 2003. Moreover, rather than disproving the parsimonious self-
interested models of electoral reforms (Benoit 2004), the 2005 electoral reform shows the 
importance of considering the existence of other institutional reform attempts when trying to 
understand the position of a given party during a given process of electoral system change. The 
re-emergence of the debate on the electoral law in September 2005 was the result of two 
structural elements (the long-term commitment of the UDC to a return to PR, and the under-
performance of the centre-right coalition in the SMDs), and of two contingent elements (the 
approach of the final vote on the constitutional reform in the Senate, and the bad electoral 
prospects of the centre-right coalition for 2006). Finally, despite the fact that the electoral reform 
                                                 
429 This part is largely drawn upon the article I published on the comparison of the 1993 and 2005 
electoral reforms (Bedock 2011), which itself was drawn from the chapter 3 of my Masters’ dissertation. It 
has been completed by the interviews conducted in Italy between June and July 2013.  
430 Cf. supra. 
431 Interview with Roberto D’Alimonte, Professor of Italian political system at University LUISS Guido 
Carli of Rome, 13 June 2013, at his office in Florence. 
268 
Bundling the Bundles: Coalition Dynamics and Institutional Reforms in Italy 
was not dealt with up until the very end of the institutional process, the reflection on the electoral 
reform began earlier, in 2003. Indeed, the direct election of the PM, instigated in the new 
constitutional law, pointed towards a system similar to that of the provinces or of the regions, 432 
whose heads are directly elected in Italy. These reflections had remained embryonic, but de facto, 
constitutional and electoral reforms were clearly thought of as part of the same debate.433 
The debate on the electoral reform began with the apparent benign will to modify the 
most problematic aspects of the Mattarellum, following the generalisation of “liste civette” in 2001 – 
a concept that can be roughly translated as “trap lists” – invented in order to bypass the 
compensation mechanism for small parties in the PR part.434 The most discussed proposal was on 
the adoption of a single ballot, a proposal nicknamed the Nespolum after the AN senator who 
developed it.435 This choice was made, notwithstanding the repeated declarations of the UDC on 
the need to proceed with a much wider reform, that would lead to a return to PR.436 Yet, the first 
reflections of the Chamber of deputies on the electoral reform in commission took the form of a 
discussion in March 2005 regarding 7 proposals of minor corrections of the Mattarellum, and of 
the adoption in June 2005 of a relatively consensual text by the same Commission. These 
correctives had another, hidden objective: there was widespread agreement among the experts 
and the leaders of the centre-right regarding the tendency of the Polo to under-perform in the 
single member districts. Indeed, the centre-right consistently won more votes in the list part, 
where the parties run on their own, compared to the number of votes obtained in the SMD part, 
where the coalition presented a common candidate (the "differential of coalition", D’Alimonte 
and Bartolini 2002). In late June 2005, the UDC MPs changed strategy, and eventually led the 
centre-right to widen the scope of the reform considerably, until the elaboration of a text to 
replace the 1993 system with a PR system with majority bonus (Table 19). In mid-2005, the 
constitutional reform reached the final stage in the Parliament, and the two final readings in the 
                                                 
432 Caprettini, Alessandro M. « Scajola promette agli azzurri un nuovo sistema elettorale. » Il Giornale, 11 
May 2003. 
433 As confirmed to me by politicians such as Andrea Pastore, and experts such as Tarli Barbieri. 
Interviews with Andrea Pastore and with Tarli Barbieri, op. cit 
434 When the citizens voted to elect their MPs, they had to give one vote for a candidate, and the other for 
a list. Each candidate was linked to a list, and thanks to a complex mechanism of compensation named the 
scorporo, the parties that performed the best in the SMDs had some of their votes subtracted in the PR part 
in order to give more seats to the parties that had underperformed in the majoritarian part. However, in 
2001, the two biggest parties (FI and DS) had generalised the practice, which consisted of linking their 
candidates with “trap lists” with whimsical names in order to avoid subtracting votes from the party lists. 
435 Anon., « Si profila una mini-modifica del sistema per votare alle prossime politiche fra un anno e mezzo 
». La Stampa, 15 December 2004. 
436 Cf. Fregonara, Gianna. « Torna la voglia di proporzionale. Forza Italia cambia idea». Corriere della sera, 16 
June 2004. Rampino Antonella. « Alla richiesta leghista di accelerare sulla devolution l’UDC contrappone 
il ritorno alla proporzionale ». La Stampa, 30 June 2004. 
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Chamber and in the Senate were due to take place before the end of the year. It is worth recalling 
that if any modification had taken place during those two readings, a further reading in each 
Chamber would have been required, making the adoption of the constitutional reform in the 
Parliament before the 2006 general elections impossible. 
Table 19. Main steps in the emergence of the electoral reform in the Chamber of deputies 
Date Event in the Parliament Initiator  Main dispositions    
3 March 2005 Beginning of discussion in Commission Commission 
Affari 
Costituzionali 
Projects of minor 
modifications of the 
Matarella law  
16 June 2005 Adoption of a unified text : suppression 
of the scorporo and minor technical 
dispositions  
Commission 
Affari 
Costituzionali 
Suppression of the 
scorporo 
  
28 June 2005 Amendments in favour of a substantial 
electoral reform 
UDC The PR part of the 
Matarella electoral system 
would rise from 25% to 
75% 
8 September 2005 Re-opening of the amendments to the 
unified text against the will of the 
opposition  
UDC       
13 September 
2005 
Discussion in commission of 
amendments entirely substituting the 
unified text  
FI PR system 
Blocked lists 
Majority bonus according 
to the seats obtained by 
the leading coalition 
27 September 
2005 
Presentation in commission of new non-
modifiable amendments  
FI, AN Suppression of 
preference vote  
National threshold of 4% 
Majority bonus according 
to the votes obtained by 
the leading coalition  
Obligation for coalitions 
to present a PM 
candidate and a common 
programme  
As Nania recalls, the UDC intimidated its coalition partners, threatening to make the 
constitutional reform fail, if the electoral reform argument was not discussed: “Once the 
argument had been found on the whole reformatory package, [the UDC] (…) imposed a diktat: 
either an electoral law with a proportional system is made, or [they] do not vote these reforms 
that they had contributed, and a lot, to make”.437 A few years later, Roberto Calderoli, the LN 
senator who elaborated the final version of the project, talked about “blackmail” in an interview, 
                                                 
437 « Una volta invece trovata l’intesa su tutto il pacchetto riformatore, [l’Udc] (...) pose un diktat: o si fa 
una legge elettorale su impianto proporzionale, o non [votano] quelle riforme che avevano contruibuito, e 
molto, a fare. » Interview with Domenico Nania, op. cit. 
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referring not only to the UDC, but also to the rest of its coalition partners: “we were blackmailed 
by Casini and the UDC to introduce a proportional system, by Fini who wanted the blocked lists 
and by Berlusconi who wanted the majority bonus”.438   
The second contingent aspect that should be taken into account is the tight electoral spot 
in which the centre-right coalition found itself in 2005. Since its return to power in 2001, the 
centre-right had lost all of the intermediary elections. This came to a peak in April 2005, when 
the centre-right lost 12 regions out of the 14 called to vote. The centre-left was, at the time, 
considered to be almost sure to win, by a comfortable margin, the 2006 parliamentary elections, 
and was actively preparing the open primaries that would lead Romano Prodi to be appointed 
leader of the coalition in October 2005, with 75% of the 4.3 million votes. During September 
2005, hard negotiations took place between the leaders of the centre-right coalition, in the 
context of major tensions between the UDC and Berlusconi, who accused the centrist leaders of 
“metastasis”.439 The in extremis closure of the deal, prior to the start of the general discussion of 
the text on 29 September 2005, resulted from the resignation of the first secretary of the UDC, 
Marco Follini, who had advocated for an exit from the centre-right coalition. Pier Ferdinando 
Casini, the president of the Chamber of Deputies was, on the other hand, in favour of keeping 
the centrist party within the Polo, and was one of the main architects of a definitive agreement on 
the electoral reform, by giving up on the matter of preference vote and accepting the majority 
bonus.440 His decision also closed the argument regarding Silvio Berlusconi’s leadership of the 
centre-right coalition. Moreover, the pact was facilitated by pre-electoral polls suggesting that the 
new system advocated by the centre-right would reduce the electoral defeat.441 
 
2.2.2. A bundle within a bundle: a complex electoral reform with contradictory 
incentives 
So far, the emergence of the electoral reform has been explained, but its precise content 
has not, and nor have the reasons why the various parties of the centre-right came to an 
agreement on this particularly tricky institutional issue. The new system, modelled on the Tuscan 
                                                 
438 « Fummo ricattati da Casini e dall’Udc per introdurre un sistema proporzionale, da Fini che voleva le 
liste bloccate e Berlusconi che voleva il premio di maggioranza ». Declarations of Roberto Calderoli in the 
TG1 on TV, quoted in anon. « Calderoli: “Berlusconi ci ricattò sul Porcellum, con Casini e Fini”. Ma non 
spiega come ». Il Fatto quotidiano, 2 October 2011. 
439 Interview with Silvio Berlusconi, « Basta Metastasi nel Polo ». Corriere della Sera, 21 September 2005. 
440 Note that the centre-left had unsuccessfully attempted to propose a waiver pact for the next 
parliamentary elections in exchange for the blocking of the electoral reform.  
441 D’Alimonte, Roberto. « Per chi vince maggioranza ad handicap». Il Sole 24 Ore, 15 September 2005. 
271 
Bundling the Bundles: Coalition Dynamics and Institutional Reforms in Italy 
regional electoral system, substituted the single member districts with a mixed system combining 
PR tempered by a majority bonus, taking the form of blocked lists for vast regional 
constituencies. The first crucial point is the mode of attribution of the majority bonus: the 
coalition that obtains more votes automatically secures 54% of the seats in the Chamber, while 
the bonuses are attributed region by region in the Senate.442 Secondly, the lists are blocked: the 
citizen cannot express any preference vote. Thirdly, the new law introduced various thresholds of 
representation in order to access the distribution of seats in the Chamber: 10% of the votes for a 
coalition, 2% of the votes for a party that is part of a coalition,443 4% for lists running on their 
own. These thresholds are 20%, 3%, and 8%, respectively, in the Senate. Finally, the law gave the 
option of standing for election in multiple constituencies, enabling the parties to modify the 
order of the lists in a discretionary way after the vote in case of multiple elections of a single 
candidate. 
Figures gathered by Chiaramonte and Di Virgilio (2006) give a picture of the preferences 
of delegates from 11 Italian parties between 2002 and 2005 on the best electoral system.444 All of 
the small centre-left parties were in favour of a PR system (UDEUR, RC, Verdi, PCDI, SDI, 
SVP), as well as a substantial number of the MPs of the Margherita. The only actors who were 
clearly against the proportional option were the Left Democrats (DS), a majority of whom 
supported a two-round majoritarian system. Most of the centre-right parties (FI, MSFT, UDC) 
were in favour of pure PR, or PR with thresholds, with the notable exception of AN, which 
supported a majoritarian electoral system. Yet, why would all of the centre-left parties, including 
the small formations, oppose the reform in Parliament? Why would AN, the full integration of 
which into the Italian political system was only made possible by the 1993 electoral law, support 
the new system? Why would the UDC accept majoritarian corrections, with a majority bonus?  
The answers to these questions are different for the centre-left and the centre-right. 
Again, for the political actors of the majority, the conciliation of contradictory interests within a 
bundle of electoral mechanisms served to bypass the conflict between the different components. 
Multiple mechanisms, with potentially contradictory incentives, were introduced in the law in 
order to enable each of the four parties of the coalition to anticipate the realisation of its own 
priorities. Such expectations were facilitated by the ambiguity of the law, which made it difficult, 
if not impossible, to anticipate its exact consequences. Similarly to what happened with the 
                                                 
442 This was a consequence of the indication of the Colle that the law would be considered 
unconstitutional if a majoritarian bonus was applied nationally in the Senate.  
443 In reality, the threshold is even lower, as the “best” party in the coalition under this threshold of 2% 
also gets to participate in the distribution of seats. 
444 Cf. appendix 16. 
272 
Bundling the Bundles: Coalition Dynamics and Institutional Reforms in Italy 
constitutional reform, each party tried to push forward certain priorities, and had “blind spots” 
that enabled the agreement to emerge. This time, it is possible to identify five main points of 
tension (Table 20): the bipolarisation of the political system (1); the coalition constraint, which 
can be defined as the incentive for parties to form a pre-electoral coalition rather than running on 
their own (2); the level of the thresholds of representation (3); governability, which in particular 
implies the examination of government stability (4); and the reinforcement of the central leaders’ 
powers in candidate selection (5).445 The motley dispositions of the new law suddenly make sense: 
each of them is a concession to conciliate antonymic objectives, in particular those of AN and of 
the UDC, whose priorities are opposed on each and every point. 
Table 20. Prioritisation of the objectives on the electoral law by the parties present in the Italian Parliament, 
2005 
 
 
Reinforcement 
of bipolarisation 
Strong coalition 
constraint 
Low thresholds 
of representation 
Reinforcement 
of governability 
Reinforcement of the 
central leadership of parties 
FI + + -- ++ ++ 
AN + + ++ - + ++ 
LN = - + - + 
UDC -- -- + - -- 
Others Polo = = ++ -- = 
DS ++ + -- ++ + 
Margherita + + -- ++ + 
RC - -- ++ -- -- 
Others 
Unione 
= - ++ -- -- 
 
Note: ++ Leading priority, + secondary priority, = indifferent, - in contradiction with a secondary priority, -- in 
contradiction with a leading priority 
Source: Bedock 2009, 105. 
Given the different prioritisation of these five goals by the coalition partners, only a 
compromise which preserved the priorities of each partner enabled them to reach a consensus on 
the law, although, as for the constitutional reform, this was at the expense of the efficiency of the 
text. According to Vassallo, the general logic is the following: “the competition must be bipolar”, 
meaning that all provisions were meant to disincentivise independent lists.446 The PR formula 
aimed to make the system more representative, the differentiated thresholds of representation 
were meant to reinforce the coalition constraint, the majority bonus aimed to reinforce 
bipolarisation, the blocked lists aimed to give greater power to the party oligarchies, etc. As a 
                                                 
445 This analysis is a synthesis of the systematic qualitative and quantitative study of the detailed arguments 
on the merits of the reform during the parliamentary debates held on the electoral reform between 29 
September and 13 October 2005 in the Chamber of Deputies. The main themes are the following: 
bipolarisation and alternation, coalitions, governability and fragmentation, thresholds of representation, 
selection of candidates and internal functioning of political parties (Bedock 2009, 94–105). 
446 Interview with Salvatore Vassallo, op. cit. 
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consequence, the position of AN – or rather, the position of Fini447 – can be explained by the 
conviction that the majority bonus would preserve the bipolar structure of the Italian party 
system, and incidentally, that the blocked lists would avoid corruption,448 whereas the concessions 
of the UDC on the blocked lists were based on the (not so) secret hope that the law would 
eventually reconstitute a third centrist pole. FI sought to get rid of the SMDs while reinforcing 
the power of the party leaders through the blocked lists, and imposed the majority bonus in order 
to preserve bipolarism as well as its leadership. As D’Onofrio, the UDC senator, explains, “the 
bonus, Berlusconi in the final agreement, I would not say that he has imposed it, but he has been 
the one to ask for it, the head of the coalition”.449 The Northern League, finally, was compelled to 
adopt the electoral law in exchange for final support for the constitutional reform.  
The existence of opposed objectives in the centre-left, which puts the big parties of the 
coalition (DS and Margherita) face to face with the small ones, is exacerbated, and does not 
immediately explain the centre-left’s unanimous opposition to the electoral reform. The small 
parties protested particularly against the introduction of thresholds of representation, even if they 
were very low, as they considered them to be a potential threat to their presence in the 
parliament. The attitude of the opposition has primarily to do with the centre-left’s certainty of 
an easy victory in the upcoming elections, therefore putting the electoral reform back on the 
agenda after the election, within conditions chosen by the centre-left. In other words, the official 
position of the Unione should not be explained on the basis of the actual preferences of the 
actors, but rather on the basis of the need to show strong opposition to the centre-right only a 
few months before a crucial electoral contest. The DS senator Tonini explained to me that the 
parliamentary opposition did everything in their power to stop the reform:  
                                                 
447 Nania, the AN “wise man”, told me what happened when he was consulted by his party leader on the 
opportunity to introduce preference voting in the new system: “Fini phoned me and told me: ‘what do 
you think about that [Tuscan] law, put at the national level?’ I told him that according to me, that law was 
an anti-democratic law because it did not give the voters the possibility to choose who they elect. (…) He 
answered me: ‘From now on, you are not in charge of this matter’”. « Fini mi telefonò e mi disse: ‘che ne 
pensi di questa legge, da mettere sul piano nazionale? Io gli disse che secondo me, questa legge era una 
legge anti-democratica perché non consentiva agli elettori di scegliere chi eleggere. (...) Lui mi rispose: ‘Da 
oggi non ti occupi più di questa materia’ ». Interview with Domenico Nania, op. cit. 
448 This explanation was offered by Roberto Calderoli. Iovene Bernardo. « Ecco il retroscena della porcata 
». CorriereTV, 8 October 2013. 
449 « Il premio, Berlusconi nell’accordo finale, non dico che l’ha imposto, ma lo ha chiesto lui, il capo della 
coalizione ». Interview with Francesco D’Onofrio, op. cit. 
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“The battle against in the Parliament, we did it. (…) Obviously, we did not use weapons, 
explosives, no one has set himself on fire in a square, (…) we did not burn the hall of the 
Parliament, however, apart from violence, everything that could be done within the standing 
orders was done.”450 
In fact, there is no consensus on the degree of opposition that was actually expressed internally: 
Alessandro Maran, a DS MP, recalls that “we were only a handful of people criticising”.451 
Moreover, this is not to gloss over the fact that some parties of the coalition, and in particular 
Comunist Rifoundation, were actually quite happy with the adoption of the new system.452  
Calderoli soon called the law a “porcata” (“junk” or “load of rubbish”), which led to its 
more colourful nickname, Porcellum. The problems relating to its conception are numerous, the 
most problematic of these being the high risk involved in having different majorities in the 
Chamber and in the Senate. Beyond the anecdotes, the important issue is that, in this particular 
instance, as was the case with the referendum on the constitutional reform,453 the attitude of the 
centre-left was based not so much on the merit of the reform, but on the need to oppose a 
reform from which they had been excluded. This brings us to the importance of understanding 
the logic guiding the attitudes of parties within the context of majoritarian processes of 
institutional reforms.  
 
2.3. The reasons behind the failed referendum: the consequences of the majoritarian logic 
of adoption 
The hard-earned constitutional reform was adopted in a final reading in the Senate in 
November 2005, but ultimately failed to clear the final hurdle: in June 2006, during the 
confirmative referendum, the “no” vote triumphed with a comfortable margin, in the aftermath 
of parliamentary elections which were won by the centre-left. The main reasons behind this failed 
referendum were the successful centre-left campaign which presented the constitutional project 
as a product of the Lega’s blackmailing, thus threatening the unity of the country, but also the 
                                                 
450 « La battaglia contro in Parlamento, l’abbiamo fatta. (...) Certo, non abbiamo usato armi, esplosivi, 
nessuno si è dato fuoco in piazza, (...) o non abbiamo dato fuoco all’aula del Parlamento, però, a parte la 
violenza, tutto ciò che si poteva fare dentro i regolamenti è stato fatto ». Interview with Giorgio Tonini, 
op. cit. 
451 « Eravamo quattro gatti a criticare ». Interview with Alessandro Maran, MP of Gorizia between 2001 
and 2006 and member of the Commission Affari Costituzionali I between 2001 and 2006, MP of Friuli-
Venezia Giulia between 2006 and 2013, senator of Friuli-Venezia Giulia since 2013, DS, 25 June 2013, at a 
restaurant in Rome. 
452 D’Alimonte asserts: “I know for certain that Bertinotti has uncorked many bottles of champagne. (...) 
And French champagne, not even Italian! (« Io so per certo che Bertinotti ha stappato molte bottiglie di 
champagne. (...) E champagne francese, neanche italiano! »). Interview with Roberto D’Alimonte, op. cit. 
453 Cf. infra. 
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bad timing of the referendum, as it occurred after the centre-right was defeated in elections. 
Beyond the Italian case, the failure of the referendum tells us quite a lot about the mechanics 
behind majoritarian processes of adoption of institutional reforms, and the conditions that must 
be present for these types of processes to succeed, illustrating the incentive to practice head-on 
opposition against packages of divisive institutional reforms. 
  
2.3.1. The combination of  bad timing and the “Lega factor”: the results of  the 
2006 constitutional referendum 
The constitutional reform was rejected because the centre-right coalition did not manage 
to win the confirmative referendum on the constitutional package that it had been negotiating 
since 2003. The referendum failed because the centre-left won the elections, and managed to 
convince voters with its “anti-Lega” rhetoric. Finally, the length of the negotiations due to the 
construction and the expansion of the bundle gave the centre-right a difficult strategic choice: 
going all-out in the parliamentary elections, or in the referendum campaign. Berlusconi made the 
choice to organise the referendum after the parliamentary elections, knowing full well that a 
negative result would prevent his coalition from controlling the results of the referendum.   
Much could be said, in retrospect, about the constitutional reform of the centre-right. 
Some criticisms are widespread, such as the fact that the legislative procedure that it would have 
put into place would probably have been very dysfunctional, and the fact that it did not correct 
the 2001 reform’s fundamental flaws (rigid repartition of matters between state and regions 
creating conflicts of competences). Regarding the reinforcement of the PM, and federalisation, 
many experts now consider that, if anything, the strengthening of the executive was limited, and 
that it was probably a re-centralising rather than a de-centralising reform.454 That being said, 
however, during the institutional process of the adoption of this constitutional reform, and even 
more so during the referendum campaign, the constitutional reform was demonised by the 
overwhelming majority of politicians and experts from the centre-left opposition on opposite 
grounds. The constitutional reform was described with colourful and comminatory judgments: as 
the “big ugly hash of Lorenzago” by the former president of the Republic, Cossiga,455 as 
“imminent and grave danger for Italian democracy” by Prodi,456 and as “a vision of extreme 
                                                 
454 Cf. supra. 
455 « Quel pasticciaccio brutto di Lorenzago ». Cossiga, Francesco. « Francesco Cossiga : ecco perché sono 
contrario alla proposta del centrodestra ». Corriere della Sera, 18 September 2004. 
456 Rampino, Antonella. « Il professore contro il premierato e le modifiche della carta: un pericolo grave e 
imminente per la democrazia italiana ». La Stampa, 12 March 2005 
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personalization of politics and power, even at the cost of a disaggregation of the institutional 
fabric” by Napolitano.457 A few experts raised voices defending the new text, or at least to give it 
the chance to be improved in the successive legislature: these included Panebianco,458 Calderisi,459 
the Magna Carta foundation,460 but also constitutionalists close to the centre-left such as Carlo 
Fusaro (2004). Nevertheless, most constitutional lawyers and centre-left politicians not only 
opposed the reform, but argued against it on the grounds of serious accusations, the most 
common of these being the threat to Italian unity posed by devolution, the excessive 
personalisation of powers of the executive and of the PM, and the confusion of the new 
legislative procedure (for a synthesis, cf. Bassanini 2004).   
On 25 and 26 June 2006, 61.3% of Italian voters rejected the centre-right’s constitutional 
reform, with a 52.3% turnout, a notable figure for a referendum.461 There are two main reasons 
behind the clear “no” vote in this instance: the bad timing, and the successful campaign. Firstly, 
the change in the balance of power between centre-left and centre-right found concrete 
expression with the arrival in power of a new government led by Romano Prodi in April 2006. In 
addition, the centre-right chose not to campaign for a “yes” once it had decided to place the 
referendum after the parliamentary elections. Therefore, the timing chosen for the referendum 
was inauspicious, as the government did not manage to organise the referendum at a time when 
the balance of power was in its favour. Secondly, the referendum was perceived primarily as a 
move stemming from the Lega, which led to strong opposition to the reform in Southern Italy, a 
zone that had traditionally been favourable to the centre-right.  
The referendum took place after the parliamentary elections of 2006, which were won by 
the centre-left coalition with a very slim majority in the Senate. The coalition’s opposition to the 
adoption of the constitutional reform in itself contributed to the victory of the “no” side in the 
referendum. In addition, the centre-right voters did not mobilise to the same extent as their 
centre-left counterparts during the referendum contest, explaining - at least partially - the 20 
percentage point gap between the “yes” and the “no” vote. The interesting issue, beyond the 
electoral dynamics favourable to the centre-left, is the then PM, Silvio Berlusconi’s decision to 
                                                 
457 « Una visione di estrema personalizzazione della politica e del potere, anche a costo di una 
disgregazione del tessuto istituzionale ». Rampino Antonella. « La nuova costituzione voto scontato a 
Palazzo Madama, il centrosinistra si prepara al referendum per cancellarla ». La Stampa, 16 November 
2005. 
458 Panebianco Angelo. « Perché sì ». Corriere della Sera, 1 June 2006. 
459 Calderisi, Giuseppe.  « Prodi, ribaltoni e bugie ». Il Giornale, 19 June 2006. 
460 Magna Carta. « Il Sì renderà più stabile l’Italia ». Il Giornale, 9 June 2006. 
461 Note that no quorum of registered voters is necessary for confirmative constitutional referendums, 
unlike abrogative referendums, where a 50% turnout of registered voters is required. 
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organise the referendum after, rather than before the parliamentary elections. The victory of the 
centre-left contenders was seen, if not as a foregone conclusion, then at least as the probable 
outcome of the 2006 elections. As a consequence, some people in the centre-right tried to give 
the constitutional referendum a chance, arguing that it should be organised before the general 
elections: 
“We went, Calderoli and I, to Berlusconi. Before the election, obviously. And we said: ‘we 
would like to have the referendum organised before the elections. (…) And Berlusconi told 
us: ‘but this way we also lose the elections!’ ”
462 
In other words, in 2006 Berlusconi preferred to give himself and his coalition the best 
possible chance of winning the parliamentary elections, rather than risk losing them by a wider 
margin in the case of a negative referendum outcome. As a result, after the electoral defeat, the 
people who had actually elaborated the constitutional reform did very little to mobilise in favour 
of the “yes” vote. Fusaro summarises the attitude of the former PM Berlusconi as follows: “one 
of the golden rules of Berlusconi is ‘never support a lost cause’”.463 During the legislature, the 
constitutional reform was, for Berlusconi, the gateway between the Northern League and the 
government, and the way to keep LN in government. As the leader rightly considered that the 
referendum would be virtually impossible to win if the parliamentary elections were lost, the 
cause of the constitutional reform was more or less abandoned by the centre-right.  
The second factor behind the referendum results is the rhetoric that came from the 
centre-left, which had managed to successfully present the constitutional reform as a Lega 
project. The “yes” vote won in the electoral strongholds of the Lega (Lombardy and Veneto), 
whereas the referendum was defeated in all other Italian regions, with the “no” vote peaking in 
Calabria with 82.5% (Figure 18). The electoral map shows clear evidence of strong opposition to 
the constitutional reform, not only in the traditional strongholds of the centre-left (Tuscany, 
Emilia-Romagna, and centre-Italy), but also in the South, where parties such as the UDC, AN, 
and FI in Sicily are stronger.464   
Pastore, recalling the electoral campaign, talks about a “disaster”: “this idea was generated 
(...) that the law had been made to meet the will of the League, and our southerners became 
                                                 
462 « Andammo, Calderoli ed io, da Berlusconi. Prima dell’elezione, ovviamente. E dicemmo: ‘voremmo far 
fare il referendum prima delle elezioni. (...) E Berlusconi ci disse: ‘ma noi così perdiamo anche le elezioni!’ 
». Interview with Francesco D’Onofrio, op. cit. 
463 « Una delle regole principe di Berlusconi è ‘non sostenere mai cause perse’ ». Interview with Carlo 
Fusaro, op. cit. 
464 Cf. appendix 18.   
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scared.”465 To summarise, the outcome of a reform in a majoritarian process, unsurprisingly, is 
dependent on the ability of the majority that has elaborated the reform to pass it without the 
support of the opposition. The centre-right managed to pass the reform in the parliamentary 
arena thanks to the creation of a bundle of reforms, but it failed to pass the reform in the 
referendum arena following the change of majority in the 2006 parliamentary elections. Yet, one 
question remains: why did the centre-left systematically, and in many ways instrumentally, oppose 
the constitutional reform?   
Figure 18. “No” vote in the referendum of 2006 by region, Italy 
 
Note: “M” refers to the arithmetic mean. “S” to the standard deviation, and the figure on top of each class to the 
maximum by class. The map was computed with the software Philcarto.  
Source: Ministero dell’Interno, archivio storico delle elezioni 
 
                                                 
465 « Si è generata quest’idea (...) che la legge fosse stata fatta per andare contro alla volontà della Lega, e i 
nostri meridionali si sono spaventati ». Interview with Andrea Pastore, op. cit. 
279 
Bundling the Bundles: Coalition Dynamics and Institutional Reforms in Italy 
2.3.2. The incentives for the opposition to “kill” a majoritarian constitutional 
reform 
One of the DS senators that I questioned on the constitutional reform told me frankly 
that, “even if this reform had been made by the centre-left, it would not have been very 
different”.466 Yet the centre-left has, at least on the record, opposed the centre-right’s 
constitutional reform altogether. How can one explain the fierce opposition of the centre-left to 
this reform, even though the positions of the main Italian parties are actually quite similar in 
relation to many institutional topics? Beyond the Italian case, and beyond the referendum of 
2005, what we try to understand here is the dominant strategy and attitudes of an actor who has 
been excluded from the elaboration of the law. As Vannino Chiti, the minister for parliamentary 
relations between 2006 and 2008, recalls, “the reform has been conducted by the forces who 
sustained the Berlusconi government. (…) So, in all of the parliamentary debate, there has been a 
poor involvement from our part. It has substantially been a confrontation”.467 Note that the 
responsibility for the opposition’s lack of involvement is clearly shared. As early as January 2003, 
on the issue of premierato,468 the centre-left had clearly chosen to stop collaboration with the 
centre-right on constitutional matters, despite discreet expressions of readiness for dialogue from 
Calderoli.  
The constitutional reforms of the fourteenth legislature fall into the category of divisive 
institutional reforms, as there is no perception of widespread agreement among the citizens and 
the political elites on the desirability of the alternative contemplated. During institutional reform 
processes that are conducted through a majoritarian logic (i.e., reforms proposed and elaborated 
by the government, without the opposition), and concern divisive reforms, the opposition has more of 
an incentive to antagonise rather than to support the reform, regardless of its own position on the topic. In this 
regard, it is interesting to contrast the result of the 2001 referendum with that of the referendum 
in 2006. The two constitutional reforms, i.e. the successful reform of Title V of 2001 and the 
failed reform of the second part of the Constitution of 2005, are similar in two important aspects: 
during the final stages of the parliamentary procedures, they were adopted with only the votes of 
the parliamentary majority, after a majoritarian process in the parliament. Secondly, both 
                                                 
466 « Anche se quella riforma fosse stata fatta dal centrosinistra, non sarebbe stata molto differente ». 
Interview with Alessandro Maran, op. cit. 
467 « La riforma fu portata avvanti dalle forze che sostenevano il governo Berlusconi (...) Per cui, in tutto il 
confronto parlamentare, ci fu un scarso coinvolgimento nostro. Fu sostanzialmente un muro contro 
muro.» Interview with Vannino Chiti, MP of Toscana between 2001 and 2008, minister of the relations 
with the Parliament between 2006 and 2008, senator of Toscana since 2008, DS, 3 July 2013, at his office 
in Rome. 
468 Cf. supra. 
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referendums took place soon after political alternation, following the 2001 and the 2006 
elections. Yet, the later confirmative referendum led to a reversal in results (Table 21), as the two 
reforms were of different natures: consensual for the 2001 referendum, highly divisive for the 
2005 referendum.  
Table 21. Comparison of the results of the 2001 and 2006 confirmative referendums 
 2001 confirmative referendum 
(Title V) 
2006 confirmative referendum 
(Part II of the constitution) 
“Yes” vote 64.2% 38.7% 
“No” vote 35.8% 61.3% 
Turnout 34.1% 52.3% 
Source: Ministero dell’Interno, archivio storico delle elezioni 
In the first case, the centre-right (then in the opposition) was involved in the conception and 
elaboration of the constitutional reform up until the breakup of the third Bicamerale. Despite the 
fact that the centre-right refused to vote on the reform of Title V during the final phase of the 
process, and the fact that the centre-right called for a “no” vote in the referendum, the 
confirmative referendum was adopted by a comfortable majority. As already explained, the 
centre-right’s main argument to justify its formal opposition was that the reform did not go “far 
enough”.469 This strategy is different to opposing the reform altogether: it consists of showing 
agreement with the objectives, but also of blaming the government for not doing enough to 
achieve them. Therefore, in many ways, federalism was framed as a valence issue (Stokes 1963) 
during the 2001 referendum, which can be defined as “those issues on which there is agreement 
on the ends of politics” (Green 2007, 629). The implicit, underlying argument behind the centre-
right rhetoric was that the centre-left was unable to deliver on that shared objective, i.e. 
federalism.  
 In 2006, on the other hand, the centre-left built its rhetoric by framing the constitutional 
reform as ultimately a position issue. The main difference, in this instance, stems from the fact that 
the reforms at stake were divisive. I argue that the opposition’s attitude to the whole 
constitutional package was not dependent on their agreement or disagreement with the content 
of the reform, but was a consequence of the two major incentives for them to disagree with the 
reform. The first reason to oppose the reform derives from the majoritarian logic. More often 
than not, the parliamentary opposition has a greater incentive to oppose a project it has not 
participated in, even in the case of projects which benefit from broad agreement on their general 
                                                 
469 Cf. supra. 
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objectives, or even on the particular provisions of a given text. Lijphart considers that some 
political regimes, with identifiable institutional characteristics, are inherently more oriented 
towards consociational or adversarial behaviour (1969). The argument here is that cooperative vs. 
adversarial behaviour is also crucially dependent on the process of reform itself, as well as on the 
nature of the reform. As the issue of constitutional reform was hugely divisive, it was ultimately an 
easier, and less costly political strategy for the centre-left to present the project as an evil 
emanation of Berlusconi and Bossi’s axis.  
 The second crucial incentive for the centre-left to oppose the constitutional reform of 
2005 was its myriad of internal divisions on the matter. We have already made clear that, during 
the electoral reform, the centre-left was certainly not united behind clear and shared preferences 
on the best electoral system. Exactly the same thing can be said for the constitutional reform, 
with internal divisions both within parties and between the parties comprising the coalition,  
particularly in relation to the form of government and the opportunity to reinforce the Prime 
Minister (or not). As Stefano Ceccenti argues, “there are internal differences within the 
opposition that in this way have not emerged because the opposition has been able to make a 
propagandistic campaign against the majority”.470  
  
Conclusion 
 
The electoral reform and the constitutional reform are to be viewed in light of an 
institutional sequence which started in 1993, following the collapse and recomposition of the 
Italian party system in a context of democratic dissatisfaction and deep electoral uncertainty. 
These two institutional reforms were put on the agenda as a direct consequence of the reforms 
adopted in the preceding legislature, and particularly the constitutional reform of Title V which 
turned Italy into a “federal” state. As early as 2003, the different themes that had structured the 
debate on Italian institutions (bicameralism, form of government, and electoral reform on one 
hand; federalism on the other) became intrinsically linked into a single debate and eventually, into 
a single gigantic bundle of institutional reforms.  
This chapter has focused on two divisive institutional reforms, one of which succeeded 
and one of which failed, both after a majoritarian process of adoption in the Italian Parliament. 
                                                 
470 « C’erano differenze interne nell’opposizione che così non sono emerse perché l’opposizione ha potuto 
fare una campagna propagandistica contro la maggioranza ». Interview with Stefano Ceccanti, op. cit. 
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First of all, the chapter has shown the crucial importance of the bundling logics in contexts where 
the government coalition is divided. The adoption of the two reforms in the parliament resulted 
from the ability of the elements of the majority to build a package deal enabling every actor in the 
coalition to “win” on at least one of its priorities. Secondly, in majoritarian processes for divisive 
institutional reforms, the opposition has greater incentive to oppose the reform regardless of its 
own position on the topic, and this is even more the case when the opposition itself is split. 
Therefore, coalition dynamics are, in contexts where divisive reforms are discussed within a 
government coalition holding widely distinctive preferences, key to understanding the failure or 
the success of the adoption of institutional reforms, but also to understanding the attitude of the 
opposition towards the project. Thirdly, the issue of the confirmative referendum has 
demonstrated the centrality of timing in explaining the final outcome of a reform: despite the fact 
that the parliamentary battle for the constitutional reforms had been won, the time required to 
finalise the deal prevented the centre-right coalition from holding a referendum in favourable 
conditions, leading to the failure of the constitutional reform.  
Another paradox of institutional design is apparent in the Italian case: mutual concessions 
and trade-offs were necessary in order to allow a comprehensive deal to be reached, but these 
negotiations eventually led to the adoption in the parliament of reforms which partially clashed 
with the initial objectives of most of the reformers. Despite the fact that the constitutional 
reform initially aimed, for some, to reinforce the executive, and for all, to neutralise the second 
chamber, and for others still to deepen federalism, the final agreement was so ambiguous and 
complex that, in all likelihood, it would have been at odds with all of these objectives. The same 
goes for the electoral reform: empirical evidence from the 2013 election particularly shows that it 
did not consolidate bipolarism, provide stable parliamentary majorities, or enable a truly 
proportional repartition of seats to emerge. “Too many cooks spoil the broth”, as the saying 
goes: here, the very conditions enabling an agreement to be found also meant that any deal would 
necessarily contain contradictory incentives and lead to uncertain outcomes.   
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Conclusion of the second part 
  
 The last three chapters have provided evidence suggesting that the factors explaining the 
final outcomes of consensual and divisive reforms are different, and thus lead to distinctive causal 
mechanisms. Before coming back to these findings, I should say a word about the link between 
the favourable antecedent conditions identified in the first part and the way in which they have 
facilitated the emergence of certain types of reform rather than others. Finally, I will briefly 
discuss how these findings could be generalized to other cases. 
 Ireland was the case that presented the most striking and most compelling short-term 
factors facilitating change, with a level of volatility that was through the roof, and a political 
alternation after 14 years of domination by Fianna Fáil. Experts and representatives of civil 
society have been successful in constructing a narrative linking the dramatic economic crisis that 
Ireland has faced since 2009 with the failure of its political system. This has resulted in the 
emergence of an agenda of reform mostly, but not exclusively, composed of consensual reforms, 
supported by a major element of both the political system and the public. The French case 
shows, however, that the presence of strong external public pressure to reform is not a necessary 
condition for the emergence of consensual reforms. Indeed, the reduction of the length of the 
presidential term, an issue which had enjoyed widespread public support for decades, resurfaced 
on the agenda without a clear external push, but as a result of the successful efforts of the 
centrists. On the other hand, the return to office of the left in 1997 certainly helped the issue to 
jump back up the agenda, as the leader of the coalition, Jospin, held distinctive preferences on the 
issue, unlike his predecessor. This finding confirms how political alternation often constitutes the 
concrete translation of the change in the preferences of the government, and provides new 
opportunities for reforms of the core democratic rules. As would be expected, conversely, the 
divisive reforms that were put on the agenda with the intention to act on them were mostly the result 
of mobilisation endogenous to the political system. For example, the Italian case shows the 
decisive role of the Northern League in the emergence of the initial agenda for the constitutional 
reform in 2003, whereas the UDC was the main supporter and initiator of the subsequent 
electoral reform in 2005. In France, the reordering of the electoral calendar clearly resulted from 
the short-term, vote-seeking considerations of the Socialist Party and its leader, who believed that 
they would be better off if the presidential election happened before the legislative elections. In 
contrast, in Ireland, some of the reforms that emerged as a result of the popular mobilisation of 
experts and civil society were ultimately quite divisive: the electoral reform, voting age, and the 
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reduction of the presidential term, to name a few. As a result, the leaders of the reform process 
adopted delay tactics, taking the form of the constitutional convention, to water down the reform 
agenda and bury the most contentious ones. Therefore, the case studies provide evidence that not 
all reforms of core democratic rules that appear on an agenda are tackled by politicians with the 
intention of actually having them adopted. On the contrary, in some cases, and particularly when 
the reforms result mainly from pressures external to the political system, reformers may engage in 
a process of reform that has little chance of leading to a concrete outcome, purely for the sake of 
dealing with the topic.  
 The empirical evidence points towards the variance of the causal pathways at work 
according to the combination of the type of process and the nature of the reform. I will now 
summarise the findings of the three chapters, and present the six combinations of types of 
reforms and types of processes, with empirical illustrations in the form of the successful and 
unsuccessful reforms that have occurred in Ireland, France and Italy. Most crucially, I will discuss 
the mechanisms behind these reforms. What was puzzling in the three cases investigated here is 
that, despite the fact that the reforms in each country are part of a single bundle, linked together 
by the reformers, and consequently have the same dynamics, they have not experienced the same 
fate.  
Table 22. Expected outcomes for different combinations of types of reform and types of process 
 Consensual reform Divisive reform 
Externalised process ++ 
Ex: none in the case studies 
- 
Ex: most of the reforms 
discussed in constitutional 
convention in Ireland since 2013 
Supermajoritarian process ++ 
Ex: Quinquennat in France in 
2000 
- 
Ex of attempt: Third Bicamerale in 
Italy, 1997-98 
Majoritarian process +/- 
Ex: Seanad reform in Ireland of 
2013 
“small” Irish reforms 2011-13 
Federalism reform of 2001 in 
Italy 
+/- 
Ex: constitutional reform of 
2005 in Italy 
Electoral reform of 2005 in Italy 
Reordering of the electoral 
calendar in France 
Note: ++ means that the reform is adopted by a majority going beyond the parties supporting the government, + that 
the reform is adopted by the majority/by a small margin, - that it is rejected or abandoned,  -- that it is rejected and 
that there are defections inside the majority.  
 
1- Consensual reform, externalised process 
 In the fifth chapter, I argue that for this type of reform, the general logic is to involve all 
actors in the process of reform as much as possible, including those outside of the political 
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system. As it concerns consensual reforms enjoying a great deal of popular support, and therefore 
bringing about positive outcomes for all of the actors within the political system, the dominant 
strategy consists of making sure that credit can be claimed for the reform, and therefore of 
ensuring involvement in the process. I have also argued that in such configurations, adoption 
should be relatively easy. These reforms are not actually expected to be very frequent: there 
would be many reasons to expect that, whenever possible, the government will try to claim credit 
for a popular reform idea by controlling its elaboration (see 3-). To date, at least, no instances of 
such reforms can be found in the three case studies. This might be the case at some point if 
topics such as voting rights for Irish emigrants are effectively implemented in the near future, 
based on the work of the constitutional convention; such measures appear to have the support of 
many Irish citizens and political parties. However, most of the reforms that are currently on the 
agenda of the constitutional convention are actually divisive (see 4-). This seems to confirm and 
expand the impasse already apparent to those who have studied citizens’ assemblies: these 
devices are primarily created in order to deal with contentious issues such as electoral systems, or 
in the case of Ireland, the length of the presidential term, voting age, etc.. They don’t tend to deal 
with consensual issues. Yet, at this point, the Irish case doesn’t seem to provide decisive proof 
that externalised processes of reform make the adoption of consensual reforms easier either, 
insofar as the reformers appear to have little motivation to delegate the elaboration of consensual 
reforms. Indeed, given the fact that consensual reforms are dominated by outcome-contingent 
logics and credit-claiming strategies, the externalisation of consensual reforms would amount to 
deliberately sharing credit with external actors for the initiation of a popular institutional reform.  
 
2-  Consensual reform, supermajoritarian process 
 This second configuration of reform was encountered in the French case study, in relation 
to the shortening of the presidential term. This was the result of the country’s particular 
institutional situation after the 1997 election, with the cohabitation of a Socialist PM and a 
Gaullist president. This situation of “divided majority” compelled the French political elites to 
collaborate, as both the president and the prime minister have some prerogatives regarding 
institutional reforms. Empirical evidence points towards a mix of collaboration between the 
majority and the opposition during the phase of elaboration of the content of the reform, and of 
the competition to be seen as the actor “responsible” for the reform during the adoption phase. 
In other words, in this configuration, I have argued that the dominant logic is one of credit-
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claiming, and that the expected outcome would be the adoption of the reform by a large majority, 
regardless of the number of veto players or the referendum requirement.  
 The reform to introduce the quinquennat illustrated the double logic of competition and 
collaboration. The president of the Republic and his camp (the opposition) did indeed cooperate 
with the PM and his allies (the majority) in order to pass a popular reform in the parliament, but 
this was followed by a phase of competition to claim credit for a reform which had been 
supported by the vast majority of French people for decades. The credit-claiming logic was 
abundantly clear, and actors were quite self-aware of this imperative. For example, the lack of 
involvement of the left-wing parliamentary majority in the constitutional referendum called by 
the president, and therefore by the opposition, shows clearly how the main political actors tried 
both to claim credit for the reform and to minimise (in the eyes of the public) their opponents’ 
degree of involvement in the final, positive outcome. Conversely, Chirac’s decision to hold a 
referendum that was not constitutionally required for the adoption of that particular 
constitutional reform was a consequence of his fear of being excluded from the benefits of a 
popular reform. The reform was passed by a very comfortable margin, both in the parliament and 
during the referendum held a couple of months later, as a result of the agreement between the 
majority and the opposition on its merits.  
 To conclude, the cooperation between the majority and the opposition in France was 
forced upon them by the constitutional character of the modification, and the situation of a 
divided majority. In all likelihood, as illustrated by the reordering of the electoral calendar (6-), 
such cooperation would not have taken place if no institutional constraints had compelled the 
actors to act together. Going beyond the French case, it is arguable that situations in which the 
government and the opposition collaborate to pass a consensual institutional reform may actually 
be, if not exactly frequent, then at least relatively common. Indeed, in many countries, reforms of 
the core democratic rules, and constitutional reforms in particular, require a special procedure 
more stringent than that for the passing of ordinary legislation in the parliament. France, Ireland 
and Italy illustrate the consequences of the referendum requirement. However, supermajorities 
are also often necessary to pass a constitutional reform in parliament: in the US, for example, any 
constitutional amendment requires a supermajority of two-thirds of both houses of the Congress, 
and ratification by three-quarters of the states! In such cases, reformers who fight for the 
adoption of a given modification have greater incentives to work closely with the opposition, in 
order to have its support, notwithstanding the credit-sharing implicit in this set-up.  
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3- Consensual reform, majoritarian process 
  This case of reform is particularly interesting, and I believe it to be much more common 
than the two configurations mentioned above. This would suggest that the topics at stake are 
perceived as being popular with the public, and that the government decides to retain the upper 
hand on the elaboration of the reforms.  
 Thus, contrary to the previous configurations, the government here chooses not to 
collaborate with the opposition during the phase of elaboration of the reform, and therefore to 
claim credit for the reform without sharing the spoils with its main contenders. I argued that 
there is a particularly big chance in this situation that the opposition will switch positions before 
the process is over, being in favour at the beginning, and opposed at the end, particularly when a 
referendum is to be held during the final adoption phase, again as a result of outcome-contingent 
motivations. The rationale behind this assertion was that this would be a consequence of the 
exclusion of the opposition from the elaboration of the reform, and of the difficulty they would 
then have in claiming credit for the reform. Three examples of such reforms have been outlined 
in the case studies: the abolition of the Seanad in Ireland, the reform of Title V (the federal 
reform) in Italy in 2001, and the vast majority of the reforms that have been debated in Ireland 
since 2011.  
 The failure to abolish the Seanad in Ireland resulted, to a large degree, from the successful 
re-framing of the reform debate, which turned a consensual issue into a divisive one through 
criticism of the motives behind the referendum, and linked the issue with other contentious 
issues within the Irish institutional system, such as the matter of executive accountability. The 
constitutional reform of Title V in Italy in 2001 also offers an interesting example of this sort of 
configuration. The general objective of “federalism” was shared by political actors in both 
political camps, and was widely perceived to be a positive, popular reform that would benefit the 
entire Italian political system. Initially, the issue of federalism was embedded within a wider range 
of reforms (see 5- ), involving both the opposition and the majority. The failure of this process 
following the dismissal of the Third Bicamerale led the centre-left majority to elaborate, this time 
on its own, a deep reform of Title V of the Italian constitution, which was eventually adopted 
through a confirmative referendum, but was opposed, at least “officially”, by the centre-right, 
both in the parliament and in the referendum campaign, on the grounds that the reform did not 
go “far enough”. Therefore, in both cases, there was evidence that the opposition, which had 
been excluded from the elaboration of the reform, felt the urge to hold a distinctly separate 
position from that of the majority, and partly or totally re-framed the issue at stake in order to 
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weaken the position of the government. However, in the case of the Seanad referendum, the 
reformers actively re-framed the debate in order to turn a single issue into a more complex one, 
embedded into multiple other dimensions of reform. In Italy, on the other hand, and despite the 
fact that the reform at stake was complex, the referendum on the issue largely consisted of asking 
one simple question: are you in favour of federalism? Moreover, the opposition was more 
cosmetic than anything else.  
 I argued in chapter 5 that it is harder to adopt a consensual reform when it is framed as a 
multidimensional issue, as it is highly likely that the existing consensus on a specific point will 
disappear when this issue is embedded into a wider frame. Moreover, the consequences of the 
exclusion of the opposition seem to be far less important for the outcome of consensual reforms 
when the final adoption takes place in the parliament, rather than in a referendum. Indeed, in 
such cases, the final outcome ultimately depends on the parliamentary majority: if this majority 
has enough seats in the parliament to pass the reform on its own, there is only so much that the 
opposition can or would want to do in order to reverse the final outcome on an issue that enjoys 
broad agreement. Indeed, insofar as the reforms of the core democratic rules tend not to be very 
popular with the general public, the credit-claiming logics are much less strong for issues that 
remain purely in the parliament. The conclusions may be different, however, in countries where 
reforms require supermajorities to pass: in such instances, it is probably a risky strategy for a 
government to attempt to claim credit for a consensual reform on its own by bypassing the 
opposition.  
 
4- Divisive reform, externalised process 
 I have argued that such a configuration is particularly likely when the government is trying 
to shelve a topic that it considers too important to deal with, and where the government actually 
prefers the status quo. This may be the case, in particular, when a given agenda of institutional 
reforms is imposed upon the political elites by external pressures, as was the case in Ireland in 
2011. It is quite striking to see, for example, how all of the experiences of citizens’ assemblies on 
electoral reform eventually failed to lead to positive outcomes. Even though the existing Irish 
legislature is far from being over, the investigations in the Irish chapter show conclusively that 
the setting-up of the constitutional convention was a way of getting rid of certain important and 
divisive topics regarding institutional reform, such as electoral system reform in particular, but 
also other aspects, such as voting age and the length of the presidential term. There is still a great 
deal of uncertainty as to what the government will eventually put to a vote, either in the 
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parliament or through a referendum, with the current strategy consisting of moving the issues 
forward in time, later in the legislature. Therefore, the empirical evidence largely confirms that 
the most likely outcome of divisive reforms, when an externalised process of reform is put in 
place, is either the non-adoption of a reform proposed by the body to which the government has 
delegated the elaboration, or the non-discussion of the reform in the parliament, which is even 
more likely. This empirical evidence is completely in line with the findings on citizens assemblies 
conducted in Ontara, British Columbia, and the Netherlands, where divisive electoral reforms 
have failed to be adopted or even put to a vote (Fournier et al. 2011).  
 
5- Divisive reform, supermajoritarian process 
 Of all of the six configurations of reform, I believe this one to be the least likely to lead to 
a positive outcome “in the real world”. What is more likely, however, is that the process will 
begin with collaboration between the opposition and the majority on a divisive issue, that this 
collaboration will end in the middle of the process, and that this will lead either to the 
abandonment of the reforms at stake, or to a switch to a majoritarian process of reform.  
 The example of the third Bicamerale in Italy presided over by D’Alema between 1999 and 
2001 offers a good illustration of how the opposition and the majority failed to collaborate until 
the end of a project of constitutional reform that would have necessitated many substantial 
changes of the core democratic rules. Many of the provisions discussed over the course of the 
Bicameral Commission were abandoned altogether, whereas others led to a majoritarian process 
of adoption on the topic of federalism (see 3-). The reason why these reforms are particularly 
unlikely to succeed is straightforward: it is just very difficult to bring together the interests of the 
majority and of the opposition on divisive issues. The interests of these actors are likely to be 
totally distinct, and if such a reform is not particularly popular with public opinion, self-interested 
logics tend to prevail. This to some extent explains why, despite numerous attempts to reach a 
shared solution (shared by the majority and the opposition) on constitutional reforms in Italy, the 
antagonistic interests represented in the Italian Parliament were always a stumbling block. 
Overcoming the barriers to reform represented by such a configuration would imply both the 
opposition and the majority sharing of a set of “selfish” interests, a situation that could arise if 
“within-block” divisions inside the majority and the opposition prevail over “between-block” 
divisions. Some examples exist, such as the 4% threshold for European elections adopted by the 
big parties (PD, PDL) in 2009 in Italy in order to weaken their numerous, small coalition 
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partners. However, this situation is still quite exceptional, particularly in democracies based on a 
strong bipolar and alternating logic.  
 
6- Divisive reform, majoritarian process 
 The last configuration is also probably the most frequent when it comes to the discussion 
of institutional reforms. It concerns divisive reforms, and processes during which the majority 
chooses to lead the process. When the majoritarian process is chosen to deal with such reforms, 
there are a number of possible final outcomes, which ultimately depend on the unity of the 
parliamentary majority.  
 The easiest situation is when the government can pass the reform on its own with the 
support of the parliamentary majority, because the majority is in agreement on the content of the 
reform. This implies, again, that no supermajority is required to pass the reform. In this case, the 
outcome is relatively straightforward: the opposition opposes, while the majority adopts the 
reform. The reordering of the electoral calendar in 2000 in France is a typical example: despite 
the fact that the RPR, particularly in the Senate, tried to slow down the reform in every way 
possible, as long as the Socialist Party, with the help of the centrists, had enough votes to pass the 
law in the parliament, the outcome was certain.  
 A second possible situation concerns moments when the majority supporting the 
government is divided on the reforms at stake, with opposite positions. In such cases, as the 
Italian case shows, both for the constitutional reform (at the parliamentary stage) and for the 
electoral reform, the crucial factor that enabled the reform to pass was the ability of the majority 
to construct a bundle of reforms, offering mutual concessions and “spoils” to each member of 
the coalition. The multifaceted character of the reforms, together with the uncertainty about their 
actual effects, and the actors’ misperceptions – each of whom believed that they had been the 
canniest of all, successfully led to the adoption of complex and substantial reforms, at least in the 
parliament. It is also important to note that in such cases, a positive outcome may occur at the 
expense of the general readability and efficiency of the reform, and that reform can only occur 
when the different actors have different priorities. Otherwise, it is not possible to distribute the 
“spoils” in such a way as to satisfy everyone.  
 The third possible outcome is that the government has no majority with which to pass 
the reform, or that this majority changes during the final stages of the adoption. The 2006 
referendum on the constitutional reform in Italy provides a good illustration. The reform was 
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successfully adopted in the parliament thanks to the construction of a bundle of reforms during 
the parliamentary phase. Yet, the reform failed to pass the final hurdle, the referendum, as the 
2006 election led to a switch of government majority (with the return of the centre-left), and to 
the defection of many centre-right voters. This also brings me back to the importance of timing 
for the final outcome of reforms. Rahat and Hazan suggest that, in the case of electoral reforms, 
delaying tactics serve as barriers to reform (2011, 487–488): procedural barriers, and the 
disagreement over content. Although the authors argue that these tactics cannot completely block 
a reform, the case studies suggest that they may be able to delay them for so long that the 
conditions favourable to a positive outcome may change.  
 To conclude, one can wonder how these empirical and theoretical findings could be 
expanded to other cases of reform. The empirical results on divisive reforms could certainly also 
be applied to major electoral reforms. For instance, the bundling logic found in the Italian case 
both for the electoral and the constitutional reform can be applied to other Italian reforms, 
including for instance the 1993 electoral reform where an agreement was also reached by 
accommodating in the text multiple incentives and priorities (Bedock 2011). I have also 
mentioned that the findings on externalised processes for divisive reform clearly echo the 
findings of authors who have worked on citizens’ assemblies. We could multiply the examples, 
although a more promising research track could be to use a different method in order to 
investigate the applicability of these findings. In particular, the use of configurational methods 
and qualitative comparative analysis (QCA, Rihoux and Ragin 2009) seem particularly 
appropriate: the dependent variable is dichotomous (adoption/non-adoption), and a limited list 
of independent variables has been identified (the type of process, veto players, the type of 
reform, and its multifaceted character). It may therefore be possible to list a combination of 
variables observed in a larger dataset than the case studies presented here, in order to identify 
more systematically the conditions leading to reform and non-reform. 
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General conclusion 
 
 I started this thesis with the ambition of gaining a better understanding of the occurrence 
of change of the core democratic rules in Western Europe in the two last decades. These formal 
institutions contribute enormously to defining, and re-defining political competition, 
representation, and democracy. Consequently, it is important to understand not only how they 
function, but also how they are modified. This investigation has provided some answers to 
questions relating to the description of change, its contextual determinants, and the mechanisms 
leading to the successful adoption of a given reform. The main result of the thesis has consisted 
of showing that the primary determinant of the occurrence of change is not the difficulty in 
reforming the institutions, but rather, the conjunction of exogenous pressures making change 
more likely, and endogenous dynamics leading certain reforms to succeed and others to fail. The 
thesis has reached conclusions on four issues: the accurate description of the reforms of the core 
democratic rules that occurred in Western Europe from 1990 to 2010, the short and long-term 
determinants influencing the occurrence of reform, the dynamics of emergence of bundles of 
reforms, and finally, the link between the nature of the reform at stake, the process of reform, 
and the final outcome of a given proposal. The thesis leaves some issues unresolved, such as the 
degree of “real change” that has actually occurred, and leaves some blind spots, such as the issue 
of country patterns in the use of institutional engineering.  
 Through the study of six dimensions of change of the core democratic rules, the thesis 
has shown that reforms have happened in bundles 75% of the time, have moved towards greater 
institutional inclusion in two-thirds of the cases, and have been relatively frequent (on average, 
one reform every two and a half years). The evidence that most reforms tend to take place as part 
of a wider package of reforms in a single legislature reinforces the choice made, in the second 
part of the thesis, to study successful and unsuccessful reforms within a single bundle of reforms. 
The bundle of reforms as an analytical tool finds its theoretical justification in the inherently 
systemic and multidimensional character of the democratic institutions. The fact that the 
overwhelming majority of reforms of the core democratic rules happen within a bundle of 
reforms also shows that this is of strong empirical interest, and that there are very valid reasons 
to focus on institutional changes happening as part of a wider package deal and/or institutional 
sequence. The move towards greater inclusiveness is in line with the conclusions of Cain, Dalton 
and Scarrow, who argue that “in summary, institutional reform has expanded citizen access and 
participation in the political process” (2003c, 256). The empirical findings also confirm their 
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conclusions on the continuing predominant role of the representative form of democracy. 
Finally, compared with much of the existing literature, my findings dismiss the common 
assumption that changes to the formal institutional rules are exceptional. This is certainly because 
the database used is not limited to major changes of the core democratic rules. However, the 
theoretical implications are important, insofar as the findings replace institutional change as part 
of the everyday political life of consolidated European democracies. In other words, changing the 
formal institutional rules is neither the prerogative of democratising countries, nor of peculiar 
outliers such as Italy.  
The “non-exceptionality” of these reforms is more apparent when one examines the long 
and short-term contextual determinants of the changes made to core democratic rules. In the 
long term, countries with low levels of public support for the political system tend to reform their 
institutions more often. In the short term, variables contributing to the prediction of more 
reforms in a given legislature include political alternation and rising volatility. Both of these 
factors occur frequently in consolidated democracies, and certainly do not fall within the realm of 
unforeseen, extraordinary conditions. Changing the core democratic rules, therefore, appears to 
result from the political elites’ response to certain challenges that they face, particularly in the 
electoral arena, confirming Mair, Müller, and Plasser’s hunch (2004b, 13). Therefore, the 
empirical findings of the first part of this thesis have tended to lean more towards an incremental, 
endogenous and pedestrianised vision of change, rather than an abrupt, deus ex machina and rare 
conception of institutional reform. To put it differently, change here resembles more gradual, or 
evolutionary institutional change (Mahoney and Thelen 2010b, Steinmo 2010, Streeck and Thelen 
2005), rather than punctuated equilibrium (Baumgartner and Jones 1993, Jones and Baumgartner 
2012). This constitutes an important finding in itself: indeed, the analysts focusing on incremental 
institutional change adopt a broad vision of institutions, which sometimes includes informal 
rules. There is evidence here that even the formal institutional rules which regulate democracy 
obey similar patterns.  
 Another major finding of the thesis on the contextual determinants of the occurrence of 
reform has been the evidence suggesting that neither constitutional rigidity nor the number of 
partisan veto players can be considered a main explanation for the number of reforms adopted. 
In the case of partisan veto players, some results even point towards the idea that many veto 
players may encourage, rather than discourage, reforms of the core democratic rules, whereas 
constitutional rigidity seems to have only a minor negative impact on the occurrence of reform in 
the short-term. These results are puzzling, and they put into perspective the main concurrent 
explanation that could have been advanced against the hypothesis of reforms as a response to 
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electoral challenges. However, one can only get a partial and imperfect understanding of the 
occurrence of reforms of core democratic rules if one fails to examine reforms that failed to be 
adopted together with successful reforms. This is the focus of the second part, examining three 
countries in which bundles of reforms have occurred, including reforms that succeeded and 
others that failed. The emergence of the reforms in Ireland, France and Italy has illustrated more 
precisely the findings of the fourth chapter in particular. Ireland provided a vivid illustration of 
the influence of a great electoral shock resulting from the economic crisis on the agenda of 
institutional reforms. It was clear in this particular example that the reforms of the core 
democratic rules that took place since 2011 were seen as part of the answer to the economic and 
political turmoil, which resulted in strong external pressure for the Irish political elites to reform 
the institutional system. France, on the other hand, showed that in a country characterised by a 
declining level of political support and in which the institutions were part of the everyday political 
battle for a long time, no strong external shock (such as that experienced in Ireland) was 
necessary for institutional reforms to be put on the agenda. France did experience political 
alternation in 1997, but the reforms largely resulted from the endogenous interactions of political 
elites, served by the favourable opportunity offered by cohabitation. Finally, the Italian example 
illustrated that in a context where the political system has taken a major blow, and been shaken to 
its foundations, a large sequence of institutional reforms may occur – even years after this shock, 
especially if the electoral environment and the party system prove particularly unstable, and if the 
level of political support is extremely low. The empirical evidence largely confirms the findings of 
previous studies, in particular those on electoral reform (Renwick 2010), showing that these 
reforms emerged either as a result of elite-mass interaction (as in Ireland), or through a process of 
elite majority imposition (as in France), or both (as in Italy). It seems, therefore, that there is no 
crucial difference between the mechanisms of emergence of electoral reforms, and the 
mechanisms of emergence of reforms of the core democratic rules more generally.  
The main finding of the second part is the evidence that the final outcome of reform is 
dependent on the combination of the nature of the reform at stake, and the process used to 
adopt it. There are distinctive mechanisms leading to the adoption (or non-adoption) of 
consensual and divisive reforms, and depending on whether a majoritarian, supermajoritarian or 
externalised process is engaged, six configurations of reform may be identified.471 Consensual 
reforms are dominated by act-contingent motivations. The main factor that explains why a 
consensual reform fails or succeeds is the ability of actors to claim credit for a popular measure. I 
have shown, in particular, that the perceived inability to claim credit when the majority takes over 
                                                 
471 Cf. supra. 
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the process may provide an incentive for the opposition to re-frame the reform as a divisive 
issue, in order to weaken the parliamentary majority, particularly when a referendum will be 
making the final decision. In the Irish debate on Seanad abolition, the process of re-framing has 
consisted of repositioning a single, popular, issue as a multidimensional, complex, and 
contentious framework, with emphasis on other dimensions of the institutional system that were 
controversial and related to the alternative considered. The French case, where the consensual 
reform of the five-year term was conducted through a supermajoritarian process of reform, also 
showed the crucial importance of credit-claiming logics in explaining the behaviour of political 
actors, and the competition to appear to be the main promoter of the reform, while dismissing 
rivals’ contributions. Divisive reforms obey a completely different set of motivations: as the 
actors cannot really capitalise on a reform which already enjoys widespread support, the main 
motivation in conducting a divisive reform is self-interest, understood broadly. As a result, the 
final outcome depends primarily on the fact that a party – or in the three cases examined, a 
coalition – supports an alternative, and has a sufficient majority to push through this alternative. 
Therefore, veto player dynamics are paramount. However, the Italian case shows that, even in 
cases where the parliamentary majority is extremely divided, reformers may have the ability to 
adopt substantial institutional reforms. This depends on their capacity to build a large bundle of 
reforms in which each player whose vote is needed to secure the deal obtains “spoils”, making 
trade-offs on other dimensions acceptable. The construction of such a bundle is made easier if 
the deal touches upon multiple dimensions in situations of relative uncertainty about the 
outcomes, as this makes it harder for the parties to accurately foresee the effects of the reform, 
and reinforces their view of the reform as an opportunity to win more than their counterparts as 
a result of the change. These findings can be related, in particular, to Rahat’s conclusions on the 
politics of regime structure reform, as he evidences relatively similar dynamics in the building and 
re-building of coalitions at each stage of reform, and the play on ambiguity and uncertainty 
(2008). This result also shows that the number of veto players may not primarily influence the 
occurrence of reform, but rather, the level of complexity of the final product of reform.  
The distinction between consensual and divisive reforms and the different set of 
mechanisms they entail constitutes one of this thesis’ important conclusions. Indeed, insofar as 
most of the case studies focused on electoral reforms, much attention was devoted to the 
importance of self-interested motivations, and to the distinction between redistributive and 
efficient reforms (Tsebelis 1990). I argue that the most relevant analytical distinction may not 
consist of examining different dimensions of reform (electoral reform, decentralising reform, 
etc.), but rather of assessing the level of support reforms enjoy, both inside the political system 
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and with citizens. Here it is clear that different types of reform (consensual vs. divisive) entail 
very different types of behaviour, and this has an impact on the final outcome. However, the 
divisive or consensual character of reform does not depend on the dimension of reform 
examined, but rather on framing the pre-existing conceptions on a given alternative of reform, 
and the other dimensions with which it is examined. To take the example of the length of the 
presidential term in France, it is clear that the reform was consensual because it was examined 
before the reordering of the electoral calendar. Had the two reforms been examined together, the 
matter of the presidential term would certainly have become a divisive reform.  
Some important questions have persisted, in the shadows, over the course of this 
demonstration. First, the seemingly simple question of “how much actual change”? Second, the 
importance of unique country patterns in relation to Irish, Italian and French political history. 
The first question is embedded in the context in which the examined reforms have taken place, 
i.e. the so-called “erosion of political support” (Dalton 2004). It has been argued that Western 
European democracies have never before faced such strong challenges to their legitimacy, outside 
of periods of war and historical disasters. These challenges have led some authors to talk about 
“democracy without a demos” (Mair 2006, 25), as a result of the joint processes of growing 
public indifference and elite disentrenchment regarding mass electoral politics. In such a context, 
the transformation of the core democratic rules is a major issue, as is commonly presented as a 
possible means of counter-acting these twin processes by re-engaging elites and citizens. That 
being said, assessing the “real” degree of change that has actually taken place is extremely hard. In 
the case of Ireland, in which the institutional reforms engaged were the result of external 
pressures, there is some evidence that thus far, the agenda of reforms has led to minor tinkering 
rather than to the democratic revolution promised in the 2011 election manifestos. In France, on 
the other hand, the reforms of the presidential term and the reordering of the calendar, which 
were largely presented as minor adjustments at the time, certainly had more significant 
consequences for French institutional practices than any other reform, other than the direct 
election of the president of the Republic. It effectively annihilated (until now at least) the 
possibility of cohabitation, and greatly accelerated the transformation of the French President 
into a “super prime minister” (Grossman and Sauger 2009, 424), as he is now elected in the same 
year as the MPs. In Italy, had the constitutional reform been adopted, it may have constituted a 
major institutional development, although it is impossible to know whether it would have 
changed the “core” nature of the Italian institutions. If one takes the examples of the 1993 and 
2005 Italian electoral reforms, it is ultimately quite debatable as to whether they have led to any 
fundamental alteration within the Italian political system. Moreover, as Bowler and Donovan put 
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it, “there is a sense (...) that ‘true’ reform must promise a progressive component, an advance 
over some status quo, and a sense of improvement” (2013, 2). The same authors, while 
examining major electoral reforms, show that these reforms had a very limited impact on the 
actual behaviour of voters and parties. In conclusion, despite the fact of its importance, the issue 
of assessing the degree of change resulting from reforms of the core democratic rules may be the 
most difficult to tackle. It would be inaccurate to cynically conclude that “plus ça change, plus c’est la 
même chose”, and equally inaccurate to believe that seemingly small modifications necessarily have 
small consequences. Despite the fact that no institutional revolution in Western Europe has taken 
place in the last two decades, the institutions no longer look quite the same as in 1990. The actual 
impact of any reform, however, is highly contingent and unpredictable, and is heavily dependent 
on both the actors and the political context in each country. In other words, it is undoubtable 
that the scope of change depends largely on “unintended consequences” and “path dependence” 
(Hall and Taylor 1996, 938).  
This leads me to the final consideration of this thesis: the importance of country patterns, 
something that I have deliberately mostly ignored in my demonstration. Most of the political 
science literature since the 1990s has centred on the renewed interest in the institutions, 
articulated through the three new institutionalisms (Hall and Taylor 1996). I want to return here, 
in particular, to historical institutionalism, which seeks to better understand the distinctiveness of 
national outcomes by examining the institutional organisation of their political and economic 
systems. As Steinmo emphasises, it is “neither a specific theory nor a specific method. It is best 
understood as an approach” (2008, 118). There have now been countless examples of influential 
works providing theoretical and empirical evidence that the major differences across countries 
can be explained by the structure of their institutions, which itself is a product of their national 
history, and shapes the strategies, alternatives, outcomes and preferences of the actors. Historical 
institutionalism’s major contribution has been to make actors “tak[e] history seriously”, firstly, by 
placing political outcomes in their historical context, demonstrating how agents can learn from 
their experiences, and also, by showing how actors’ preferences are shaped by the past (Steinmo 
2008, 127). Using the historical institutionalist approach for this study, and particularly for the 
second part of the thesis, would have been a perfectly legitimate research strategy. In that case, I 
would have focused on the specificities of the French, Italian and Irish cases in order to 
understand why their institutions have not been reformed in the same way, and how the historical 
trajectories of these three countries influenced their use of institutional engineering. For instance, 
it is perfectly obvious that the alternatives that have been thought of as belonging to the range of 
reasonable possibilities for reform in Ireland since 2011 have been heavily influenced by previous 
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debates, and severely limited by the predilection of the Irish political system towards institutional 
stability since 1937. Similarly, the manner in which the electoral and constitutional debates were 
framed in Italy was greatly influenced, firstly, by the heritage of the First Republic, and secondly, 
by the traumatic experience that its demise represented for the political class. The debate on the 
presidential term in France was heavily influenced by the dominant vision of the French 
institutions since the advent of the Fifth Republic and the deep rejection of the Fourth Republic’s 
so-called “derive du régime parlementaire”. Moreover, the agitated institutional history has also served 
to turn institutional engineering into a perennial issue in the public debate. My thesis says little 
about these national trajectories. Rather, it tries to show that, beyond differences in the institutional 
structures and in the party systems, beyond historical paths, it is possible to say something about 
the occurrence of reforms of the core democratic rules in Ireland, France and Italy, and also 
more generally in consolidated democracies, by isolating particular factors that are decisive in 
explaining the final outcomes of reform, independently of specific countries' characteristics. In 
conclusion, this thesis is based on a variable-oriented rather than case-oriented strategy. This is 
not because it dismisses the findings of historical institutionalists in particular, but rather because, 
on a topic that has not been thoroughly investigated (the reforms of the core democratic rules 
from a multidimensional perspective), I feel the need to emphasise the importance of certain 
common factors (the level of political support, electoral challenges, the nature of the reforms and 
of the processes at stake) in explaining the variety of the outcomes observed, in order to go 
beyond a story about particular countries. 
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er
 t
o
 r
ed
u
ce
s 
th
e 
su
rr
ep
re
se
n
ta
ti
o
n
 o
f 
th
e 
co
u
n
tr
ys
id
e 
m
ix
ed
 l
o
gi
c 
su
b
st
an
ti
al
 
Y
 
Ic
el
an
d
 
2
0
0
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ec
en
tr
al
is
in
g 
re
fo
rm
 
N
u
m
b
er
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f 
m
u
n
ic
ip
al
it
ie
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lls
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o
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2
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cl
u
si
v
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in
o
r 
Y
 
Ic
el
an
d
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0
0
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D
ec
en
tr
al
is
in
g 
re
fo
rm
 
N
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
m
u
n
ic
ip
al
it
ie
s 
fa
lls
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o
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cl
u
si
v
e 
m
in
o
r 
N
 
Ic
el
an
d
 
2
0
1
0
 
D
ec
en
tr
al
is
in
g 
re
fo
rm
 
N
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
m
u
n
ic
ip
al
it
ie
s 
fa
lls
 t
o
 7
7
 
ex
cl
u
si
v
e 
m
in
o
r 
Y
 
Ir
el
an
d
 
1
9
9
1
 
D
ec
en
tr
al
is
in
g 
re
fo
rm
 
C
re
at
io
n
 o
f 
8 
re
gi
o
n
al
 a
u
th
o
ri
ti
es
 t
o
 m
o
n
it
o
r 
an
d
 c
o
o
rd
in
at
e 
im
p
le
m
en
ta
ti
o
n
 o
f 
E
U
 
st
ru
ct
u
ra
l 
fu
n
d
s,
 i
n
d
ir
ec
tl
y 
el
ec
te
d
 b
y 
lo
ca
l 
au
th
o
ri
ti
es
. 
ex
cl
u
si
v
e 
su
b
st
an
ti
al
 
N
 
Ir
el
an
d
 
1
9
9
8
 
D
ec
en
tr
al
is
in
g 
re
fo
rm
 
C
re
at
io
n
 o
f 
tw
o
 r
eg
io
n
al
 a
ss
em
b
lie
s 
to
 m
o
n
it
o
r 
an
d
 c
o
o
rd
in
at
e 
im
p
le
m
en
ta
ti
o
n
 o
f 
E
U
 
st
ru
ct
u
ra
l 
fu
n
d
s,
 i
n
d
ir
ec
tl
y 
el
ec
te
d
 b
y 
lo
ca
l 
au
th
o
ri
ti
es
. 
T
h
is
 c
o
m
p
le
m
en
ts
 (
an
d
 d
o
es
 
n
o
t 
re
p
la
ce
) 
th
e 
8
 
re
gi
o
n
al
 
au
th
o
ri
ti
es
 
cr
ea
te
d
 
in
 
1
99
1
. 
L
o
ca
l 
G
o
v
er
n
m
en
t 
A
ct
 
ap
p
ro
v
es
 a
 t
w
o
-t
ie
r 
st
ru
ct
u
re
 c
o
m
p
o
se
d
 o
f 
to
w
n
 c
o
u
n
ci
ls
 (
lo
w
er
 t
ie
r)
 a
n
d
 c
o
u
n
ty
 o
r 
ci
ty
 c
o
u
n
ci
ls
 (
u
p
p
er
 t
ie
r)
. 
R
ep
la
ce
m
en
t 
o
f 
th
e 
U
rb
an
 D
is
tr
ic
t 
C
o
u
n
ci
ls
 a
n
d
 T
o
w
n
 
C
o
m
m
is
si
o
n
er
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o
ar
d
s.
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si
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b
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ti
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1
9
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D
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en
tr
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in
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re
fo
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C
o
n
st
it
u
ti
o
n
al
 
am
en
d
m
en
t 
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co
gn
is
in
g 
th
e 
ro
le
 
o
f 
lo
ca
l 
go
v
er
n
m
en
t 
fo
r 
lo
ca
l 
d
em
o
cr
ac
y,
 s
ay
in
g 
th
at
 t
h
e 
lo
ca
l 
au
th
o
ri
ti
es
 s
h
o
u
ld
 b
e 
el
ec
te
d
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v
er
y 
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v
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ar
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cl
u
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v
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m
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o
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en
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al
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in
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re
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h
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2
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 s
im
p
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ie
d
 t
h
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ca
l 
go
v
er
n
m
en
t 
st
ru
ct
u
re
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 w
h
ic
h
 t
h
e 
p
ri
n
ci
p
al
 t
ie
r 
o
f 
lo
ca
l 
go
v
er
n
m
en
t 
(c
o
u
n
ty
 a
n
d
 c
it
y 
co
u
n
ci
ls
) 
co
v
er
s 
th
e 
en
ti
re
 t
er
ri
to
ry
 o
f 
th
e 
st
at
e 
an
d
 
h
av
e 
ge
n
er
al
 r
es
p
o
n
si
b
ili
ty
 f
o
r 
al
l 
fu
n
ct
io
n
s 
o
f 
lo
ca
l 
go
ve
rn
m
en
t 
ex
ce
p
t 
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 8
0
 t
o
w
n
s 
w
it
h
in
 t
h
e 
te
rr
it
o
ry
 o
f 
co
u
n
ty
 c
o
u
n
ci
ls
, 
w
h
er
e 
th
e 
lo
w
er
 t
ie
r 
(t
o
w
n
 c
o
u
n
ci
ls
) 
ex
is
ts
 
w
it
h
 m
o
re
 l
im
it
ed
 f
u
n
ct
io
n
s.
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h
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v
e 
co
u
n
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o
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u
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b
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C
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al
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ay
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m
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ed
 l
o
gi
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in
o
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3
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pp
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di
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at
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fo
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d
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im
er
ic
k
 w
er
e 
re
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le
d
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s 
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 c
o
u
n
ci
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 u
n
d
er
 t
h
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A
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w
it
h
 t
h
e 
sa
m
e 
st
at
u
s 
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 l
aw
 a
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co
u
n
ty
 c
o
u
n
ci
ls
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 d
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 c
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 c
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b
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o
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 c
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m
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 t
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 d
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 b
y 
a 
m
ix
ed
-m
em
b
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 m
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o
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P
s 
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te
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in
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 d
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ic
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 l
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 b
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b
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ro
v
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d
en
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ro
u
gh
 a
 t
w
o
 r
o
u
n
d
 b
al
lo
t,
 a
 s
ec
u
re
 g
o
v
er
n
in
g 
m
aj
o
ri
ty
 (
6
0
%
 s
ea
ts
) 
fo
r 
p
ar
ty
 l
is
ts
 
lin
k
ed
 t
o
 w
in
n
in
g 
M
ay
o
ra
l 
o
r 
P
re
si
d
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 c
an
d
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p
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w
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b
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v
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ti
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al
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tr
al
is
in
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E
m
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o
w
er
m
en
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o
f 
th
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n
tr
al
 g
o
v
er
n
m
en
t 
to
 t
ra
n
sf
er
 a
d
m
in
is
tr
at
iv
e 
re
sp
o
n
si
b
ili
ti
es
 t
o
 
th
e 
re
gi
o
n
s 
in
 t
h
e 
ar
ea
s 
o
f 
th
ei
r 
co
m
p
et
en
ce
. 
L
im
it
at
io
n
 o
n
 t
h
e 
ex
er
ci
se
 o
f 
ce
n
tr
al
 a
n
d
 
b
u
re
au
cr
at
ic
 
co
n
tr
o
ls
. 
O
rd
in
ar
y 
re
gi
o
n
s 
ar
e 
al
lo
w
ed
 
to
 
se
t 
th
ei
r 
ra
te
 
o
f 
p
er
so
n
al
 
in
co
m
e 
ta
x 
u
p
 t
o
 a
 n
at
io
n
al
ly
 d
et
er
m
in
ed
 c
ei
lin
g 
 
in
cl
u
si
v
e 
m
in
o
r 
Y
 
It
al
y 
1
9
9
9
 
D
ir
ec
t 
el
ec
ti
o
n
 
C
o
n
st
it
u
ti
o
n
al
 r
ef
o
rm
 s
ec
u
re
s 
th
e 
d
ir
ec
t 
el
ec
ti
o
n
 o
f 
R
eg
io
n
al
 P
re
si
d
en
ts
 t
h
ro
u
gh
 a
 o
n
e 
ro
u
n
d
 
sy
st
em
, 
an
d
 
gu
ar
an
te
es
 
th
em
 
a 
se
cu
re
 
m
aj
o
ri
ty
 
in
 
th
e 
le
gi
sl
at
u
re
 
(R
eg
io
n
al
 
C
o
u
n
ci
l)
. 
M
ay
o
rs
 c
an
n
o
t 
h
o
ld
 o
ff
ic
e 
fo
r 
m
o
re
 t
h
an
 t
w
o
 t
er
m
s 
o
f 
4
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cl
u
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v
e 
m
in
o
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al
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2
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D
ec
en
tr
al
is
in
g 
re
fo
rm
 
C
en
tr
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le
ft
 
re
fo
rm
 
m
o
d
if
ie
s 
th
e 
A
rt
ic
le
 
V
 
o
f 
th
e 
C
o
n
st
it
u
ti
o
n
 
an
d
 
gr
an
ts
 
gr
ea
te
r 
au
to
n
o
m
y 
to
 r
eg
io
n
al
 g
o
v
er
n
m
en
ts
, 
w
h
ic
h
 o
b
ta
in
 a
ll 
p
o
w
er
s 
n
o
t 
re
se
rv
ed
 f
o
r 
n
at
io
n
al
 
go
v
er
n
m
en
t 
in
 t
h
e 
C
o
n
st
it
u
ti
o
n
. 
O
rd
in
ar
y 
re
gi
o
n
s 
ca
n
 s
et
 t
h
e 
ra
te
 o
n
 t
h
ei
r 
sh
ar
e 
o
f 
v
al
u
e 
ad
d
ed
 
ta
x.
 
In
tr
o
d
u
ct
io
n
 
o
f 
an
 
eq
u
al
is
at
io
n
 
fu
n
d
 
th
at
 
o
b
lig
es
 
th
e 
st
at
e 
to
 
su
b
si
d
is
e 
p
o
o
re
r 
re
gi
o
n
s.
 T
h
e 
ﬁ
v
e 
sp
ec
ia
l 
re
gi
o
n
s 
(a
n
d
 B
o
lz
an
o
-B
o
ze
n
 a
n
d
 T
re
n
to
) 
h
av
e 
p
ar
ti
cu
la
r 
ar
ra
n
ge
m
en
ts
 w
h
er
eb
y 
th
ey
 r
ec
ei
v
e 
a 
sh
ar
e 
o
f 
ta
xe
s 
co
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n
 t
h
ei
r 
in
cl
u
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b
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an
ti
al
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R
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al
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en
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 S
p
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ia
l 
S
ta
tu
s 
re
gi
o
n
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in
tr
o
d
u
ce
d
 v
ia
 
C
o
n
st
it
u
ti
o
n
al
 a
m
en
d
m
en
t.
 N
o
w
 a
p
p
li
es
 t
o
 a
ll
 I
ta
li
an
 r
eg
io
n
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ex
ce
p
t 
V
al
 d
’A
o
st
a 
an
d
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ro
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in
ce
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o
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an
o
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b
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P
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w
it
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m
aj
o
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o
n
u
s 
fo
r 
th
e 
la
rg
er
 c
o
al
it
io
n
  
m
ix
ed
 l
o
gi
c 
su
b
st
an
ti
al
 
Y
 
It
al
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ec
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tr
al
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M
o
d
if
ic
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io
n
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o
n
st
it
u
ti
o
n
al
 a
rt
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le
s,
 w
h
ic
h
 w
o
u
ld
 h
av
e 
tr
an
sf
o
rm
ed
 I
ta
ly
 i
n
to
 a
 
“f
ed
er
al
 s
ta
te
”.
 I
n
cr
ea
se
 o
f 
th
e 
co
m
p
et
en
ce
s 
o
f 
re
gi
o
n
s,
 t
h
e 
C
h
am
b
er
 w
o
u
ld
 d
ev
el
o
p
 
ex
cl
u
si
v
e 
au
th
o
ri
ty
 o
n
 i
ss
u
es
 o
f 
ex
cl
u
si
v
e 
n
at
io
n
al
 c
o
m
p
et
en
ce
 a
n
d
 w
o
u
ld
 d
et
er
m
in
e 
go
v
er
n
m
en
t 
fo
rm
at
io
n
 a
n
d
 t
ra
n
sf
o
rm
ed
 b
i-
ca
m
er
al
 s
ym
m
et
ry
 o
f 
n
at
io
n
al
 p
ar
lia
m
en
t 
in
to
 a
n
 a
sy
m
m
et
ri
ca
l 
ar
ra
n
ge
m
en
t 
w
it
h
 f
ed
er
al
 f
ea
tu
re
s.
 T
h
e 
S
en
at
e 
w
o
u
ld
 d
ev
el
o
p
 
ex
cl
u
si
v
e 
au
th
o
ri
ty
 o
n
 i
ss
u
es
 o
f 
sh
ar
ed
 c
o
m
p
et
en
ce
 b
et
w
ee
n
 n
at
io
n
al
 a
n
d
 r
eg
io
n
al
 
le
v
el
s,
 t
h
e 
C
h
am
b
er
 w
o
u
ld
 d
ev
el
o
p
 e
xc
lu
si
v
e 
au
th
o
ri
ty
 o
n
 i
ss
u
es
 o
f 
ex
cl
u
si
v
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n
at
io
n
al
 
co
m
p
et
en
ce
 
an
d
 
w
o
u
ld
 
d
et
er
m
in
e 
go
v
er
n
m
en
t 
fo
rm
at
io
n
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 b
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b
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 f
o
r 
th
e 
ex
is
ti
n
g 
1
1
8
 m
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ra
ti
o
n
 o
f 
v
o
te
rs
 r
ed
u
ce
d
 f
ro
m
 1
 y
ea
r 
to
 3
 m
o
n
th
s,
 a
n
d
 d
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 f
ro
m
 5
 t
o
 2
 y
ea
rs
. 
in
cl
u
si
v
e 
m
in
o
r 
Y
 
L
u
xe
m
b
o
u
rg
 
2
0
0
8
 
E
le
ct
o
ra
l 
re
fo
rm
 
C
h
an
ge
 i
n
 e
le
ct
o
ra
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 f
o
r 
E
P
 e
le
ct
io
n
s,
 w
it
h
 p
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 p
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 c
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v
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v
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 c
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 c
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is
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 c
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m
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b
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 c
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 c
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 d
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 c
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n
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en
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ri
o
r 
to
 t
h
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h
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n
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en
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n
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n
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o
u
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 p
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 r
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d
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 c
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 b
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 b
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p
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b
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b
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 b
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 b
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 b
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 b
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 c
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 p
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b
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 p
er
so
n
al
 v
o
te
 i
n
 t
h
ei
r 
lo
ca
l 
co
n
su
la
te
. 
 
in
cl
u
si
v
e 
m
in
o
r 
Y
 
3
2
7
 
A
pp
en
di
x
 
P
o
rt
u
ga
l 
1
9
9
8
 
D
ir
ec
t 
d
em
o
cr
ac
y 
R
ef
o
rm
 
in
tr
o
d
u
ce
d
 
a 
5
0%
 
+
 
1
 
q
u
o
ru
m
 
fo
r 
th
e 
p
o
p
u
la
r 
re
fe
re
n
d
u
m
s 
to
 
b
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p
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b
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b
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 c
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ro
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 c
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 t
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 c
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h
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b
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b
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re
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 c
an
d
id
at
e’
s 
p
ar
ty
 i
n
 
th
at
 c
o
n
st
it
u
en
cy
 (
th
re
sh
o
ld
 i
s 
o
n
ly
 5
%
 i
n
 m
u
n
ic
ip
al
, 
co
u
n
ty
, 
an
d
 E
u
ro
p
ea
n
 e
le
ct
io
n
s)
. 
 e
xc
lu
si
v
e 
m
in
o
r 
Y
 
S
w
ed
en
 
1
9
9
4
 
P
ar
lia
m
en
ta
ry
 r
ef
o
rm
 
In
cr
ea
se
 i
n
 t
h
e 
le
n
gt
h
 o
f 
le
gi
sl
at
u
re
 f
ro
m
 3
 t
o
 4
 y
ea
rs
. 
 
ex
cl
u
si
v
e 
su
b
st
an
ti
al
 
Y
 
S
w
ed
en
 
1
9
9
5
 
E
le
ct
o
ra
l 
re
fo
rm
 
In
tr
o
d
u
ct
io
n
 o
f 
p
re
fe
re
n
ce
 v
o
te
 f
o
r 
E
u
ro
p
ea
n
 e
le
ct
io
n
s 
in
cl
u
si
v
e 
m
in
o
r 
Y
 
3
2
8
 
A
pp
en
di
x
 
S
w
ed
en
 
1
9
9
7
 
D
ec
en
tr
al
is
in
g 
re
fo
rm
 
T
w
o
 
re
gi
o
n
s 
ar
e 
fo
rm
ed
 
(V
as
tr
a 
G
o
ta
la
n
d
, 
S
k
an
e)
 
fr
o
m
 
th
e 
m
er
ge
r 
o
f 
3
 
an
d
 
2
 
co
u
n
ti
es
 
re
sp
ec
ti
v
el
y.
 
T
h
ey
 
co
-e
xi
st
 
w
it
h
 
1
9
 
co
u
n
ti
es
 
in
 
th
e 
re
st
 
o
f 
S
w
ed
en
. 
T
h
e 
re
gi
o
n
s 
co
n
ta
in
 
el
ec
te
d
 
co
u
n
ci
ls
 
(P
R
 
ev
er
y 
4
 
ye
ar
s)
 
an
d
 
a 
re
gi
o
n
al
 
ex
ec
u
ti
v
e 
co
m
m
is
si
o
n
. 
T
h
ey
 
ta
k
e 
o
ve
r 
re
sp
o
n
si
b
ili
ty
 
fo
r 
th
e 
fu
n
ct
io
n
s 
o
f 
co
u
n
ty
 
co
u
n
ci
ls
 
(m
ai
n
ly
 h
ea
lt
h
ca
re
),
 b
u
t 
h
av
e 
al
so
 b
ee
n
 d
el
eg
at
ed
 n
ew
 c
o
m
p
et
en
ce
s 
fr
o
m
 t
h
e 
ce
n
tr
al
 
go
v
er
n
m
en
t 
o
n
 e
co
n
o
m
ic
 g
ro
w
th
 a
n
d
 r
eg
io
n
al
 i
n
fr
as
tr
u
ct
u
re
. 
in
cl
u
si
v
e 
m
in
o
r 
Y
 
S
w
ed
en
 
1
9
9
8
 
E
le
ct
o
ra
l 
re
fo
rm
 
V
o
te
rs
 c
an
n
o
t 
ad
d
 o
r 
cr
o
ss
 o
u
t 
ca
n
d
id
at
es
, 
an
d
 c
o
m
p
et
in
g 
lis
ts
 i
n
 s
am
e 
p
ar
ty
 c
an
n
o
t 
h
av
e 
b
al
lo
t 
ac
ce
ss
, 
re
in
fo
rc
in
g 
p
o
w
er
 o
f 
p
ar
ty
 l
ea
d
er
sh
ip
 v
is
-à
-v
is
 i
n
te
rn
al
 f
ac
ti
o
n
s.
  
ex
cl
u
si
v
e 
m
in
o
r 
Y
 
S
w
it
ze
rl
an
d
 
1
9
9
1
 
A
cc
es
s 
to
 s
u
ff
ra
ge
 
R
ed
u
ct
io
n
 o
f 
th
e 
v
o
ti
n
g 
ag
e 
fo
r 
S
w
is
s 
ci
ti
ze
n
s 
to
 1
8
 
in
cl
u
si
v
e 
m
in
o
r 
N
 
S
w
it
ze
rl
an
d
 
1
9
9
2
 
A
cc
es
s 
to
 s
u
ff
ra
ge
 
S
w
is
s 
ci
ti
ze
n
s 
liv
in
g 
ab
ro
ad
 a
re
 a
llo
w
ed
 t
o
 v
o
te
 i
n
 f
ed
er
al
 e
le
ct
io
n
s 
an
d
 b
al
lo
ts
 a
n
d
 t
o
 
ap
p
en
d
 
th
ei
r 
si
gn
at
u
re
 
to
 
p
o
p
u
la
r 
in
it
ia
ti
v
es
 
an
d
 
re
fe
re
n
d
u
m
s 
b
y 
co
rr
es
p
o
n
d
en
ce
 
fr
o
m
 t
h
ei
r 
fo
re
ig
n
 d
o
m
ic
ile
. 
 
in
cl
u
si
v
e 
m
in
o
r 
N
 
S
w
it
ze
rl
an
d
 
1
9
9
9
 
D
ec
en
tr
al
is
in
g 
re
fo
rm
 
C
o
n
st
it
u
ti
o
n
al
 
am
en
d
m
en
t 
gi
v
es
 
ca
n
to
n
s 
th
e 
ri
gh
t 
to
 
p
ar
ti
ci
p
at
e 
in
 
S
w
is
s 
fo
re
ig
n
 
p
o
lic
y.
  
in
cl
u
si
v
e 
m
in
o
r 
Y
 
S
w
it
ze
rl
an
d
 
1
9
9
9
 
A
cc
es
s 
to
 s
u
ff
ra
ge
 
P
o
st
al
 
v
o
ti
n
g 
is
 
n
o
w
 
p
o
ss
ib
le
 
fo
r 
ev
er
yb
o
d
y 
in
 
fe
d
er
al
/
ca
n
to
n
al
 
el
ec
ti
o
n
s/
re
fe
re
n
d
u
m
s.
 
in
cl
u
si
v
e 
m
in
o
r 
Y
 
U
K
 
1
9
9
6
 
D
ec
en
tr
al
is
in
g 
re
fo
rm
 
T
w
o
 t
ie
r 
sy
st
em
 o
f 
lo
ca
l 
go
v
er
n
m
en
t 
is
 r
ep
la
ce
d
 b
y 
a 
si
n
gl
e 
ti
er
 s
ys
te
m
 i
n
 S
co
tl
an
d
 
an
d
 W
al
es
. 
E
n
gl
an
d
 c
o
n
ti
n
u
es
 t
o
 c
o
n
ta
in
 a
 c
o
m
p
lic
at
ed
 p
at
ch
w
o
rk
 o
f 
si
n
gl
e 
ti
er
 a
n
d
 
tw
o
 t
ie
r 
sy
st
em
s.
  
ex
cl
u
si
v
e 
m
in
o
r 
N
 
U
K
 
1
9
9
7
 
E
le
ct
o
ra
l 
re
fo
rm
 
In
tr
o
d
u
ct
io
n
 o
f 
m
ix
ed
-m
em
b
er
 e
le
ct
o
ra
l 
sy
st
em
s 
in
 d
ev
o
lv
ed
 S
co
tl
an
d
, 
W
al
es
 a
n
d
 
N
o
rt
h
er
n
 I
re
la
n
d
 
in
cl
u
si
v
e 
su
b
st
an
ti
al
 
Y
 
U
K
 
1
9
9
7
 
D
ec
en
tr
al
is
in
g 
re
fo
rm
 
D
ev
o
lu
ti
o
n
 l
eg
is
la
ti
o
n
 a
p
p
ro
v
ed
 b
y 
in
co
m
in
g 
L
ab
o
u
r 
go
v
er
n
m
en
t,
 g
ra
n
ti
n
g 
a 
la
rg
e 
n
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
co
m
p
et
en
ce
s 
to
 t
h
e 
n
ew
ly
 c
re
at
ed
 d
ev
o
lv
ed
 a
ss
em
b
lie
s.
  
in
cl
u
si
v
e 
su
b
st
an
ti
al
 
Y
 
U
K
 
1
9
9
8
 
D
ec
en
tr
al
is
in
g 
re
fo
rm
 
8
 R
eg
io
n
al
 A
ss
em
b
lie
s 
ar
e 
cr
ea
te
d
 i
n
 E
n
gl
an
d
 (
in
 a
d
d
it
io
n
 t
o
 L
o
n
d
o
n
) 
to
 m
o
n
it
o
r 
ac
ti
v
it
ie
s 
o
f 
th
e 
R
eg
io
n
al
 D
ev
el
o
p
m
en
t 
A
ge
n
ci
es
. 
ex
cl
u
si
v
e 
m
in
o
r 
Y
 
U
K
 
1
9
9
9
 
P
ar
lia
m
en
ta
ry
 r
ef
o
rm
 
H
er
ed
it
ar
y 
p
ee
ra
ge
s 
ab
o
lis
h
ed
 e
x
ce
p
t 
fo
r 
9
2
 h
er
ed
it
ar
y 
L
o
rd
s 
“e
le
ct
ed
” 
b
y 
th
ei
r 
p
ee
rs
, 
w
h
o
 w
ill
 s
ta
y 
in
 p
o
st
 (
an
d
 p
as
s 
o
n
 t
h
ei
r 
p
ee
ra
ge
s)
  
in
cl
u
si
v
e 
m
in
o
r 
Y
 
U
K
 
1
9
9
9
 
A
cc
es
s 
to
 s
u
ff
ra
ge
 
R
ef
o
rm
 o
f 
p
o
st
al
 a
n
d
 p
ro
xy
 v
o
ti
n
g 
th
at
 m
ak
es
 i
t 
m
u
ch
 e
as
ie
r 
fo
r 
so
m
eb
o
d
y 
aw
ay
 
fr
o
m
 t
h
ei
r 
p
la
ce
 o
f 
re
si
d
en
ce
 t
o
 v
o
te
 
in
cl
u
si
v
e 
m
in
o
r 
Y
 
3
2
9
 
A
pp
en
di
x
 
S
ou
rc
e:
 B
ed
o
ck
, 
M
ai
r,
 W
il
so
n
 2
0
1
2
 a
n
d
 m
y 
o
w
n
 f
u
rt
h
er
 e
la
b
o
ra
ti
o
n
s 
 
U
K
 
2
0
0
0
 
D
ir
ec
t 
el
ec
ti
o
n
 
In
tr
o
d
u
ct
io
n
 o
f 
th
e 
d
ir
ec
t 
el
ec
ti
o
n
 o
f 
th
e 
m
ay
o
r 
o
f 
L
o
n
d
o
n
. 
L
o
ca
l 
G
o
v
er
n
m
en
t 
A
ct
 
o
f 
2
0
0
0
 a
ls
o
 i
n
tr
o
d
u
ce
d
 t
h
e 
p
o
ss
ib
ili
ty
 o
f 
in
tr
o
d
u
ci
n
g 
th
e 
d
ir
ec
t 
el
ec
ti
o
n
 o
f 
m
ay
o
rs
 a
t 
th
e 
m
u
n
ic
ip
al
 
le
v
el
, 
if
 
th
is
 
re
fo
rm
 
is
 
in
it
ia
te
d
 
b
y 
th
e 
d
is
tr
ic
t 
an
d
 
su
p
p
o
rt
ed
 
in
 
a 
re
fe
re
n
d
u
m
.  
in
cl
u
si
v
e 
m
in
o
r 
Y
 
U
K
 
2
0
0
1
 
A
cc
es
s 
to
 s
u
ff
ra
ge
 
T
h
e 
n
ew
 
ru
le
s 
m
ak
e 
it
 
u
n
n
ec
es
sa
ry
 
to
 
gi
v
e 
a 
re
as
o
n
 
an
d
 
n
o
 
re
q
u
ir
em
en
t 
fo
r 
an
 
at
te
st
at
io
n
 o
f 
ill
n
es
s 
to
 u
se
 p
ro
xy
 o
r 
p
o
st
al
 v
o
ti
n
g 
in
cl
u
si
v
e 
m
in
o
r 
Y
 
U
K
 
2
0
0
2
 
P
ar
lia
m
en
ta
ry
 r
ef
o
rm
 
R
ed
u
ct
io
n
 o
f 
th
e 
n
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
S
co
tt
is
h
 M
P
s 
fr
o
m
 7
2
 t
o
 5
9
 f
ro
m
 t
h
e 
2
0
0
5
 e
le
ct
io
n
, 
as
 a
 
re
su
lt
 o
f 
th
e 
 p
ro
ce
ss
 o
f 
d
ev
o
lu
ti
o
n
 t
o
 t
h
e 
S
co
tt
is
h
 P
ar
lia
m
en
t,
 a
n
d
 i
n
 o
rd
er
 t
o
 r
ed
u
ce
 
th
e 
o
v
er
-r
ep
re
se
n
ta
ti
o
n
 
o
f 
S
co
tt
is
h
 
M
P
s 
in
 
W
es
tm
in
st
er
. 
H
o
u
se
 
o
f 
L
o
rd
s 
A
p
p
o
in
tm
en
t 
C
o
m
m
is
si
o
n
 f
o
rm
al
ly
 r
ed
u
ce
s 
m
in
is
te
ri
al
 p
o
w
er
 a
n
d
 d
is
cr
et
io
n
 i
n
 t
h
e 
n
o
m
in
at
io
n
 o
f 
m
em
b
er
s 
o
f 
th
e 
u
p
p
er
 h
o
u
se
. 
In
tr
o
d
u
ct
io
n
 o
f 
sa
la
ri
es
 f
o
r 
C
o
m
m
it
te
e 
ch
ai
rs
, 
m
ak
in
g 
th
em
 m
o
re
 i
n
d
ep
en
d
en
t 
o
f 
go
v
er
n
m
en
t.
 
m
ix
ed
 l
o
gi
c 
m
in
o
r 
Y
 
U
K
 
2
0
0
4
 
E
le
ct
o
ra
l 
re
fo
rm
 
S
T
V
 e
le
ct
o
ra
l 
sy
st
em
 i
n
tr
o
d
u
ce
d
 f
o
r 
lo
ca
l 
el
ec
ti
o
n
s 
in
 S
co
tl
an
d
 (
al
o
n
gs
id
e 
w
it
h
 t
h
e 
M
ix
ed
-m
em
b
er
 p
ro
p
o
rt
io
n
al
 s
ys
te
m
 f
o
r 
re
gi
o
n
al
 e
le
ct
io
n
s,
 t
h
e 
W
es
tm
in
st
er
 s
ys
te
m
 
fo
r 
ge
n
er
al
 e
le
ct
io
n
s,
 a
n
d
 t
h
e 
D
’H
o
n
d
t 
P
R
 s
ys
te
m
 f
o
r 
E
u
ro
p
ea
n
 e
le
ct
io
n
s)
. 
in
cl
u
si
v
e 
m
in
o
r 
Y
 
U
K
 
2
0
0
6
 
D
ec
en
tr
al
is
in
g 
re
fo
rm
 
G
o
v
er
n
m
en
t 
o
f 
W
al
es
 
A
ct
 
gr
an
ts
 
gr
ea
te
r 
le
gi
sl
at
iv
e 
co
m
p
et
en
ce
s 
fo
r 
th
e 
W
el
sh
 
A
ss
em
b
ly
 
in
cl
u
si
v
e 
m
in
o
r 
Y
 
U
K
 
2
0
0
7
 
D
ec
en
tr
al
is
in
g 
re
fo
rm
 
R
es
to
ra
ti
o
n
 o
f 
th
e 
N
o
rt
h
er
n
 I
re
la
n
d
 A
ss
em
b
ly
 r
es
to
re
d
 a
ft
er
 a
n
 a
gr
ee
m
en
t 
b
et
w
ee
n
 
th
e 
U
ls
te
r 
U
n
io
n
is
ts
 
an
d
 
th
e 
Ir
is
h
 
N
at
io
n
al
is
t 
p
ar
ti
es
. 
F
u
rt
h
er
 
d
ev
o
lu
ti
o
n
 
o
f 
co
m
p
et
en
ce
s 
to
 N
o
rt
h
er
n
 I
re
la
n
d
. 
in
cl
u
si
v
e 
m
in
o
r 
Y
 
330 
Appendix 
Appendix 2. Detailed criteria of classification of reforms in function of their scope (substantial vs. minor) 
 
 
A substantial institutional reform can be defined as a reform that substantially alters the balance of power and the 
relationship between parties, executive and legislative, or citizens and political elites. 
 
 
1. Electoral reforms regulating the translation of  votes into seats and the expression of  votes 
adopted at the national level 
 
In classifying electoral reforms as either major or minor electoral reforms, I have used Jacobs and 
Leyenaar’s conceptualisation (2011, 497), which is a very precise categorisation of the scope of reforms. I 
also chose to ignore the distinction between minor and technical electoral reforms, combining the 
“minor” and “technical” categories into the single category of minor reforms, as the most crucial 
distinction is between major reforms and all others.  
 
 
The substantial reforms here correspond to the “major reforms” regarding proportionality and ballot 
structures.  
One should note that what the authors classify as reforms affecting “inclusiveness” were not classified as 
belonging to this first category, but within the category of reform concerning the access to vote, and also 
that what the authors refer to as reforms concerning “election levels”, belong to the category of reform 
concerning the direct election of the head executive.  
 
Table 1: Conceptualization of electoral reform  
 
Dimension Major  Minor  Technical  
1.Proportionality  Change in category of electoral 
formula 
 Average district magnitude, 
effective threshold: X > 20% 
change 
 Change within category of electoral 
formula 
 Average district magnitude, effective 
threshold: 1% < X < 20% change 
 Redistricting: affecting X > 1% of 
inhabitants 
 
 
 Average district magnitude, effective 
threshold: X < 1% change 
 Redistricting: affecting X < 1% of 
inhabitants 
2.Election levels  Introduction direct election 
president/prime minister 
 
 Introduction direct election non-national 
public figures for X > 1% of the electorate  
 Introduction new layer for  
X > 1% of the electorate  
 Introduction direct election non-national 
public figures for X < 1% of the 
electorate  
 Introduction new layer for  
X < 1% of the electorate 
3.Inclusiveness  Expansion of the electorate X>20% 
 
 
 
 
 
  Compulsory voting: yes or no 
 Expansion of the electorate: 
1% < X < 20% change 
 Registration: 
* Cost: free or not 
* Individual or state 
 
 Compulsory voting: change in actual 
enforcement: yes or no 
 Expansion of the electorate: 
X < 1% change 
 Registration: 
* Cost: lowering cost 
* Role individual: lowering burden for 
individual 
 Compulsory voting: other changes  
4.Ballot structure  Ballot choice: 
* Type of ballot structure changes 
 Candidate choice 
* Introduction/repeal of quotas  
X > 20% of the candidates 
 
 Party choice 
* Introduction/repeal/change 
registration requirements 
X > 20% of parties 
 Ballot choice:  
* Number of votes : X > 20% change 
* Impact of votes: X > 20% change 
 Candidate choice: 
* Change in quota: X > 20%  
* Introduction quota 1% < X < 20% 
 Party choice 
* Change in requirements: 1%<X<20% of 
parties 
 Ballot choice:  
* Number of votes : X < 20% change 
* Impact of votes: X < 20% change 
 Candidate choice: 
* Change in quota: X < 20% 
* Introduction quota X < 1%  
 Party choice 
* Change in requirements: X < 1% 
5.Electoral 
procedures 
  Change between EMB category  All other changes in how and when 
elections are organized?* 
 
*  Given the limited research on electoral procedures, this category is still fairly underdeveloped.  It may well be that more reforms merit the label ‘minor’ or even ‘major’. 
The question mark seeks to highlight this and urges other scholars to focus on elaborating the fifth dimension.   
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Other cases listed as substantial reforms: 
 Introduction of  a national threshold for representation in parliament 
 Introduction of  a new electoral formula at local or subnational levels for the whole country 
Other cases listed as minor reforms: 
 Introduction of  regional electoral tiers 
 Introduction or modification of  a majority bonus for the winning party while keeping the same 
electoral formula 
 Introduction or suppression of  preference vote while keeping the same electoral formula 
 
2. Parliamentary reforms 
 
Parliamentary reforms that have been classified as substantial: 
 
 Increase or decrease by more than 20% of the size of the parliament 
 Increase or decrease by more than 20% of the duration of the term (president, MPs, senators) 
 Constitutional change modifying the formal balance of powers between the executive and the 
legislative (between president and parliament, between the different chambers)  
 Adoption of a new constitution 
 Introduction or suppression of one or several upper chambers 
 
Parliamentary reforms that have been classified as minor:  
 
 Change of the parliamentary procedures within the same constitutional framework (rules to enter 
cabinet, incomes of public officials, duration of sessions, …) 
 Relaxing or introduction of special parliamentary procedures (emergency procedures, simplified 
votes) without a formal change in the balance of powers between executive and legislative 
 
3. Federal reforms or decentralisation reforms 
 
For the definition of the criteria, I have used extensively those proposed by Hooghe, Marks, and Schakel 
(2010).  
 
Federal/decentralisation reforms that have been classified as substantial: 
 
In all of the following criteria, we considered the reform as substantial ONLY if the reforms concerned 
the totality or the vast majority of a given set of subnational entities, i.e. the general rule for a given layer 
of regional or local authority.  
 
 A unitary state becomes federal (or the opposite) 
 Introduction of a new subnational level of authority 
 Number of municipalities reduced by more than 20% 
 Number of subnational entities increased or reduced by more than 20% for a given layer or 
regional authority 
 Subnational entities for the first time gain some authority in one or several of the following areas: 
economy, education, welfare 
 Subnational entities gain some authority in immigration, citizenship, police, justice 
 Subnational entities gain some fiscal autonomy  
 Subnational entities given direct involvement in national or EU decision making 
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Federal/decentralisation reforms that have been classified as minor: 
 
 Only one or less than 20% of the subnational entities gain some new policy competences, 
representation or tax autonomy 
 All reforms concerning inter-municipal cooperation 
 Limit on the control of central governments 
 
4. Reforms of the direct election of the head executive/president 
 
Direct election reforms that have been classified as substantial:  
 
 First introduction of the direct election of mayors or presidents of regions for all or the great 
majority of the municipalities/regions/provinces of the territory 
 
Direct election reforms that have been classified as minor: 
 Introduction of direct election for less than 20% of the municipalities, regions or provinces 
 
N.B. for the case of Belgium, the introduction of the direct election of mayors in Wallonia in 2006 was 
considered a substantial reform even though the new measure did not concern the majority of the Belgian 
population, given the particular situation of the country and the extreme separation between the two 
linguistic communities.  
 
5. Reforms of  direct democracy at the national level 
 
Direct democracy reforms that have been classified as substantial: 
 
 First historical introduction of mechanisms of citizens’ initiative / direct democracy 
 
Direct democracy reforms that have been classified as minor: 
 
 All other modifications regarding access and conditions of use of citizens’ initiative or direct 
democracy 
 Introduction of constitutional provisions for citizens’ initiative, but no law to implement it 
 
6. Reforms regulating the access to suffrage or the means of access to suffrage 
 
Access to suffrage reforms that have been classified as substantial: 
 
 All regulations regarding means of voting, access to vote to citizens living abroad, etc., resulting in 
a net change in the size of the electorate in access of 20% 
 
 
Access to suffrage reforms that have been classified as minor: 
 
 All regulations regarding means of voting, access to vote to citizens living abroad, etc., resulting in 
a net change in the size of the electorate of less than 20% 
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Appendix 3. Detailed criteria of classification of reforms in function of their direction (inclusive vs. exclusive) 
 
1. Electoral reforms regulating the translation of  votes into seats and the expression of  votes 
adopted at the national level 
 
Electoral reforms that have been classified as inclusive:  
 
 Increase of preference vote 
 Introduction of corrective tiers in majoritarian systems 
 Expansion of the proportionality of the electoral system (through size of district, formula, etc.) 
 Introduction/ Reinforcement of mechanisms to establish gender-equality 
 Reduction of territorial discrepancies 
 
Electoral reforms that have been classified as exclusive: 
 
 Introduction of or rise in the legal threshold of representation 
 Reduction of proportionality of the electoral system (through size of district, formula, etc.) 
 Introduction of a majority bonus in a proportional electoral system 
 
When reforms were introduced with both exclusive and inclusive dimensions, they have been classified as 
reforms with multiple logics. For example, the 1994 electoral reform in Austria was qualified as a reform 
with multiple logics because it both enhanced the preference vote and increased the effective threshold of 
representation, and therefore gave both more and less weight to the voter’s decision at the same time. The 
same applies for all of the five remaining dimensions.  
 
2. Parliamentary reforms 
 
Parliamentary reforms that have been classified as inclusive: 
 
 Decrease of the duration of the term for MPs/the president 
 Increased opportunities for MPs to enter the government / choose the head of a chamber 
 Tougher regulations on the incomes of MPs and elected officials 
 Increase of the formal power of the Lower Chamber over the upper Chamber/the president 
 Suppression of the upper chamber 
 Reduction in the majority needed to pass a law/amendment 
 Increase in the number of MPs 
 
Parliamentary reforms that have been classified as exclusive 
 
 Increase in the duration of the term of MPs/the president 
 Decrease in the number of MPs 
 Weakening or suppression of the means of the minority to delay the adoption of a law or of 
amendments 
 
3. Federal reforms or decentralisation reforms 
 
Federal/decentralising reforms that have been classified as inclusive: 
 
 Creation of new regional entities 
 Increase in the competences of the regions or federal entities 
 Increase in the tax autonomy of regional or federal entities 
 Introduction of or increase in the opportunities for municipalities to cooperate  
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 Limitation of the dual mandate 
 
Federal/decentralisation reforms that have been classified as exclusive: 
 
 Reduction of the proportionality of the composition of decision-making bodies in regions or 
municipalities 
 Reduction of the number of municipalities/regions/federal entities 
 Creation of scrutiny institutions to monitor spending of regions/federal entities 
 
4. Reforms of the direct election of the head executive/president 
 
Direct election reforms that have been classified as inclusive: 
 
 Introduction of the direct election of the mayor / president of region or province 
 Introduction of the direct election of the president 
 
Direct election reforms that have been classified as exclusive: 
 
 Suppression of the direct election of the mayor / president of region or province (not applicable) 
 Suppression of the direct election of the president (not applicable) 
 
 
5. Reforms of direct democracy at the national level 
 
Direct democracy reforms that have been qualified as inclusive: 
 
 Introduction of citizens’ initiative and other provisions for direct democracy 
 Facilitation of citizens’ initiative when it already exists (not applicable) 
 
Direct democracy reforms that have been qualified as democracy restrictive: 
 Suppression of citizens’ initiative and mechanisms for direct democracy (not applicable) 
 Tougher regulation of citizens’ initiative (not applicable) 
 
 
6. Reforms regulating the access to suffrage or the means of access to suffrage 
 
Access to suffrage reforms that have been classified as inclusive: 
 
 Facilitation of postal or overseas voting 
 Facilitation of the registration procedures on electoral lists 
 Introduction of constituencies for citizens abroad 
 Lowering of voting age 
 Expansion of suffrage to non EU-citizens for local elections   
 
 
Access to suffrage reforms that have been classified as exclusive: 
 Suppression of possibilities of alternative forms of voting (not applicable) 
 Tougher regulation on access to alternative forms of voting (not applicable) 
 Restraints on the access to suffrage based on age or nationality (not applicable) 
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Appendix 4. Number of reforms of the core democratic rules adopted by country and by dimension in Western 
Europe, 1990-2010 
  Electoral  Parliamentary Decentralisation Direct  Direct Access to    
  reform reform / federal reform democracy  election suffrage Total 
Austria 1 4 2 1 1 1 10 
Belgium 5 2 4 0 1 3 15 
Denmark 0 0 3 0 0 0 3 
Finland 1 3 5 0 1 1 11 
France 4 4 6 1 1 1 17 
Germany 0 1 5 0 0 0 6 
Greece 3 0 3 0 3 0 9 
Iceland 2 1 4 0 0 0 7 
Ireland 0 0 5 0 1 0 6 
Italy 3 0 4 0 4 1 12 
Luxembourg 1 0 1 1 0 2 5 
Netherlands 2 0 1 1 0 0 4 
Norway 1 2 1 0 0 0 4 
Portugal 1 3 5 2 0 2 13 
Spain 0 0 3 0 0 0 3 
Sweden 3 1 2 0 0 0 6 
Switzerland 0 0 1 0 0 3 4 
UK 2 2 5 0 1 2 12 
Total 29 23 60 6 13 16 147 
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Appendix 5. Explanatory variables for the models 1 to 5 
Variables Measurement Source 
Explanatory variables   
Political support 
 
 
Scale ranging from 0 to 100% 
constructed out of 4 variables, 
summarising  
 The average percentage of  
respondents in a given 
country who trust the 
political parties, the 
parliament, and the 
government “a great deal” 
or “quite a lot” 
 The average percentage of  
respondents “fairly” or 
“very” satisfied with the 
functioning of  democracy in 
their country 
Eurobarometers 31, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38.0, 39.0, 
40, 41.0, 42, 43.1, 44.3, 47.1, 48, 49, 51, 52, 53, 
54.1, 56.2, 58.1, 59.1, 60.1, 61, 62, 62.2, 63.4, 65.2, 
68.1, 72.4, 73.4 
For Iceland, Norway and Switzerland: European 
Value Survey: Waves of 1990, 1999, 2008, World 
Value Survey: wave of 1994-1999, module 1, 2 and 
3 of the Comparative Study of Electoral systems 
 released in 2003, 2007 and 2011, and some 
complements at the beginning of the period with 
the Mannheim Eurobarometer trend file, 1970-
2002 for Norway, 1990-1995 
 Data points for:  
 Trust in political parties: Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, UK: 1997, 
99-2010,  
Iceland: 2009  
Norway, Switzerland: 1996, 2008 
Portugal: 1998-2010 
 Trust in parliament: Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, UK: 1997, 
99-2010 
Iceland: 1990, 1999, 2008 
Norway: 1990, 1996, 2008 
Portugal: 1990-2010 
Switzerland: 1996, 2008 
 Trust in government: Austria, Belgium, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
Spain, Sweden, UK: 1997, 99-2010 
Denmark: 1997, 1999, 2001-10 
Iceland: 2010 
Norway, Switzerland: 1996, 2008 
Portugal: 1998-2010 
 Satisfaction with democracy: Austria: 
1995, 1997-2007, 2009-10 
Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, 
Spain, UK: 1990-95, 1997-2007, 2009-10 
Finland: 93-95, 97-2007, 2009-10 
Germany: 90-95, 97-2006, 2009-10 
Iceland: 1990, 2003, 2007  
Ireland: 1990-2007, 2009-2010 
Switzerland: 1999, 2003, 2007 
Majoritarian 
democracy 
Majoritarian countries are all 
countries that load negatively on the 
final measure of the executive-parties 
Lijphart, Arendt. Patterns of Democracy, New 
Haven, Yale University Press, 1999.  
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dimension (1971-1996) 
 
Disproportionality Average measure of the least square 
index of disproportionality of 
Gallagher, 1990-2010 
Source: 
http://www.tcd.ie/Political_Science/staff/michae
l_gallagher/ElSystems/ 
 
Partisan veto players Average number of parties present in 
the government, 1990-2010  
Computed from the data about cabinet 
composition of the Parlgov dataset 
http://www.parlgov.org/stable/data.html 
Control variables   
Level of constitutional 
rigidity 
Degree of constitutional rigidity on a 
scale of 1 to 4.  
 
This variable measures how hard it is 
to change the constitution in a given 
country. One point each is given if 
the approval of the majority of the 
legislature, the chief of state and a 
referendum is necessary in order to 
change the constitution. An 
additional point is given for each of 
the following: if a supermajority in 
the legislature (more than 66% of 
votes) is needed, if both houses of 
the legislature have to approve, if the 
legislature has to approve the 
amendment in two consecutive 
legislative terms, or if the approval of 
a majority of state legislature is 
required. 
 
La Porta, López-de-Silanes, Pop-Eleches & 
Shleifer– Judicial independence. (La Porta et al 
2004)  
http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/shleif
er/Data/jcb_data.xls 
in the dataset: Teorell, Jan, Marcus Samanni, 
Sören Holmberg and Bo Rothstein. 2011. The 
Quality of Government Dataset, version 6 Apr 
2011. University of Gothenburg: The Quality of 
Government Institute, http://www.qog.pol.gu.se.  
 
Total of registered 
voters 
Total of registered voters in the last 
election  
http://www.idea.int 
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Appendix 6. Explanatory and control variables for the models 6 to 11 
Variables Measurement Source 
Explanatory variables   
Shifts in satisfaction 
with democracy 
Shift in percentage from one 
legislature to another of the 
percentage of respondents “fairly” or 
“very” satisfied with the functioning 
of democracy in their country 
(phrasing of the original question: 
“On the whole, are you very 
satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very 
satisfied or not at all satisfied with 
the way democracy works in (YOUR 
COUNTRY)?” 
Eurobarometers 31, 33, 34, 35, 36, 
37, 38.0, 39.0, 40, 41.0, 42, 43.1, 44.3, 
47.1, 48, 49, 51, 52, 53, 54.1, 56.2, 
58.1, 59.1, 60.1, 61, 62, 62.2, 63.4, 
65.2, 68.1, 72.4, 73.4  
For Iceland, Norway and 
Switzerland: Module 1, 2 and 3 of 
the Comparative Study of Electoral 
systems  released in 2003, 2007 and 
2011, and some complements at the 
beginning of the period with the 
Mannheim Eurobarometer trend file, 
1970-2002 for Norway, 1990-1995 
Shifts in total volatility Shift in percentage of the level of 
total volatility from one election to 
another  
Computed from the electoral data 
for parliamentary elections of the 
Parlgov dataset  
http://www.parlgov.org/stable/data
.html 
Political alternation Dummy variable: 1 if the head 
executive and the ideological 
orientation of a cabinet changed at 
the beginning of a legislature, 0 
otherwise.  
Computed from the data about 
cabinet composition of the Parlgov 
dataset 
http://www.parlgov.org/stable/data
.html 
Control variables   
Partisan veto players Number of parties present in the 
government  
Computed from the data about 
cabinet composition of the Parlgov 
dataset 
http://www.parlgov.org/stable/data
.html 
Level of constitutional 
rigidity 
Degree of constitutional rigidity on a 
scale of 1 to 4.  
 
This variable measures how hard it is 
to change the constitution in a given 
country. One point each is given if 
the approval of the majority of the 
legislature, the chief of state and a 
referendum is necessary in order to 
change the constitution. An 
additional point is given for each of 
the following: if a supermajority in 
the legislature (more than 66% of 
votes) is needed, if both houses of 
the legislature have to approve, if the 
legislature has to approve the 
amendment in two consecutive 
legislative terms or if the approval of 
a majority of state legislature is 
required. 
 
La Porta, López-de-Silanes, Pop-
Eleches & Shleifer– Judicial 
independence. (La Porta et al 2004)  
http://post.economics.harvard.edu/
faculty/shleifer/Data/jcb_data.xls 
in the dataset: Teorell, Jan, Marcus 
Samanni, Sören Holmberg and Bo 
Rothstein. 2011. The Quality of 
Government Dataset, version 
6Apr11. University of Gothenburg: 
The Quality of Government 
Institute, http://www.qog.pol.gu.se.  
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Ideological orientation Classification of the legislatures Computed from the data about 
of the legislature based on the ideological orientation 
of the cabinets, divided in three 
categories: left/centre left, 
right/centre right, grand coalition.  
Grand coalitions include all of the 
main political parties of the left and 
the right in power. When one or 
several of the main parties are 
excluded, and the cabinet still 
contains left-wing and right-wing 
parties, we looked who is the prime 
minister to know whether the 
cabinet was classified as a left-wing 
or a right-wing cabinet. 
In cases when a legislature 
experiences cabinets with different 
ideological orientation, the 
classification depends on the cabinet 
that lasted longer. Caretakers 
governments were included into the 
“grand coalition” category.  
cabinet composition of the Parlgov 
dataset 
http://www.parlgov.org/stable/data
.html 
 
Economic growth Average percentage of growth in 
GDP in constant prices for a given 
legislature  
Data of the International Monetary 
Fund 
www.imf.org 
 
  
340 
Appendix 
Appendix 7. Actual distribution of the total number of reforms adopted by legislature compared to the poisson 
and the negative binomial distribution 
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Appendix 8. Determinants of the number of reforms of the core democratic rules in Western Europe, 1990-
2010 (controlling for the number of registered voters) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Degree of constitutional rigidity -1.529 
(1.323) 
    Index of political support 
   
-0.367 ** 
(0.111) 
-0.269 ** 
(0.094) 
Majoritarian democracy 
 
4.694 
(3.222) 
   Least squares index 
  
0.721 ** 
(0.214) 
 
0.545 ** 
(0.185) 
Mean number of parties in government 
 
1.638 
(1.013) 
1.453 * 
(0.691) 
 
1.218 * 
(0.69) 
Number of registered voters (in millions) 0.055 
(0.052) 
0.016 
(0.060) 
-0.035 
(0.050) 
-0.058 
(0.055) 
-0.099 * 
(0.047) 
 
     Constant 11.128 * 
(3.732) 
2.804 
(2.912) 
1.415 
(2.234) 
26.096 *** 
(5.830) 
16.429 ** 
(5.572) 
Number of observations 18 18 18 18 18 
Adjusted R2 0.04 0.08 0.42 0.40 0.61 
Note: Coefficients are the result of ordinary least-squares regression; standard errors are in parentheses; the 
dependent variable is the number of reforms adopted between 1990 and 2010                                                   
*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 
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Appendix 10 Methodology of the case studies 
 
1. Sources triangulated in the case studies 
 
Semi-directed interviews were conducted with academics, experts, journalists, civil society activists, 
policy advisors and politicians involved in the three processes of reform, during short and intensive stays: 
one month for the 23 interviews conducted in Ireland in May 2012 (principally in Dublin); around two 
months for the 16 interviews conducted in France between January and March 2013 in Paris; and a bit 
more than one month for the 14 interviews conducted between June and July 2013, mostly in Florence 
and Rome. The interviews lasted, on average, around 50 minutes (from 30 minutes to an hour and a half). 
A different questionnaire comprising about twenty questions was used consistently for each country, and 
the use of interviews was facilitated by the fact they were always conducted in the native language of the 
interviewees. For each of the three interview guides, I adopted a sequential approach for the analysis of 
the reforms, dividing the processes into different phases (emergence of the issue of reform, construction 
of the agenda of reforms, negotiation, and adoption) in order to facilitate comparisons between the 
different reforms. This also means that before going out into the field, a fair amount of time was spent 
studying the relevant secondary sources (reports and press articles), in order to get a fair idea of the 
sequencing of the reforms, and, of course, to identify the key people who should be interviewed.  
In addition to these 53 interviews which have constituted the most important research material 
for the three case studies, the empirical corpuses have been complemented with a significant number of 
reports led by experts or by politicians in and outside of parliament, analysis of the press coverage of the 
reforms over a long period of time, occasionally archives, and consultation of the most relevant 
parliamentary debates, which are systematically available online for the period covered in all three 
countries. I therefore applied the triangulation strategy advocated by Davies, advocated in particular when 
elite interviewing constitutes the major material (2001). The analysis of the press was systematised in order 
to lead to some additional quantitative analyses in the French case, while I re-used the study of the 
integrality of the debates on the electoral reform (both in committees and in plenary sessions) that I 
conducted in Italy for my Master’s dissertation (Bedock 2009). In each case, I focused on several daily 
newspapers, trying as much as possible to use sources with different political sensibilities – ideally, one 
left-wing, one centrist, and one-right wing newspaper – and, when relevant (in Italy) published in different 
regions of the country. In Ireland, I consulted articles from the Irish Times (Dublin, centre-left), the Irish 
Independent (Dublin, centre-right) between 2009 and 2013. In France, the three main newspapers (Libération, 
left, Le Monde, centre, and Le Figaro, right) were systematically reviewed on the reduction of the 
presidential term and the reordering of the electoral calendar for a period covering July 1999 to June 2001. 
In Italy, the press archives cover a period ranging from January 2003 to July 2007, including in particular 
articles from La Repubblica (Rome, centre-left), Il Corriere della Sera (Milano, centre), la Stampa (Torino, 
centre-right) and Il Giornale (Milan, right).  
 
2. Access to the field 
The interviews were based on a “non-probability sampling approach”, as it is of course more 
suitable for process-tracing (Tansey 2007): in all three cases, the first important task consisted of 
identifying the key political actors in charge during the process. The interviews conducted can fall within 
the category of elite interviews, elites being intended as “those with close proximity to power or 
policymaking” (Lilleker 2003, 207). Email was generally used for first contacts, including an explanation 
about my research and a justification of my wish to interview them, recalling their role in the process in 
order to show that I had some circumstantial knowledge of the process at stake.   
Overall, I did not encounter major problems of access to the most important actors of the 
process, although it is indubitable that the fieldwork in Ireland was the easiest: the reforms studied were 
still largely “in progress” and high on the agenda, and there has been far greater involvement from civil 
society than in the Italian or French case. In the three countries, the experts, as they were almost all linked 
to academia, were particularly helpful and easy to talk with. In all three cases I managed to meet some or 
most of the experts who were closely, intensively, and directly associated with the processes of reform 
studied. I contacted them first, in order to get a point of access to the field, and to use their advice and 
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contacts to access to the political actors. Regarding the politicians, I chose not to focus most of my efforts 
on trying to meet the party leaders or the heads of the executive in charge at the time, given the limited 
amount of time at my disposal. Rather, I privileged meetings with those who were specialists of the 
institutional matters in their party, and who were actively involved in building the political alternatives that 
were examined by the parliament, and the policy advisers working in the cabinets and in charge of the 
concrete aspects of the elaboration of the reform. I usually proceeded in the following way: contacting, 
first, the individuals who were easier to access (i.e. the academics), in order to use their knowledge of the 
processes to gain access to other people, most notably politicians and political advisors. In some cases, I 
had to go through a number of steps before managing to obtain the interview, including information 
about my credentials or the list of people I had interviewed in the past. On only one occasion, for a 
French interview, I had to communicate the list of questions in advance. I asked the interviewees 
systematically if they allowed me to record the interview, to quote them and if they allowed their names to 
appear in the research. Only two public servants in office asked me not to mention their name, and on 
only one occasion did the interviewee refuse to be recorded. 
To conclude, the interview process was very smooth, and I did not encounter many of the 
difficulties usually associated with elite interviews, which some have called a “minefield” (Lilleker 2003). I 
attribute this to several factors. First, institutional reforms are typically technical and not highly 
contentious issues. Despite the fact that some of the reforms studied were divisive, institutional reforms 
tend to be dealt with by a limited number of specialists, who on many occasions have specialised 
knowledge in public law and/or political science. This undoubtedly facilitated the interviews a great deal. 
Secondly, both the experience of my Master’s dissertation and that of this thesis have opened my eyes to a 
paradox: it may actually be easier to interview elites in a foreign country. Indeed, both in Ireland and in 
Italy, my status as a French student in a European University was a help rather than a hindrance: my 
interviewees adopted a much more educational attitude than the French interviewees, and revealed the 
dynamics of the process more freely than they would have done with a “domestic” interviewer. On several 
occasions, I discussed some of the findings of the interviews with Irish or Italian students, and several of 
them noted the freedom of tone that some of the quotes indicated. I believe that this largely counter-
balanced the “insider” knowledge I benefited from when conducting the French interviews. These 
conclusions are relatively similar to those of Herod, who shows that being a foreign researcher can operate 
as an “ice-breaker” (1999, 325). National factors also certainly came into play, facilitating or complicating 
the interviews: Ireland’s small size and its tradition of informal and localist political elites making them 
more accessible in comparison, for example, to the centralised and hierarchised processes of policy-
making in France. 
 
3. List of  the interviews conducted  
 
This presentation is ordered in the following way: name, function held during the sequence of reforms 
considered (for politicians and councillors), current function (for experts), other relevant functions (when 
applicable), party (when applicable), date of the interview, location of the interview, city in which the 
interview was held. 
3.1. List of  the interviews conducted in May 2012 on the agenda of  political reforms in Ireland 
 
1- Anon. political adviser in the department of  the Taoiseach, FG, 30 May 2012, at his office in 
Dublin. 
2- Byrne, Elaine, journalist and research fellow at University of  New South Wales Sydney, co-author 
of  politicalreform.ie, on the academic team of  We the Citizens, 10 May 2012, at a café in Dublin. 
3- Coakley, John, Professor of  political science in the University College Dublin, 1 June 2012, at his 
office in Dublin. 
4- Daly, Eoin, lecturer in the School of  Law at University College Dublin, 9 May 2012, at a café in 
Dublin.  
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5- Dempsey, Noel, ex-Teachta Dála (TD) for Meath and Meath West between 1987 to 2011, ex-
minister (1997-2011), FF, 30 May 2012, at a café in Dublin  
6- Devins, Jimmy, ex Teachta Dála (TD) for Sligo-Leitrim between 2002 and 2011, ex local 
councillor in Sligo County Council between 1991 and 2002, ex-minister, FF, 18 May 2012, at his 
office in Sligo. 
7- Farrell David, Professor of  political science at University College Dublin, co-author of  
politicalreform.ie, on the academic team of  We the Citizens, the constitutional convention and 
reformcard.com, 8 May 2012, at his office in Dublin. 
8- Hardiman, Niamh, Professor of  political science at University College Dublin, 22 May 2012, at a 
restaurant in Dublin. 
9-  Harris, Clodagh, Professor of  political science at University College Cork, on the academic team 
of  We the Citizens and reformcard.com, 21 May 2012, by Skype.  
10- Hogan, Gerard, High Court Judge, ex-lawyer and professor of  constitutional law at Trinity 
College Dublin, 29 May 2012 and 31 May 2012, at his office in Dublin.  
11- Leahy, Pat, journalist for the Sunday Independent, 15 May 2012, at a café in Dublin.  
12- Marsch, Michael, professor of  political science at Trinity College Dublin, 15 May 2012, at his 
office in Dublin.  
13- Mac Conghail Fiach, senator since 2011, director of  the Abbey Theatre and Chairman of  “We the 
Citizens”, Independent, 29 May 2012, at his office in Dublin.  
14- Murphy, Eoghan, Teachta Dála (TD) for Dublin South-East since 2011, ex-Dublin city councillor 
from 2009 to 2011, FG, 24 May 2012, Leinster House, Dublin. 
15- Murphy, Mary P., professor of  sociology at NUI (National University of  Ireland) Maynooth, 
member of  TASC and Claiming our Future, 16 May 2012, at a café in Dublin  
16- O’Connor Nat, director of  the think tank TASC, 4 May 2012, at his office in Dublin.  
17- O’Keeffe, Susan, senator since 2011, ex-journalist, Labour, 24 May 2012, Leinster House, Dublin.  
18- O’Rourke, Mary, ex-Teachta Dála (TD) for Longford Westmeath and Westmeath (1981-1997, 
2007-2011), ex-senator (1997-2007), ex-president of  the Seanad (2002-2007), ex-minister (1989-
1994, 1997-2002), FF, 23 May 2012, at her home in Athlone.  
19- Power, Averil, senator since 2011, ex-political advisor of  Mary Hanafin in the Department of  
Tourism, Family affairs and education, ex-spokesperson on political reform in the 2011 election, 
FF, 29 May 2012, Leinster House, Dublin.  
20- Wall, Matt, postdoctoral researcher in the department of  political science of  the Free University, 
Amterdam, 2 May 2012, by Skype.  
21- Whelan, Noel, lawyer, columnist with the Irish Times and other media, ex-political adviser and FF 
politician, 14 May 2012, at a café in Dublin.  
22- White, Alex, Teachta Dála (TD) for Dublin South since 2011, senator from 2007 to 2011, Labour, 
24 May 2012, Leinster House, Dublin.  
 
3.2. List of  the interviews conducted between February 2013 and April 2013 on the quinquennat and the reordering 
of  the electoral calendar 
 
1- Avril Pierre, constitutional lawyer, ex-Professor of  public law at Institut d’Etudes Politiques of  Paris, 
6 February 2013, in his home in Paris. 
2- Bas, Philippe, former deputy general secretary of  the Presidency of  the Republic between 2000 
and 2002, 19 February 2013, at his office in Paris. 
3- Bourdon, Pierre, constitutional and administrative lawyer, ATER at University Paris I Panthéon 
Sorbonne, 25 February 2013, at a café in Paris. 
4- Carcassonne, Guy †, constitutional lawyer, professor at university Paris-X Nanterre, 4 February 
2013, at his office in Paris. 
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5- Colmou, Yves, former director of  cabinet of  the minister in charge of  the relations with the 
Parliament, and adviser of  the minister of  Home Affairs between 1997 and 2002, 11 March 2013, 
at his office in Paris. 
6- Dutheillet de Lamothe, Olivier, former deputy general secretary of  the Presidency of  the 
Republic between 1997 and 2000, 20 March 2013, at his office in Paris. 
7- Gicquel, Jean, constitutional lawyer, emeritus professor of  public law at University of  Paris I 
Panthéon Sorbonne, 15 February 2013, at his office in Paris. 
8- Giscard d’Estaing, Valéry, MP of  the Puy de Dôme (1956-73, 1984-2002), former President of  
the Republic between 1974 and 1981, 11 March 2013, at his home. 
9- Guelman, Pierre, former advisor of  the Prime Minister for the relations with the Parliament, 
1997-2002, 5 March 2013, at his office in Paris. 
10- Ludet, Daniel, former advisor for Justice in the cabinet of  Lionel Jospin, 1 March 2013, at his 
office in Paris. 
11- Mazeaud, Pierre, member of  the constitutional council between 1998 and 2004, former secretary 
of  state in governments of  Debré, Pompidou and Messmer, ex-MP of  Haute-Savoie  between 
1988 and 1998, former president of  the constitutional council (2004-2007), RPR, 5 March 2013, 
at his home in Paris. 
12- Maus, Didier, constitutional lawyer and high civil servant, 20 February 2013, at his home. 
13- Roman, Bernard, MP of  the Nord (1997-now) and former president of  the Commission des lois in 
the national Assembly (2000-2002), PS, 13 March 2013, at his office in Paris. 
14- Mény, Yves, political scientist and specialist of  the institutions, ex-directo of  the European 
University Institute, 31 January 2013, at a café in Paris. 
15- Paillé, Dominique, former general delegate of  the UDF, MP of  the Deux-Sèvres between 1993 
and 2007, 3 April 2013, at his office in Paris. 
 
3.3.  List of  the interviews conducted between in June and July 2013 on the constitutional reform and on the electoral 
reform of  2005 
 
1- Anon. Councillor of  the Camera dei Deputati, 28 June 2013, at his office in Rome. 
2- Calderisi, Giuseppe, Councillor for the president of  the Senate between 2001 and 2006, 4 July 
2013, at his office in Rome 
3- Ceccanti, Stefano, Professor of  Comparative Public Law at university La Sapienza of  Rome, 
senator of  Piemonte between 2008 and 2013, PD, 26 June 2013, at a café in Rome.   
4- Chiti, Vannino, MP of  Toscana between 2001 and 2008, minister of  the relations with the 
Parliament between 2006 and 2008, senator of  Toscana since 2008, DS, 3 July 2013, at his 
office in Rome. 
5- D’Alimonte, Roberto. Professor of  Italian political system at University LUISS Guido Carli 
of  Rome, 13 June 2013, at his office in Florence. 
6- D’Onofrio, Francesco, senator of  Lazio (1983-1987, 1996-2008) and president of  the 
parliamentary group from 2001 to 2006, ex-MP of  Lazio  between 1990 and 1996, UDC, 25 
June 2013, at his home in Rome. 
7- Fisichella, Domenico, senator of  Lazio between 1994 and 2005, independent senator between 
2005 and 2006, vice-president of  the Senate from 2001 to 2006, AN, 3 July 2013, at his home 
in Rome. 
8- Fusaro, Carlo, Professor in the department of  legal sciences at Università degli Studi of  
Florence, 10 June 2013, at his office in Florence. 
9- Maran, Alessandro, MP of  Gorizia between 2001 and 2006 and member of  the Commission 
Affari Costituzionali I between 2001 and 2006, MP of  Friuli-Venezia Giulia between 2006 
and 2013, senator of  Friuli-Venezia Giulia since 2013, DS, 25 June 2013, in a restaurant, 
Rome. 
10- Nania, Domenico, senator of  Sicilia and president of  the AN parliamentary group in the 
Senate from 2001 to 2006, MP of  Sicilia between 1987 and 2001, AN, 26 June 2013, in the 
Senate, Rome. 
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11- Pastore, Andrea, senator of  Abruzzo between 1996 and 2013 and president of  the 
Commission Affari Costituzionali I between 2001 and 2006, FI, 19 June 2013, at his office in 
Pescara. 
12- Tarli Barbieri, Giovanni, Professor of  constitutional law at Università degli Studi of  Florence, 
17 June 2013, at his office in Florence. 
13- Tonini, Giorgio, senator of  Marche between 2001 and 2013, senator of  Trento since 2013, 
DS, 4 July 2013, at his office in Rome. 
14- Vassallo, Salvatore, Professor of  Political Science and Comparative Politics at University of  
Bologna, former MP of  Emilia-Romagna between 2008 and 2013, PD, 11 June 2013, at his 
office in Bologna.   
 
4. Interview guides  
The three following interview guides were used as consistently as possible across the different interviews. 
They are here reported in the original language in which the interviews were conducted.     
4.1. Interview guide used in Ireland 
Role of the interviewee in political reform 
1- First of  all, I would like you describe me a little bit what has been your specific role in the process 
of  political reform that is (now) happening in Ireland. I know you were involved in…, but I 
would like to know more precisely was your “function”, and when and why you started to focus 
on political reform.  
2- What, personally, do you think are the most urgent political reforms to conduct in Ireland?  
Period going from the 1990s to the crisis in 2008 
Before going to the most intense “moment of the debate”, I want to understand what was the importance 
given to the issue of political reform before the crisis, so roughly in the last two decades before 2008. So, 
quickly, can you tell me… 
3- Who were the actors / parties interested in political reform back then? Who was pushing for it?  
4- What were the topics that were debated? How did these topics emerge in the agenda in the first 
place? /Who pushed to discuss these topics in the Parliament in the first place?  
5- Where did the discussions about political reforms take place? /For politicians: how was work 
organised in the committee? Was it only in the parliament, or between academics? Was there some 
interest among the general public?  
6- What were the preferences of  the actors promoting reforms? Were there really consensual, or on 
the contrary quite contentious, or were parties quite indifferent? For politicians: What was the 
preference of  your own party on this matter? And the other parties in Parliament?  
7- There were quite a number of  early parliamentary reports that were released, by the All-party 
committee on the constitution, then by the Joint committee on the constitution between 1997 and 
2002. What happened with the recommendations of  these reports? Were they followed by any 
action?  
Discussions on political reform in the legislature 2008-2011 
Then I would like to focus on the period that preceded the election of 2011, so roughly 2008-2011.  
8- Was there a “before” and “after” crisis in the debate on political reform? When did non-political 
actors start to get interested in the topic (like the civil society and academics)? And when did the 
citizens and the general public start to become interested in this?  
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9- For politicians: When the Joint committee on the constitution was set up, what was it you were 
asked to debate? For example, why did you review the electoral system? And what did you intend 
to achieve back then?  
 
10- What were the positions of  the main parties in the parliament about political reform at the 
beginning of  the last legislature? And at the end? Do you think that this position changed? Why?  
11- Did the agenda of  the things discussed concerning political reform in the parliament change over 
the course of  the legislature?/Do you think that the leader of  your party, or of  other parties 
became more interested in political reform before the election?  
12- What happened with the recommendations released by the committee, such as the establishment 
of  an electoral commission, or commitment for women participation and reinforcement of  the 
Dail? Were they followed by action? Were they used to fashion the manifestos, or the programme 
for government? /How and who fashioned the manifestos for the section on political reform in 
your party? 
Political reform since the election of 2011  
There are now clear commitments to political reform in the Programme for Government, and the 
government is preparing the launch of a constitutional convention right now.  
13- Who are the actors involved in the debate on political reform since the election of  2011? Did 
new actors emerge?  
14- What are the preferences of  these actors? Do you believe for example that the governing 
coalition, the opposition parties, and the civil society are pushing for the same agenda for reform, 
or that there are differences? What are they hoping to achieve with it?  
15- Would you say that there are now strong expectations of  the citizens towards political reform, or 
is the crisis still mainly an economic crisis? For politicians: When you talk(ed) to your constituents, 
do you have the feeling that political reform is an important topic for them, compared to other 
issues? Is there a demand for it?  
16- What are the different arenas in which political reform is debated today in Ireland?  
17- Some of  the most important measures announced by the PoG include the abolition of  the 
Seanad, the reduction of  the size of  the Dáil, more powers to the Dáil. Who is responsible for 
the content of  the Pfg, and where do the main ideas come from? For example, how did the idea 
to abolish the Seanad appear? 
18- Why do you think that the government made the choice of  delegating a part of  the decision 
about reform to the constitutional convention? Why not staying within the parliament? Where 
does the idea of  Citizens’ assemblies come from?  
Conclusion 
Thank you, again, for these insights, and for giving me this interview. Before I leave,  
19- Do you know other people, or do you have access to documents that might help me to better 
understand the process of  political reform in Ireland? Who do you think I should talk to?  
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4.2. Interview guide used in France 
Rôle de l’interviewé dans le processus quinquennat/calendrier, préférences, et prévisions 
a- Premièrement, j’aimerais que vous me décriviez quel a été votre rôle spécifique dans le processus 
qui s’est déroulé entre 2000 et 2001. Quelle a été votre « fonction », et à quel moment avez-vous 
commencé à vous impliquer dans ces deux questions institutionnelles ?  
b- D’un point de vue théorique, pourquoi pensiez-vous (ou non) que les réformes du quinquennat et 
du calendrier étaient importantes à mener ? Par quelles réformes auriez vous voulu les voir 
complétées ?  
c- Au moment de l’adoption du quinquennat et de l’inversion du calendrier, quels effets anticipiez 
vous ?  
La genèse du quinquennat 
Avant que nous commencions à parler du moment le plus intense du débat j’aimerais comprendre quelle 
était l’importance accordée à l’enjeu de la réduction du mandat présidentiel avant 2000, disons depuis 
1973, moment où le sujet est débattu au parlement. Pouvez-vous me dire, en deux mots :  
1- Que s’est-il passé en 1973, au moment de l’échec de la réforme? Le sujet a-t-il été remis sur 
l’agenda depuis ? 
2- Quels étaient les acteurs qui soutenaient cette réforme avant 2000 ? S’agissait-il plutôt d’acteurs 
isolés, ou y-avait-il une réflexion systématique au sein des partis et du monde académique sur ce 
sujet ? Quels étaient les arguments avancés ? 
3- Pourquoi ce long moment entre 1973 et 2000 sans rediscuter du quinquennat? L’intérêt pour la 
réforme était-il alors purement limité au monde académique ?  
4- Alors que Jospin s’est prononcé assez rapidement en faveur du quinquennat, Chirac s’y est 
opposé à de nombreuses reprises. Etaient-ils représentatifs des positions de leurs partis 
respectifs ? Savez-vous s’il s’agissait d’un sujet plutôt consensuel au sein des différents partis ? 
suscitait-il le conflit, l’indifférence, une large adhésion ?  
5- La troisième cohabitation a-t-elle relancé le débat ? A-t-elle fait changer d’avis certains acteurs ? 
Pourquoi ? 
6- Des tribunes d’intellectuels ont été publiées régulièrement dans le monde pour défendre le 
quinquennat, notamment à partir de la troisième cohabitation. Ont-elles influencé les politiques ? 
Avez-vous pu, vous ou des collègues, être consulté à ce propos par les acteurs politiques ? 
Lesquels ? A quel moment ?  
Premiers mois de l’année 2000 
Je voudrai maintenant revenir sur les premiers mois de l’année 2000, avant que le quinquennat ne soit 
discuté au parlement.  
7- Des acteurs politiques tels qu’Alain Juppé, Hervé de Charrette, ont commencé à annoncer 
publiquement leur soutien au quinquennat début 2000. De plus, le RPR a commencé à avoir un 
groupe de travail sur le sujet, assez actif. Pourquoi ce revirement ? Comment se positionne Chirac 
là dedans ?  
8- Avant que le débat ne s’engage au parlement, avez-vous une idée de ce qu’étaient les positions des 
principaux partis sur le sujet ? Existait-il des divisions au sein de la droite et de la gauche, ou 
même au sein des partis ? 
9- Lorsque l’on épluche la presse de 2000, on a l’impression que la réforme devient peu à peu 
inéluctable. Pourquoi le débat se cristallise-t-il à ce moment précis ? Pourquoi cette réforme 
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gagne-t-elle autant d’adhésion aussi vite après avoir été oubliée si longtemps, et pourquoi cette 
accélération ? 
10- VGE a pris la responsabilité de déposer une proposition de loi début mai. Pouvez-vous 
m’expliquer ce qui s’est passé entre ce moment, et le moment où la décision est prise de passer 
par un projet de loi sans amendement (« quinquennat sec »), puis par un référendum ? pourquoi 
cette voie et pas une autre ?  
11- Comment expliquez-vous une adoption facile et rapide au parlement de la réforme ? Comment 
est-il possible qu’autant d’acteurs aux idéologies et préférences institutionnelles opposées aient-pu 
se retrouver sur cette réforme ? 
Pour les parlementaires 
12- Pouvez-vous me redonner les grandes lignes du débat qui ont eu lieu au parlement sur le 
quinquennat ? L’assentiment était-il fort? Sur quels arguments? Qui pour, qui contre? Comment 
les acteurs ont-ils réagi à l’interdiction d’amender le texte ? 
Campagne référendaire de l’année 2000 
Revenons maintenant brièvement sur la champagne référendaire qui a eu lieu à l’été 2000. 
13- Il a été fait le choix d’une campagne brève. Pourquoi ce choix ? Pour les partis n’ont-ils pas mis 
plus de ressources et d’énergie dans la campagne ?  
14- L’opinion publique apparaissait, dans les sondages, à la fois comme acquise, et indifférente. Mais 
comment expliquer un tel niveau d’abstention ? Les partis avaient-ils prévu cela ?  
Pour les experts 
15- Les académiques et les intellectuels ont-ils été appelé à jouer un rôle dans cette campagne ? 
Quelle était la position des experts face au « quinquennat sec » proposé ? 
 
La genèse du calendrier 
16- Juste après la réforme du quinquennat, un certain nombre de voix s’élèvent pour modifier le 
calendrier dans la foulée, avec au départ une grande réticence, et de Chirac, et de Jospin. Qui a 
promu l’idée de l’inversion, avec quels arguments ? Et pourquoi cette réticence ? 
17- Comment expliquer que, quelques-mois après s’y être opposé, Jospin et le PS décident finalement 
de déposer une proposition de loi sur le sujet ?  
Le débat sur le calendrier 
18- Au contraire du débat sur le quinquennat, la question du calendrier a suscité une forte opposition 
au parlement du PCF, des Verts, et du RPR. Comment expliquer les positions des partis respectifs 
sur le sujet ? Pourquoi, notamment, le RPR a-t-il défendu une vision qui, somme toute, donnait 
plus de prééminence au parlement ? Et le PS une vision qui entérinait une vision plus 
présidentielle ? 
19- De façon générale, pourquoi le quinquennat a-t-il fait peu débat, et le calendrier déclenché les 
passions politiques ?  
Conclusion 
20- Connaissez vous d’autres gens, ou avez-vous accès à des documents qui pourraient m’aider à 
mieux appréhender ce qui s’est passé pendant ces deux réformes?  
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4.3. Interview guide used in Italy 
Ruolo dell’intervistato nel processo di riforma, preferenze, e previsioni sulle consequenze delle riforme 
1- Innanzitutto, vorrei sapere qual è stato il Suo ruolo specifico nel processo di elaborazione delle 
riforme istituzionali che sono state definite tra il 2003 e il 2005. Quale è stata la sua funzione, e in 
che modo Lei è stato coinvolto nel processo? 
2- Dal punto di vista teorico, che cosa pensava respettivamente della riforma costituzionale e della 
riforma elettorale del 2005? Il Suo giudizio era positivo o negativo? Perché?  
3- Quali erano gli effetti di queste due riforme da Lei anticipati, sia sul piano politico che sul piano 
istituzionale? 
Genesi della riforma (2002-Agosto 2003) 
Prima del 2003, ci sono stati vari tentativi di riforma delle istituzione italiane. Quali sono state le iniziative 
del centrosinistra tra il 1996 e il 2001? In particolare, potrebbe parlarmi della riforma del Titolo V?  
4- Alla fine del 2002, c’erano già state varie discussioni in Parlamento sulla devoluzione. In seguito, 
all’inizio del 2003, si è cominciato a parlare di premierato, con un giudizio abbastanza positivo da 
parte dell’opposizione. In marzo, si parla della riforma del Titolo V. A che epoca queste questioni 
hanno cominciato a emergere nel dibattito pubblico? Sono emerse in modo concomitante oppure  
le differente questoni sono apparse in momenti diversi? Chi ha preso l’iniziativa per i differenti 
aspetti della riforma? 
5- Quali erano le posizioni iniziali dei principali partiti della maggioranza all’inizio delle discussioni 
su questi temi? E quelle dell’opposizione?  
6- Perché il CDx ha scelto di discutere i vari aspetti della riforma costituzionale (devoluzione, 
federalismo, premierato, corte costituzionale, etc) in un singolo provvedimento piuttosto che in 
alcuni disegni di legge distinti?  
7- L’idea di riformare la legge elettorale per tornare alla proporzionale è emersa nell’aprile 2003, 
insieme all’idea di adottare un sistema similare a quello delle elezioni provinciali. Chi ha avuto 
quest’idea? Perché fu deciso di non discuterla insieme alla riforma costituzionale? Quali erano le 
posizioni iniziali dei differenti partiti del CDx su questo punto? 
Per i politici 
8- Quali erano gli aspetti più importanti della riforma per il suo partito? Perché? E quelli più 
problematici?  
  
L’elaborazione del progetto unico di riforma costituzionale 
9- Qual è stato il ruolo dei costituzionalisti e degli esperti all’inizio del processo? Quali 
costituzionalisti, gruppi, ed esperti, sono stati consultati dal centrodestra? (dal centrosinistra)? 
10- Nel luglio 2003, D’Onofrio, Nania, Pastore, e Calderoli hanno ricevuto il compito di scrivere una 
proposta di riforma costituzionale. Perché si è scelto di procedere cosi? Che cos’è successo a 
Lorenzago di Cadore, e quali sono stati i punti più problematici della discussione? Come sono 
state sormontate le divisioni della coalizione?  
11- Quali sono state le principali misure su di cui ci fu un accordo fra i 4 saggi di Lorenzago?  
12- Che cosa è successo nella maggioranza del CDx fra agosto 2003 (accordo di Lorenzago) e 
dicembre 2003 (inizio della discussione in parlamento)? Chi ha negoziato il progetto?  
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La discussione della riforma costituzionale in parlamento 
13- Da dicembre 2003 a marzo 2004, durante la prima lettura al Senato, ci sono state ancora delle 
tensioni tra la Lega e gli altri alleati sul federalismo? Il CDx era unito, oppure restavano dei punti 
problematici? Erano isolati, o rappresentativi, gente come Pera o Fisichella?  
14- Qual era l’attitudine dell’opposizione sul testo, e come spiegarla? C’erano sono tensioni interne al 
CSx sulla riforma costituzionale?  
15- Durante la prima lettura alla Camera (aprile-ottobre 2004), torna la discussione sulla riforma 
elettorale, questa volta con l’idea di adottare il Tatarellum. Perché? Qual è stato il ruolo dell’UDC, 
e perché quest’idea non ha avuto impatti in quel momento?  
16- Nel luglio 2004, l’UDC ha proposto vari emendamenti del testo, che hanno provocato nuove 
tensioni nel centrodestra. Perché? Come è stato sormontato questo nuovo ostacolo? Che cosa 
cambia nel testo e nell’accordo? A cosa serve il cosidetto Lorenzago due?  
17- Che cosa succede durante gli ulteriori passaggi della riforma costituzionale in Parlamento nel 
2005?  
 
Riforma elettorale 
18- Alla fine del 2004, fu presa la decisione di adottare una “mini-riforma elettorale”, più 
precisamente con l’idea di adottare la scheda unica e il cosidetto Nespolum, mentre l’UDC voleva 
una riforma molto più importante. Perché il processo è finito con l’adozione di una grande 
riforma elettorale abbastanza eteroclita? Quali erano le posizioni dei partiti di CDx sulla riforma 
elettorale? E quelle dei partiti di CSx? C’erano delle divisioni nelle due coalizione, oppure erano 
compatte?   
19- Come si è riusciti ad arrivare al compromesso finale e all’adozione delle due riforme alla fine 
2005?  
Referendum 
20- Che cosa mi può dire della mobilitazione per il referendum del 2006? Delle posizioni dei differenti 
partiti? Perché il CDx ha perso questo referendum abbastanza nettamente? Quale sono stati i 
momenti decisivi della campagna sul referendum?  
Conclusione  
21- Lei conosce altre persone, o dei documenti che potrebbero aiutarmi a capire meglio che cos’é 
successo durante il processo di adozione di queste due riforme ?  
3
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Appendix 12. Example of poster of Fine Gael for the campaign on the abolition of the Seanad, October 2013.  
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Appendix 13. Coding of the French articles relative to the quinquennat and the reordering of the electoral 
calendar.  
1023 articles have been coded, coming from the three main daily national newspapers in France, 
representing the main ideological families of the French ideological spectrums (Libération for the left, Le 
Monde for the centre, and Le Figaro for the right), dealing exclusively or in part with the reforms of the 
quinquennat and the reordering of the electoral calendar. 
The period examined is from 1 July 1999, until 30 June 2001, hence covering two years. The keywords 
used to select the articles were “quinquennat” and “calendrier électoral”. One or both of these keywords 
had to be present either in the title or in the body of the text. The Lexis Nexis database was used to 
identify the articles from Le Monde and Le Figaro, and the Factiva database was used to identify the 
articles from Libération. This research led to the identification of 1023 articles, which form the corpus of 
the database.  
All of these articles were hand-coded, with information relative to the date, the journal, the authors of the 
articles, the theme of the article, the other institutional reforms mentioned in the body of the article, and 
the main arguments used in favour or against these reforms, when relevant.   
journal 
 
Libération 
Le Monde 
Le figaro 
 
yyyymmdd 
 
Date of the article, coded: year, month, day 
 
year 
 
1999 
2000 
2001 
 
month 
 
01- January 
02- February 
Etc. 
 
author 
 
Name of the author 
 
author2 
 
Name of the second author 
(etc. until author5) 
 
title 
 
Title of the article as published in the journal 
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wordnumber 
 
Length of the article in words 
 
theme 
 
Theme of the article 
1- quinquennat 
2- calendrier 
3- Both reforms  
 
otherref 
 
Are other institutional reforms mentioned in the article? 
0- No 
1- yes 
 
otherref1 
 
First other institutional reforms mentioned in the article 
1- “Cumul des mandats” 
2- Senator term in office, and other terms in office 
3- Electoral system for legislative elections 
4- Federalism and decentralisation 
5- Right to dissolve, veto of  the president 
6- Reinforcement of  the parliament, Senate 
7- Reform of  the Conseil national de la magistrature and of  justice 
8- Reform of  the article 5 and 20 
9- Referendum 
10- Corsica 
11- Vote des étrangers 
12- Suppression PM / president 
13- Responsabilité pénale du chef  de l’Etat et des membres du gouvernment  
14- Direct election of  the president 
15- Constitutional council, saisine, QPC 
16- Limitation of  the power of  nominations and other powers of  the president  
 
otherref2 
second other institutional reform mentioned in the article 
(same grid until otherref8) 
framing 
What is the main way in which the article is framed?  
1- Purely factual: the article only gives information about what is happening, who made declarations 
in favour or against, regarding the reforms of  the quinquennat and the reordering of  the calendar.  
2- The article contains other elements (arguments, tactical considerations) 
tactical 
(Among the population of article that are not purely factual) 
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The article contains speculation about either: 
- tactical considerations of  the actors regarding this reform, i.e. anticipations about the 
consequences of  the reforms for the actors and parties themselves (outcome-contingent 
arguments),  
- tactical considerations about the desirability to be seen as supporting/opposing the process of  
reform, and/or the desirable process of  adoption (act-contingent arguments) 
 
0- No 
1- Yes 
Examples of abstracts of articles that were coded as presenting tactical considerations:  
« Face au calendrier électoral, François Bayrou est plus démuni. Si, comme prévu, les législatives précèdent 
de quelques semaines la présidentielle, il lui sera difficile d'affirmer l'autonomie de l'UDF, donc sa propre 
différence. En 2002, les députés centristes n'auront, en effet, qu'un seul objectif : décrocher des 
investitures communes UDF-DL-RPR » (Portes Didier. « UDF Au-delà des municipales, c'est déjà la 
présidentielle que préparent les centristes ». Le Figaro, 29 November 1999) 
« Jacques Chirac souffrira en 2002 d'un handicap, celui de l'âge. Il lui sera plus aise de demander aux 
électeurs de le reconduire pour cinq ans plutôt que pour sept. Valery Giscard d'Estaing lui donne 
l'occasion d'opérer une conversion au quinquennat, propice a son éventuelle réélection, sans apparaitre a 
l'initiative d'une reforme a laquelle il s'est toujours dit hostile » (anon. « Dans la presse ». Le Monde, 5 May 
2000) 
« Dès à présent, l'Elysée fait monter la pression sur les vingt-cinq députés de l'UDF qui ont permis à 
Jospin d'obtenir une majorité. Chirac est persuadé qu'il lui sera plus facile de l'emporter en 2002 après une 
victoire de la droite aux législatives. François Bayrou fait le calcul inverse. Le président de l'UDF a son 
«théorème»: les législatives ne propose qu'un choix binaire - gauche-droite, RPR-PS. La présidentielle offre 
plus de choix à l'électeur » (Bresson, Gilles. « Calendrier électoral : Chirac s’inverse ». Libération, 27 March 
2001) 
argumentation  
(Among the population of article that are not purely factual) 
The article contains elements of precise argumentation (“reason-giving”) about the reform (normative 
arguments) 
0- No 
1- Yes 
proreform 
(Among the population of articles containing elements of precise argumentation)  
This article contains pro-reform arguments, i.e. justification of the endorsement of a pro-reform position  
0- No 
1- Yes 
antireform 
(Among the population of articles containing elements of precise argumentation)  
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This article contains anti-reform arguments, i.e. justification of the endorsement of an anti-reform 
position  
0- No 
1- Yes 
neutral 
(Among the population of articles containing elements of precise argumentation)  
This article contains arguments about the reform, but leading to a neutral position, i.e. justification of the 
endorsement of a pro-reform position  
0- No 
1- Yes 
refarg1 
first reform argument mentioned? 
1- Centrality / no centrality of  the presidential election and function in the Vth Republic and or 
balance of  power between the prime minister and the president  
2- Cohabitation: will be affected/not affected by the reform 
3- Democracy: more frequent consultation/better “democratic respiration”/more involvement of  
the citizens 
4- “modernity”/”modern”  
5- Length (“too long”, not long enough…) 
6- Stability and coherence: governability of  the regime, clarity of  alternation and balance of  power 
and responsibilities of  legislative and executive power  
7- President and the parties: the reform will detach the president of  party politics / reinforce the 
link of  president with parties 
8- Drift of  the institutional regime: towards presidentialisation, the “American regime”, domination 
of  the parliament 
9- Triviality of  the reform: “Gadget reform”/not essential 
10- Trick: reform is an electoral manipulation / “circumstantial manoeuver” 
11- Pluralism: equality of  chances for each candidate before the election, preservation of  the 
representation of  different forces 
refarg2 
Second reform argument mentioned? 
(same grid until refarg8) 
These eleven arguments are not, of course, fully exhaustive, but encompass the great majority of the pro, 
anti, or neutral arguments used in the debate. In order to make them clearer, I present some examples for 
each of these eleven arguments.  
function 
The article mentions an argument about the centrality/no centrality of the presidential election and 
function in the Vth Republic and/or balance of power between the PM and the president. 
0- No 
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1- Yes 
cohabitation 
The article mentions an argument about the fact that the cohabitation: will be affected/not affected by the 
reform 
0- No 
1- Yes 
democracy 
The article contains an argument about democracy: more frequent consultation/better “democratic 
respiration”/more involvement of the citizens 
0- No 
1- Yes 
 modern 
The article contains an argument about the reform bringing “modernity” or being “modern” 
0- No 
1- Yes 
length 
The article contains an argument about length (“too long”, not long enough…) 
0- No 
1- yes 
stability 
The article contains an argument about stability and coherence: governability of the regime, clarity of 
alternation and balance of power and responsibilities of legislative and executive power  
0- No 
1- Yes 
partypol 
The article contains an argument about the balance between the President and the parties: the reform will 
detach the president of party politics / reinforce the link of president with parties 
0- No 
1- Yes 
drift 
The article contains an argument about the drift of the institutional regime: towards presidentialisation, 
the ‘American regime’, domination of the parliament 
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0- No 
1- Yes 
gadget 
the article contains an argument about the triviality of the reform: “Gadget reform”/not essential 
0- No 
1- Yes 
trick 
The article contains an argument about the reform being a trick: reform is an electoral manipulation / 
“circumstantial manoeuver” 
0- No 
1- Yes 
pluralism 
The article contains an argument about pluralism: equality of chances for each candidate before the 
election, preservation of the representation of different forces 
0- No 
1- yes 
Examples for each argument 
1- Centrality / no centrality of  the presidential election and function in the Vth Republic and/ or 
balance of  power between the prime minister and the president  
« Le député de Paris estime que, dans l'esprit de la Ve République, c'est l'élection présidentielle qui est la 
clef de voûte des institutions. Normalement, elle doit précéder les législatives. » (anon. « Le calendrier 
électoral de 2002 en débat à droite ». Le Monde, 2 October 1999) 
« L'instauration du quinquennat permettrait plutôt de revenir à la conception initiale de la Ve République 
telle qu'elle a fonctionné de 1962 à 1986, avec un président de la République élu au suffrage universel et 
gouvernant avec un gouvernement appuyé sur une majorité parlementaire de même sens que la majorité 
présidentielle. » (Fulda, Anne. « Après l'initiative de Giscard et l'acquiescement suspensif de Chirac; un 
retour aux fondements de la Ve République ». Le Figaro, 12 May 2000) 
« On me pardonnera de répéter que l'élection la plus importante étant celle qui confère le pouvoir de 
gouverner, c'est l'élection législative, comme l'a montré ce qui s'est passé dans notre pays en 1986, 1993 et 
1997, lorsqu'une majorité parlementaire contraire à l'orientation politique qui était celle du président élu 
quelques années plus tôt a imposé un changement de politique. En 2002, c'est celui qui gagnera les 
législatives qui gouvernera et pas un autre » (Balladur, Edouard. « Que les élections coïncident ». Libération, 
9 May 2001) 
2- Cohabitation: will be affected/not affected by the reform 
« Elisabeth Guigou a rappelé que le raccourcissement du mandat présidentiel (…) ‘permettra un 
fonctionnement plus ordonné de nos institutions’ en raréfiant les périodes de cohabitation » (Bresson, 
Gilles. « Le Sénat vote le quinquennat de l'amitié ». Libération, 30 June 2000) 
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« Cette reforme n'est ni bonne ni prioritaire. Je ne voterai pas le quinquennat. Il ne nous prémunit pas 
contre la cohabitation et il soulève des questions de fond » (Bezat, Jean Michel. « Josselin de Rohan ». Le 
Monde, 17 May 2000) 
3- Democracy: more frequent consultation/better “democratic respiration”/more involvement of  
the citizens 
« Alain Juppé, d'abord, qui, dans un entretien au Figaro du 27 mars, estime que le septennat n'est plus un 
temps démocratique dans un univers fortement médiatique et ne correspond plus a la perception que les 
gens ont de leur relation avec le pouvoir » (Robert Diard Pascale. « Jacques Chirac et Lionel Jospin 
confrontes au quinquennat ». Le Monde, 11 May 2000) 
« Le quinquennat constitue, certes, une amélioration. (…). Hérité de circonstances historiques hasardeuses, 
le septennat détonne parmi les pratiques des grandes démocraties, où le chef effectif de l'exécutif est élu 
tous les quatre ou cinq ans. » (Maury, Emmanuel. « Cette réforme ne règle ni le risque de cohabitation ni la 
question de l'équilibre des pouvoirs ». Le Figaro, 13 July 2000) 
4- “modernity”/”modern”  
« [Cette réforme] vise (…) à moderniser le délai de legitimation du président de la République en lui 
donnant une durée qui corresponde davantage a l'évolution des esprits de notre temps » (Giscard 
d’Estaing, Valéry. « Et maintenant, le quinquennat! ». Le Monde, 11 May 2000) 
« 'J'ai l'impression, ajoute le sénateur du Puy-de-Dôme, d'assister à un grand concours, genre 'plus 
moderne que moi, tu meurs'. Mais la modernité telle qu'ils semblent la concevoir est contraire aux grands 
principes républicains. Quitte à avoir l'air d'un vieux con, je m'en tiens aux valeurs qui fondent la 
République. » (anon. « Quinquennat : le coup de gueule de Charasse ». Le Figaro, 30 May 2000) 
5- Length (“too long”, not long enough…) 
« Le 27, Pompidou se justifie: J'ai pensé qu'il fallait consulter le pays un peu plus souvent et j'ai pensé 
qu'une durée de cinq ans était bonne. » (Virot, Pascal. « Pompidou, pionnier du quinquennat. ». Libération, 
6 June 2000) 
« Le président du RPF ajoute que le président de la République doit avoir une assise électorale supérieure a 
celle des autres élus nationaux, notamment les députés. Il doit disposer d'un mandat plus long pour 
conduire les affaires du pays avec le recul nécessaire. » (anon. « QUINQUENNAT: Charles Pasqua se dit 
prêt a prendre toute (sa) place dans la bataille du "non" ». Le Monde, 29 May 2000) 
6- Stability and coherence: governability of  the regime, clarity of  alternation and balance of  power 
and responsibilities of  legislative and executive power  
« Que voulons-nous? (…) Une équipe, un capitaine, la durée, la responsabilité, la plupart des grandes 
démocraties européennes comportent ces éléments indispensables à une articulation viable entre efficacité 
et liberté. (…)La logique et les précédents convergent pour indiquer qu'une présidentielle juste avant les 
législatives garantit mieux la cohérence majoritaire que l'inverse. La priorité de l'élection présidentielle est 
donc préférable du point de vue de l'efficacité du pouvoir politique » (Carcassonne, Guy, Duhamel, 
Olivier, Vedel, Georges. « Ne pas voter la tête à l’envers ». Le Monde, 13 October 2000) 
« Au Sénat, son patron, Christian Poncelet, grince des dents sur le référendum. Et Josselin de Rohan, le 
patron du groupe RPR, est contre le quinquennat qui risque d'ouvrir une période d'instabilité 
institutionnelle. » (anon. « Référendum d'automne pour le quinquennat. ». Libération, 19 May 2000) 
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7- President and the parties: the reform will detach the president of  party politics / reinforce the 
link of  president with parties 
« Samedi, à Nîmes, le président du RPF a estimé que 'le quinquennat ramènerait le président de la 
République à un rôle de chef de parti. En revanche, le septennat est garant de la légitimité du président, 
qui dépasse les clivages des partis politiques et donne une assise plus large à la fonction'. » (Portes, Didier. 
« Lionel Jospin appelle 'naturellement à voter oui' ». Le Figaro, 10 July 2000) 
« Pourtant, le plus étrange de cette argumentation porte sur l'idée que la Ve République est 
ontologiquement trahie si le quinquennat est voté. Car la fonction présidentielle exigerait par essence un 
mandat majestueux par sa durée, enjambant les rythmes électoraux ordinaires, et transcendant les divisions 
partisanes, gardien souverain de l’essentiel sans lien avec la cuisine politicienne. Mais de quoi et de qui 
parle-t-on? Où siège cette Ve République? Pour la tuer ou la trahir il faudrait qu'elle existe autrement que 
sur le papier (…) Cette pièce maîtresse, raison d'être du septennat, cet arbitre, idéal, à la fois distant et 
souverain, où l'a-t-on rencontré depuis 1958 sinon au pays des coquecigrues? » (Vedel, Georges. « Voter 
oui et comprendre ». Le Monde, 16 September 2000) 
8- Drift of  the institutional regime: towards presidentialisation, the “American regime”, domination 
of  the parliament 
« La situation ne saurait s'accommoder d'une réforme purement cosmétique comme, par exemple, le 
fameux quinquennat. Un succédané de régime présidentiel à l'américaine n'aurait aucune chance de 
s'adapter à la culture de notre nation. » (Toubon, Jacques. « Pour un gaullisme de projet ». Le Monde, 19 
October 1999) 
 «Cela peut présenter des avantages», a-t-il ajouté, avant de virer à 180 degrés: selon lui, une inversion de la 
chronologie conduirait à «une accentuation de la présidentialisation du régime», ce qui serait «grave pour la 
vie politique française». » (Quinio, Paul, Virot, Pascal. « Calendrier - Hollande promet de négocier ». 
Libération, 28 November 2000)  
9- Triviality of  the reform: “Gadget reform”/not essential 
« Que veulent les écologistes? Une VIe République, avec une représentation proportionnelle, un statut de 
l'élu, le droit de vote des étrangers aux élections locales... Bref, le quinquennat ‘sec’ ne les intéresse pas. 
Sur ce point, ils se retrouvent d'accord avec les chasseurs de CPNT dont le slogan se résume à ‘un 
référendum pour rien, votons blanc ou nul’. Le député européen CPNT Michel Raymond a même 
conseillé à ses électeurs d'aller à la chasse’ le 24 septembre. » (Lebegue, Thomas. « Quinquennat - revue de 
troupes avant une morne bataille ». Libération, 5 September 2000  
« Le quinquennat ne résout 'aucun des maux de notre démocratie'. Plusieurs députés avancent cet 
argument. 'Le quinquennat est une mascarade, un cautère sur une jambe de bois', lance Renaud Dutreil 
(DL), (…)'. 'Réservé' à l'égard d'une réforme qu'il juge 'accessoire', Jean-Louis Debré, le président du 
groupe RPR de l'Assemblée, estime que la modernisation de la vie politique 'passe par d'autres voies, plus 
importantes, notamment l'instauration d'un scrutin législatif à un tour' » (Huet, Sophie. « A l'Assemblée et 
au Sénat, les adversaires de la réduction du mandat présidentiel se recrutent dans tous les groupes 
politiques ». Le Figaro, 21 May 2000) 
10- Trick: the reform is an electoral manipulation / “circumstantial manoeuver” 
« C'est une mesure de circonstance. Je suis contre. Jacques Delors, ancien ministre, ancien président de la 
Commission européenne, a exprimé ainsi, dimanche 18 juin, au Grand Jury RTL- Le Monde-LCI, son 
hostilité au quinquennat sec, qui nous fait faire un saut dans l'inconnu. » Anon. « Jacques Delors votera 
non ». Le Monde, 20 June 2000) 
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« Le maire de Lyon assure que c'est sa seule fidélité aux institutions de la Ve République qui le pousse à 
vouloir engager un ‘débat loyal’ sur le sujet. Il ajoute: ‘Je ne suis pas candide au point de méconnaître que, 
par-delà les appréciations portées sur l'évolution de nos institutions, chacun sera sensible à l'intérêt que 
peut présenter un calendrier ou l'autre pour le candidat qui a sa préférence, ou pour la famille politique à 
laquelle il appartient. Rien de plus naturel. Mais, justement, personne ne peut dire aujourd'hui si un 
calendrier avantagerait un candidat ni, moins encore, lequel.’ Raymond Barre refuse de politiser le débat » 
(Hassoux, Didier. « Barre veut remonter le temps électoral. ». Libération, 23 November 2000)  
11- Pluralism: equality of  chances for each candidate before the election, preservation of  the 
representation of  different forces 
« En désignant clairement son adversaire de l'Elysée, il observe que pour tous les candidats à l'élection 
présidentielle, sauf un, le dilemme sera le suivant: ou bien affaiblir leur campagne législative parce qu'ils 
auront déjà annoncé leur candidature à l'élection présidentielle; ou retarder leur candidature à la présidence 
jusqu'aux termes des législatives, ce qui les placera en situation d'inégalité manifeste face au président 
sortant, si celui-ci décidait d'être à nouveau candidat. Au contraire, si le calendrier est remis sur ses pieds, 
plaide-t-il, la compétition redevient équitable. » (Anon. « Alain Juppé et Lionel Jospin s'affrontent sur la 
convenance ». Le Monde, 20 December 2000.)  
« Le quinquennat ‘mène à un régime encore plus présidentialiste et à une bipolarisation de la vie politique 
autour des partis pouvant présenter un candidat, au dépens du pluralisme’, a-t-il prédit en annonçant que 
les communistes allaient déposer un amendement pour éviter la concomitance des scrutins présidentiels et 
législatifs. » (Bresson, Gilles. « Quinquennat - les députés mous du oui ». Libération, 6 June 2000). 
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Appendix 14. Other institutional reforms mentioned, among the articles on the quinquennat, electoral calendar 
or both mentioning at least one other reform, in % 
Quinquennat: total = 180 
 
Electoral calendar: total= 66 
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Both : total=33 
 
 
Appendix 15. Balance of the pro, anti, and neutral reform arguments in the articles about the quinquennat 
and/or the electoral calendar, July 1999-July 2001 (in %) 
 
pro-reform anti-reform neutral Total 
Quinquennat 55.3 46.3 11.0 246 
Electoral calendar 53.1 60.8 7.0 143 
Both 76.5 43.1 9.8 51 
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Appendix 17. Main steps of the parliamentary procedures for the electoral and constitutional reforms, and 
electoral contests between 2002 and 2006 
Date Event 
11/02/2002 Institution of the Committee of study Brigandì on the constitution 
25 and 26/5/2003 
Administrative elections won by the centre-left (6 municipalities out of 10, 7 provinces out of 
12) 
17/10/2003 Presentation of the project AS 2544 of constitutional reform in the Senate 
25/04/2004 Approval in the Senate in first reading of the constitutional reform 
12 and 13/6/2004 European elections won by the centre-left 
15/10/2004 Approval with modifications in the Chamber of Deputies of the project AC.4862 of 
constitutional reform in first reading 
03/03/2005 Beginning of the discussion on electoral reform in the Chamber of Deputies 
23/03/2005 Approval in the Senate in new first reading of the constitutional reform 
3 and 4/4/2005 Regional elections won by the centre left (12 regions out of 14) 
13/10/2005 Approval in the Chamber of Deputies of the electoral reform  
20/10/2005 Approval by the Chamber of Deputies of the constitutional reform in second reading  
16/11/2005 Approval by the Senate of the constitutional reform in second reading  
18/11/2005 Publication of the constitutional law in the Official journal 
14/12/2005 Approval without modifications in the Senate of the electoral law 
30/12/2005 Publication of the electoral law in the Official journal 
9 and 10/4/2006 Parliamentary elections won by the centre-left 
25 and 26/6/2006 Confirmative referendum on the constitutional reform won by the "no" side 
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Appendix 18. Geographic repartition of the votes for the four parties of the center-right coalition by regions in the 
2001 parliamentary elections 
 
Vote for Alleanza Nazionale in the 2001 parliamentary elections by region, Chamber of Deputies 
 
Vote for the CCD-CDU in the 2001 parliamentary elections by region, Chamber of Deputies
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Vote for Forza Italia in the 2001 parliamentary elections by region, Chamber of Deputies 
 
Vote for the Lega Nord in the 2001 parliamentary elections by region, Chamber of Deputies 
 
Note: “M” refers to the arithmetic mean. “S” to the standard deviation, and the figure on top of each class to the 
maximum by class. The map was computed with the software Philcarto. Source: Ministero dell’Interno, archivio 
storico delle elezioni. 
 
